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PHILIPPINE SUPREME
COURT
DECISIONS
EMILIANA TORAL
KARE,
G.R.
No.
157526
-versus- COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x SALVADOR K. MOLL, Petitioner, G.R.
No.
157527
-versus- COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. PANGANIBAN,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When a mayoral candidate who gathered the highest number of votes is disqualified after the election is held, a permanent vacancy is created, and the vice mayor succeeds to the position. The Case Before us are two Petitions for Certiorari under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of the March 19, 2003 En Banc Resolution issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) in SPA No. 01-272. The Comelec resolved therein to disqualify Salvador K. Moll from the mayoralty of Malinao, Albay, and to proclaim Avelino Ceriola as the mayor-elect of the said municipality. The decretal portion of the Resolution reads:chanrobles virtual law library
In GR No. 157526, Petitioner Emiliana Toral Kare seeks the nullification of the March 19, 2003 Resolution insofar as it authorized the proclamation of Ceriola as the mayor-elect of Malinao. In GR No. 157527, Petitioner Moll prays for the annulment of the entire Resolution.chanrobles virtual law library The Facts Petitioner Moll and Private Respondent Ceriola were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Malinao, Albay, during the elections of May 14, 2001.cralaw:red Moll obtained the highest number of votes cast for the position while Ceriola came in second, with a total of nine hundred eighty-seven (987) votes separating the two. Kare was elected vice mayor in the same election.cralaw:red On May 18, 2001, Ceriola filed a “Petition to Confirm the Disqualification and/or Ineligibility of Dindo K. Moll to Run for Any Elective Position.” The Petition alleged that the latter had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and nine (9) months of prision correccional, for the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code.cralaw:red In its May 28, 2001 Resolution,[2] the Comelec First Division dismissed the Petition. Ceriola filed his Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec en banc which, on August 31, 2001, set aside the said Resolution. It thereafter directed the clerk of the Comelec to remand the Petition to the provincial election supervisor of Albay for hearing and reception of evidence.cralaw:red Ruling of the Comelec En Banc On March 19, 2003, after the provincial election supervisor of Albay submitted the report and recommendation, the Comelec en banc issued the questioned Resolution affirming Moll’s disqualification and proclaiming Ceriola as the mayor-elect of the municipality.cralaw:red As earlier adverted to, the Comelec ruled that Moll had indeed been disqualified from being a mayoral candidate in the May 14, 2001 local election, and that his subsequent proclamation as mayor was void ab initio. Consequently, he was disqualified from holding that office.chanrobles virtual law library The Comelec further ruled that the trial court’s final judgment of conviction of Moll disqualified him from filing his certificate of candidacy and continued to disqualify him from holding office. Accordingly, the votes cast in his favor were stray or invalid votes, and Ceriola -- the candidate who had obtained the second highest number of votes -- was adjudged the winner. Thus, the Comelec ordered the Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim him as the mayor-elect of the municipality.cralaw:red Before Ceriola’s actual proclamation, Kare filed a Petition before this Court with a prayer for a Status Quo Order, which was granted on April 1, 2003.[3] In this Order, the Comelec, the provincial election supervisor of Albay, and the municipal canvassers of Malinao (Albay) were required to observe the status quo prevailing before the filing of the Petition.cralaw:red The other Petition was filed by Moll.[4] The Issues After going through the Memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court has determined that the following are the two issues that have to be resolved:chanrobles virtual law library 1. Should Moll be disqualified from running and/or holding the position of mayor?chanrobles virtual law library 2.) If the first issue is answered in the affirmative, who should become the mayor -- Ceriola, the second placer in the mayoral election? Or Kare, the elected vice mayor? The Court’s Ruling The Petition in GR No. 157526 is partly meritorious, but the Petition in GR No. 157527 has no merit.cralaw:red First Issue: Disqualification Moll argues that he cannot be disqualified from running for mayor, since his judgement of conviction[5] -- the basis of his disqualification -- has allegedly not yet attained finality. He contends that while the said judgment “promulgated on May 11, 1999 was not appealed by filing the Notice of Appeal in the ordinary course of the proceedings, he still filed a ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ dated May 28, 1999 within the reglementary period.”[6] Thus, according to him, the filing of such Motion stayed the finality of his conviction.chanrobles virtual law library We disagree. Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure reads thus:chanrobles virtual law library
In turn, Section 6 of Rule 122 provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is clear that the period for appeal is interrupted by the filing of either a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial. Moll makes it appear that his filing of a motion for reconsideration should have stayed the running of the period for filing an appeal. What he did file, however, was a “Motion to Quash the Information”; and when it was denied, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the denial.chanrobles virtual law library The Rules of Court mandates that an appeal should be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. It necessarily follows that this period is interrupted only by the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the judgment or of the final order being appealed.cralaw:red Neither Moll’s Motion to Quash Information nor his Motion for Reconsideration was directed at the judgment of conviction. Rather, they both attacked a matter extraneous to the judgment. Hence, they cannot affect the period of appeal granted by the Rules of Court in relation to the conviction.cralaw:red Moll himself admitted that “no regular appeal was filed because he was still questioning the propriety of the denial of his Motion to Quash the Information and the propriety of the conduct of the promulgation of his sentence despite his absence x x x.”[7] Aside from not interrupting his judgment of conviction, the motion to quash was even belatedly filed. Such a motion may be filed by the accused at any time before entering a plea[8] and certainly not on the day of the promulgation, as Moll did.cralaw:red As to his contention that the promulgation of judgment was not valid because it was done in his absence, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General, which argues as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library “It was not contested that Moll received a notice of the promulgation, in fact his counsel was present on the day of the promulgation - to file a motion to quash. Hence, because of Moll’s unexplained absence, the promulgation of the judgment could be validly made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof to his last known address or thru his counsel (Section 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court).”[9] Indubitably, since no appeal of the conviction was seasonably filed by Moll, the judgment against him has become final.[10] Thus, the Comelec en banc correctly ruled that he was disqualified from running for mayor, under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code (RA No. 7160), which provides:chanrobles virtual law library
Moll was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and nine (9) months of prision correccional, a penalty that clearly disqualified him from running for any elective local position.chanrobles virtual law library Second Issue: The Lawful Mayor In allowing Ceriola -- the second placer in the mayoralty race -- to be proclaimed mayor-elect after the disqualification of Moll, the Comelec applied Section 211(24) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which provides:chanrobles virtual law library
The poll body interpreted the phrase “disqualified by final judgment” to mean “disqualification by a final judgment of conviction,” which was the ground upon which Moll was disqualified. It ruled:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Further, it said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Such arguments do not persuade.chanrobles virtual law library In every election, the choice of the people is the paramount consideration, and their expressed will must at all times be given effect.[13] When the majority speaks by giving a candidate the highest number of votes in the election for an office, no one else can be declared elected in place of the former.[14] In a long line of cases, this Court has definitively ruled that the Comelec cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, should the winning candidate be declared ineligible or disqualified.[15] The Comelec, however, asserts that this case falls under the exception declared by the Court in Sunga v. Comelec,[16] from which we quote:chanrobles virtual law library
According to the Comelec, Section 211(24) of the OEC is a clear legislative policy that is contrary to the rule that the second placer cannot be declared winner. We disagree.cralaw:red The provision that served as the basis of Comelec’s Decision to declare the second placer as winner in the mayoral race should be read in relation with other provisions of the OEC. Section 72 thereof, as amended by RA 6646, provides as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
When read together, these provisions are understood to mean that any vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose disqualification has already been declared final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered stray. The Comelec misconstrued this provision by limiting it only to disqualification by conviction in a final judgment. Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by conviction in a final judgment; the law lists other grounds for disqualification.[18] It escapes us why the Comelec insists that Section 211(24) of the OEC is strictly for those convicted by a final judgment. Such an interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the other provisions of the election code.cralaw:red More important, it is clear that it was only on March 19, 2003, that the Comelec en banc issued Resolution No. SPA No. 01-272. The Resolution adopted the recommendation of the provincial election supervisor of Albay to disqualify Moll from running as a mayoral candidate in Malinao, Albay. Thus, on May 14, 2001, when the electorate voted for him as mayor, they were under the belief that he was qualified. There is no presumption that they agreed to the subsequent invalidation of their votes as stray votes, in case of his disqualification.cralaw:red A subsequent finding by the Comelec en banc that Moll was ineligible cannot retroact to the date of the election and thereby invalidate the votes cast for him.[19] Moreover, Moll was not notoriously known to the public as an ineligible candidate. As discussed above, the Resolution declaring him as such was rendered long after the election. Thus, on the part of those who voted for him, their votes are presumed to have been cast with a sincere belief that he was a qualified candidate, and without any intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, their votes cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless.[20]chanrobles virtual law library The Comelec’s interpretation of a section in the OEC cannot supplant an accepted doctrine laid down by this Court. In Aquino v. Comelec,[21] we said:chanrobles virtual law library
To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise them through no fault on their part, and to undermine the importance and the meaning of democracy and the right of the people to elect officials of their choice.[23] Theoretically, the second placer could receive just one vote. In such a case, it would be absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters’ choice. Moreover, there are instances in which the votes received by the second placer may not be considered numerically insignificant. In such situations, if the equation changes because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate, voters’ preferences would nonetheless be so volatile and unpredictable that the results for qualified candidates would not be self-evident.[24] The absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than the second placer.[25] Where an “ineligible” candidate has garnered either a majority or a plurality of the votes, by no mathematical formulation can the runnerup in the election be construed to have obtained the majority or the plurality of votes cast.[26]chanrobles virtual law library We reiterate that this Court has no authority under any law to impose upon and compel the people of Malinao, Albay, to accept Ceriola as their mayor.[27] The law on succession under Section 44 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, would then apply. This provision relevantly states:chanrobles virtual law library
The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal. Thus, it admits no room for interpretation, but merely for application.[28] Accordingly, when Moll was adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy was created for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the office.[29] In such eventuality, the duly elected vice mayor shall succeed as provided by law.[30]chanrobles virtual law library For violating the law and the clear jurisprudence on this matter, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion.[31]chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No 157526 is PARTLY GRANTED, and the assailed Resolution MODIFIED. Petitioner Salvador K. Moll is DECLARED ineligible for the position of municipal mayor of Malinao, Albay. In view of the vacancy created in that office, Petitioner Emiliana Toral Kare, the duly elected vice mayor, shall succeed as mayor, following the rule on succession. The status quo order of this Court dated April 1, 2003, is made permanent. Petitioner Kare shall continue discharging the duties and powers of the mayor of Malinao, Albay. The Petition in GR 157527 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.cralaw:red No pronouncement as to costs.cralaw:red SO ORDERED.cralaw:red Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Callejo Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.cralaw:red Corona, J., on leave.
Endnotes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[1]
Assailed Comelec Resolution, pp. 10-11; Annex “A,” of Salvador K.
Moll’s
Petition, GR No. 157527, rollo, pp. 52-53.
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