RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO
B.
AUMENTADO,
TOGETHER WITH
6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS,
Petitioners, |
G.R. No. 174153
October 25, 2006
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.
MONSOD, RENE
B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN
T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P.
MEDINA, JR.
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA,
Intervenor.
x-------------------------------------------x
|
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson
Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA
represented by its Chairperson,
Dr. Reynaldo
Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented
by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD
represented by its
Secretary General Dr. Gene
Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas,
MIGRANTE represented
by its Chairperson
Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA
represented by its Secretary General
Emerenciana de Jesus,
GABRIELA WOMEN’S
PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina
Palabay,
ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson
Eleanor de
Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS represented by Chair
Vencer
Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the
League of
Concerned Professionals and
Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO
of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter
Change, DR. REGINALD
PAMUGAS of
Health Action for Human Rights,
Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------------x
|
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO
F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,
MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO
GAT
INCIONG,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO
MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL
WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO)
and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D.
BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and
RANDALL TABAYOYONG,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE
CHAPTERS,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO
Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and
SENATORS
SERGIO R. OSMEŇA III,
JAMBY
MADRIGAL, JINGGOY
ESTRADA,
ALFREDO S. LIM and
PANFILO LACSON,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
and
PWERSA
NG MASANG
PILIPINO,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL
BINAY,
SOFRONIO
UNTALAN, JR.,
and
RENE
A.V. SAGUISAG,
Petitioners,
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
G.R. No. 174299
October 25, 2006
-versus- chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
represented by Chairman BENJAMIN
S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z.
BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
ROMEO A.
BRAWNER,
RENE V.
SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER,
and
John
Doe and Peter
Doe,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
These are
consolidated Petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the
Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”) denying due course to an initiative
petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February
2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico
B. Aumentado (“Lambino Group”), with other groups and individuals,
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 Constitution On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act (“
RA
6735
”).
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of
all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the
1987 Constitution
by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and
Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding
Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes
will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino
Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC
should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters’
ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE
THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING
THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE
OTHER?
On 30 August
2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of their initiative.
chan robles virtual law library
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August
2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the
Lambino Group’s petition for lack of an enabling law governing
initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked
this Court’s ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections declaring RA
6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the
Constitution
In G.R. No.
174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of
certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31
August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their
initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their
petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the
Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case,
and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the “will of
the sovereign people.”
In G.R. No.
174299, petitioners (“Binay Group”) pray that the Court require
respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not be
cited in contempt for the COMELEC’s verification of signatures and for
“entertaining” the Lambino Group’s petition despite the permanent
injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group’s petition as
an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment
to the Lambino Group’s petition, the Solicitor General joined causes
with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite
the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court
treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules “as temporary devises to
implement the system of initiative.”
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings
supporting or opposing the Lambino Group’s petition. The supporting
intervenors uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the
opposing intervenors hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago
is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1)
the Lambino Group’s standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of
the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino
Group’s compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of
voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII
of the
1987 Constitution
; (4) the nature of the proposed changes as
revisions and not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution
; and (5) the Lambino Group’s compliance
with the requirement in Section 10(a) of
RA 6735
limiting
initiative petitions to only one subject.
chan robles virtual law library
The Court heard
the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006.
After receiving the parties’ memoranda, the Court considered the case
submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative
petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution
on
amendments to the
Constitution
through a people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling
in Santiago declaring
RA
6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group’s petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic
requirements of the
Constitution
for conducting a people’s
initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as
the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino
Group’s glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution For following the Court’s ruling in Santiago,
no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on
Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by
the People.
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution
is the governing
constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose
amendments to the
Constitution This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this
Constitution
may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the
meaning of an amendment “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition,” thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let
us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a
constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What
does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they
sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No,
because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and
they are asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional
amendment.
chan robles virtual law library
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal
and pass it around for signature. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the
Constitution
intended that the “draft of
the proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to
the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly
stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign
on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is
a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must
be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal
must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their
assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments.
chan robles virtual law library
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the
face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the
petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the
petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time
constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had
seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing.
The framers of the
Constitution
directly borrowed the concept of
people’s initiative from the United States where various State
constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost
all States which allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement
is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the
people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments.
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in
several decisions of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State
Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the
First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:cralaw:red
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying
the signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing.
Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription
requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person
permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to
a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the
petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting,
downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition
that might not be to the signer’s liking. This danger seems
particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the
description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested
interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for
the ballot. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury, the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of “full text” provisions that apply to amendments by
initiative commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose
of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so
that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the
initiative petition.”); x x x (publication of full text of amended
constitutional provision required because it is “essential for the
elector to have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to or
subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this
knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote in
the dark.”) (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing
of the nature and effect of that which is proposed” and failure to do
so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative
void.
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution
does not expressly state
that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the
relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative. In
particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first
see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that
the people must sign on a petition containing such full
text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the
Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid,
requires that the people must sign the “petition x x x as signatories.”
chan robles virtual law library
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people.
The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not
as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties
who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present
favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments
against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters,
often pay those who gather the signatures. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving
that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering
the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by
attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
chan robles virtual law library
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this
Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative
petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a
signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they
filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet
with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet
attached to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by
intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra’s opposition and the
signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group’s Memorandum are the
same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:
Province: |
City/Municipality: |
No. of
Verified
Signatures: |
|
Legislative District: |
Barangay: |
|
PROPOSITION: “DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF
ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT
FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN
GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?”
I hereby APPROVE the
proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which
shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution
signifies my support for the filing thereof.
|
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Name
Last Name, First
Name, M.I.
|
Address |
Birthdate
MM/DD/YY
|
Signature |
Verification |
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_________________
_________________
__________________
Barangay
Official Witness
Witness
(Print
Name and
Sign)
(Print Name and
Sign)
(Print Name and Sign)
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of
the Lambino Group’s proposed changes in the signature sheet.
Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed
changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted
this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26 September
2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a
shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary
system of government. The signature sheet does not show to
the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to
sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is
not the “petition” that the framers of the
Constitution
envisioned when
they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the
signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group
circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the
Lambino Group’s draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006
with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the
draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the
COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated
both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that
what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the
draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months
earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures.
Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado’s “Verification/Certification” of the 25
August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my
personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union
of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution
No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of
signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 to the present petition. However, the “Official Website
of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines” has posted the
full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE’S CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE
1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach to support
the proposals of the People’s Consultative Commission on Charter Change;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her
Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms
as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms
signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the
House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREAS, the People’s Consultative Commission on Charter Change created
by Her Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has
submitted its final report sometime in December 2005;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in
Congress which militates against the use of the expeditious form of
amending the
1987 Constitution
;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and
the failure of Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent
assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional
reform agenda through People’s Initiative and Referendum without
prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;
chan robles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE
MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE’S CONSULATATIVE (SIC)
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on
14 January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila. (Underscoring
supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to
prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 “support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative
(sic) Commission on Charter Change through people’s initiative and
referendum as a mode of amending the
1987 Constitution” The proposals
of the Consultative Commission are vastly different from the proposed
changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30
August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission
affect all provisions of the existing Constitution, from the Preamble
to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have
profound impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions
of the existing
Constitution
, provisions that the Lambino Group’s
proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group’s proposed
changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing
Constitution
, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.
chan robles virtual law library
The ULAP adopted
Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months
before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006
amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the
circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets,
six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary,
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group’s
claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to
the draft petition or to the Lambino Group’s proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the
proposed amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically,
paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory
Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect
their proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition
because the amended petition was what they had shown to the people
during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead,
the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006
“inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments.”
The Lambino
Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August
2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed
copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets.
Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition
before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft
petition together with the signature sheets. The signature
sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is
attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the
Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that
they circulated the “petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC,”
thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that “(w)here there is
not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the measure attached to a
referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he
did not understand the nature of the act.” [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State
v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters
who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the petition
for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have
understood the proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Lambino Group’s statement that they circulated to the people “the
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC” appears an
afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty.
Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain the
text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the
Lambino Group alleged that they circulated “the petition for
initiative” but failed to mention the amended petition. This
contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments
that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30
August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating
that “a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum
petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act.” The Lambino Group quotes
an authority that cites a proposed change attached to the petition
signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group
quotes requires that the proposed change must be attached to the
petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires
the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed
amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative
petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the
Lambino Group’s proposed changes were not incorporated with, or
attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group’s citation
of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their
feet. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared,
printed, circulated, from February to August 2006 during the
signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended
petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are
less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that they
printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the
petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino
Group circulated the amended petition during the signature-gathering
period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited copies
of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they
printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than
six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he
also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft
petition but he could not state with certainty how many additional
copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only
assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself
caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group’s Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006,
the Lambino Group expressly admits that “petitioner Lambino initiated
the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for
initiative x x x.” This admission binds the Lambino Group and
establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the
full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people
who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could
have received with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a
100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and
company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only
100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with the petition.
Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures.
Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with
the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the
petition before they signed the signature sheets would not exceed
1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be
physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million
signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature
sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group
failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the
proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million
signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group’s signature sheets do not contain the
full text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature
sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of
such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during
the oral arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group.
This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet.
This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the
proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void
for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
amendment must be “directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition.” The signature sheet is not the “petition” envisioned
in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes
before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect
of the proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus
members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its
members, who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to
call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the
interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of
office;
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the
interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or
revisions to the
Constitution
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the
Lambino Group’s signature sheets. The people who signed the
signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these
amendments. These three proposed changes are highly
controversial. The people could not have inferred or
divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of
the contents of the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and
his group assured the people during the signature-gathering that the
elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007
local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007
local elections. However, the text of the proposed changes
belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the
election of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and
held simultaneously with the election of all local government
officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular
Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local
elections. This section merely requires that the elections for
the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local
elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the
proposed changes, could have easily written the word “next” before the
phrase “election of all local government officials.” This would have
insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in
the next local elections following the ratification of the proposed
changes. However, the absence of the word “next” allows the
interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration
of their own term of office. This allows incumbent members of the
House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year
term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office
of regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary
to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3
million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and
his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire
nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an
initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present
initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal
representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature
sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The
result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led
to believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007
of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local
elections.
The Lambino Group’s initiative springs another surprise on the people
who signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the
interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the
ConstitutionThe proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory
Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these
amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments
to, or revisions of, this
Constitution
consistent with the principles
of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis
supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is
a “surplusage” and the Court and the people should simply ignore
it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the
Lambino Group’s initiative.
Section 4(4) is
a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary
system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this
as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an
unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts
the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to
the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that
effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find
unacceptable.
chan robles virtual law library
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify
the entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus,
in Fine v. Firestone, the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes
“logrolling,” which, if our judicial responsibility is to mean
anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the
proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot
know what it is voting on - the amendment’s proponents’
simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x
x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed
amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the
instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the
proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and effect
and violates the requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one
subject. (Emphasis supplied)
chan robles virtual law library
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air
Alaska v. McAlpine, the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against
“inadvertence, stealth and fraud” in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the
problems that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are
exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or
the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an
initiative’s passage, and there is a greater opportunity for
“inadvertence, stealth and fraud” in the enactment-by-initiative
process. The drafters of an initiative operate
independently of any structured or supervised process. They
often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while
remaining silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions,
when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative
promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present their
initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual
voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the
initiative before the election. More importantly, there is
no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an
initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish
the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for
further amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim
Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed
the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would
be used to propose an amendment mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to
compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise again the
Constitution
within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the
May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4),
the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise
again the
Constitution With the proposed Section 4(4), the
initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to
immediately amend or revise again the
Constitution
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush
in amending or revising again so soon the
Constitution The
signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or
revisions the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to
make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or
revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the
nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an
initiative is not “directly proposed by the people” because the people
do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group’s
amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of
the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be
members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as
member of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule
elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However,
there is no counterpart provision for the present members of the House
of Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June
2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present
Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain
members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010.
Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the
President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections
for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will
come only from the present members of the House of Representatives to
the exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the
Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets
could not have known that their signatures would be used to
discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that
their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the
interim Parliament’s choice of Prime Minister only to members of the
existing House of Representatives.
An initiative
that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the
people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people.
That is why the
Constitution
requires that an initiative must be
“directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition” - meaning
that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of
the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the
nation’s fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed
amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special
power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected
individuals.
The
Constitution
entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if
the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign
the petition. However, this trust emanates from a
fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment
is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after
they have signed the petition.
In short, the
Lambino Group’s initiative is void and unconstitutional because it
dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article
XVII of the
Constitution
that the initiative must be “directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition.”
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article
XVII of the
Constitution
Disallowing Revision through Initiatives.
A people’s initiative to change the
Constitution
applies only to an
amendment of the
Constitution
and not to its revision. In
contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both
amendments and revisions to the
Constitution Article XVII
of the
Constitution
provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article XVII of
the
Constitution
speaks of three modes of amending the
Constitution The first mode is through Congress upon
three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through
a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people’s
initiative.
Section 1 of
Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to
“[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution” In contrast,
Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to
“[A]mendments to this
Constitution” This distinction was
intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission
that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this
afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed
provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the
Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite
held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative
upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report
No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter
of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes
of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee
members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of
the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section
1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x
x x x
MS.
AQUINO:
[I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as
another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as
another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
chan robles virtual law library
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while
ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment
and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total
overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by
the Committee.
MS.
AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of
revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given
to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS.
AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
x x x
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner
Davide’s proposed amendment on line 1 refers to “amendments.” Does it
not cover the word “revision” as defined by Commissioner Padilla when
he made the distinction between the words “amendments” and “revision”?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because “amendments” and “revision” should
be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can
only relate to “amendments” not “revision.”
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you. (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no
mistake about it. The framers of the
Constitution
intended, and
wrote, a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision” of the
ConstitutionThe framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution The framers intended, and wrote, that a
people’s initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution Where the intent and language of the
Constitution
clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the
Constitution
, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are
empowered to propose amendments. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the
United States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan, the Supreme Court of
California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the
Constitution
x x x applies only to the proposing and the adopting or
rejecting of ‘laws and amendments to the
Constitution
’ and does not
purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It
is thus clear that a revision of the
Constitution
may be accomplished
only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution
proposed by a convention called for that purpose as outlined
hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative
measure (hereinafter termed ‘the measure’) now before us is so broad
that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present
state
Constitution
would be effected, then the measure may not properly
be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon
by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner
should issue. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in
which it may be amended or revised, it can be altered by those who
favor amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one
of the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that
there is a difference between an amendment and a revision; and it is
obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is
not an amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is used
in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in
large part on the revision of the constitution drafted by the
‘Commission for Constitutional Revision’ authorized by the 1961
Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative
Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third’s
majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and
hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure
sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of
the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a
measure as can be submitted to the people through the initiative.
If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII,
Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed at a
convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x
x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people’s
initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution
since the
Constitution
itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can
be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising
the
Constitution A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3
million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes
prescribed in the
Constitution
itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised
or amended in the manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that
any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other than the one
provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as
extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x “While it
is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they
have power to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at
will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to
the settled principles of constitutional law. And where the
people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by which
the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental
law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is
unconstitutional.” x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the
Constitution
, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure
compliance with the clear command of the
Constitution
―
that a people’s initiative may only amend, never revise, the
Constitution
The question is, does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute an
amendment or revision of the
Constitution
? If the Lambino Group’s
initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be
dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.
Courts have long
recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a
Constitution One of the earliest cases that
recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this
manner:
[T]he very term “constitution” implies an instrument of a permanent and
abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision
indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon
which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument,
shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the
significance of the term “amendment” implies such an addition or change
within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an
improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed. (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or
the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision
if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as
when the change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers
to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic
principle involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only
the specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not
revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts
have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the
qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed
change is “so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
‘substantial entirety’ of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions.” The court examines
only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree
of the change. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the
proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the
change will “accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our
basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.” Whether
there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry. Thus, “a change in the nature of [the] basic
governmental plan” includes “change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches.” A change in the nature
of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that “jeopardize
the traditional form of government and the system of check and
balances.”
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s
initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment.
Quantitatively, the Lambino Group’s proposed changes overhaul two
articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the
Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the
entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature.
A change in the
structure of government is a revision of the
Constitution
, as when the
three great co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution
are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the
Constitution Merging the legislative and executive
branches is a radical change in the structure of
government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of
Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a
revision of the
Constitution Likewise, the abolition alone of
one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within
the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving
the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.
On the face alone of the Lambino Group’s proposed changes, it is
readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of
government as set forth in the
Constitution Father Joaquin
Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission,
writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and
separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is
to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to
meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have
become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision,
however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a
re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document
which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine
how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a
switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be
a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional
structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral
system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter, an initiative petition proposed the amendment of
the Florida State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the
initiative “was defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed
amendment would x x x affect several other provisions of [the]
Constitution.” The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the
initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as
follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968
Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only
many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in
the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in
existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the
nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be
difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept
of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of
government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern
of government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the
Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary
to carry on government.
x x x
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were
adopted by the people at the General Election and if the Legislature at
its next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise and
clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result,
or if after submission of appropriate amendments the people should
refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of
this State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for
instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme
Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too numerous
to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and
women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the
Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and
to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date
document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to
hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative
petition here. (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the
present petition. The Lambino Group’s initiative not only seeks a
shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to
merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in
Adams did not even touch the executive department.
chan robles virtual law library
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the
Florida Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group’s
present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the
Constitution
would be affected based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr. There is no doubt that the Lambino Group’s present
initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of
government than the initiative in Adams.
The
Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between “amendment” and
“revision” is only one of procedure, not of substance. The
Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes
changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called “revisions”
because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the
changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed
through an initiative, are called “amendments” because the changes are
made by ordinary people who do not make an “occupation, profession, or
vocation” out of such endeavor.
chan robles virtual law library
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
99.
With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional
provisions expressly provide for both “amendment” and “revision” when
it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same
provisions expressly provide only for “amendment” when it speaks of the
people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is based on
the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common people
in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of
correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation,
profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and
constitutional convention delegates are expected to work
full-time on the same matter because that is their occupation,
profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words
“revision” and “amendment” pertain only to the process or procedure of
coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the
constitutional provisions.
100.
Stated otherwise, the difference between “amendment” and “revision”
cannot reasonably be in the substance or extent of the correction. x x
x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing
supplied)
The Lambino
Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention
had drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in
the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the
Constitution Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed
changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or
a constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However, since the
Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the
changes are merely amendments to the
Constitution The
Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the
fundamental law of the land.
The
express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution
contradict the Lambino Group’s theory. Where the
intent of the framers and the language of the
Constitution
are clear
and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent
and language. Any theory espousing a construction contrary to
such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so,
if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of
government established in the
Constitution Such a theory, devoid
of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the
Constitution
, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group’s
position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change involving a
radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision
justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents
in American jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any
success. In Lowe v. Keisling, the Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, Section 2, does not apply to changes to
the constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that
Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the
legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not
affect proposed revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a
wholesale change to the constitution that cannot be enacted through the
initiative process. They assert that the distinction
between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and
subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not
limited to “a formal overhauling of the constitution.” They
argue that this ballot measure proposes far reaching changes outside
the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on
existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the
government’s relationship with a defined group of citizens.
Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure “will
refashion the most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law,” the
trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2,
and cannot appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the
legislature.
We first address Mabon’s argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does
not prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes
v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the
constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the
provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article
XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
“From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1,
authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of amending the Oregon
Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a
means of revising the constitution.” x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and
said: “It is the only section of the constitution which provides the
means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an
individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure before the
electorate.” x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon’s argument that Article XVII, section 2,
does not apply to constitutional revisions proposed by
initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group’s theory which
negates the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end
green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions.
Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise
in determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The
present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the red
spectrum where revision begins. The
present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation
of powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring
far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the
Constitution.
Where the
proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the
Constitution
without affecting any other section or article, the change
may generally be considered an amendment and not a
revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age
from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision.
Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies
from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment
and not a revision.
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of
sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific
provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the
structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or
within the three branches. These three examples are located at the far
green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision
sought by the present petition is located.
However, there
can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a
revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the
Constitution
may be a revision and not an amendment. For
example, the substitution of the word “republican” with “monarchic” or
“theocratic” in Section 1, Article II of the
Constitution
radically
overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental
ideological basis of the
Constitution Thus, each specific
change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it
affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of
government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and
the underlying ideological basis of the existing
Constitution
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several
provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded
proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A
revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the
altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus,
constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions.
On the other hand, constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do
not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded
proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group’s proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President
and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and
7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended
and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of
Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section
2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule
in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably
inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule
also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the
Lambino Group’s draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns
on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case of such
irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision “shall be amended
to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government.” The
effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier
one “shall be amended,” which requires a future separate constitutional
amendment.
Realizing the
absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino
readily conceded during the oral arguments that the requirement of a
future amendment is a “surplusage.” In short, Atty. Lambino wants
to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later
provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable
inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as
that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2
of the Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI
of the
1987 Constitution
and a provision in the proposed changes. The
inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the
1987 Constitution
and the “Parliamentary system of government,” and the
inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a “unicameral parliamentary
form of government.”
Now, what “unicameral parliamentary form of government” do the Lambino
Group’s proposed changes refer to ― the Bangladeshi, Singaporean,
Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few countries with
unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly
refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of
government ― the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian,
Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral
parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets
realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli,
or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people’s initiative is not meant
for revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments. A
shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions
in many articles of the
ConstitutionRevision of the
Constitution
through a people’s initiative will only
result in gross absurdities in the
Constitution
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group’s
initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present
initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2,
Article XVII of the
Constitution
limiting the scope of a people’s
initiative to “[A]mendments to this
Constitution”
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary.
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the
basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution
on
the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution There is no need to revisit this Court’s
ruling in Santiago declaring
RA
6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting
in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to
amend the
ConstitutionAn affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not
change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this
Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA
6735 does not comply with the requirements of the
Constitution
to
implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution
chan robles virtual law library
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the
constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be
resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical
consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon
the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some
other grounds.
Nevertheless,
even assuming that
RA
6735
is valid to implement the constitutional
provision on initiatives to amend the
Constitution
, this will not
change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2,
Article XVII of the
Constitution To be a valid initiative, the
present initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of
the
Constitution
even before complying with
RA
6735
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of
RA
6735
which requires that the “petition for an initiative on the
1987 Constitution
must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total
number of registered voters as signatories.” Section 5(b) of
RA
6735
requires that the people must sign the “petition x x x as
signatories.”
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006
or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only
Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra
signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for “Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners.” In the COMELEC, the
Lambino Group, claiming to act “together with” the 6.3 million
signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and
amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed
with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of
RA
6735
that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino
Group’s logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of
RA
6735
stating, “No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; x x x.” The proposed Section
4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a
subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of
government. Since the present initiative embraces more than one
subject matter,
RA
6735
prohibits submission of the initiative petition
to the electorate. Thus, even if
RA
6735
is valid, the Lambino
Group’s initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse
of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group’s Initiative.
In dismissing the Lambino Group’s initiative petition, the COMELEC en
banc merely followed this Court’s ruling in Santiago and People’s
Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
COMELEC. For following this Court’s ruling, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone,
the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus,
this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse
of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that
it only complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this
Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion.
The
Constitution
, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the
utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation.
No one can trivialize the
Constitution
by cavalierly amending or
revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of
amendment and revision laid down in the
Constitution
itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the
Constitution
in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every
dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows
today a cavalier change in the
Constitution
outside the
constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political
group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same
cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door
constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of
the total votes cast − approved our
Constitution
in a
national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is
the unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the
people’s sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed
modes for amending or revising the
Constitution
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures
gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our
Constitution
contrary to
the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity,
prescribed when they ratified the
Constitution The alternative
is an extra-constitutional change, which means subverting the people’s
sovereign will and discarding the
Constitution This is one act
the Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate
guardian of the
Constitution
, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn
duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real
sovereign will of the people.
chan robles virtual law library
Incantations of “people’s voice,”
“people’s sovereign will,” or “let the people decide” cannot override
the specific modes of changing the
Constitution
as prescribed in the
Constitution
itself. Otherwise, the
Constitution
― the people’s
fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society ―
becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups
gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the
Constitution
ceases to be the bedrock of the nation’s stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the “people’s
voice.” However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the
COMELEC, that “ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of
Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional
reforms.” The Lambino Group thus admits that their
“people’s” initiative is an “unqualified support to the agenda” of the
incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns
the Court to be wary of incantations of “people’s voice” or “sovereign
will” in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the
Constitution The
Constitution
, which embodies the people’s
sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to
defend and protect the
Constitution To allow this
constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered
signatures, to alter basic principles in the
Constitution
is to allow a
desecration of the
Constitution To allow such alteration
and desecration is to lose this Court’s raison d’etre.
chan robles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
Concurring Justices:
Panganiban, C.J.,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Austria-Martinez,
Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., and
Azcuna,
JJ.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Dissenting Justices:
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Corona,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario,
Garcia,
and Velasco, Jr., JJ.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[1]
Including Sigaw ng Bayan and Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines (ULAP).
[2]
This provision states: “Requirements. — x x x
(b) A
petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5)
years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once
every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:cralaw:red
c.1. contents or
text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract
or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[3]
This provision states: “Verification of Signatures. — The Election
Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list
of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in
the immediately preceding election.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[4]
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI will be changed thus:cralaw:red
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in
a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as
may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces,
representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand
inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least
one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the
election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior
thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district
for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof,
except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by
law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total
membership coming from the parliamentary districts.
chan robles virtual law library
[5]
Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article VII will be changed thus:cralaw:red
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of
State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime
Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister
shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from
among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for
the program of government.
[6]
Sections 1-5 of the Transitory Provisions read:cralaw:red
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall
serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day
of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987
Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the
members of the interim parliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or
removal from office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice
President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent
disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent
President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume
all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII
as amended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President
and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and
7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended
and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other sections of
Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section
2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government;
provided, however, that any and all references therein to
“Congress”, “Senate”, “House of Representatives” and “Houses of
Congress” shall be changed to read “Parliament”; that any and all
references therein to “Member[s] of Congress”, “Senator[s]” or
“Member[s] of the House of Representatives” shall be changed to read as
“Member[s] of Parliament” and any and all references to the “President”
and or “Acting President” shall be changed to read “Prime Minister”.
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President
and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended and
Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other
Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially
as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent
with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as
to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided
however that any and all references therein to “Congress”, “Senate”,
“House of Representatives” and “Houses of Congress” shall be changed to
read “Parliament”; that any and all references therein to
“Member[s] of Congress”, “Senator[s]” or “Member[s] of the House
of Representatives” shall be changed to read as “Member[s] of
Parliament” and any and all references to the “President” and or
“Acting President” shall be changed to read “Prime Minister”.
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these
amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the
Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall
have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of
the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members
of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
chan robles virtual law library
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall
also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He
shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over
its sessions for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until
the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the
members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments,
the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or
revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local
autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief
Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the interim
Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a
majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister
shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and
responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President.
chan robles virtual law library
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the
members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government
officials. Thereafter, the Vice President, as Member of
Parliament, shall immediately convene the Parliament and shall
initially preside over its session for the purpose of electing the
Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all its
members, from among themselves. The duly elected Prime Minister shall
continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and
responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of
the term of incumbent President and Vice President.
[7]
As revised, Article XVIII contained a new paragraph in Section 4
(paragraph 3) and a modified paragraph 2, Section 5, thus:cralaw:red
Section 4. x x x x
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
x x x x
Section 5. x x x x
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the
members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government
officials. The duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to
exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the
interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the
incumbent President and Vice President.
[8]
336 Phil. 848 (1997); Resolution dated 10 June 1997.
[9] The COMELEC held:cralaw:red
We agree with the Petitioners that this Commission has the solemn
Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of, as in this case, initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other
provisions of the Constitution particularly on initiative. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution
provides:cralaw:red
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative, upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right.
The afore-quoted provision of the Constitution being a non
self-executory provision needed an enabling law for its
implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the
constitutional right of the people under a system of initiative to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 6735.
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago vs.
Commission on Elections struck down the said law for being incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
The Supreme Court likewise declared that this Commission should be
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the
required minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district is represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot
be given due course since the Supreme Court categorically declared R.A.
No. 6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance
of the right of the people under a system of
initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the
pronouncement of the High Court that in the absence of a valid enabling
law, this right of the people remains nothing but an “empty right”, and
that this Commission is permanently enjoined from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Considering the foregoing, We are therefore constrained not to
entertain or give due course to the instant Petition.
[10]
Arturo M. De Castro; Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo
Baya; Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO);
Trade Union Congress of the Philippines; Sulong Bayan Movement
Foundation, Inc.
[11]
Onevoice Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon
III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.;
Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Atty. Pete Quirino Quadra; Bayan, Bayan
Muna, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Head, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante,
Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino
Students, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, Dr. Reginald Pamugas;
Loretta Ann P. Rosales, and Mario Joyo Aguja, Ana Theresa
Hontiveros-Baraquel, Luwalhati Ricasa Antonino; Philippine Constitution
Association (PHILCONSA), Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo,
Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M. Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr.,
Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; Senate of the Philippines;
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio
L. Salvador and Randall C. Tabayoyong, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Cebu City and Cebu Province Chapters; Senate Minority
Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, and Senators Sergio R. Osmeňa III, Jamby
Madrigal, Jinggoy Estrada, Alfredo S. Lim and Panfilo Lacson;
Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino.
[12]
This provision states: “Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[13] I Record, 387-388.
[14]
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner
Rene V. Sarmiento made the following report (I Record 389): chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
MR.
SARMIENTO:
Madam President, I am happy that the Committee on Amendments and
Transitory Provisions decided to retain the system of initiative as a
mode of amending the Constitution. I made a survey of American
constitutions and I discovered that 13 States provide for a system of
initiative as a mode of amending the Constitution — Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma and Oregon. The initiative for
ordinary laws only is used in Idaho, Maine, Montana and South Dakota.
So, I am happy that this was accepted or retained by the Committee.
x x x x
The Americans in turn copied the concept of initiatives from the Swiss
beginning in 1898 when South Dakota adopted the initiative in its
constitution. The Swiss cantons experimented with initiatives in the
1830s. In 1891, the Swiss incorporated the initiative as a mode
of amending their national constitution. Initiatives promote “direct
democracy” by allowing the people to directly propose amendments to the
constitution. In contrast, the traditional mode of changing the
constitution is known as “indirect democracy” because the amendments
are referred to the voters by the legislature or the constitutional
convention.
[15]
Florida requires only that the title and summary of the proposed
amendment are “printed in clear and unambiguous language.” Advisory
Opinion to the Attorney General RE Right of Citizens to Choose Health
Care Providers. No. 90160, 22 January 1998, Supreme Court of Florida.
[16]
State ex. rel Patton v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E. 872
(1933); Whitman v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211, 125 P.2d 445 (1942);
Heidtman v. City of Shaker Heights, 99 Ohio App. 415, 119 N.E. 2d 644
(1954); Christen v. Baker, 138 Colo. 27, 328 P.2d 951 (1958);
Stop the Pay Hike Committee v. Town Council of Town of Irvington, 166
N.J. Super. 197, 399 A.2d 336 (1979); State ex rel Evans v.
Blackwell, Slip copy, 2006 WL 1102804 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.),
2006-Ohio-2076.
[17]
407 Mass. 949, 955 (1990). Affirmed by the District Court of
Massachusetts in Henry v. Conolly, 743 F. Supp. 922 (1990) and by the
Court of Appeals, First Circuit, in Henry v. Conolly, 9109 F. 2d. 1000
(1990), and cited in Marino v. Town Council of Southbridge, 13
Mass.L.Rptr. 14 (2001).
[18] 89 P.3d 1227, 1235 (2004).
[19] Stumpf v. Law, 839 P. 2d 120, 124 (1992).
[20]
Exhibit “B” of the Lambino Group’s Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006.
[21] Annex “B” of the
Comment/Opposition in Intervention of Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra filed
on 7 September 2006.
[22] www.ulap.gov.ph.
[23] www.ulap.gov.ph/reso2006-02.html.
[24] The full text of the
proposals of the Consultative Commission on Charter Change can be
downloaded at its official website at www.concom.ph.
[25] The Lambino Group’s Memorandum, p 5.
[26]
Under the proposed Section 1(2), Article VI of the Constitution,
members of Parliament shall be elected for a term of five years
“without limitation as to the number thereof.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[27]
Under the proposed Section 4(1), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions
of the
Constitution
, the interim Parliament “shall continue until the
Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall
have qualified.” Also, under the proposed Section 5(2), Article
XVIII, of the same Transitory Provisions, the interim Parliament “shall
provide for the election of the members of Parliament.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[28]
Under the proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions
of the
Constitution
, the interim Parliament, within 45 days from
ratification of the proposed changes, “shall convene to propose
amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution”
[29]
448 So.2d 984, 994 (1984), internal citations omitted.
[30] 698 P.2d 1173, 1184 (1985).
[31] I Record 386, 392, 402-403.
[32]
196 P.2d 787, 790 (1948). See also Lowe v. Keisling, 130
Or.App. 1, 882 P.2d 91 (1994).
[33] 392 P.2d 636, 638 (1964).
[34]
930 P.2d 186, 196 (1996), internal citations omitted.
[35] Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 118-119 (1894).
[36]
Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of
Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286 (1978).
[37] Id. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[38]
Legislature of the State of California v. EU, 54 Cal.3d 492, 509 (1991).
[39]
California Association of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109 Cal.App.4th
792, 836 (2003).
[40] See note 44, infra.
[41]
Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, p. 1294 (2003).
[42] 238 So.2d 824 (1970). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[43] Id. at 830-832.
[44]
As stated by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. during the 26
September 2006 oral arguments.
[45]
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10
November 2003, 415 SCRA 44; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration, 142 Phil. 393 (1970); Gold Creek Mining Corporation v.
Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938).
[46]
882 P.2d 91, 96-97 (1994). On the merits, the Court in Lowe v.
Keisling found the amendment in question was not a revision.
[47] Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution
[48] Section 11(1), Article XVI of the
Constitution
[49] Section 2, Article VII of the
Constitution
[50]
This section provides: “The Philippines is a democratic and republican
State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[51]
Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 760 (2001); Intia Jr. v.
COA, 366 Phil. 273 (1999).
[52]
G.R. No. 129754, Resolution dated 23 September 1997.
[53]
Presidential Proclamation No. 58 dated February 11, 1987, entitled
“Proclaiming the Ratification of the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines Adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986,
including the Ordinance Appended thereto.”
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