IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
OF CAMILO L. SABIO,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 174340
October 17, 2006
J. ERMIN ERNEST LOUIE R. MIGUEL,
Petitioner-Relator,
- versus -
HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, in his
capacity as Chairman, and the HONORABLE MEMBERS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES and
THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES of
the Senate, HONORABLE SENATOR JUAN PONCE-
ENRILE, in his official capacity as Member,
HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, Senate President,
SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, and the SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG) and CAMILO L. SABIO, Chairman, NARCISO S.
NARIO, RICARDO M. ABCEDE, TERESO L. JAVIER
and NICASIO A. CONTI, Commissioners, MANUEL ANDAL
and JULIO JALANDONI, PCGG nominees to Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation,
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 174318
- versus -
RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as Chairman,
and MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC
ENTERPRISES, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
ON PUBLIC SERVICES, SENATOR JUAN PONCE-
ENRILE, in his capacity as member of both said
Committees, MANUEL VILLAR, Senate President,
THE SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS,
and SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------------------------------x
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATIONS,
PHILIP G. BRODETT, LUIS K. LOKIN, JR.,
ROBERTO V. SAN JOSE, DELFIN P. ANGCAO,
ROBERTO L. ABAD, ALMA KRISTINA ALOBBA,
and JOHNNY TAN,
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 174177
- versus -
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS and PUBLIC ENTERPRISES,
its MEMBERS and CHAIRMAN, the HONORABLE
SENATOR RICHARD GORDON and SENATE
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, its Members
and Chairman, the HONORABLE SENATOR
JOKER P. ARROYO,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Two decades ago, on February 28, 1986, former President Corazon C. Aquino installed her regime by issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1,[1]
creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
She entrusted upon this Commission the herculean task of recovering the
ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the deposed President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates.[2] Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1
provides that: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required
to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered
performance of its task.[3]
Today, the constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the
ground that it tramples upon the Senate’s power to conduct legislative
inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the
1987 Constitution
, which reads:cralaw:red
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The facts are undisputed.
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced
Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),[4]
“directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of
Directors.” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:cralaw:red
WHEREAS, in the last quarter
of 2005, the representation and entertainment expense of the PHC
skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as compared to the previous year’s mere
P106 thousand;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC
subsidiary called Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC
funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months, over P73 million had been
allegedly advanced to TCI without any accountability report given to
PHC and PHILCOMSAT;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue
reported that the executive committee of Philcomsat has precipitately
released P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an
executive committee member; to date there have been no payments given,
subjecting the company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.25
million in 2004;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to protect the interest of
the Republic of the Philippines in the PHC, PHILCOMSAT, and POTC from
any anomalous transaction, and to conserve or salvage any remaining
value of the government’s equity position in these corporations from
any abuses of power done by their respective board of directors;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee
shall conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT),
and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors.
Adopted.
(Sgd) MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
On the same date, February 20, 2006, Senate Res. No. 455 was
submitted to the Senate and referred to the Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers and Investigations and Committee on Public
Services. However, on March 28, 2006, upon motion of Senator
Francis N. Pangilinan, it was transferred to the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises.[5]
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the
authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio
of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of
the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting
was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.[6]
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment.[7] At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1
earlier quoted.
On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum,[8] approved by Senate President Manuel Villar, requiring
Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti,
Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing
scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to
the matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455. Similar subpoenae
were issued against the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation, namely: Benito V. Araneta, Philip J. Brodett,
Enrique L. Locsin, Manuel D. Andal, Roberto L. Abad, Luis K.
Lokin, Jr., Julio J. Jalandoni, Roberto V. San Jose, Delfin P. Angcao,
Alma Kristina Alloba and Johnny Tan.[9]
Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. In his letter to
Senator Gordon dated August 18, 2006, he reiterated his earlier
position, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the other hand,
the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation relied on
the position paper they previously filed, which raised issues on the
propriety of legislative inquiry. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thereafter, Chief of Staff Ma. Carissa O. Coscolluela, under the
authority of Senator Gordon, sent another notice[10] to Chairman Sabio
requiring him to appear and testify on the same subject matter set on
September 6, 2006. The notice was issued “under the
same authority of the Subpoena Ad Testificandum previously served upon
(him) last 16 August 2006.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Once more, Chairman Sabio did not comply with the notice. He sent
a letter[11] dated September 4, 2006 to Senator Gordon reiterating his
reason for declining to appear in the public hearing.
This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order dated September 7, 2006
requiring Chairman Sabio and Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Javier and
Nario to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt of the
Senate. On September 11, 2006, they submitted to the Senate
their Compliance and Explanation,[12] which partly reads:cralaw:red
Doubtless, there are laudable intentions of the subject inquiry in aid
of legislation. But the rule of law requires that even the best
intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the
Constitution
and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods. (Brillantes, Jr., et al. v. Commission on Elections, En Banc [G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004]) chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On this score, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 should not be ignored as it explicitly provides:cralaw:red
No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.
With all due respect, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a
limitation on the power of legislative inquiry, and a recognition by
the State of the need to provide protection to the PCGG in order to
ensure the unhampered performance of its duties under its
charter. E.O. No. 1 is a law, Section 4(b) of which had not been
amended, repealed or revised in any way.
To say the least, it would require both Houses of Congress and
Presidential fiat to amend or repeal the provision in
controversy. Until then, it stands to be respected as part of the
legal system in this jurisdiction. (As held in People v. Veneracion,
G.R. Nos. 119987-88, October 12, 1995: Obedience to the rule of
law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under
the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to
exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the
exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its
authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of
Law, and ought to ‘protect and enforce it without fear or favor,’ 4
[Act of Athens (1955)] resist encroachments by governments, political
parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.)
x x
x
x x x
x x x
Relevantly, Chairman Sabio’s letter to Sen. Gordon dated August 19,
2006 pointed out that the anomalous transactions referred to in the
P.S. Resolution No. 455 are subject of pending cases before the regular
courts, the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court (Pending cases
include: a. Samuel Divina v. Manuel Nieto, Jr., et al., CA-G.R. No.
89102; b. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Manuel
Nieto, et al.; c. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v.
Manuel D. Andal, Civil Case No. 06-095, RTC, Branch 61, Makati City; d.
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. PHILCOMSAT
Holdings Corporation, et al., Civil Case No. 04-1049) for which reason
they may not be able to testify thereon under the principle of sub
judice. The laudable objectives of the PCGG’s functions,
recognized in several cases decided by the Supreme Court, of the PCGG
will be put to naught if its recovery efforts will be unduly impeded by
a legislative investigation of cases that are already pending before
the Sandiganbayan and trial courts.
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, (203 SCRA 767, 784 [1991]) the Honorable Supreme Court held:cralaw:red
“…[T]he issues sought to be
investigated by the respondent Committee is one over which jurisdiction
had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has
been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee
to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the
Sandigabayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting
judgments between a legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, but
if the Committee’s judgment were to be reached before that of the
Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on
the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.
x x
x
x x x
IT IS IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS that the
Commission decided not to attend the Senate inquiry to testify and
produce evidence thereat.
Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on
Public Services issued an Order[13] directing Major General Jose
Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and
his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate. The Order
bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the
Committees’ members.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia
arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA,
Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was
detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition for habeas
corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen,
Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. The case
was docketed as G.R. No. 174340.
Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario,
and Javier, and the PCGG’s nominees to Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation, Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, likewise filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition against the same respondents,
and also against Senate President Manuel Villar, Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and the entire Senate. The case was
docketed as G.R. No. 174318.
Meanwhile, Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its officers and
directors, namely: Philip G. Brodett, Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Roberto V.
San Jose, Delfin P. Angcao, Roberto L. Abad, Alma Kristina Alobba and
Johnny Tan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
Senate Committees on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Gordon and Arroyo, and
Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174177.
In G.R. No. 174340 (for habeas corpus) and G.R. No. 174318 (for
certiorari and prohibition) Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede,
Conti, Nario, and Javier; and the PCGG’s nominees Andal and
Jalandoni alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees disregarded
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason; second, the
inquiries conducted by respondent Senate Committees are not in
aid of legislation; third, the inquiries were conducted in the absence
of duly published Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation; and fourth, respondent Senate Committees are not vested
with the power of contempt.
In G.R. No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its
directors and officers alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees
have no jurisdiction over the subject matter stated in Senate Res. No.
455; second, the same inquiry is not in accordance with the Senate’s
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; third,
the subpoenae against the individual petitioners are void for having
been issued without authority; fourth, the conduct of legislative
inquiry pursuant to Senate Res. No. 455 constitutes undue encroachment
by respondents into justiciable controversies over which several courts
and tribunals have already acquired jurisdiction; and fifth, the
subpoenae violated petitioners’ rights to privacy and against
self-incrimination.
chan robles virtual law library
In their Consolidated Comment, the above-named respondents countered:
first, the issues raised in the petitions involve political questions
over which this Court has no jurisdiction; second, Section 4(b) has
been repealed by the
Constitution
;
third, respondent Senate Committees are vested with contempt power;
fourth, Senate’s Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation have been duly published; fifth, respondents have not
violated any civil right of the individual petitioners, such as their
(a) right to privacy; and (b) right against self-incrimination; and
sixth, the inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into
justiciable controversies.
During the oral arguments held on September 21, 2006, the parties were
directed to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within a
non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from date. In the
meantime, per agreement of the parties, petitioner Chairman Sabio was
allowed to go home. Thus, his petition for habeas corpus has
become moot. The parties also agreed that the service of the
arrest warrants issued against all petitioners and the proceedings
before the respondent Senate Committees are suspended during the
pendency of the instant cases.[14]
Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental
issue of whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987
Constitution. On this lone issue hinges the merit of the
contention of Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners that their refusal
to appear before respondent Senate Committees is justified.
With the resolution of this issue, all the other issues raised by the
parties have become inconsequential.
Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article VI, Section 21 of the
1987 Constitution
granting respondent Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:cralaw:red
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1
limiting such power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG
members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding, thus:cralaw:red
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
To determine whether there exists a clear and unequivocal repugnancy
between the two quoted provisions that warrants a declaration that
Section 4(b) has been repealed by the
1987 Constitution
, a brief consideration of the Congress’ power of inquiry is imperative.
The Congress’ power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it reached our shores through McGrain v. Daugherty,[15]
cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.[16] In those earlier days, American
courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to
legislate. The 1864 case of Briggs v. MacKellar[17] explains the breath and basis of the power, thus:cralaw:red
Where no constitutional
limitation or restriction exists, it is competent for either of the two
bodies composing the legislature to do, in their separate capacity,
whatever may be essential to enable them to legislate….It is
well-established principle of this parliamentary law, that either house
may institute any investigation having reference to its own
organization, the conduct or qualification of its members, its
proceedings, rights, or privileges or any matter affecting the public
interest upon which it may be important that it should have exact
information, and in respect to which it would be competent for it to
legislate. The right to pass laws, necessarily implies the right
to obtain information upon any matter which may become the subject of a
law. It is essential to the full and intelligent exercise of the
legislative function….In American legislatures the investigation of
public matters before committees, preliminary to legislation, or with
the view of advising the house appointing the committee is, as a
parliamentary usage, well established as it is in England, and the
right of either house to compel witnesses to appear and testify before
its committee, and to punish for disobedience has been frequently
enforced….The right of inquiry, I think, extends to other matters, in
respect to which it may be necessary, or may be deemed advisable to
apply for legislative aid.
Remarkably, in Arnault, this Court adhered to a similar theory.
Citing McGrain, it recognized that the power of inquiry is “an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function,” thus:cralaw:red
Although there is no provision in the “Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power
of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended
to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself
possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true –
recourse must be had to others who possess it.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress’ power of
inquiry, provisions on such power made their maiden appearance in
Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution.[18] Then came
the 1987 Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section
12. What was therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as
influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions.[19]
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of
investigation, not just of Congress, but also of “any of its
committee.” This is significant because it constitutes a direct
conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that
the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively
perform its investigative function are also available to the
committees.[20]
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more
solid existence and expansive construal. The Court’s high
regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v.
Ermita,[21] where it categorically ruled that “the power of
inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in
Arnault that “the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive
with the power to legislate.” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b)
directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts
the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry.
This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any
provision granting such exemption. The Congress’ power of
inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed
statutes.[22] It even extends “to government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress
to regulate or even abolish.”[23] PCGG belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the
broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section
1 of the Constitution stating that: “Public office is a public trust.
Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public
office is invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties
pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are
held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the
government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the
officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties
pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the
servants of the people, and not their rulers.[24]
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with
the principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG
members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other
administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public
accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes
irresponsibility and non-accountability. In Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Peña,[25] Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano characterized as “obiter” the portion of the majority opinion
barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:cralaw:red
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted,
clearly obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not
here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the
literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1.
If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG
or any member thereof from civil liability “for anything done or
omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order,” the
constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to
most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize
the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the
PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and
1987 Constitution
and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x.
x x
x
x x x
x x x
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or
staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the
Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with
orders of this Court. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan[26] reiterates the same view. Indeed,
Section 4(b) has been frowned upon by this Court even before the filing
of the present petitions.
Corollarily, Section 4(b) also runs counter to the following
constitutional provisions ensuring the people’s access to information:cralaw:red
Article II, Section 28
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote
transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government,
as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to
exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right
information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to
the formulation of government policies and their effective
implementation. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.[27] the Court
explained that an informed citizenry is essential to the existence and
proper functioning of any democracy, thus:cralaw:red
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing
dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for
free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government
may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet,
this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the
citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will
intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are
aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can
such bear fruit.
Consequently, the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not
only intended to benefit Congress but also the citizenry. The
people are equally concerned with this proceeding and have the right to
participate therein in order to protect their interests. The
extent of their participation will largely depend on the information
gathered and made known to them. In other words, the right to
information really goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies
of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It
is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental
decision-making as well as in checking abuse in the
government.[28] The cases of Tañada v. Tuvera[29] and
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission[30] have recognized a citizen’s
interest and personality to enforce a public duty and to bring an
action to compel public officials and employees to perform that duty.
chan robles virtual law library
Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from
PCGG members and staff information and other data in aid of its power
to legislate. Again, this must not be countenanced.
In Senate v. Ermita,[31] this Court stressed:cralaw:red
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally
conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly
limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily
deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid
of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The
citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in
formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress – opinions
which they can then communicate to their representatives and other
government officials through the various legal means allowed by their
freedom of expression.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the
legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or
forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect
violates the Constitution or its basic principles.[32] As shown in the
above discussion, Section 4(b) is inconsistent with Article VI, Section
21 (Congress’ power of inquiry), Article XI, Section 1 (principle of
public accountability), Article II, Section 28 (policy of full
disclosure) and Article III, Section 7 (right to public
information). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Significantly, Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:cralaw:red
All existing laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
The clear import of this provision is that all existing laws, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive
issuances inconsistent or repugnant to the Constitution are repealed.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions invalidating laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances inconsistent with the Constitution. In Pelaez
v. Auditor General,[33] the Court considered repealed Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 authorizing the Executive to change
the seat of the government of any subdivision of local governments,
upon the approval of the 1935 Constitution. Section 68 was adjudged
incompatible and inconsistent with the Constitutional grant of limited
executive supervision over local governments. In Islamic
Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., v. Office of the Executive
Secretary,[34] the Court declared Executive Order No. 46, entitled
“Authorizing the Office on Muslim Affairs to Undertake Philippine Halal
Certification,” void for encroaching on the religious freedom of
Muslims. In The Province of Batangas v. Romulo,[35] the
Court declared some provisions of the General Appropriations Acts of
1999, 2000 and 2001 unconstitutional for violating the Constitutional
precept on local autonomy. And in Ople v. Torres,[36] the Court
likewise declared unconstitutional Administrative Order No. 308,
entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System,” for being violative of the right to privacy protected by the
Constitution.
These Decisions, and many others, highlight that the Constitution is
the highest law of the land. It is “the basic and paramount law
to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons,
including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall
be valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the
Constitution.”[37] Consequently, this Court has no recourse
but to declare Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987
Constitution.
Significantly, during the oral arguments on September 21, 2006,
Chairman Sabio admitted that should this Court rule that Section 4(b)
is unconstitutional or that it does not apply to the Senate, he will
answer the questions of the Senators, thus:cralaw:red
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:cralaw:red
Okay. Now, if the Supreme Court rules that Sec. 4(b)
is unconstitutional or that it does not apply to the Senate, will you
answer the questions of the Senators?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:cralaw:red
Your Honor, my father was a judge, died being a judge. I was
here in the Supreme Court as Chief of Staff of Justice Feria. I would
definitely honor the Supreme Court and the rule of law.
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:cralaw:red
You will answer the questions of the Senators if we say that?
CHAIRMAN
SABIO: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Yes, Your Honor. That is the law already as far as I am concerned.
With his admission, Chairman Sabio is not fully convinced
that he and his Commissioners are shielded from testifying before
respondent Senate Committees by Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. In
effect, his argument that the said provision exempts him and his
co-respondent Commissioners from testifying before respondent Senate
Committees concerning Senate Res. No. 455 utterly lacks merit.
Incidentally, an argument repeated by Chairman Sabio is that respondent
Senate Committees have no power to punish him and his Commissioners for
contempt of the Senate.
The argument is misleading.
Article VI, Section 21 provides:cralaw:red
The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
It must be stressed that the Order of Arrest for “contempt of Senate
Committees and the Philippine Senate” was approved by Senate President
Villar and signed by fifteen (15) Senators. From this, it can be
concluded that the Order is under the authority, not only of the
respondent Senate Committees, but of the entire Senate.
At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not
only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of
their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct
conferral of power to the committees. Father Bernas, in his Commentary
on the 1987 Constitution, correctly pointed out its significance:cralaw:red
It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly recognizes the
power of investigation not just of Congress but also of “any of its
committees.” This is significant because it constitutes a direct
conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that
the means which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its
investigative function are also available to the Committees.[38] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This is a reasonable conclusion. The conferral of the legislative power
of inquiry upon any committee of Congress must carry with it all powers
necessary and proper for its effective discharge. Otherwise,
Article VI, Section 21 will be meaningless. The indispensability and
usefulness of the power of contempt in a legislative inquiry is
underscored in a catena of cases, foreign and local.
In the 1821 case of Anderson v. Dunn,[39] the function of the
Houses of Congress with respect to the contempt power was
likened to that of a court, thus:cralaw:red
…But the court in its reasoning goes beyond this, and though the
grounds of the decision are not very clearly stated, we take them to
be: that there is in some cases a power in each House of Congress to
punish for contempt; that this power is analogous to that exercised by
courts of justice, and that it being the well established doctrine that
when it appears that a prisoner is held under the order of a court of
general jurisdiction for a contempt of its authority, no other court
will discharge the prisoner or make further inquiry into the cause of
his commitment. That this is the general rule…as regards the
relation of one court to another must be conceded.
In McGrain,[40] the U.S. Supreme Court held: “Experience has shown that
mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.”
The Court, in Arnault v. Nazareno,[41] sustained the Congress’ power of
contempt on the basis of this observation.
In Arnault v. Balagtas,[42] the Court further explained that the
contempt power of Congress is founded upon reason and policy and that
the power of inquiry will not be complete if for every contumacious
act, Congress has to resort to judicial interference, thus:cralaw:red
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to
punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy.
Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of
legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the
knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it
cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and
information if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and
authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle
of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of
its respective authority, it must have intended each department’s
authority to be full and complete, independently of the other’s
authority or power. And how could the authority and power
become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance,
every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to
the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is
impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts
committed against its authority or dignity.[43]
chan robles virtual law library
In Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dumaguete,[44] the Court characterized contempt
power as a matter of self-preservation, thus:cralaw:red
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of
self-preservation as that branch of the government vested with the
legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its
authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of
the legislature is, therefore, sui generis x x x.
Meanwhile, with respect to G.R. No. 174177, the petition of Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers, this Court holds
that the respondent Senate Committees’ inquiry does not violate their
right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
One important limitation on the Congress’ power of inquiry is that “the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.” This is just another way of saying that the power of
inquiry must be “subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution
on government action.” As held in Barenblatt v. United States,[45] “the
Congress, in common with all the other branches of the Government, must
exercise its powers subject to the limitations placed by the
Constitution on governmental action, more particularly in the context
of this case, the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
First is the right to privacy.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws.[46]
Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless
excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The
meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our
conviction that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and
“the right most valued by civilized men,”[47] but also from our
adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates
that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy” and “everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.”[48]
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution,
provides at least two guarantees that explicitly create zones of
privacy. It highlights a person’s “right to be let alone” or the “right
to determine what, how much, to whom and when information about himself
shall be disclosed.”[49] Section 2 guarantees
“the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose.” Section 3 renders inviolable
the “privacy of communication and correspondence”
and further cautions that “any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court
must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation
of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion.[50] Applying this
determination to these cases, the important inquiries are: first, did
the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a
reasonable expectation of privacy?; and second, did the
government violate such expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the
Senate’s public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455,
particularly “on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat
Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the
operations by their respective board of directors.”
Obviously, the inquiry focus on petitioners’ acts committed in the
discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the said
corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation.
Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over
matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government
has interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over
which the people have the right to information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there
is an overriding compelling state interest. In Morfe v.
Mutuc,[51] the Court, in line with Whalen v. Roe,[52] employed the
rational basis relationship test when it held that there was no
infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to
disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and
minimize the opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard
of honesty in public service, and promote morality in public
administration.[53] In Valmonte v. Belmonte,[54] the Court remarked
that as public figures, the Members of the former Batasang
Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary
individuals, and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny.
Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that the right of the
people to access information on matters of public concern prevails over
the right to privacy of financial transactions. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the
PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and the
conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are
compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as well as
from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the
necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial
measures and policy determination regarding PCGG’s efficacy.
There being no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of those
directors and officers over the subject covered by Senate Res. No. 455,
it follows that their right to privacy has not been violated by
respondent Senate Committees.
Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be
emphasized that this right maybe invoked by the said directors and
officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation only when the incriminating
question is being asked, since they have no way of knowing in
advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of
them.”[55] That this right may possibly be violated or abused is
no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their power of
inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused, such
issue may be presented before the courts. At this juncture, what is
important is that respondent Senate Committees have sufficient Rules to
guide them when the right against self-incrimination is
invoked. Sec. 19 reads:cralaw:red
Sec. 19. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A witness can invoke his
right against self-incrimination only when a question tends to elicit
an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. However, he
may offer to answer any question in an executive session.
No person can refuse to testify or be placed under oath or
affirmation or answer questions before an incriminatory question is
asked. His invocation of such right does not by itself excuse him from
his duty to give testimony.
In such a case, the Committee, by a majority vote of the members
present there being a quorum, shall determine whether the right has
been properly invoked. If the Committee decides otherwise, it shall
resume its investigation and the question or questions previously
refused to be answered shall be repeated to the witness. If the latter
continues to refuse to answer the question, the Committee may punish
him for contempt for contumacious conduct.
The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from
inquiring into the same issues being litigated before the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution of criminal or
administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out
a legislative purpose.
Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the
constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate Committees,
it their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the
facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting
obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the
dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with
respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.
chan robles virtual law library
In fine, PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede,
Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti, and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and
Julio Jalandoni, PCGG’s nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as
well as its directors and officers, must comply with the Subpoenae Ad
Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to
appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No.
455.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 174340 for habeas corpus is DISMISSED, for being moot. The petitions in G.R Nos. 174318 and 174177 are likewise DISMISSED.
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED
by the 1987 Constitution. Respondent Senate Committees’ power of
inquiry relative to Senate Resolution 455 is upheld. PCGG
Chairman Camilo L. Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso
Nario, Nicasio Conti and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio
Jalandoni, PCGG’s nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well
as its directors and officers, petitioners in G.R. No. 174177, are
ordered to comply with the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued
by respondent Senate Committees directing them to appear and testify in
public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Nazario, Garcia and Velasco, JJ., concur.
[1] E.O. No. 1
was issued by Former President Aquino in the exercise of her
legislative power under the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution.
Thus, it is of the same category and has the same binding force as a
statute. (Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1998 citing Legaspi v.
Ministry of Finance, 115 SCRA 418 [1982]; Garcia-Padilla v. Ponce
Enrile, G.R. No. 61388, April 20, 1983; Aquino v. Commission on
Elections, 62 SCRA 275 [1975] )
[2] Section 2 (a), Executive Order No.1.
[3]
See Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pena, April 12, 1988,
159 SCRA 558
[4]
Annex “E” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[5] Id.
[6]
Annex “F” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[7]
Annex “G” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[8]
Annex “A” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[9] Petition in G.R. No. 174177 at p. 15.
[10] Annex “B” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[11] Annex “I” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[12] Annex “J” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[13] Annex “D” of the petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[14] En Banc Resolution dated September 21, 2006.
chan robles virtual law library
[15]
273 U.S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319, 71 L. Ed. 580, 50 A.L.R. 1 (1927).
[16] No. L- 3820, 87 Phil. 29 (1950).
[17] 2 Abb. Pr. 30 (N.Y. 1864).
[18]
Puno, Lecture on Legislative Investigations and the Right to Privacy,
at p. 22.
[19]
Bernas S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
2003 Ed. at p.737.
[20]
Bernas S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
2003 Ed. at p.739.
[21] G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006.
[22]
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), pp. 194-195.
[23] Senate v. Ermita, Id.
[24]
De Leon, De Leon, Jr. The Law on Public Officers and Election
Law, p. 2.
[25] No. L-77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 558.
[26] 193 SCRA 282 (1991).
[27] G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 256.
[28] Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.
[29] 136 SCRA 27.
[30] 150 SCRA 530.
[31] Supra.
[32]
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1998 citing In re Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534
(1954).
[33] No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569.
[34] G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003, 405 SCRA 497.
[35] G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736.
[36] 293 SCRA 141 (1998).
[37] Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2003, p. 4.
[38]
Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
A Commentary, p. 678.
[39]
19 U.S. [6 Wheat.] 204 (1821) cited in Justice Puno, Legislative
Investigations and Right to Privacy.
[40] Supra.
[41] Supra.
[42] 97 Phil. 358 [1955].
[43] Id.
[44] No. L-72492, November 5, 1987, 155 SCRA 421.
[45] 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
[46]
Marquez v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001, 359 SCRA 772.
[47]
See Morfe v. Mutuc No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424.
[48]
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See also
Article 17 (1) and (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
[49]
Constitutional and Legal Systems of ASEAN Countries, Sison, Academy of
ASEAN Law and Jurisprudence, 1990, at 221, citing I.R. Cortes, The
Constitutional Foundations of Privacy, 7 (1970).
[50]
Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529
P 2d 590 (1974). See Katz v. United states (1967), 389 U.S.
347, 350-352, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576; People v. Krivda (1971)
5 Cal. 3d 357, 364, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 486 P. 2d 1262; 8 Cal. 3d
623-624,105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 504 P. 2d 457. INSERT Herrera’s
Handbook on Arrest, Search and Seizure.
[51] Supra.
[52] 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
[53]
Justice Puno, Lecture on Legislative Inquiry and Right to Privacy, p.
60.
[54] 170 SCRA 256 (1989)
[55] Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2003, p. 307.
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