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PHILIPPINE SUPREME
COURT
DECISIONS
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
G.R.
Nos.
152683-84
-versus- LEONARDO ILAO,
D E C I S I O N QUISUMBING, J.: For automatic review is the Decision[1] dated December 18, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 163, convicting appellant Leonardo Ilao of two counts of rape, and imposing on him the penalty of death in Criminal Case No. 118448-H and reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 118449-H. The Informations against appellant alleged:chanrobles virtual law library
Briefly, the facts of the case, based on the records, are as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In view of the imposition of the death penalty, the case is now before us on automatic review, pursuant to Article 47[17] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Reversal of the decision is sought on the grounds that:chanrobles virtual law library I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE SEXUAL ACTS BETWEEN ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AS CONSENSUAL.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT NO FORCE OR INTIMIDATION ATTENDED THE SEXUAL ACTS BETWEEN THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The basic issues are:chanrobles virtual law library
Anent the first issue, appellant implores the Court to take a closer look at the testimony of the complainant. He points to several aspects of complainant's testimony which allegedly affected her credibility, namely: (a) that there was delay in reporting to her husband or to the police of the alleged rapes,[19] (b) that she was an experienced woman and older than appellant by 5 years, (c) that she did not resist or attempt to flee or shout for help,[20] and (d) that no proof was presented to indicate that the alleged threats were continuous and thus prevented her from reporting the rape promptly.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the credibility of private complainant and her witnesses are beyond question. They had no motive to maliciously implicate appellant in a serious offense, except their desire to see to it that justice for the victim is done and that the guilty is punished properly.cralaw:red We find the appellant's contentions devoid of merit. As a rule, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect because of its opportunity to hear their testimonies and observe their demeanor and manner of testifying. However, considering that the deciding judge had heard only the testimonies of the defense witnesses, said rule may not be applicable fully. Nonetheless, following a careful perusal of the records, this Court is inclined to agree with Judge Leili Suarez Acebedo's assessment of facts and appreciation of evidence.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred As borne by the records, we agree with the trial court that complainant's testimony that she was raped was straightforward, credible, and convincing, whereas the denial and alibi of the appellant, that he was in Batangas on the dates and hours of the rape incidents, were unworthy of belief and lacking in plausibility.cralaw:red Said the trial court in its Decision:chanrobles virtual law library The Court is not inclined to believe that the complainant would be so cold-blooded as to hatch up the humiliating and degrading story of the repeated sexual assaults and violations of her honor by the accused; to allow a meticulous examination of her body and sex organs and to suffer the humiliation and embarrassment of narrating in Court the shameful ordeal she had gone through if she had not really been a victim of repeated sexual assaults by the accused, or was motivated by extreme desire for justice and the punishment of the accused. Zenaida could have invented a story of rape without having to include her daughter in it to spare her the trouble, inconvenience, shame and anxiety of having to testify in court on what appeared to be a humiliating experience of her own mother. Yet, she did and the Court is inclined to think that she could not have done so if it were not the truth.[21]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred On the second issue, appellant argues that force or intimidation was not adequately proved by the prosecution. On the contrary, the OSG shows that force and intimidation clearly attended the commission of the crime.[22]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The fact that private complainant did not resist or attempt to flee or shout for help does not negate force or intimidation.[23] Different people react differently when confronted by a shocking or a harrowing and unexpected incident, for the workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. Some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to the intrusion.[24] Moreover, in rape cases, physical resistance need not be established when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself out of fear. Intimidation is addressed to the mind of the victim and is therefore subjective. Here, the victim categorically described the force and intimidation exerted with the use of lethal weaponry (knife and ice pick) when she was ravished. Mentally, she was revolted at the sexual assault. Indeed with a knife poked at her, physical resistance was not only futile but truly hazardous and might cost her life and, in the first incident, that also of her daughter.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The assertion of appellant that private complainant was a married woman, and was no longer a virgin, will not exculpate him from criminal liability for rape. Well-settled is the rule that in rape cases, virginity of the victim is not an element of rape.[25]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The fact that private complainant was older than appellant by 5 years does not excuse nor mitigate the heinous nature of the sexual molestation. Whether or not appellant is younger than complainant is not relevant in rape cases as force or intimidation is relative and need only be sufficient to consummate the crime.[26] While indeed the victim might have tarried in reporting her defilement, yet the delay is explained by the fear generated by appellant in the mind of complainant. The hiatus in reporting the crime does not extricate appellant from his predicament.[27] As the trial court found, complainant did not divulge the first incident of rape out of fear for her life and that of her family. She could have kept her ordeal forever in silence were it not for the second incident which engendered her continuing fear of a repetition thereof, unless she could put a stop to it.[28] This reaction appears typical of a woman who has been abused. Rape is a harrowing experience and the shock concomitant to it may linger for a while. It is upon this fear springing from the initial rape that the perpetrator hopes to build a climate of psychological terror, which could numb his victim to submissiveness.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred On the face of evidence for the defense, it is rather perplexing that appellant would plead alibi and denial while simultaneously insisting that his sexual intercourses with complainant were consensual.[29] There is no method in his madding style of defense. A "sweetheart theory" as an affirmative defense must be established by convincing proof. The burden of proof is on appellant to prove that he and the victim were sweethearts. As earlier noted, herein appellant utterly failed to establish such fact at the trial, much less during this review.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred But even more bizarre is his defense of alibi. He and his three other witnesses tried to establish during the trial that he was away from the scene of the rapes. Yet, he also claims that the coituses with complainant were acts of love. Thus, he could not escape an apparent contradiction. How could his alibi square with actual sexual contact? Indeed, instead of boosting his defense, appellant's "sweetheart theory" wreaked havoc on it. The inevitable conclusion is that it is an afterthought, a last ditch ploy to avoid the extreme penalty for a heinous crime.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred But was the trial court correct in imposing capital punishment in Criminal Case No. 118448-H? Considering that the rape was committed on November 18, 1999, the pertinent law is found in Article 266-B[30] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353 which took effect on October 22, 1997. Under said law, the death penalty shall be imposed when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity. Since this circumstance increases the range of the penalty and changes the nature of the crime, it is a special qualifying circumstance. Accordingly, consistent with appellant's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, this circumstance must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information and proven during the trial.[31] Although specifically alleged in the information, the qualifying circumstance that the rape was committed in full view of one of the victim's children was not specifically proved during trial. The prosecution offered no proof of Rose Vargas' filiation. That Zenaida is the mother of Rose, which is also to say that Rose is the daughter of Zenaida, was not satisfactorily shown by competent evidence, i.e., birth certificate. In our view, the parent-child relationship between Zenaida and Rose cannot be presumed in this case. Indirect references to such a relationship by counsels during their direct or cross-examination is not sufficient proof. Such relationship must be directly inquired into, and properly proved. The failure of the prosecution to do so should not be taken lightly. For the prosecution has the burden of proving its allegation of the filial relationship to qualify this case into a capital offense. Here, where the life of a human being hangs in the balance, we must apply the law and our rules strictly against the prosecution. Thus, the death penalty imposed by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 118448-H cannot be upheld because of the prosecution's failure to prove directly and adequately the qualifying circumstance that the rape was committed by appellant in full view of the child of the victim.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred As well said in People v. Ramos,[32] "In the prosecution of criminal cases, especially those involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must be established. Qualifying circumstances or special qualifying circumstances must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself, otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified form."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Nor is the imposition of death justified by the fact that it was alleged in the information in Criminal Case No. 118448-H and Criminal Case No. 118449-H that the rapes were committed with the use of a deadly weapon — a knife and an ice pick, respectively. Under Art. 266-B, the prescribed penalty for rape with a deadly weapon is reclusion perpetua to death.[33] But under Art. 63, RPC, the penalty to be applied should be the lesser one, when there is no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance.[34] Consequently, herein appellant can only be held liable for two (2) counts of simple rape, each punishable with the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Lastly, as to the civil liability of appellant, the trial court's ruling in both cases is in order and must be affirmed.[35] WHEREFORE, the decision dated December 18, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 163 in Criminal Case No. 118448-H and Criminal Case No. 118449-H is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant LEONARDO ILAO is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count. He is also ORDERED to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages in each count. Costs against appellant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno,
Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Endnotes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[1]
Rollo, pp. 18-23.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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