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PHILIPPINE SUPREME
COURT
DECISIONS
NORMA DE JOYA,
G.R.
Nos.
159418-19
-versus- THE JAIL WARDEN
OF
BATANGAS CITY
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.: This is a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Norma de Joya praying for her release from the Batangas City Jail on the claim that her detention was illegal.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The Antecedents The petitioner was charged separately with violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Municipal Trial Court In Cities in Batangas City. The docket numbers and accusatory portion of each of the Informations reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When arraigned in both cases, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. While trial was going on, the petitioner jumped bail. No evidence was thereby adduced in her defense in any of the two cases.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred On December 14, 1995, the trial court promulgated its Decision in Criminal Case No. 25484. The petitioner and her counsel failed to appear despite due notice. The decretal portion of the decision reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On March 21, 1997, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 25773 was likewise promulgated in absentia. The decretal portion of the said decision reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The petitioner remained at large and no appeal was filed from any of the said decisions. In the meantime, the Court issued Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 on November 21, 2000 enjoining all courts and judges concerned to take notice of the ruling and policy of the Court enunciated in Vaca v. Court of Appeals[5] and Lim v. People[6] with regard to the imposition of the penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred After five years, the petitioner was finally arrested while she was applying for an NBI clearance. She was forthwith detained at the Batangas City Jail on December 3, 2002. On July 28, 2003, the petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas City asking the court to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code and to order her release from detention. The public prosecutor opposed the motion. In an Order dated August 15, 2003, the trial court denied the motion on three grounds: (a) its decision convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had long become final and executory; hence, could no longer be amended to change the penalty imposed therein; (b) the SC Circular should be applied prospectively; and (c) the SC Circular did not amend B.P. Blg. 22, a substantive law, but merely encourages trial court judges to have a uniform imposition of fine.cralaw:red Hence, the petition at bar.cralaw:red The petitioner posits that SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 deleted the penalty of imprisonment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and allows only the imposition of a fine. The trial court was mandated to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively conformably with Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code citing the ruling of this Court in United States v. Pacrose.[7] The petitioner prays that the Court declare her detention illegal and order her release from the Batangas City Jail.cralaw:red The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition contending that:chanrobles virtual law library
The OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Abarquez v. Court of Appeals.[9] The petition has no merit. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this case, the petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to the final judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas City, convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Irrefragably then, the petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner's reliance of our ruling in Ordoñez v. Vinarao[10] that a convicted person is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon,[11] is misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit her has no basis.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred It is, therefore, understood that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
B.P. Blg. 22 provides for alternative penalties of fine or imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred In providing for alternative penalties in B.P. Blg. 22, Congress took into account the principal objectives of the law, namely, the prohibition on the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on public interest. The effects of the increase of worthless checks transcend the private interest of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order.[14]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred However, in imposing penalties for crimes, the courts must bear in mind that Philippine penal law is based on the Spanish penal code and has adopted features of the positivist theory of criminal law. The positivist theory states that the basis for criminal liability is the sum total of the social and economic phenomena to which the offense is expressed. The adoption of the aspects of the theory is exemplified by the indeterminate sentence law, Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (impossible crime), Article 68 and Articles 11 to 14, not to mention Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code (penalties for heinous and quasi-heinous crimes). Philippine penal law looks at the convict as a member of society. Among the important factors to be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed on him are (1) his relationship towards his dependents, family and their relationship with him; and (2) his relationship towards society at large and the State. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends.[15] The purpose of penalties is to secure justice. The penalties imposed must not only be retributive but must also be reformative, to give the convict an opportunity to live a new life and rejoin society as a productive and civic-spirited member of the community. The court has to consider not only the primary elements of punishment, namely, the moral responsibility of the convict, the relation of the convict to the private complainant, the intention of the convict, the temptation to the act or the excuse for the crime — was it done by a rich man in the insolence of his wealth or by a poor man in the extremity of his need? The court must also take into account the secondary elements of punishment, namely, the reformation of the offender, the prevention of further offenses by the offender, the repression of offenses in others.[16] As Rousseau said, crimes can be thoroughly repressed only by a system of penalties which, from the benignity they breathe, serve rather than to soften than to inflame those on whom they are imposed.[17] There is also merit in the view that punishment inflicted beyond the merit of the offense is so much punishment of innocence.[18] In this case, even if the Court applies SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000, as revised, retroactively, the petition must nevertheless be dismissed. The petitioner did not offer any evidence during trial. The judgment of the court became final and executory upon her failure to appeal therefrom. Worse, the petitioner remained at large for five long years. Were it not for her attempt to secure an NBI clearance, she would have been able to elude the long arm of the law.cralaw:red IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Puno, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez
and Tinga, JJ., concur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Endnotes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[1]
Rollo, p. 36.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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