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DISSENTING OPINION

PUNO, J.:

The presidential election of May 11, 1992 was a watershed in our political history. The first presidential election after the EDSA revolution, it was a test to determine whether our people were ready to reexercise their sovereignty vitiated during the authoritarian years. It was also a test to ascertain the capability of government to hold clean, honest, and credible elections. It attracted the keen interest of many and no less than seven (7) candidates vied for the presidency. 1 After the smoke of election battle cleared, candidate Fidel V. Ramos was proclaimed winner. He garnered 5,342,571 votes while candidate M. Defensor-Santiago took the second place as she obtained 4,465,173 votes. 2 Soon, murmurs and whispers of fraud filled the air with all the candidates, including the winner, alleging that they were victims of election irregularities. The losers were urged to seek judicial relief but only M. Defensor-Santiago dared to file an election protest, a remedy derisively dismissed by some as a chase of a chimera. The others left their grievance to the tribunal of the peoples conscience.

Mrs. Santiago formally filed her election protest on July 20, 1992. Paragraph 3 of her Protest capsulizes her cause of action, viz:

x x x xxx xxx

"3. In violation of the Constitution and specific statutory provisions, the protestee in conspiracy with top officials of the then reigning administration used government funds like the rebel returnee funds, the BALGU AND NALGU funds, among others, and government facilities like radio and television networks as well as transportation facilities to campaign for the protestee and buy out whole slates of candidates, voters, watchers and members of the board of election inspectors/tellers, election registrars and other Comelec officials, other strategic officials in government as well as other individuals to manipulate, tamper, change, replace, alter, switch ballots and election returns and other election documents including certificates of canvass and statement of votes by precinct and municipality, print ballots and stuff them in ballot boxes, the results of the election in favor of the protestee."

On September 22, 1992, after the filing of the Answer of the protestee containing a counter protest, this Tribunal ordered the protestant to pinpoint the three (3) areas that "best exemplify the frauds and irregularities committed in the 1992 presidential election." The protestant specified the pilot areas as Metro Manila, Pampanga, and Zamboanga involving a total of seventeen thousand five hundred twenty-seven (17,527) precincts. Revision of ballots in these pilot areas proceeded though it suffered some delay primarily because the same ballots were also used as evidence in the election protest filed by Cielo Macapagal-Salgado against Bren Guiao involving the governorship of Pampanga and the election protest filed by Augusto Syjuco against Joker Arroyo involving the then lone congressional seat in Makati.

On August 16, 1995, protestant filed a Motion alleging that the ballots and other election documents in thirteen thousand five hundred ten (13,510) precincts out of the seventeen thousand five hundred twenty-seven (17,527) precincts in the pilot areas had already been revised. She prayed "x x x that the revision of ballots and other election documents in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process of the pilot areas be deemed completed." We deferred our ruling on the prayer of the protestant.

It is of public notice that the protestant filed her certificate of candidacy in the election of May 8, 1995 for senator. She won and was proclaimed and now discharges the duties of the office.

The majority would dismiss protestants election protest as moot and academic on two (2) grounds: first, that the findings of irregularities made by the revisors of the protestant in the course of the revision of ballots in 13,510 contested precincts are entirely irrelevant; and second, she abandoned her protest when she filed her certificate of candidacy in the May 8, 1995 senatorial elections.

With due respect, I dissent.

The majority holds that "it is entirely irrelevant at this stage of the proceedings that the protestants revisors discovered in the course of the revisions alleged irregularities in 13,510 out of the 17,525 contested precincts in the pilot areas." The majority noted the protestants decision to waive the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots from 4,017 precincts. It also noted the failure of the protestant to inform the Tribunal whether she still intends to present additional evidence after the completion of the revision of the ballots from the pilot areas.

I will not count against the protestant her decision to waive revision of the ballots from 4,017 precincts. Without engaging in speculation, it seems to me obvious that the protestant made the waiver because of her belief, rightly or wrongly, that the contested ballots in 13,500 precincts when properly appreciated will sufficiently establish her electoral victory. It is also apparent that the protestant is wary of the slow pace of the protest and she felt that the waiver will at least shorten the lengthening odds of time against her. Indubitably too, the waiver will enable her to cut the cost of her protest.

Nor will I make any adverse inference from the alleged failure of the protestant to inform this Tribunal whether she would still be presenting evidence to support the allegations of fraud and irregularities made by her revisors. The records show that in a motion dated August 16, 1995, she prayed that the revision of ballots in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be deemed completed. The Tribunal has not acted on this motion, hence, the process of revision of ballots is not formally finished. Since the Tribunal has not formally declared the termination of the process of revision, it is not timely for protestant to manifest whether or not she would adduce further evidence to prove her claim of fraud and irregularities. In any event, if the Tribunal entertains any doubt on the matter it should issue an Order requiring the protestant to make clear whether or not she intends to exercise her right to present further evidence. Valuable rights need not be lost on the basis of equivocal acts and omissions.

Prescinding from these premises, I will not dismiss as entirely irrelevant the allegations of the revisors of the protestant that they discovered in the course of the revision irregularities in 13,510 precincts in the pilot areas. The protestant still has the opportunity to adduce further evidence to prove her case. She can still undertake to make a technical examination of the ballots through handwriting experts. She can still present the testimonies of witnesses like voters, watchers, inspectors and others who have knowledge of the alleged fraud and irregularities. She can still submit a memorandum of facts and law to clinch her case. It is only after the protestant has been afforded the opportunity to exercise these rights that the Tribunal can proceed to examine the contested ballots. Then and only then can the Tribunal rule whether or not the protestant failed to make a case.

It can be assumed arguendo that the protestant has lost her right to present additional evidence by her failure to invoke it within a reasonable time. Even then, I submit that the non-presentation of further evidence is not necessarily fatal. Certain types of fraud and irregularities can be proved without the testimonies of handwriting experts or the testimonies of voters, watchers, inspectors and others who witnessed the same. There are fraud and irregularities which are patent on the face of the ballots and other election documents and paraphernalia. Ballots that are marked, ballots that are spurious, ballots written by the same hand, a ballot written by different hands, tampered tally sheets, false list of voters, falsified election returns, and other election documents can be appreciated without need of evidence aliunde. For this reason, the Tribunal cannot evade the duty to examine the protested ballots for the ballots are the best evidence to enable the court to determine the votes obtained by the protestant and the protestee. 3 Needless to state, until the Tribunal examines and appreciates the protested ballots it cannot dismiss the protest.

I do not also subscribe to the ruling of the majority that the protestant abandoned her protest when she ran for Senator and discharged her duties. Abandonment in law means "voluntary relinquishment of all right, title, claim x x x with the intention of not reclaiming it." 4 In ascertaining abandonment, whether in election, property, or criminal litigations, "x x x intention is the first and paramount object of inquiry for there can be no abandonment without the intent to abandon. " 5 Intention is subjective and can be inferred from the acts and conduct of a person. It is a question of fact. 6 In the case at bar, the Tribunal cannot resolve this question of fact for lack of competent evidence. The protestee has not adduced evidence to prove acts and omissions of the protestant which can be the basis for a finding that she intentionally abandoned her protest. Indeed, the protestee does not want the protest to be dismissed on a technicality but prays that it be decided on the merits. The lack of competent evidence on record notwithstanding, the majority ruled, to wit:

"x x x She knew that the term of office of the Senators who would then be elected would be six (6) years. to commence at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election and to end at noon of 30 June 2001. Knowing her high sense of integrity and candor, it is most unlikely that during her campaign she promised to serve the electorate as Senator, subject to the outcome of this protest. In short, she filed her certificate of candidacy for the Senate without any qualification, condition, or reservation." (Italics supplied)

Clearly, the majority merely relied on a deduction to support its conclusion that the protestant did not make any promise to serve the electorate as a Senator subject to the outcome of this protest. It deduced this conclusion from its knowledge of protestants "high sense of integrity and candor." The argument is a non sequitur . If the protestant has candor, the conclusion ought to be that she should have bared to the electorate the pendency of her protest.

A more fundamental reason prevents me from joining the majority. With due respect, I submit that the majority ruling on abandonment is inconsistent with the doctrine that an election contest is concerned less with the private interest of the candidates but more with public interest. Under a republican regime of government, the overarching object of an election contest is to seek and enforce the judgment of the people on who should govern them. It is not a happenstance that the first declaration of policy of our Constitution underlines in bright that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." 7 The first duty of a citizen as a particle of sovereignty in a democracy is to exercise his sovereignty just as the first duty of any reigning government is to uphold the sovereignty of the people at all cost. Thus, in Moraleja vs. Relova, 8 we emphatically held that "x x x once the court has acquired jurisdiction over an election contest, the public interest involved demands that the true winner be known without regard to the wishes or acts of the parties so much so that there can be no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind of cases." Wisely, this Tribunal has consistently demurred from dismissing election contests even on the ground of death of the protestee or the protestant. 9 cräläwvirtualibräry

The majority appears to stray away from this lodestar of our Constitution. It will dismiss the case at bar even while the protestee and the protestant are yet alive, even while the term of the 1992 president-elect has yet to expire, and even while the protestee and the protestant together plead that the Tribunal should determine the true will of the people by deciding their dispute on the merit and not on technicalities that trifle with the truth. I submit that it is the better stance for the Tribunal to decide this election contest on the merit and vindicate the political judgment of the people which far surpasses in significance all other considerations. Our duty to tell the people who have the right to govern them cannot depend on the uncertain oscillations of politics of the litigants as often times they are directed by the wind of convenience, and not by the weal of the public.

I proffer this postulate only because of the dominant public interest involved in the case at bar. This case does not involve an obscure office but the presidency. It concerns the first presidential election after the EDSA revolution. Only 877,398 votes separate the protestee and the protestant.

Ballots in 13,500 precincts are contested by the revisors of the protestant which if found correct can materially affect the results of the election. The protestant has charged that nationwide irregularities were committed in the elections. The protestee, on the other hand, dismisses the protest as merely intended to keep the protestant in the limelight in preparation for her senatorial campaign. Even the protestee has pleaded that the protest be tried on its merit as it involves a matter of paramount and grave public interest. Considering these distinct facts, the Tribunal should not dismiss the protest on the ground of mootness.

To be sure, the majority cultures the thesis that the dismissal of the case at bar will "x x x serve public interest, as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty on the results of the 1992 presidential election." Dismissing the case on the tenuous technicality that it has become moot and academic will not tell the people who really won the last presidential election. Only the light of truth can pierce the uncertainty that has enveloped its results. It is with reason that the protestant has been joined by the protestee in the plea that this Tribunal decide their case on its merit so that once and for all, its result will be free from the badgerings of doubt. I join their plea for the people deserve the whole truth and in an election contest a half-truth is a lie. I vote to continue hearing the election protest at bar and decide it on the merit without unnecessary delay.

Endnotes:


1 Aside from the protestee and protestant, the other candidates were Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Salvador H. Laurel, Imelda R. Marcos, Ramon V. Mitra, and Jovito R. Salonga.

2 The other candidates garnered the following votes: Cojuangco, Jr. (4,116,376); Laurel (770,046); Marcos (2,338,294); Mitra (3,316,661); and Salonga (2,302,124). See Resolution No. 2 of both Houses of the Congress of the Philippines adopted June 22, 1992.

3 Francisco, Vicente, How to Try Election Cases. 1973 ed., p. 253.

4 Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 2.

5 lbid., citing Roebuck v. Mecosta Country Road Commission, 49 Mich. App. 128, 229NW 2d 343, 345; See also Moreno, Phil. Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., pp. 2-4.

6 lbid., p. 3.

7 Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution.

8 42 SCRA 10 [1971].

9 Sibulovda. de Mesa vs. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]; Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA 520 [1967]; and Lomugdang vs. Javier, 21 SCRA 402 [1967].



























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