SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

Search for www.chanrobles.com

PLEASE CLICK HERE FOR THE LATEST ➔ SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

CONCURRING OPINION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The ponencia of Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, and that of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, to which I concur, easily join the rank of the well-written opinions in Constitutional law. Incisive in their analysis, realistic in their approach, and instructive in their rationalization, there is so much in them to which any concurrence may easily yield.

Enshrined in our Constitution is the mandate that [N]o person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law." ¹ This stands as a guaranty to every man's civil liberties regardless of his race, sex, character, station in life, and reputation. ²cräläwvirtualibräry

I believe that to allow the live television coverage of Mr. Joseph Ejercito Estrada's trial in the Sandiganbayan will violate his right to equal protection of the law, to due process and to a fair and impartial hearing. Not even the other constitutionally-guaranteed rights, such as the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, to free speech and to a free press, can serve as more weighty justifications.

Equal protection is afforded in a criminal proceeding where the trial is conducted fairly and impartially in the same manner and under the same procedure as all other people are tried within the state. ³ In the myriad of criminal cases that passed our trial courts, this is only the second time that the issue of the propriety of a televised trial is directly raised. In the first instance, this Court prohibited the live radio and television coverage of a criminal proceeding in order to protect the parties right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the proceedings and to avoid a miscarriage of justice. ⁴ I see no reason why the case of Mr. Estrada should be treated differently.

I do not discount the claim of the proponents of the televised trial that the people has the right to information on matters of public concern. But I am convinced that such right cannot be given preference over the right of an accused to a fair and impartial trial. To my mind, the fair administration of criminal justice cannot be subordinated to the people's right to information, particularly in the present case, where what at stake is the life of an individual.

The job of the judiciary is not to teach the public of its inner workings but to preserve fairness within the system . ⁵ No empirical evidence exists which indicates that televised criminal proceedings broaden the public's understanding of the judiciary. ⁶ The New York University conducted a study following an enactment of legislation prescribing an eighteen-month experimental period of televising criminal trials. ⁷ The results indicated that viewing criminal trials had virtually no effect on the level of the public understanding of even the most rudimentary aspects of court proceedings.

The fact that the accused held the highest position in the land is significant. As a matter of fact, his stature strongly justifies the denial of the request for a televised trial. To be sure, even before the camera starts moving, the case would have already achieved a sensational status. When a case is sensationalized, there is a greater difficulty in safeguarding the rights of the accused, particularly, his right to due process, which basically requires that the court trying the case should be impartial, ⁸ free from outside pressure and interference. The presence of news media can deny a defendant that judicial serenity and calm" which due process of law guarantees. This should not be allowed. Every person accused of a crime is entitled to a fair and impartial trial in which his legal rights are protected, ⁹ that is, a trial of facts, in accordance with the law and the evidence before an unbiased tribunal, in an atmosphere free from harmful error and from any extraneous influence that might be to his prejudice. The Supreme Court of the United States gives this right a ringing tone of support in its numerous decisions. Thus, in Irvin v. Dowd, ¹⁰ the defendant was convicted of murder following intensive and hostile news coverage. On review, the Court vacated the conviction and death sentence and remanded the case to the court a quo to allow a new trial for [w]ith his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion.." Similarly, in Rideau v. Lousiana ¹¹, the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant whose staged, highly emotional confession had been filmed with the cooperation of local police and later broadcast on television for three days while he was awaiting trial, holding: "[a]ny subsequent court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hallow formality.

In Estes v. Texas, ¹² the Court ruled that the defendant had not been afforded due process where the volume of trial publicity, the judge's failure to control the proceedings, the telecast of the hearing and the trial itself "inherently prevented a sober search for the truth." It was further held that the televising of "notorious" criminal trials is prohibited by the "due process of law." ¹³ Justice Harlan, supplying the winning vote, agreed but only because the Estes trial was one of "great notoriety." He made clear that he would reserve judgment on more routine cases. ¹⁴cräläwvirtualibräry

In Sheppard v. Maxwell, ¹⁵ with only Mr. Justice Black dissenting, the Court ordered a new trial for the petitioner, even though the first trial had occurred 12 years before. The Court noted that, "unfair and prejudicial news comment on pending trial has become increasingly prevalent" and issued a strong warning, thus:

"X x x. Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused. X x x. If publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration between the counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures." (Emphasis supplied)

In KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Arizona Superior Court, ¹⁶ the said US Supreme Court ruled that courts "may insist that the only performance which goes on in the courtroom is the trial of the case at hand." The Court said further that "the fact that media coverage has transformed events such as professional sports contests into a framework designed to accommodate that coverage does not mean that the First Amendment requires criminal trials to undergo the same transformation." In reaching these conclusions, the Court addressed the importance of a trial with no outside distractions. While the Court recognizes the media's right to freedom of the press within the First Amendment, it also recognizes the right of a court to close its doors. The Court condemns the transformation of a criminal trial into a spectacle created by intense media coverage.

In the Philippines, the legal aspect of prejudicial publicity through television has not yet been fully considered. To reiterate, the last time this Court directly came across with such an issue was on October 22, 1991, in "Re:Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino's Libel Case. "Relying on Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the case of Estes v. Texas, this Court issued an En Banc Resolution on the said date prohibiting the live radio and television coverage of court proceedings.

I see no justification to modify the said Resolution. It was relevant then as it is now.

Moreover, to allow media coverage of the Estrada trial would be to open a veritable Pandora's box of afflictions which will stymie the judiciary's efforts to make certain that the administration of justice is effected with equanimity, speed, and judiciousness. To be sure, our ruling will apply to all lower courts, including the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Appeals. Therefore, we should not be overly swayed by the passing passions generated by the Estrada cases into promulgating a doctrine which this Court will rue in its supervision of lower courts and in the exercise of its own original and appellate jurisdiction.

Assuming that this Court authorizes the desired media coverage, will it be fair to the Sandiganbayan Justices concerned to subject them to the massive and unfair scolding of what Estrada's counsel calls " a by and large hostile and at times cruel media?" Criticism and ridicule will likely arise from members of the media unfamiliar with the technical rules of the legal profession.

I submit that live TV coverage will not assist the Sandiganbayan in its duty to be temperate, attentive and impartial during the proceedings. Quite the contrary, live TV coverage will divert the attention of the Sandiganbayan from the testimonies of witnesses and serious arguments of counsel, thus affecting the court's understanding of the case.

The same adverse effects are true insofar as the lawyers are concerned. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines states that live coverage will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers. Ever conscious of the instant public reaction, the Sandiganbayan may hesitate to correct the highly unprofessional conduct of a popular attorney.

More importantly, the general public is unaware of procedural rules. If the Sandiganbayan's rulings are adverse to their expectations, this may start another massive action which may culminate to an "EDSA IV." Needless to state, the effects are disastrous to the nation.

In sum, the theory that televising the trial ensures that justice is served is not true. With intense coverage, the media becomes less of a defensive force against injustice and more of an offensive force by intimidating witnesses, distracting the lawyers and distorting the unfolding drama in the courtroom. ¹⁷ It gives rise to prejudiced opinion and publicity and creates bias and sometimes confusion among the people. All these factors definitely render the accuseds right to a fair and impartial trial illusory. Thus, until and unless the media can secure the rights of the accused and eliminate all the adverse effects, specifically on the general public, the television should remain outside the courtroom.

¹ Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

² As Justice Harlan of the US Supreme Court decreed: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerated classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. (Plessy v. Fergusson, 163 U.S. 537).

³ State v. Gill, 172 So. 412.

⁴ Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino's Libel Case, October 22, 1991.

⁵ Smith, The Distortion of Criminal Trials Through Televised Proceedings", Law and Psychology Review, 1997.

⁶ ibid., Thaler, The Watchful Eye: American Eye: American Jurisprudence in the Age of the Television Trial (1994).

⁷ Ibid., See also Petkanas, Cameras on Trial: An Assessment of Educational Effects of News Cameras in Trial Courts (1990) (Ph. D. Dissertation, New York University).

⁸ Tumey v. Ohio, 273 US 510; See also Banco Espanol v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 927;US v. Samio, 8 Phil.691; Paterson v. Colorado, 205 us 454 [1907]; Impartiality, in theory, requires that the conclusion to be reached in the case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.

⁹ Section l4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

"Sec. 14. x x (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appeal is unjustifiable.

¹⁰ 6 L Ed 2d 751,81 S Ct 1639 (1961).

¹¹ 373 US 723,10 L Ed 2d 663, 83 S Ct 1417 [1963]; 373 US 723,10 L Ed 2d 663, 83 S Ct 1417 [1963]); 373 US 723, 10 L Ed 2d 663,83 S Ct 1417 [1963].

¹² 381 US 532,14 L Ed 2d 543,85 S Ct 1628 [1965]; see also Marshall v. United States, 360 US 310,3 L Ed 2d 1250, 79 S Ct 1171 [1959].

¹³ Abraham, Perry, Freedom and the Court, Seventh Edition, 1998, p. 177

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 178

¹⁵ 384 US 333, 16 Led 2d 600,86 S Ct 1507[1966].

¹⁶ 459 US 1302,1306 (1982).

¹⁷ Smith, supra.