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A.M. OCA-IPI No. 06-2429-RTJ. September 4, 2006]

ATTY. REX G. RICO v. JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 275, LAS PI�AS CITY

First Division

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated SEPT. 4, 2006

A.M. OCA-IPI No. 06-2429-RTJ (Atty. Rex G. Rico v. Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pi�as City)

Acting on the Report [1] cralaw of the Office of the Court Administrator dated July 20, 2006, to wit:

1. VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated 16 January 2006 (with Annexes) of Atty. Rex G. Rico charging Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC, Br. 275, Las Piñas City with Gross Ignorance of the Law; Incompetence; Manifest Bias and Partiality relative to Criminal Case No. 02-0710 entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Conrado Jocson, et al." for Kidnapping for Ransom.

Complainant alleges that on 09 December 2003, private complainant, through counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing scheduled on 10 December 2003, because the hanging witness, Jan Arad Fernandez, the kidnap victim himself, had to take his final examination in his school, AMA Computer College in Makati City. This fact was made known to the private prosecutor (herein complainant) by Jan Arad's mother, Daisy Fernandez, on 09 December 2003, hence, the former immediately filed a motion for postponement on that same day, or a day before the scheduled hearing (December 10, 2003). Despite the clear and obvious validity of the ground for postponement, the respondent outrightly denied the motion, solely on the basis of unfounded, nay, irrationalized doubts over the truthfulness of the said ground for postponement, and despite the fact that no evidence or contrary assertion proving the falsity of the reason for the postponement was proffered either by respondent Judge himself or counsel for the accused. In his Order dated 10 December 2003, respondent Judge issued the assailed order the pertinent portion of which reads:

"The Court really doubts there is a valid reason for the postponement because of this the request for postponement is DENIED.

The prosecutor is directed to make formal offer of evidence furnishing copy thereof to the defense counsel who in turn are given ten (10) days to comment. As a consequence, the redirect examination on the witness Jan Arad Fernandez is hereby stricken off from the record.

Set the reception of the defense evidence on February 25, March 31, May 19, June 15, August 13, September 8, October 5, 2004 all at 2:00 in the afternoon.

Set the promulgation of the Decision on December 15, 2004 at 2:00 in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.

Given in open court this 10th day of December 2003 at Las Pi�as City ." (Emphasis supplied)

The respondent Judge did proffer reason or basis why he doubted the truthfulness of the cause for the postponement. Worse, he ordered the direct testimony of Jan Arad Fernandez, the kidnap victim, stricken-off the record. Resultantly, the prosecution's right to further adduce evidence was forfeited in view of the abusive and dogmatic conduct of the respondent Judge, this despite the fact that the prosecution had other witnesses to present documentary and object evidence to adduce.

On 10 February 2004, the prosecution filed its Motion for Reconsideration over the respondent's Order dated 10 December 2003, attaching therein the original copy of the Certification dated 02 February 2004, issued by Ms. Ma. Dolores Grutas, professor who gave the final examination to Jan Arad Fernandez, attested by Dr. Dante Silva, Dean, College of Business Administration and Accountancy, AMA Computer College. To his dismay, the said Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the respondent Judge in his Order dated 30 March 2004, stating that:

"Pursuant to Resolution No. 02-001 by the Las Piñas RTC Judges and conformably with the Covenant signed by the Representatives of the Criminal Justice System in Las Piñas City on February 18, 2004 and there being no injunction received from the Supreme Court enjoining the implementation of the Covenant or the Resolution despite receipt of the copies thereof, the above-captioned case/s is/are hereby declared covered by the project "EXPRESS COURT: A 180-DAY JUSTICE SYSTEM" designed to dispose, to wit: (1) ordinary cases within 180 days from their filing; (2) extraordinary cases 360 days from their filing; (3) exceptional cases within 720 days." (Emphasis provided)

Complainant argues that respondent Judge arrogated unto himself the authority to promulgate rules of procedure exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court. Based on the above-cited order, the prosecution, in conformity with the public prosecutor filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) directed against the assailed irregular and oppressive Orders of the respondent Judge dated 10 December 2003 and 30 March 2004. Thus, on 19 May 2004, the prosecution also moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the trial court in view of the said petition, but to no avail. On 25 May 2004, the prosecution once again filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the proceedings in the case handled by the respondent Judge, but the Court of Appeals in its Order dated 19 July 2004, denied the same.

However, on 08 August 2005, private prosecutor received copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals granting the prosecution's Petition for Certiorari, finding that respondent Judge acted abusively, oppressively and with grave abuse of discretion, thus, setting aside his Orders dated 10 December 2003 and 30 March 2004. The pertinent portions of the appellate court's decision reads as follows:

"Consequently, in view of the foregoing, we find the public respondent to have acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders in a manner that is capricious, whimsical and arbitrary or despotic in the exercise of his judgment." (Emphasis ours)

Complainant said that respondent Judge's acts of issuing the said assailed orders should not be countenanced as it amounted to deprivation of the prosecution's right to adduce evidence. The alleged Resolution No. 02-001 by the Las Piñas RTC Judges and the supposed covenant signed by the Representative of the Criminal Justice System in Las Piñas City on 18 February 2004, stated in respondent's Order dated 30 March 2004, cannot arrogate or bestow unto said bodies, with more reason to respondent Judge of the authority to promulgate rules of procedure. It should be emphasized that said authority is vested exclusively by the Constitution only to the Supreme Court and no other court. Therefore, the act of the respondent Judge in denying the said Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing as well as the denial of the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration are clear indications of the latter's blatant disregard of the Rules of Court which must be acted upon accordingly in order to set a precedent against abusive and whimsical magistrate like the respondent.

2. COMMENT (with Annexes) dated 28 April 2006 of respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda.

In his comment, respondent Judge vehemently denies the allegations of the complaint. He maintains that his actuations falls squarely within the reasonable latitude where every magistrate is authorized to do based on his appreciation of the facts of the case.

Anent the allegation that he acted with abuse and oppression relative to the Order dated 10 December 2003, denying the prosecution's Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing, respondent Judge explained that he did not oppress the prosecution's right to adduce evidence. The Order he issued may have been too harsh yet, the same does not outrightly mean oppression or despotism. Complainant harps on the fact that his case involves a heinous crime, but on the contrary respondent believes that rules are made to apply uniformly for both big and small cases.

Respondent Judge narrated that the hearing of 10 December 2003 was pre-set in accord with continuous trial. The said date was for the cross-examination of the prosecution's witness Jan Arad Fernandez after his direct examination, which is in addition to his testimony given during the application for bail proceedings. The motion to cancel was filed on 09 December 2003. Records show that no affidavit was attached to the motion except the private prosecutor's assertion that witness Fernandez could not appear on 10 December 2003 as it allegedly coincided with a school examination. Respondent contended that the fact that complainant himself did not appear on 10 December 2003 lead him to assume that his motion to cancel hearing will be granted is to respondent's opinion merely an absurd assumption and which will not sit well in any court. In the first place, said motion is a litigious one and will require comment or opposition on the adverse party. Truly, respondent argued, the defense lawyers vigorously objected to the cancellation of the hearing by contending that the absence of an affidavit violated the Rules of Court as well as the violation of the three-day notice rule. Not amiss to mention is the fact that the defense was then invoking the right to speedy trial. Thus, had the private prosecutor appeared, the scheduled date would not have been wasted; trial could have continued by presenting another witness.

Respondent said that his assailed Order dated 10 December 2003 should be analyzed with utmost dispatch when he declared that:

"When this case was called this afternoon for cross-examination of prosecution's witness Jan Arad Fernandez, the same witness failed to appear. There is an Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing filed by private prosecutor, Atty. Rex G. Rico, seeking cancellation of today's cross-examination of said witness on the ground that the witness is still a student pursuing a College Degree at AMA Computer College and has a final examination today, which explains his absence this afternoon. Atty. Luis Paredes, counsel for the accused Conrado de Guzman Jocson, opposed the motion to cancel and interposed vigorous objection to the requested postponement on the ground that the Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing failed to comply with the three-day notice required by the Rules and that the schedule of the Final Examination according to the semestral schedule of schools will not be in December but sometime in March. That he doubts the reason given by Atty. Rico especially considering that the motion itself is not verified and there was no document attached to support the reason given by Atty. Rico. Atty. Paredes informed the Court that such examination of the witness has been postponed earlier on account of the absence of the witness. Atty. Clarence R. Gaite, counsel for all the other accused except Jocson, adopted the objections of Atty. Paredes and on the ground that his clients has been detained for more than a year and the testimony of the complaining witness has not yet been terminated. Pros. Aurelio H. Castillo asked that the prosecution be given another chance to present the witness Jan Arad Fernandez as the earlier postponements of the hearing were not directly attributed to the absence of the witness but some other circumstances. Atty. Paredes informed the Court that there is no other witness present in the Court to testify for the prosecution contrary to the earlier situation when all the other police officers were always in Court when this case was called. The record however, shows that the police officers referred to by Atty. Paredes were not notified for today's hearing except SPO2 Danilo Noveno.

The question is whether the reason for the postponement is meritorious or not. The Court has no way of knowing at this time whether the reason given will merit the requested postponement because there is no document showing that the alleged Final Examination to be taken by the witness. Verification shows that the Minutes of the proceeding last October 28 does not bear the signature of Jan Arad Fernandez. But, private prosecutor, Atty. Rex G. Rico signed the same, indicating that he was present on October 28 wherein the witness Jan Arad Fernandez' cross-examination was scheduled for today. Clearly, Atty. Rico had all the time from October 28 to inform of his cross-examination today. The filing today by Atty. Rico of the motion to postpone the cross-examination indeed gave rise to some doubt as to motive thereof. If the reason is truly the final examination, then Atty. Rico could have prepared other witness even SPO2 Danilo Noveno was notified of today's hearing.

The Court is inclined to believe Atty. Paredes' submission that Atty. Rico presumed his motion to postpone will be granted. That is why he is not present in court today. The Court could not allow such frame of mind to harden into belief that he can make such presumption. x x x (Emphasis provided).

Respondent Judge further argued that a judge could not take judicial notice of either illness or a school examination, hence, the rule requires affidavits and other supporting papers. Although he believes that his order may have been too harsh, yet the same cannot in any way be considered oppressive or despotic. On this aspect, respondent pointed out that contrary to complainant's view, he is of the belief that his actuation is in accordance with the strict mandate of the requirements under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. In fine, what the complainant really dislikes is the strictness he manifested when the latter violated the rules.

Anent the expunction of testimony of the prosecution's witness, respondent countered it is but the necessary consequence thereof considering that there was an incomplete testimony and no cross-examination was conducted on the part of the prosecution's witness. Likewise, respondent Judge believes that that is a valid consequence of the Order, thus, the prosecution must rest its case, after its failure or unwillingness to adduce additional evidence. The absence of other witnesses and further evidence has paved the way for him to sustain the defense invocation for speedy trial.

It bears stressing that the alleged partiality and bias raised against him by the complainant were unsubstantiated. Simply put, there was no evidence to prove such allegations of the complainant. At the outset, respondent submits that in order for administrative liability to attach, complainant must establish that respondent was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other evil motive. Contrary to what the complainant contemplates is the fact that no evidence which will merit administrative liability on his part has been established in the case at hand.

EVALUATION. This case stemmed from the issuance of the assailed Orders dated 10 December 2003 and 30 March 2004 by the respondent Judge relative to the aforementioned criminal cases wherein the latter denied the presentation of the prosecution's witness in the person of the victim himself, Jan Arad Fernandez. Moreover, complainant assailed the respondent's Order by which the testimony of the said prosecution witness was stricken-off from the record, arguing that the said Order amounts to oppression and abuse of authority. Allegations of bias and partiality were likewise pleaded by the complainant. However, after a careful perusal of the records of the case at hand, it is the considered view of this Office that the complainant is clearly assailing the alleged errors committed by the respondent Judge in the latter's exercise of judicial discretion.

Time and again, the Supreme Court in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1581, Re: Peter Sesbre�o vs. Judge Gloria B. Aglugub, February 28, 2005 enunciated that: "In sum, for liability to attach for gross ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision, or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous but most importantly, it must be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty or some other like motive." (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Judge's actuations are hardly indicative of bad faith or any motive of the same nature which characterizes the offense of gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, bias and partiality. The appreciation of the factual settings of the above-cited criminal case by the respondent Judge is based on the chronological set-up during the trial on the merits of the said case. The fact is that the respondent Judge's denial of the Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing dated 10 December 2003 resulting in the expunction of the prosecution witness' testimony is by its nature neither despotic nor oppressive in the absence of a clear and convincing proof to the contrary.

It is noteworthy to mention that there was negligence on the part of the movant (herein complainant) when he filed the motion to postpone a day before the scheduled hearing. He did not even bother to appear on the scheduled date of hearing, which made the respondent Judge rule to deny the same. Indeed, complainant had the belief that his Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing would be granted, but to his dismay, the respondent Judge did otherwise which prompted him to file this administrative complaint.

Settled in this case is the fact that the respondent Judge strictly applied the provisions of the Rules of Court pertaining to three-day notice requirement in filing motions and other similarly applicable rules under the premises. Such being the case, respondent merely exercised his judicial discretion on the basis of the respective contentions of the parties in the criminal proceedings vis-�-vis the factual antecedents in the said proceedings which became the subject matter of this administrative complaint. In the same vein, absence of any evidence to prove that the respondent Judge acted in a malevolent manner relative to the issuance of the assailed Orders will make him administratively liable.

Moreover, it should be noted that although the Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari filed by the prosecution, no evidence of bad faith was established against the respondent Judge in relation to the issuance of the assailed Orders. Therefore, the administrative complaint filed by the complainant is not an appropriate remedy in order to vindicate their alleged damaged and prejudice. The Court reiterates its settled ruling that: administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the issuance of the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. Complainant could not be allowed to indirectly secure from this Court a ruling thereon in violation of the principle on hierarchy of courts. (A.M. No. RTJ-05-1905, Re: Charito L. Planas vs. Judge Ernesto A. Reyes, etc., February 23, 2005 ).

RECOMMENDATION. Culled from the foregoing discussions, respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court is our recommendation that the instant administrative complaint be DISMISSED for lack of merit and for being judicial in nature.

The Court agrees with the foregoing recommendation.

The filing of an administrative complaint against a judge is not the appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available. Indeed, as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty and corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. [2] cralaw Moreover, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even. [3] cralaw The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. [4] cralaw As against the bare allegations of misconduct with no cogent proof thereon, and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, the latter shall prevail. [5] cralaw

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to DISMISS the instant administrative matter against Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for lack of merit and for being judicial in nature.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court

First Division


Endnotes:

[1] cralaw Rollo , pp. 217-223.

[2] cralaw Cua Shuk Yin v. Judge Norma C. Perello , A.M. No. RTJ-05-1961, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 472, 476.

[3] cralaw Casta�os v. Esca�o , A.M. No. RTJ-93-955, December 12, 1995, 251 SCRA 174, 194.

[4] cralaw See Abdula v. Guiani , 382 Phil. 757, 769 (2000).

[5] cralaw Sayson v. Luna, A.M. No. P-04-1829, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 502, 505.


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