CIRCULAR
NO. 12[1987]
TO: THE
COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN
TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND
MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
SUBJECT:
GUIDELINES ON ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS OF ARREST UNDER SECTION 2, ARTICLE
III,
1987 CONSTITUTION.
Article III,
Section
2 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
provides:
"Sec. 2.
The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the Judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." (Italics
supplied)
The foregoing
provision
is a verbatim reproduction of Article III, Section 3 of the
1935
Constitution, and Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution,
except
that the word "personally" is now inserted after the word "determined"
in the 1987 Constitution; in the 1935 Constitution, the term "warrants"
was used generally while the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions specify both
search
warrant and warrant of arrest; and the authority to issue such warrants
given in the 1973 Constitution to "other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law", in addition to the Judge, has been deleted
in
the 1987 Constitution.
Conflicting interpretations
of the new provision of the 1987 Constitution have been made by lower
court
judges, in view of the insertion of the word "personally".
Hence,
pursuant to the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, the following
guidelines
are established for the guidance of the bench and bar:
[1] The
purpose
of a preliminary investigation is only to determine probable cause. As
stressed in Hashmin vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216, January 31, 1931 "x
x x the investigating judge or prosecuting officer acts upon
probable
cause and reasonable belief, not upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties'
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender
well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the
accused
is probably guilty thereof. When all this is fulfilled, the accused
will
not be permitted to cast about for fancied reasons to delay the
proceeding;
the time to task for more is at the trial. x x x."
[2] Both
under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the settled rulings of our jurisprudence,
which rulings the drafters of the 1987 Constitution were certainly
cognizant
of and took into consideration, is that the judge, in the determination
of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest,
may rely upon the certification of the fiscal that he has conducted a
preliminary
investigation and that a probable cause exists. [See Hashmin vs.
Boncan,
supra; and Placer vs. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463, citing U.S.
vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil. 1 and Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil.
739].
[3] The
insertion
of the word "personally" for the judge's determination of the
existence
of probable cause in the 1987 Constitution serves to underscore the
exclusive
and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the existence of a probable cause. He is proscribed from delegating
this
task of investigation to any other person. He must do it
personally.
[4] In
satisfying
himself of the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant
of arrest, the judge, following the established doctrine and procedure,
may either:
(a)
Rely upon the
fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause, whether or
not
the case is cognizable only by the Regional Trial Court and on the
basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(b) If on
the face
of the information, he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's
certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits
of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
a probable cause.
[5] The
Supreme Court's
admonition should be heeded that while the Constitutions does confer
upon
the judge the power to conduct preliminary examination preparatory to
issuing
a warrant of arrest, sound policy reasons should curb the propensity to
make use of such competence, since judges of the CFI and CCC (now RTC)
"should not encumber themselves with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints" but should "concentrate
on
hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before their courts." [Collector
of Customs vs. Villaluz and five other cases jointly decided, 71
SCRA
356 (1976)].
Strict compliance with
these guidelines is hereby enjoined.
June 30, 1987.
[Sgd.]
CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE Chief
Justice
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