§ 304. — Duration of copyright: Subsisting copyrights.
[Laws in effect as of January 24, 2002]
[Document not affected by Public Laws enacted between
January 24, 2002 and December 19, 2002]
[CITE: 17USC304]
TITLE 17--COPYRIGHTS
CHAPTER 3--DURATION OF COPYRIGHT
Sec. 304. Duration of copyright: Subsisting copyrights
(a) Copyrights in Their First Term on January 1, 1978.--(1)(A) Any
copyright, the first term of which is subsisting on January 1, 1978,
shall endure for 28 years from the date it was originally secured.
(B) In the case of--
(i) any posthumous work or of any periodical, cyclopedic, or
other composite work upon which the copyright was originally secured
by the proprietor thereof, or
(ii) any work copyrighted by a corporate body (otherwise than as
assignee or licensee of the individual author) or by an employer for
whom such work is made for hire,
the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and
extension of the copyright in such work for the further term of 67
years.
(C) In the case of any other copyrighted work, including a
contribution by an individual author to a periodical or to a cyclopedic
or other composite work--
(i) the author of such work, if the author is still living,
(ii) the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the
author is not living,
(iii) the author's executors, if such author, widow, widower, or
children are not living, or
(iv) the author's next of kin, in the absence of a will of the
author,
shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such
work for a further term of 67 years.
(2)(A) At the expiration of the original term of copyright in a work
specified in paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, the copyright shall
endure for a renewed and extended further term of 67 years, which--
(i) if an application to register a claim to such further term
has been made to the Copyright Office within 1 year before the
expiration of the original term of copyright, and the claim is
registered, shall vest, upon the beginning of such further term, in
the proprietor of the copyright who is entitled to claim the renewal
of copyright at the time the application is made; or
(ii) if no such application is made or the claim pursuant to
such application is not registered, shall vest, upon the beginning
of such further term, in the person or entity that was the
proprietor of the copyright as of the last day of the original term
of copyright.
(B) At the expiration of the original term of copyright in a work
specified in paragraph (1)(C) of this subsection, the copyright shall
endure for a renewed and extended further term of 67 years, which--
(i) if an application to register a claim to such further term
has been made to the Copyright Office within 1 year before the
expiration of the original term of copyright, and the claim is
registered, shall vest, upon the beginning of such further term, in
any person who is entitled under paragraph (1)(C) to the renewal and
extension of the copyright at the time the application is made; or
(ii) if no such application is made or the claim pursuant to
such application is not registered, shall vest, upon the beginning
of such further term, in any person entitled under paragraph (1)(C),
as of the last day of the original term of copyright, to the renewal
and extension of the copyright.
(3)(A) An application to register a claim to the renewed and
extended term of copyright in a work may be made to the Copyright
Office--
(i) within 1 year before the expiration of the original term of
copyright by any person entitled under paragraph (1)(B) or (C) to
such further term of 67 years; and
(ii) at any time during the renewed and extended term by any
person in whom such further term vested, under paragraph (2)(A) or
(B), or by any successor or assign of such person, if the
application is made in the name of such person.
(B) Such an application is not a condition of the renewal and
extension of the copyright in a work for a further term of 67 years.
(4)(A) If an application to register a claim to the renewed and
extended term of copyright in a work is not made within 1 year before
the expiration of the original term of copyright in a work, or if the
claim pursuant to such application is not registered, then a derivative
work prepared under authority of a grant of a transfer or license of the
copyright that is made before the expiration of the original term of
copyright may continue to be used under the terms of the grant during
the renewed and extended term of copyright without infringing the
copyright, except that such use does not extend to the preparation
during such renewed and extended term of other derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work covered by such grant.
(B) If an application to register a claim to the renewed and
extended term of copyright in a work is made within 1 year before its
expiration, and the claim is registered, the certificate of such
registration shall constitute prima facie evidence as to the validity of
the copyright during its renewed and extended term and of the facts
stated in the certificate. The evidentiary weight to be accorded the
certificates of a registration of a renewed and extended term of
copyright made after the end of that 1-year period shall be within the
discretion of the court.
(b) Copyrights in Their Renewal Term at the Time of the Effective
Date of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.--Any copyright
still in its renewal term at the time that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act becomes effective shall have a copyright term of 95 years
from the date copyright was originally secured.
(c) Termination of Transfers and Licenses Covering Extended Renewal
Term.--In the case of any copyright subsisting in either its first or
renewal term on January 1, 1978, other than a copyright in a work made
for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license
of the renewal copyright or any right under it, executed before January
1, 1978, by any of the persons designated by subsection (a)(1)(C) of
this section, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination under
the following conditions:
(1) In the case of a grant executed by a person or persons other
than the author, termination of the grant may be effected by the
surviving person or persons who executed it. In the case of a grant
executed by one or more of the authors of the work, termination of
the grant may be effected, to the extent of a particular author's
share in the ownership of the renewal copyright, by the author who
executed it or, if such author is dead, by the person or persons
who, under clause (2) of this subsection, own and are entitled to
exercise a total of more than one-half of that author's termination
interest.
(2) Where an author is dead, his or her termination interest is
owned, and may be exercised, as follows:
(A) The widow or widower owns the author's entire
termination interest unless there are any surviving children or
grandchildren of the author, in which case the widow or widower
owns one-half of the author's interest.
(B) The author's surviving children, and the surviving
children of any dead child of the author, own the author's
entire termination interest unless there is a widow or widower,
in which case the ownership of one-half of the author's interest
is divided among them.
(C) The rights of the author's children and grandchildren
are in all cases divided among them and exercised on a per
stirpes basis according to the number of such author's children
represented; the share of the children of a dead child in a
termination interest can be exercised only by the action of a
majority of them.
(D) In the event that the author's widow or widower,
children, and grandchildren are not living, the author's
executor, administrator, personal representative, or trustee
shall own the author's entire termination interest.
(3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during
a period of five years beginning at the end of fifty-six years from
the date copyright was originally secured, or beginning on January
1, 1978, whichever is later.
(4) The termination shall be effected by serving an advance
notice in writing upon the grantee or the grantee's successor in
title. In the case of a grant executed by a person or persons other
than the author, the notice shall be signed by all of those entitled
to terminate the grant under clause (1) of this subsection, or by
their duly authorized agents. In the case of a grant executed by one
or more of the authors of the work, the notice as to any one
author's share shall be signed by that author or his or her duly
authorized agent or, if that author is dead, by the number and
proportion of the owners of his or her termination interest required
under clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection, or by their duly
authorized agents.
(A) The notice shall state the effective date of the
termination, which shall fall within the five-year period
specified by clause (3) of this subsection, or, in the case of a
termination under subsection (d), within the five-year period
specified by subsection (d)(2), and the notice shall be served
not less than two or more than ten years before that date. A
copy of the notice shall be recorded in the Copyright Office
before the effective date of termination, as a condition to its
taking effect.
(B) The notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner of
service, with requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall
prescribe by regulation.
(5) Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or
to make any future grant.
(6) In the case of a grant executed by a person or persons other
than the author, all rights under this title that were covered by
the terminated grant revert, upon the effective date of termination,
to all of those entitled to terminate the grant under clause (1) of
this subsection. In the case of a grant executed by one or more of
the authors of the work, all of a particular author's rights under
this title that were covered by the terminated grant revert, upon
the effective date of termination, to that author or, if that author
is dead, to the persons owning his or her termination interest under
clause (2) of this subsection, including those owners who did not
join in signing the notice of termination under clause (4) of this
subsection. In all cases the reversion of rights is subject to the
following limitations:
(A) A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant
before its termination may continue to be utilized under the
terms of the grant after its termination, but this privilege
does not extend to the preparation after the termination of
other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered
by the terminated grant.
(B) The future rights that will revert upon termination of
the grant become vested on the date the notice of termination
has been served as provided by clause (4) of this subsection.
(C) Where the author's rights revert to two or more persons
under clause (2) of this subsection, they shall vest in those
persons in the proportionate shares provided by that clause. In
such a case, and subject to the provisions of subclause (D) of
this clause, a further grant, or agreement to make a further
grant, of a particular author's share with respect to any right
covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is signed by
the same number and proportion of the owners, in whom the right
has vested under this clause, as are required to terminate the
grant under clause (2) of this subsection. Such further grant or
agreement is effective with respect to all of the persons in
whom the right it covers has vested under this subclause,
including those who did not join in signing it. If any person
dies after rights under a terminated grant have vested in him or
her, that person's legal representatives, legatees, or heirs at
law represent him or her for purposes of this subclause.
(D) A further grant, or agreement to make a further grant,
of any right covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it
is made after the effective date of the termination. As an
exception, however, an agreement for such a further grant may be
made between the author or any of the persons provided by the
first sentence of clause (6) of this subsection, or between the
persons provided by subclause (C) of this clause, and the
original grantee or such grantee's successor in title, after the
notice of termination has been served as provided by clause (4)
of this subsection.
(E) Termination of a grant under this subsection affects
only those rights covered by the grant that arise under this
title, and in no way affects rights arising under any other
Federal, State, or foreign laws.
(F) Unless and until termination is effected under this
subsection, the grant, if it does not provide otherwise,
continues in effect for the remainder of the extended renewal
term.
(d) Termination Rights Provided in Subsection (c) Which Have Expired
on or Before the Effective Date of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act.--In the case of any copyright other than a work made for
hire, subsisting in its renewal term on the effective date of the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act for which the termination right
provided in subsection (c) has expired by such date, where the author or
owner of the termination right has not previously exercised such
termination right, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or
license of the renewal copyright or any right under it, executed before
January 1, 1978, by any of the persons designated in subsection
(a)(1)(C) of this section, other than by will, is subject to termination
under the following conditions:
(1) The conditions specified in subsections (c)(1), (2), (4),
(5), and (6) of this section apply to terminations of the last 20
years of copyright term as provided by the amendments made by the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.
(2) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during
a period of 5 years beginning at the end of 75 years from the date
copyright was originally secured.
(Pub. L. 94-553, title I, Sec. 101, Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2573; Pub.
L. 102-307, title I, Sec. 102(a), (d), June 26, 1992, 106 Stat. 264,
266; Pub. L. 105-80, Sec. 12(a)(9), Nov. 13, 1997, 111 Stat. 1535; Pub.
L. 105-298, title I, Secs. 102(d)(1), 103, Oct. 27, 1998, 112 Stat.
2827, 2829; Pub. L. 107-273, div. C, title III, Sec. 13210(10), Nov. 2,
2002, 116 Stat. 1910.)
Historical and Revision Notes
house report no. 94-1476
The arguments in favor of lengthening the duration of copyright
apply to subsisting as well as future copyrights. The bill's basic
approach is to increase the present 56-year term to 75 years in the case
of copyrights subsisting in both their first and their renewal terms.
Copyrights in Their First Term. Subsection (a) of section 304
reenacts and preserves the renewal provision, now in Section 24 of the
statute [section 24 of former title 17], for all of the works presently
in their first 28-year term. A great many of the present expectancies in
these cases are the subject of existing contracts, and it would be
unfair and immensely confusing to cut off or alter these interests.
Renewal registration will be required during the 28th year of the
copyright but the length of the renewal term will be increased from 28
to 47 years.
Although the bill preserves the language of the present renewal
provision without any change in substance, the Committee intends that
the reference to a ``posthumous work'' in this section has the meaning
given to it in Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941 (2d Cir.
1975)--one as to which no copyright assignment or other contract for
exploitation of the work has occurred during an author's lifetime,
rather than one which is simply first published after the author's
death.
Copyrights in Their Renewal Term. Renewed copyrights that are
subsisting in their second term at any time during the period between
December 31, 1976, and December 31, 1977, inclusive, would be extended
under section 304(b) to run for a total of 75 years. This provision
would add another 19 years to the duration of any renewed copyright
whose second term started during the 28 years immediately preceding the
effective date of the act (January 1, 1978). In addition, it would
extend by varying lesser amounts the duration of renewal copyrights
already extended under Public Laws 87-668, 89-142, 90-141, 90-416, 91-
147, 91-555, 92-170, 92-566, and 93-573, all of which would otherwise
expire on December 31, 1976. The subsection would also extend the
duration of renewal copyrights whose second 28-year term is scheduled to
expire during 1977. In none of these cases, however, would the total
terms of copyright for the work be longer than 75 years.
Subsection (b) also covers the special situation of a subsisting
first-term copyright that becomes eligible for renewal registration
during the year before the act comes into effect. If a renewal
registration is not made before the effective date [Jan. 1, 1978], the
case is governed by the provisions of section 304(a) [subsec. (a) of
this section]. If a renewal registration is made during the year before
the new law takes effect, however, the copyright would be treated as if
it were already subsisting in its second term and would be extended to
the full period of 75 years without the need for further renewal.
Termination of Grants Covering Extended Term. An issue underlying
the 19-year extension of renewal terms under both subsections (a) and
(b) of section 304 [subsecs. (a) and (b) of this section] is whether, in
a case where their rights have already been transferred, the author or
the dependents of the author should be given a chance to benefit from
the extended term. The arguments for granting rights of termination are
even more persuasive under section 304 than they are under section 203;
the extended term represents a completely new property right, and there
are strong reasons for giving the author, who is the fundamental
beneficiary of copyright under the Constitution, an opportunity to share
in it.
Subsection (c) of section 304 is a close but not exact counterpart
of section 203. In the case of either a first-term or renewal copyright
already subsisting when the new statute becomes effective [Jan. 1,
1978], any grant of rights covering the renewal copyright in the work,
executed before the effective date [Jan. 1, 1978], may be terminated
under conditions and limitations similar to those provided in section
203. Except for transfers and licenses covering renewal copyrights
already extended under Public Laws 87-668, 89-142, 90-141, 90-416, 91-
147, 91-555, 92-170, 92-566, and 93-573, which would become subject to
termination immediately upon the coming into effect of the revised law,
the 5-year period during which termination could be made effective would
start 56 years after copyright was originally secured.
The bill distinguishes between the persons who can terminate a grant
under section 203 and those entitled to terminate a grant covering an
extended term under section 304. Instead of being limited to transfers
and licenses executed by the author, the right of termination under
section 304(c) also extends to grants executed by those beneficiaries of
the author who can claim renewal under the present law: his or her widow
or widower, children, executors, or next of kin.
There is good reason for this difference. Under section 203, an
author's widow or widower and children are given rights of termination
if the author is dead, but these rights apply only to grants by the
author, and any effort by a widow, widower, or child to transfer
contingent future interests under a termination would be ineffective. In
contrast, under the present renewal provisions, any statutory
beneficiary of the author can make a valid transfer or license of future
renewal rights, which is completely binding if the author is dead and
the person who executed the grant turns out to be the proper renewal
claimant. Because of this, a great many contingent transfers of future
renewal rights have been obtained from widows, widowers, children, and
next of kin, and a substantial number of these will be binding. After
the present 28-year renewal period has ended, a statutory beneficiary
who has signed a disadvantageous grant of this sort should have the
opportunity to reclaim the extended term.
As explained above in connection with section 203, the bill adopts
the principle that, where a transfer or license by the author is
involved, termination may be effected by a per stirpes majority of those
entitled to terminate, and this principle also applies to the ownership
of rights under a termination and to the making of further grants of
reverted rights. In general, this principle has also been adopted with
respect to the termination of rights under an extended renewal copyright
in section 304, but with several differences made necessary by the
differences between the legal status of transfers and licenses made
after the effective date of the new law [Jan. 1, 1978] (governed by
section 203) and that of grants of renewal rights made earlier and
governed by section 304(c). The following are the most important
distinctions between the termination rights under the two sections:
1. Joint Authorship.--Under section 304, a grant of renewal
rights executed by joint authors during the first term of copyright
would be effective only as to those who were living at the time of
renewal; where any of them are dead, their statutory beneficiaries
are entitled to claim the renewal independently as a new estate. It
would therefore be inappropriate to impose a requirement of majority
action with respect to transfers executed by two or more joint
authors.
2. Grants Not Executed by Author.--Section 304(c) adopts the
majority principle underlying the amendments of section 203 [section
203 of this title] with respect to the termination rights of a dead
author's widow or widower and children. There is much less reason,
as a matter of policy, to apply this principle in the case of
transfers and licenses of renewal rights executed under the present
law by the author's widow, widower, children, executors, or next of
kin, and the practical arguments against doing so are conclusive. It
is not clear how the shares of a class of renewal beneficiaries are
to be divided under the existing law, and greater difficulties would
be presented if any attempt were made to apply the majority
principle to further beneficiaries in cases where one or more of the
renewal beneficiaries are dead. Therefore, where the grant was
executed by a person or persons other than the author, termination
can be effected only by the unanimous action of the survivors of
those who executed it.
3. Further Grants.--The reason against adopting a principle of
majority action with respect to the right to terminate grants by
joint authors and grants not executed by the author apply equally
with respect to the right to make further grants under section
304(c). The requirement for majority action in clause (6)(C) is
therefore confined to cases where the rights under a grant by the
author have reverted to his or her widow or widower, or children, or
both. Where the extended term reverts to joint authors or to a class
of renewal beneficiaries who have joined in executing a grant, their
rights would be governed by the general rules of tenancy in common;
each coowner would have an independent right to sell his share, or
to use or license the work subject to an accounting.
Nothing contained in this section or elsewhere in this legislation
is intended to extend the duration of any license, transfer, or
assignment made for a period of less than fifty-six years. If, for
example, an agreement provides an earlier termination date or lesser
duration, or if it allows the author the right of cancelling or
terminating the agreement under certain circumstances, the duration is
governed by the agreement. Likewise, nothing in this section or
legislation is intended to change the existing state of the law of
contracts concerning the circumstances in which an author may terminate
a license, transfer or assignment.
Section 304(c)(6)(E) provides that, unless and until termination is
effected under this section, the grant, ``if it does not provide
otherwise,'' continues for the term of copyright. This section means
that, if the agreement does not contain provisions specifying its term
or duration, and the author has not terminated the agreement under this
section, the agreement continues for the term of the copyright, subject
to any right of termination under circumstances which may be specified
therein. If, however, an agreement does contain provisions governing its
duration--for example, a term of sixty years--and the author has not
exercised his or her right of termination under the statute, the
agreement will continue according to its terms--in this example, for
only sixty years. The quoted language is not to be construed as
requiring agreements to reserve the right of termination.
References in Text
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, referred to in subsecs.
(b) and (d), is title I of Pub. L. 105-298, Oct. 27, 1998, 112 Stat.
2827. The effective date of the Act is the date of enactment of Pub. L.
105-298, which was approved Oct. 27, 1998. For complete classification
of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 1998 Amendments note set out
under section 101 of this title and Tables.
Amendments
2002--Subsec. (c)(2)(A) to (C). Pub. L. 107-273, in subpars. (A) to
(C), substituted ``The'' for ``the'' and, in subpars. (A) and (B),
substituted period for semicolon at end.
1998--Subsec. (a)(1)(B), (C). Pub. L. 105-298, Sec. 102(d)(1)(A)(i),
substituted ``67'' for ``47'' in concluding provisions.
Subsec. (a)(2)(A), (B). Pub. L. 105-298, Sec. 102(d)(1)(A)(ii),
substituted ``67'' for ``47'' in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (a)(3)(A)(i), (B). Pub. L. 105-298, Sec. 102(d)(1)(A)(iii),
substituted ``67'' for ``47''.
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 105-298, Sec. 102(d)(1)(B), amended heading and
text of subsec. (b) generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows:
``The duration of any copyright, the renewal term of which is subsisting
at any time between December 31, 1976, and December 31, 1977, inclusive,
or for which renewal registration is made between December 31, 1976, and
December 31, 1977, inclusive, is extended to endure for a term of
seventy-five years from the date copyright was originally secured.''
Subsec. (c)(2). Pub. L. 105-298, Sec. 103(1), struck out ``by his
widow or her widower and his or her children or grandchildren'' after
``exercised,'' in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (c)(2)(D). Pub. L. 105-298, Sec. 103(2), added subpar. (D).
Subsec. (c)(4)(A). Pub. L. 105-298, Sec. 102(d)(1)(C), inserted
``or, in the case of a termination under subsection (d), within the
five-year period specified by subsection (d)(2),'' before ``and the
notice''.
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 105-298, Sec. 102(d)(1)(D), added subsec. (d).
1997--Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 105-80 substituted ``subsection
(a)(1)(C)'' for ``the subsection (a)(1)(C)'' in introductory provisions.
1992--Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 102-307, Sec. 102(a), amended subsec. (a)
generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (a) read as follows: ``Copyrights
in Their First Term on January 1, 1978.--Any copyright, the first term
of which is subsisting on January 1, 1978, shall endure for twenty-eight
years from the date it was originally secured: Provided, That in the
case of any posthumous work or of any periodical, cyclopedic, or other
composite work upon which the copyright was originally secured by the
proprietor thereof, or of any work copyrighted by a corporate body
(otherwise than as assignee or licensee of the individual author) or by
an employer for whom such work is made for hire, the proprietor of such
copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright
in such work for the further term of forty-seven years when application
for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the Copyright
Office and duly registered therein within one year prior to the
expiration of the original term of copyright: And provided further, That
in the case of any other copyrighted work, including a contribution by
an individual author to a periodical or to a cyclopedic or other
composite work, the author of such work, if still living, or the widow,
widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living, or if
such author, widow, widower, or children be not living, then the
author's executors, or in the absence of a will, his or her next of kin
shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such
work for a further term of forty-seven years when application for such
renewal and extension shall have been made to the Copyright Office and
duly registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the
original term of copyright: And provided further, That in default of the
registration of such application for renewal and extension, the
copyright in any work shall terminate at the expiration of twenty-eight
years from the date copyright was originally secured.''
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 102-307, Sec. 102(d), substituted ``subsection
(a)(1)(C)'' for ``second proviso of subsection (a)'' in introductory
provisions.
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 102-307 effective June 26, 1992, but applicable
only to copyrights secured between January 1, 1964, and December 31,
1977, and not affecting court proceedings pending on June 26, 1992, with
copyrights secured before January 1, 1964, governed by section 304(a) of
this title as in effect on the day before June 26, 1992, except each
reference to forty-seven years in such provisions deemed to be 67 years,
see section 102(g) of Pub. L. 102-307, as amended, set out as a note
under section 101 of this title.
Effective Date
Subsec. (b) of this section effective Oct. 19, 1976, see section 102
of Pub. L. 94-553, set out as a note preceding section 101 of this
title.
Legal Effect of Renewal of Copyright Unchanged
Section 102(c) of Pub. L. 102-307, as amended by Pub. L. 105-298,
title I, Sec. 102(d)(2)(A), Oct. 27, 1998, 112 Stat. 2828, provided
that: ``The renewal and extension of a copyright for a further term of
67 years provided for under paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 304(a) of
title 17, United States Code[,] shall have the same effect with respect
to any grant, before the effective date of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act [Oct. 27, 1998], of a transfer or license of the further
term as did the renewal of a copyright before the effective date of the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act under the law in effect at the
time of such grant.''
Ad Interim Copyrights Subsisting or Capable of Being Secured Under
Predecessor Provisions
Section 107 of Pub. L. 94-553 provided that: ``In the case of any
work in which an ad interim copyright is subsisting or is capable of
being secured on December 31, 1977, under section 22 of title 17 as it
existed on that date, copyright protection is hereby extended to endure
for the term or terms provided by section 304 of title 17 as amended by
the first section of this Act [this section].''
Copyright Granted to ``Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures''
for Term of 75 Years
Private Law 92-60, Dec. 15, 1971, 85 Stat. 857, provided: ``That,
any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, copyright is
hereby granted to the trustees under the will of Mary Baker Eddy, their
successors, and assigns, in the work `Science and Health with Key to the
Scriptures' (entitled also in some editions `Science and Health' or
`Science and Health; with a Key to the Scriptures'), by Mary Baker Eddy,
including all editions thereof in English and translation heretofore
published, or hereafter published by or on behalf of said trustees,
their successors or assigns, for a term of seventy-five years from the
effective date of this Act [Dec. 15, 1971] or from the date of first
publication, whichever is later. All copies of the protected work
hereafter published are to bear notice of copyright, and all new
editions hereafter published are to be registered in the Copyright
Office, in accordance with the provisions of title 17 of the United
States Code or any revision or recodification thereof. The copyright
owner shall be entitled to all rights and remedies provided to copyright
owners generally by law: Provided, however, That no liability shall
attach under this Act for lawful uses made or acts done prior to the
effective date of this Act in connection with said work, or in respect
to the continuance for one year subsequent to such date of any business
undertaking or enterprise lawfully undertaken prior to such date
involving expenditure or contractual obligation in connection with the
exploitation, production, reproduction or circulation of said work. This
Act shall be effective upon enactment.''
Extension of Renewal Terms Under Prior Law
Pub. L. 93-573, title I, Sec. 104, Dec. 31, 1974, 88 Stat. 1873,
provided that in any case in which the renewal term of a copyright
subsisting in any work on Dec. 31, 1974, or the term thereof as extended
by Public Law 87-668, by Public Law 89-142, by Public Law 90-141, by
Public Law 90-416, by Public Law 91-417, by Public Law 91-555, by Public
Law 92-170, or by Public Law 92-556 (or by all or certain of said laws)
[set out below], would expire prior to Dec. 31, 1976, such term was
continued until Dec. 31, 1976.
Pub. L. 92-566, Oct. 25, 1972, 86 Stat. 1181, provided that in any
case in which the renewal term of a copyright subsisting in any work on
Oct. 25, 1972, or the term thereof as extended by Public Law 87-668, by
Public Law 89-142, by Public Law 90-141, by Public Law 90-416, by Public
Law 91-147, by Public Law 91-555, or by Public Law 92-170 (or by all or
certain of said laws) [set out below], would expire prior to Dec. 31,
1974, such term was continued until Dec. 31, 1974.
Pub. L. 92-170, Nov. 24, 1971, 85 Stat. 490, provided that in any
case in which the renewal term of a copyright subsisting in any work on
Nov. 24, 1971, or the term thereof as extended by Public Law 87-668, by
Public Law 89-142, by Public Law 90-141, by Public Law 90-416, by Public
Law 91-147, or by Public Law 91-555 (or by all or certain of said laws),
would expire prior to Dec. 31, 1972, such term was continued until Dec.
31, 1972.
Pub. L. 91-555, Dec. 17, 1970, 84 Stat. 1441, provided that in any
case in which the renewal term of a copyright subsisting in any work on
Dec. 17, 1970, or the term thereof as extended by Public Law 87-668, by
Public Law 89-442 [89-142], by Public Law 90-141, by Public Law 90-416,
or by Public Law 91-147 (or by all or certain of said laws) [set out
below], would expire prior to Dec. 31, 1971, such term was continued
until Dec. 31, 1971.
Pub. L. 91-147, Dec. 16, 1969, 83 Stat. 360, provided that in any
case in which the renewal term of a copyright subsisting in any work on
Dec. 16, 1969, or the term thereof as extended by Public Law 87-668, by
Public Law 89-142, by Public Law 90-141, or by Public Law 90-416 (or by
all or certain of said laws) [set out below], would expire prior to Dec.
31, 1970, such term was continued until Dec. 31, 1970.
Pub. L. 90-416, July 23, 1968, 82 Stat. 397, provided that in any
case in which the renewal term of a copyright subsisting in any work on
July 23, 1968, or the term thereof as extended by Public Law 87-668, by
Public Law 89-142, or by Public Law 90-141 (or by all or certain of said
laws) [set out below], would expire prior to Dec. 31, 1969, such term
was continued until Dec. 31, 1969.
Pub. L. 90-141, Nov. 16, 1967, 81 Stat. 464, provided that in any
case in which the renewal term of a copyright subsisting in any work on
Nov. 16, 1967, or the term thereof as extended by Public Law 87-668, or
by Public Law 89-142 (or by either or both of said laws) [set out
below], would expire prior to Dec. 31, 1968, such term was continued
until Dec. 31, 1968.
Pub. L. 89-142, Aug. 28, 1965, 79 Stat. 581, provided that in any
case in which the renewal term of a copyright subsisting in any work on
Aug. 28, 1965, or the term thereof as extended by Public Law 87-668 [set
out below], would expire prior to Dec. 31, 1967, such term was continued
until Dec. 31, 1967.
Pub. L. 87-668, Sept. 19, 1962, 76 Stat. 555, provided that in any
case in which the renewal term of a copyright subsisting in any work on
Sept. 19, 1962, would expire prior to Dec. 31, 1965, such term was
continued until Dec. 31, 1965.
Section Referred to in Other Sections
This section is referred to in sections 305, 408, 409, 708 of this
title.
