§ 402. — Contempts constituting crimes.
[Laws in effect as of January 24, 2002]
[Document not affected by Public Laws enacted between
January 24, 2002 and December 19, 2002]
[CITE: 18USC402]
TITLE 18--CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I--CRIMES
CHAPTER 21--CONTEMPTS
Sec. 402. Contempts constituting crimes
Any person, corporation or association willfully disobeying any
lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of any district
court of the United States or any court of the District of Columbia, by
doing any act or thing therein, or thereby forbidden, if the act or
thing so done be of such character as to constitute also a criminal
offense under any statute of the United States or under the laws of any
State in which the act was committed, shall be prosecuted for such
contempt as provided in section 3691 of this title and shall be punished
by a fine under this title or imprisonment, or both.
Such fine shall be paid to the United States or to the complainant
or other party injured by the act constituting the contempt, or may,
where more than one is so damaged, be divided or apportioned among them
as the court may direct, but in no case shall the fine to be paid to the
United States exceed, in case the accused is a natural person, the sum
of $1,000, nor shall such imprisonment exceed the term of six months.
This section shall not be construed to relate to contempts committed
in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice, nor to contempts committed in disobedience of
any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command entered in any
suit or action brought or prosecuted in the name of, or on behalf of,
the United States, but the same, and all other cases of contempt not
specifically embraced in this section may be punished in conformity to
the prevailing usages at law.
For purposes of this section, the term ``State'' includes a State of
the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth,
territory, or possession of the United States.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 701; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, Sec. 8(c),
63 Stat. 90; Pub. L. 101-647, title XII, Sec. 1205(c), Nov. 29, 1990,
104 Stat. 4830; Pub. L. 103-322, title XXXIII, Secs. 330011(f),
330016(2)(E), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2145, 2148.)
Historical and Revision Notes
1948 Act
Based on sections 386, 387, 389, and 390a of title 28, U.S.C., 1940
ed., Judicial Code and Judiciary (Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, Secs. 1, 21,
22, 24, 38 Stat. 730, 738, 739).
Section 21 of the Clayton Act, section 386 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940
ed., Judicial Code and Judiciary, is here consolidated with parts of
sections 1, 22, and 24 of the same act. Section 1 of said act, section
390a of title 28 U.S.C., 1940 ed., Judicial Code and Judiciary, defined
person or persons. Section 22 of said act, section 387 of title 28,
U.S.C., 1940 ed., Judicial Code and Judiciary, regulated the procedure
and provided for the punishment of contempts. Section 24 of said act,
section 389 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Judicial Code and Judiciary,
limited the application of these sections to certain kinds of contempt.
In transferring these sections to this title and in consolidating
them numerous changes of phraseology were necessary which do not,
however, change their meaning or substance. Words ``corporation or
association'' were inserted after ``any person'' in substitution for the
definition provisions of section 390a of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed.,
Judicial Code and Judiciary, which read as follows: ``The word `person'
or `persons' wherever used in sections 381-383, 386-390a of this title,
sections 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27 and 44 of title 15, and section
412 of title 18 shall be deemed to include corporations and associations
existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States,
the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws
of any foreign country.''
The words ``any person, corporation, or association,'' unqualified
except by the context of the section mean all that the more lengthy
definition included. Only those persons, corporations, and associations
who were parties to the order or had actual notice of it may be punished
for contempt. (See McCauly v. First Trust & Savings Bank, C.C.A. Ill.
1921, 276 F. 117. See, also National Labor Relations Board v. Blackstone
Mfg. Co., C.C.A. 1941, 123 F. 2d 633.) The fact that the contemnor was
incorporated or organized under a foreign law or under the laws of a
particular State or Territory would hardly be relevant to the issue of
criminal contempt.
As noted above these sections were part of the Clayton Act, entitled
``An act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and
monopolies, and for other purposes.'' Whatever doubt might have existed
as to whether the contempt provisions were variously limited to
antitrust cases seems to be dispelled by the case of Sandefur v. Canoe
Creek Coal Co. (C.C.A. Ky. 1923, 293 F. 379, certified question answered
45 S. Ct. 18, 266 U.S. 42, 69 L. Ed. 162, 35 A.L.R. 451), where the
court says: ``The act, considered as a whole, covers several more or
less distinct subjects. * * * The first eight sections pertain directly
to the subject of trust and monopolies; section 9 concerns interstate
commerce; section 10, combinations among common carriers; section 11,
proceedings to enforce certain provisions of the act; sections 12-16,
antitrust procedure and remedies; sections 17-19, regulations of
injunction and restraining orders in all cases; section 20 limits the
power of an equity court to issue any injunction in a certain class of
cases, viz., between employer and the employee; and sections 21-24
pertain to procedure in any district court, punishing contemptuous
disregard of any order of such court, providing the act constituting
contempt is also a criminal offense. Observing this relation of the
various parts of the act to each other, we think `within the purview of
this act' must refer to that portion of the act which most broadly
covers the subject-matter to which section 22 is devoted, and this
portion is section 21, which reaches all cases where the act of contempt
is also a criminal offense. We know of nothing in the legislative
history of the act, or within the common knowledge as to the then
existing situation, which justifies us in thinking that `within the
purview of this act,' in section 22, meant to limit its effect to the
employer-employee provisions of section 20, or even to the antitrust
scope of some of the earlier sections.'' (See also Michaelson v. United
States, 1924, 45 S. Ct. 18, 166 U.S. 42, 69 L. Ed. 162, 35 A.L.R. 451,
and H. Rept. No. 613, 62d Cong., 2d sess., to accompany H.R. 15657.)
1949 Act
This amendment [see section 8] corrects the catchline of section 402
of title 18, U.S.C., to better represent the section content.
Amendments
1994--Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 330016(2)(E), substituted ``punished by
a fine under this title'' for ``punished by fine'' in first par.
Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 330011(f), amended directory language of Pub.
L. 101-647, Sec. 1205(c). See 1990 Amendment note below.
1990--Pub. L. 101-647, Sec. 1205(c), as amended by Pub. L. 103-322,
Sec. 330011(f), added par. defining ``State''.
1949--Act May 24, 1949, substituted ``Contempts constituting
crimes'' for ``Criminal contempts'' in section catchline.
Effective Date of 1994 Amendment
Section 330011(f) of Pub. L. 103-322 provided that the amendment
made by that section is effective as of the date on which section
1205(c) of Pub. L. 101-647, which amended this section, took effect.
Section Referred to in Other Sections
This section is referred to in section 3285 of this title; title 42
section 10608.
