§ 6321. — Bilateral and multilateral initiatives.
[Laws in effect as of January 24, 2002]
[Document not affected by Public Laws enacted between
January 24, 2002 and December 19, 2002]
[CITE: 22USC6321]
TITLE 22--FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE
CHAPTER 72--NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION
SUBCHAPTER II--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Sec. 6321. Bilateral and multilateral initiatives
It is the sense of the Congress that in order to maintain and
enhance international confidence in the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards
and in other multilateral undertakings to halt the global proliferation
of nuclear weapons, the United States should seek to negotiate with
other nations and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of
Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to--
(1) build international support for the principle that nuclear
supply relationships must require purchasing nations to agree to
full-scope international safeguards;
(2) encourage each nuclear-weapon state within the meaning of
the Treaty to undertake a comprehensive review of its own procedures
for declassifying information relating to the design or production
of nuclear explosive devices and to investigate any measures that
would reduce the risk of such information contributing to nuclear
weapons proliferation;
(3) encourage the deferral of efforts to produce weapons-grade
nuclear material for large-scale commercial uses until such time as
safeguards are developed that can detect, on a timely and reliable
basis, the diversion of significant quantities of such material for
nuclear explosive purposes;
(4) pursue greater financial support for the implementation and
improvement of safeguards from all IAEA member nations with
significant nuclear programs, particularly from those nations that
are currently using or planning to use weapons-grade nuclear
material for commercial purposes;
(5) arrange for the timely payment of annual financial
contributions by all members of the IAEA, including the United
States;
(6) pursue the elimination of international commerce in highly
enriched uranium for use in research reactors while encouraging
multilateral cooperation to develop and to use low-enriched
alternative nuclear fuels;
(7) oppose efforts by non-nuclear-weapon states to develop or
use unsafeguarded nuclear fuels for purposes of naval propulsion;
(8) pursue an international open skies arrangement that would
authorize the IAEA to operate surveillance aircraft and would
facilitate IAEA access to satellite information for safeguards
verification purposes;
(9) develop an institutional means for IAEA member nations to
share intelligence material with the IAEA on possible safeguards
violations without compromising national security or intelligence
sources or methods;
(10) require any exporter of a sensitive nuclear facility or
sensitive nuclear technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state to notify
the IAEA prior to export and to require safeguards over that
facility or technology, regardless of its destination; and
(11) seek agreement among the parties to the Treaty to apply
IAEA safeguards in perpetuity and to establish new limits on the
right to withdraw from the Treaty.
(Pub. L. 103-236, title VIII, Sec. 841, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 522.)
Section Referred to in Other Sections
This section is referred to in section 6323 of this title.
