USA > US Constitution > Limitations on Capital Punishment - Proportionality

Limitations on Capital Punishment - Proportionality

Limitations on Capital Punishment: Proportionality. — In Coker v. Georgia,127 the Court held that the state may not impose a death sentence upon a rapist who did not take a human life.128 The Court announced that the standard under the Eighth Amendment was that punishments are barred when they are "excessive" in relation to the crime committed. A "punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime."129 In order that judgment not be or appear to be the subjective conclusion of individual Justices, attention must be given to objective factors, predominantly "to the public attitudes concerning a particular sentence—history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions...."130 While the Court thought that the death penalty for rape passed the first test, it felt it failed the second. Georgia was the sole State providing for death for the rape of an adult woman, and juries in at least nine out of ten cases refused to impose death for rape. Aside from this view of public perception, the Court independently concluded that death is an excessive penalty for an offender who rapes but does not kill; rape cannot compare with murder "in terms of moral depravity and of injury to the person and the public."131chanrobles-red

127 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Justice White's opinion was joined only by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred on their view that the death penalty is per se invalid, id. at 600, and Justice Powell concurred on a more limited basis than Justice White's opinion. Id. at 601. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 604.

128 Although the Court stated the issue in the context of the rape of an adult woman, 433 U.S. at 592, the opinion at no point sought to distinguish between adults and children. Justice Powell's concurrence expressed the view that death is ordinarily disproportionate for the rape of an adult woman, but that some rapes might be so brutal or heinous as to justify it. Id. at 601.

129 433 U.S. at 592.

130 433 U.S. at 592

131 433 U.S. at 598.

Applying the Coker analysis, the Court ruled in Enmund v. Florida132 that death is an unconstitutional penalty for felony murder if the defendant did not himself kill, or attempt to take life, or intend that anyone be killed. While a few more States imposed capital punishment in felony murder cases than had imposed it for rape, nonetheless the weight was heavily against the practice, and the evidence of jury decisions and other indicia of a modern consensus similarly opposed the death penalty in such circumstances. Moreover, the Court determined that death was a disproportionate sentence for one who neither took life nor intended to do so. Because the death penalty is a likely deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation, and because the justification of retribution depends upon the degree of the defendant's culpability, the imposition of death upon one who participates in a crime in which a victim is murdered by one of his confederates and not as a result of his own intention serves neither of the purposes underlying the penalty.133 In Tison v. Arizona, however, the Court eased the "intent to kill" requirement, holding that, in keeping with an "apparent consensus" among the states, "major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement."134 A few years earlier, Enmund had also been weakened by the Court's holding that the factual finding of requisite intent to kill need not be made by the guilt/innocence factfinder, whether judge or jury, but may be made by a state appellate court.135chanrobles-red

132 458 U.S. 782 (1982). Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice O'Connor, with Justices Powell and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, dissented. Id. at 801. Accord, Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986) (also holding that the proper remedy in a habeas case is to remand for state court determination as to whether Enmundfindings have been made).

133 Justice O'Connor thought the evidence of contemporary standards did not support a finding that capital punishment was not appropriate in felony murder situations. 458 U.S. at 816-23. She also objected to finding the penalty disproportionate, first because of the degree of participation of the defendant in the underlying crime, id. at 823-26, but also because the Court appeared to be constitutionalizing a standard of intent required under state law.

134 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987). The decision was 5-4. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court viewed a "narrow" focus on intent to kill as "a highly unsatisfactory means of definitively distinguishing the most culpable and dangerous of murderers," id. at 157, and concluded that "reckless disregard for human life" may be held to be "implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death." Id.

135 Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986). Moreover, an appellate court's finding of culpability is entitled to a presumption of correctness in federal habeas review, a habeas petitioner bearing a "heavy burden of overcoming the presumption." Id. at 387-88. See also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) (Eighth Amendment does not invariably require comparative proportionality review by a state appellate court).

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