May 1978 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-43213 May 11, 1978 - SOCORRO T. AGUILAR v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL.:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-43213. May 11, 1978.]
SOCORRO T. AGUILAR, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Bureau of Public Schools), Respondents.
Cornelio R. Besinga for Petitioner.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Eulogio Raquel-Santos and Solicitor Demetrio G. Demetria for Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Antonio Aguilar who was employed as a Geenral Education Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools in the division of Cebu died of intra-cerebral hemorrhage five and a half months after he was optionally retired under Republic Act No. 660. Petitioner, his widow, filed a claim for death and medical benefits supported by a medical certificate of a doctor of the Regional Health Office certifying that the deceased was under treatment for "essential hypertension" since 1959 as a result of the nature of latter’s employment which lasted up to 1974. The respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools) did not controvert the claim. The Acting Referee dismissed the case because of lack of employer-employee relationship between the deceased and the respondent at the time of the decedent’s death and the cause of death was not service connected. Respondent Commission affirmed the decision.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the circumstance under which the death of the decedent occurred after his retirement was immaterial since the medical certificate stating that the deceased was suffering of essential hypertension since 1959 may be the basis for an award; and that in the absence of proof on the part of the employer to support its defense, the statutory presumption that death arose out of employment should prevail. Being a social legislation, the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose.
Decision appealed from is set aside and the respondent Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools) ordered to pay P6,000 as death compensation; P3,224.33 as reimbursement for hospitalization and medical expenses; P600 as attorney’s fees and the corresponding administrative fee to the successor of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the circumstance under which the death of the decedent occurred after his retirement was immaterial since the medical certificate stating that the deceased was suffering of essential hypertension since 1959 may be the basis for an award; and that in the absence of proof on the part of the employer to support its defense, the statutory presumption that death arose out of employment should prevail. Being a social legislation, the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose.
Decision appealed from is set aside and the respondent Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools) ordered to pay P6,000 as death compensation; P3,224.33 as reimbursement for hospitalization and medical expenses; P600 as attorney’s fees and the corresponding administrative fee to the successor of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.
SYLLABUS
1. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT; HEARSAY EVIDENCE, ADMISSION UNDER SECTION 49, ALLOWED. — A medical report stating that the deceased employee was suffering of essential hypertension as a result of the nature of his employment may be a basis for an award even if the physician himself was not presented as a witness because although such a report may be hearsay under the common rules of evidence, it is nevertheless admissible under Section 49 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and may be considered in addition to the affidavit of the claimant.
2. ID.; NATURE OF POLICY. — The Workmen’s compensation Act is a social legislation. it is designed to give relief to the workman. Therefore, to effectuate its purpose, it must be liberally construed.
3. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION; PRESUMPTION. — The law presumes, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim is compensable. The burden to disconnect, by substantial evidence, the injury or sickness from employment, is laid at the employer’s door. In the absence of proof on the part of the employer to support its defense, the statutory presumption that the death of the employee arose out of the employment should prevail.
2. ID.; NATURE OF POLICY. — The Workmen’s compensation Act is a social legislation. it is designed to give relief to the workman. Therefore, to effectuate its purpose, it must be liberally construed.
3. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION; PRESUMPTION. — The law presumes, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim is compensable. The burden to disconnect, by substantial evidence, the injury or sickness from employment, is laid at the employer’s door. In the absence of proof on the part of the employer to support its defense, the statutory presumption that the death of the employee arose out of the employment should prevail.
D E C I S I O N
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission dated December 29, 1975 in RO7-MC Case No. 19040 entitled "Socorro T. Aguilar, claimant, versus Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools), respondent," affirming the decision of the Acting Referee of Regional Office No. 7, Department of Labor, Cebu City, dismissing the case for lack of merit because of the absence of employer-employee relationship between the deceased and the respondent at the time of the decedent’s death and the cause of death was not due to an illness which was contracted in the course of the decedent’s employment. 1
The petitioner, Socorro T. Aguilar, is the widow of Antonio Aguilar who died on November 13, 1974 of "intra-cerebral hemorrhage."cralaw virtua1aw library
On March 31, 1975 Socorro T. Aguilar filed with Regional Office No. 7, Department of Labor, Cebu, City, a claim for death and medical benefits predicated upon the death of Antonio Aguilar due to illness traceable to his employment.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The late Antonio Aguilar was employed as a General Education Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools in the division of Cebu with a salary of P7,236.00 per annum. On April 15, 1974 he was examined by Dr. Benjamin M. Pleños who certified that Antonio Aguilar was suffering from rheumatoid arthritis and peptic ulcer. The certification was attached to the application of Antonio Aguilar for optional retirement under Republic Act 660. He was retired on May 1, 1974.
The petitioner submitted in support of her claim for death and medical benefits a physician’s report (W. C. Form No. 4) submitted by Dr. Castor M. Ricaña of the Regional Health Office. The report states that Antonio Aguilar was suffering of "essential hypertension" which started in 1959; that said illness was the result of the nature of his employment; and that Antonio Aguilar was under Dr. Ricaña’s treatment since 1959 up to 1974. The deceased was hospitalized at the Cebu Doctors Hospital incurring a total amount of P3,224.33 as medical expenses. 2
There is no showing that the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools), submitted any affidavit or evidence to controvert the claim.
Antonio Aguilar died of intra-cerebral hemorrhage which is the consequence of hypertension. The death occurred within five and one-half months from retirement. Under the circumstances, it is of no moment that Antonio Aguilar was no longer an employee of the respondent Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools).
The report of Dr. Castor Ricaña that Antonio Aguilar was suffering of essential hypertension which stated in 1959 and that the said illness was the result of the nature of his employment, may be the basis for the award even if the physician himself was not presented as a witness. While such a report may be hearsay under the common law rules of evidence, it is nevertheless admissible under Section 49 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and may be considered in addition to the affidavit of the petitioner Socorro T. Aguilar. In Pioneer Ceramics, Inc. v. Samia 3 this Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The petitioner objects to the consideration of the physician’s report as a basis for the award on the ground that it is hearsay evidence, the physician himself not having been presented as witness. The Court has ruled, in the case of National Development Co. v. WCC, G. R. No. L-21724, April 27, 1967, that while such a report may be hearsay under the common law rules of evidence, it is nevertheless admissible under Section 49 of the Act, and may be considered in addition to the sworn testimony at open hearing. In the present case, aside from the physician’s report there is the testimony of the claimant himself concerning the nature of his work, which testimony constitutes substantial evidence to support the award. It can hardly be doubted that the disease (pulmonary tuberculosis) which the claimant contracted, if not directly caused by his employment was at least aggravated by it."cralaw virtua1aw library
The law presumes, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim is compensable. The burden to disconnect, by substantial evidence, the injury or sickness from employment, is laid at the employer’s door 4 The respondent employer did not present any evil to rebut the findings of Dr. Castor M. Ricaña in his physician’s report. In the absence of proof on the part of the employer to support its defense, the statutory presumption that the death of the employee arose out of the employment should prevail. 5 The Workmen’s Compensation Act is a social legislation. It is designed to give relief to the workman. Therefore, to effectuate its purpose, it must be liberally construed. 6
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools) is ordered:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
1) To pay the petitioner the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) as death compensation;
2) To reimburse the petitioner the amount of Three Thousand Two Hundred Twenty Four Pesos and 33/100 (P3,224.33) for hospitalization and medical expenses;
3) To pay attorney’s fees in the amount of Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00); and
4) To pay the successor of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission the corresponding administrative fee.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman) Makasiar, Santos and Cuenco, JJ., concur.
The petitioner, Socorro T. Aguilar, is the widow of Antonio Aguilar who died on November 13, 1974 of "intra-cerebral hemorrhage."cralaw virtua1aw library
On March 31, 1975 Socorro T. Aguilar filed with Regional Office No. 7, Department of Labor, Cebu, City, a claim for death and medical benefits predicated upon the death of Antonio Aguilar due to illness traceable to his employment.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The late Antonio Aguilar was employed as a General Education Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools in the division of Cebu with a salary of P7,236.00 per annum. On April 15, 1974 he was examined by Dr. Benjamin M. Pleños who certified that Antonio Aguilar was suffering from rheumatoid arthritis and peptic ulcer. The certification was attached to the application of Antonio Aguilar for optional retirement under Republic Act 660. He was retired on May 1, 1974.
The petitioner submitted in support of her claim for death and medical benefits a physician’s report (W. C. Form No. 4) submitted by Dr. Castor M. Ricaña of the Regional Health Office. The report states that Antonio Aguilar was suffering of "essential hypertension" which started in 1959; that said illness was the result of the nature of his employment; and that Antonio Aguilar was under Dr. Ricaña’s treatment since 1959 up to 1974. The deceased was hospitalized at the Cebu Doctors Hospital incurring a total amount of P3,224.33 as medical expenses. 2
There is no showing that the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools), submitted any affidavit or evidence to controvert the claim.
Antonio Aguilar died of intra-cerebral hemorrhage which is the consequence of hypertension. The death occurred within five and one-half months from retirement. Under the circumstances, it is of no moment that Antonio Aguilar was no longer an employee of the respondent Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools).
The report of Dr. Castor Ricaña that Antonio Aguilar was suffering of essential hypertension which stated in 1959 and that the said illness was the result of the nature of his employment, may be the basis for the award even if the physician himself was not presented as a witness. While such a report may be hearsay under the common law rules of evidence, it is nevertheless admissible under Section 49 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and may be considered in addition to the affidavit of the petitioner Socorro T. Aguilar. In Pioneer Ceramics, Inc. v. Samia 3 this Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The petitioner objects to the consideration of the physician’s report as a basis for the award on the ground that it is hearsay evidence, the physician himself not having been presented as witness. The Court has ruled, in the case of National Development Co. v. WCC, G. R. No. L-21724, April 27, 1967, that while such a report may be hearsay under the common law rules of evidence, it is nevertheless admissible under Section 49 of the Act, and may be considered in addition to the sworn testimony at open hearing. In the present case, aside from the physician’s report there is the testimony of the claimant himself concerning the nature of his work, which testimony constitutes substantial evidence to support the award. It can hardly be doubted that the disease (pulmonary tuberculosis) which the claimant contracted, if not directly caused by his employment was at least aggravated by it."cralaw virtua1aw library
The law presumes, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim is compensable. The burden to disconnect, by substantial evidence, the injury or sickness from employment, is laid at the employer’s door 4 The respondent employer did not present any evil to rebut the findings of Dr. Castor M. Ricaña in his physician’s report. In the absence of proof on the part of the employer to support its defense, the statutory presumption that the death of the employee arose out of the employment should prevail. 5 The Workmen’s Compensation Act is a social legislation. It is designed to give relief to the workman. Therefore, to effectuate its purpose, it must be liberally construed. 6
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools) is ordered:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
1) To pay the petitioner the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) as death compensation;
2) To reimburse the petitioner the amount of Three Thousand Two Hundred Twenty Four Pesos and 33/100 (P3,224.33) for hospitalization and medical expenses;
3) To pay attorney’s fees in the amount of Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00); and
4) To pay the successor of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission the corresponding administrative fee.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman) Makasiar, Santos and Cuenco, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 14-16, and Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 17-20.
2. Petition, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 3-4.
3. 33 SCRA 487, 492.
4. Vda. de Acosta, Et Al., v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, Et Al., 12 SCRA 168.
5. Batangas Transportation Co. v. Vda. de Rivera, 99 Phil. 1025.
6. Batangas Transportation Co. v. Perez, Et Al., 11 SCRA 793, 796.