EN BANC
RAFAEL
ENRIQUEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.
R.
Nos. 1561 & 1562
February
2, 1904
-versus-
A. S. WATSON &
CO., ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.
D E C I S I
O N
JOHNSON, J:
In each of the above-entitled
causes, the attorneys for the appellee moved that the Bill of
Exceptions
filed be dismissed for the following reasons:
1. That the said Bill
of Exceptions had not been completed and certified in the form
prescribed
by law; and
2. That said Bill of
Exceptions had not been completed, certified, nor signed by the Judge
who
tried the cause in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila.
Inasmuch as the facts in
each case upon which the motion to dismiss the said bill of exceptions
were the same, the respective attorneys agreed that the motions should
be heard together.
The facts upon which
these motions were based were as follows:
One of the Judges of
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, on the 2nd day of
May
1903, dictated a sentence in English in the said causes and immediately
thereafter left the jurisdiction of the said Court and was gone for
several
months. In fact the said Judge did not return until long after the time
fixed by the law for perfecting the appeal in said cause and for the
presentation
and certification of the bill of exceptions.
On the 4th day of March
1903, an exception to the sentence or judgment of said trial judge was
duly taken by appellants and allowed by the Hon. John C. Sweeney, the
only
judge of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila present at
that
time.
On the 5th day of
March,
1903, a motion was made by said appellants before Judge Sweeney for a
new
trial of said cause upon the ground that the sentence was manifestly
contrary
to the weight of evidence.
On the 20th day of
May, 1903, the said motion for a new trial was denied by Judge Sweeney.
The appellants then and there duly excepted to said order and then and
there gave notice of their intention to present a Bill of Exceptions,
and
on the same last-mentioned day presented the Bill of Exceptions to
Judge
Crossfield, who was then acting as a judge of the Court of First
Instance
in said City of Manila, for certification.
On the 8th day of July,
1903, Judge Crossfield signed the following:
"The preceding Bill
of Exceptions, in the cause of Rafael Enriquez, administrator, vs. A.S.
Watson & Co., Limited, Henry Humphreys, T. G. Joy, and Walter
(William)
Morley, having been presented to me because of the absence in the
United
States of the Judge who heard said cause, and there being no prospect
that
he will return before the expiration of the time within which the said
Bill of Exceptions must be approved, and the same after comparison with
the stenographic notes of the testimony taken at the trial by the
official
stenographer having been found to be correct, I approve the said bill
and
order that it be attached to the record of the said cause."
In reply to the first objection
above presented that the said bill had not been completed and certified
in the form prescribed by the law, the Court finds that the form of the
said bill of exceptions was in accordance with the rules of law.
The second objection
above presented contains greater difficulties.
The question presented
on the objection is, who must sign and certify to a bill of exceptions?
Section 143 of the
Code of Civil Procedure provides:
"Sec. 143. Perfecting
bill of exceptions. - Upon the rendition of final judgment
disposing
of the action, either party shall have the right to perfect a bill of
exceptions
for a review by the Supreme Court of all rulings, orders, and judgments
made in the action, to which the party has duly excepted at the time of
making such ruling, order, or judgment. The party desiring to prosecute
the bill of exceptions shall so inform the court at the time of the
rendition
of final judgment, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable and
before
the ending of the term of court at which final judgment is rendered,
and
the judge shall enter a memorandum to that effect upon his minutes and
order like memorandum to be made by the clerk upon the docket of the
court
among the other entries relating to the action. Within ten days after
the
entry of the memorandum aforesaid, the excepting party shall cause to
be
presented to the judge a brief statement of the facts of the case
sufficient
to show the bearing of the rulings, orders, or judgments excepted to,
and
specific statement of each ruling, order, or judgment that has been
excepted
to, for allowance by the judge. The judge shall thereupon, after
reasonable
notice to both parties and within five days from the presentation of
the
bill of exceptions to him, restate the facts if need be, and the
exceptions,
so that the questions of law therein involved and their relevancy shall
all be made clear, and when the bill of exceptions has been perfected
and
allowed by the judge shall certify that it has been so allowed, and the
bill of exceptions shall be filed with the other papers in the action,
and the same shall thereupon be transferred for the Supreme Court for
determination
of the questions of law involved. A bill of exceptions may likewise be
made to consist of the judge's findings of fact in his final judgment
and
a statement of all the exceptions reserved by the party desiring to
prosecute
the bill of exceptions, which shall be allowed and filed by the judge
as
above in this section provided.
"Immediately upon the
allowance of a bill of exceptions by the judge it shall be the duty of
the clerk to transmit to the clerk of the Supreme Court a certified
copy
of the bill of exceptions and of all documents which by the bill of
exceptions
are made a part of it. The cause shall be heard in the Supreme Court
upon
the certified copy of the bill of exceptions so transmitted."
This quoted section might
be construed to justify the contention of the appellee that the trial
judge
was the only person who could certify to the correctness of a bill of
exceptions
- he being the only person, so authorized having full knowledge of what
transpired on the trial. This contention had great weight formerly,
prior
to days when stenographers were employed in the courts. Today, where
stenographers
are employed in the courts in the trial of causes, there is a complete
authentic record made of everything which transpire during the trial.
From
this record, everyone who runs may read as well as another the record
and
be informed fully of every act, objection, or exception taken or made
during
the trial. That being true, then any person may ascertain for himself
the
correctness of any allegation made concerning what transpired during
the
trial. In order, however, that appellate courts may have a Bill of
Exception
perfected and settled without confusion or disputation, the law has
provided
that the same shall be signed by the judge of the court in which it
arose.
The ultimate object of a Bill of Exceptions is to bring before the
appellate
court in some authentic form that facts upon which the parties rely in
said court. For this purpose it would be entirely within the province
of
the legislature to provide that such facts be certified to by one
person
as well as another, so long as the particular person so authorized had
sufficient information of the facts.
Under the Code of Civil
Procedure, it is quite clear that it was not the purpose of the
legislature
to require one Judge of the Court of First Instance to do all the acts
connected with a particular action from its inception to its
conclusion.
Section 49 of Act No. 136 and Sections 378, 379, and 380 of the Code
provide
for the substitution of judges under the conditions therein enumerated.
The legislature foresaw
what has actually happened here - the frequent changes in the personnel
of the Judges - and by law has relieved the parties litigant of the
endless
embarrassment which would necessarily follow such changes, if new
judges
or successors could not conclude litigation commenced and partially
concluded.
The question, who may
sign a Bill of Exceptions, has been before the courts of the United
States
many times, and the various decisions on the same are not always
reconcilable.
Formerly it was the
practice, when an exception was taken to any order or ruling of the
court,
to present the bill immediately to the judge for his signature while
his
recollection was fresh. Later it became the practice for the judge to
note
the exception and to rely upon his notes in the determination of the
question
whether the bill tendered was true or not, and the bill was then
tendered
during the term.
This rule was still
later relaxed by statute, in many jurisdictions, by permitting the bill
to be presented within a limited time after the term. In some
jurisdictions
the judge was even given the right to extend this statutory period
within
which the bill of exceptions might be tendered for allowance and
settlement.
In one instance, where
a judge refused to sign a bill after having been so ordered by the
appellate
tribunal, and resigned in order to escape this duty, the Supreme Court,
being satisfied that the bill was true as presented, ordered it
entered,
as part of the record, as though it had been signed. [People vs.
Pearson,
4 Ill., 270, 285].
Subsection 4 of Section
499 of the Code of Civil Procedure justifies this same action on the
part
of this court, which clearly indicates that the legislature of these
Islands
did not intend to make it absolutely necessary for a Bill of Exceptions
to be signed by the trial court or otherwise to subject the parties to
the annoyance of a new trial.
There are numerous
precedents that if the bill can not be settled by the trial judge by
reason
of loss of papers, by reason of his having gone out of office, or
sickness
or absence or otherwise, a new trial will be granted. But
parties-litigants
should not be put to the annoyance and expense of time and money of a
new
trial when it can be avoided without detriment to the rights of either.
A Bill of Exceptions
is intended simply to present to the appellate court a brief statement
of facts showing in what way error was committed by the trial court,
and
to which error the attention of the trial court was called at the time.
In this present case a full report of all the evidence offered as well
as of all exceptions made in the trial was made at the time by a
stenographer,
and one judge as well as another may examine this record and be
satisfied
concerning what was done at the trial. If this be true, we can not see
how there can be much room for controversy in regard to what the
evidence
and the exceptions were. And that is the only question in setting a
Bill
of Exceptions.
The certificate of
the judge approving the bill of exceptions in this cause discloses the
fact that he had verified the facts contained therein by the
stenographic
notes of the trial of said cause.
Under the case as
presented,
it would be manifestly unjust to both of the parties to reject the bill
for lack of sufficient authentication, as such a course might result in
a new trial, when the record, if examined, might not disclose
reversible
error. If such should not be the result, the plaintiffs in error would
be deprived of the right of review secured under statutory provisions
without
any fault on their part.
In support of the
general
propositions that the trial judge is not the only judge who may certify
a Bill of Exceptions, We cite the Decision of this Court in the cause
of Fortunato Ricamora vs. Judge Grant T. Trent.
[1]
The motions in both
causes are denied.
Arellano, C.J.,
Torres, Cooper, Willard, Mapa, and McDonough, JJ., concur.
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Endnote:
[1]
Page 137, supra.
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