EN BANC
THE UNITED STATES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. 2137
October
9, 1905
-versus-
DOMINGO
BALUYUT,
Defendant-Appellant.
D E C I S I
O N
WILLARD, J:
In a fight with bolos between
the defendant and Agustin Mercado, the latter lost the index finger of
this right hand. The evidence is sufficient to prove the guilt of the
defendant,
and his claim that Mercado was the aggressor is not supported by the
proof.
The Court below held
that the index finger of the right hand was a principal member of the
body,
and that the case, therefore, was within the provisions of Article 416,
Par. 2, of the Penal Code. This view finds support in the testimony
given
by a doctor at the trial. We think, however, that a finger is not a
principal
member of the body, as that term is used in said Article 416, Paragraph
2, but that it is rather a nonprincipal member, as that term is used in
Paragraph 3 of the same Article. [4 Groizard, 552].
This case arose in
the Province of Pampanga, and was tried therein on the 11th, 12th, and
26th of January, 1904, by the Judge of the Fourth Judicial District, in
which that province is situated. The judgment in the case was written
and
signed by that Judge in the Province of Tarlac, in the Fourth Judicial
District, on the 20th day of February, 1904. It was sent by mail by the
Judge to the clerk of the court in Pampanga, and was by him received on
the 23d of February, 1904, and on that day read and published in the
court
by him, in the presence of the accused. It is claimed by the appellant
that the judgment is void, because it was never properly rendered. At
the
time this decision was made Sections 13 and 14 of Act No. 867 were in
force,
and undoubtedly the judge, in causing judgment to be entered in the way
he did, relied upon them. These sections are as follows:
"Sec. 13. Judges
in certain cases authorized to sign final judgment when out of
territorial
jurisdiction of court. - Whenever a judge of a Court of First
Instance,
or a justice of the Supreme Court shall hold a session, special or
regular,
of the Court of First Instance of any province, and shall thereafter
leave
the province in which the court was held without having entered
judgment
in all the cases which were heard at such session, it shall be lawful
for
him, if the case was heard and duly argued or an opportunity given for
argument to the parties or their counsel in the proper province, to
prepare
his judgment after he has left the province and to send the same back
properly
signed to the clerk of the court, to be entered in the court as of the
day when the same was received by the clerk in the same manner as if
the
judge had been present in court to direct the entry of the judgment:
Provided,
however, That no judgment shall be valid unless the same was signed by
the judge while within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
Whenever
a judge shall prepare and sign his judgment beyond the jurisdiction of
the court of which it is to be a judgment, he shall inclose the same in
an envelope and direct it to the clerk of the proper court and send the
same by registered mail.
"Sec. 14. Time
within
which notice of appeal must be filed in cases under previous section. -
In every case in which judgment is entered in the Court of First
Instance
of a province by direction of a judge not in the province at the time,
under the provisions of section thirteen hereof, it shall be the duty
of
the clerk of the court at once to notify the parties to the suit or
their
counsel of the nature of the judgment by personal notice in writing or
registered mail, and in such case the time within which the parties
shall
be required to except to said judgment and to file notice of their
desire
to prosecute their bill of exceptions to the judgment shall be extended
to twenty days from the date of receipt of the notice from the clerk."
This case presents for
the first time in this Court the question whether these Sections are
applicable
to all cases, civil or criminal, or whether they are applicable only to
civil cases. It presents, also, the further question whether, assuming
that they are in terms applicable to criminal cases, the Commission had
power to make them so applicable, in view of the provisions of the act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, Section 5.
Under the Spanish law
of criminal procedure in force prior to the American occupation the
judgment
of the court was always in writing. In contained a statement of the
facts
which appeared from the evidence, the conclusions of law which the
judge
drew from those facts, and the penalty imposed upon the defendant.
These
all were contained in one document. There were not two documents or two
proceedings, one corresponding to the verdict rendered by the jury in
the
criminal procedure in the United States and the other corresponding to
the imposition of the penalty by the judge. According to the former
procedure
it was not necessary that either the judge or the prisoner should be
present
in court when the judgment was entered. It was sufficient that the
judgment,
signed by the judge, was filed in the court and afterwards read to the
prisoner.
General Orders No.
58, which continued in force the Spanish criminal procedure, except as
therein modified, provides, however, in Section 41 that the defendant
must
be present in court when judgment is pronounced. It may be assumed that
this section requires the judge to be also present at that time. The
precise
question raised upon this appeal is whether this Act [No. 867] has
modified
said Section 41 so as to dispense with the presence of the judge.
We understand that
the power of the Commission to legislative upon this subject is limited
only by the provisions of the acts of Congress. The only provisions
that
have a bearing upon the question to which our attention has been called
of July 1, 1902, which are as follows:
"That no law shall
be enacted is said Islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty,
or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein
the
equal protection of the laws.
"That in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
behalf."
It is doubtless true by
the common law in force in America that the defendant in a case of
felony
must be present at all stages of the proceedings. If the legislature of
a State whose constitution contained provisions similar to those
contained
in said Section 5, should pass a law saying distinctly that the
prisoner
in a case of felony should not be entitled to be present upon the
hearing
of a demurrer or a motion for a new trial, or when the verdict of the
fury
was pronounced, or when the penalty was declared by the judge, would
such
legislation be constitutional? The right of the prisoner to be present
at any one of these stages is not in terms secured by any one of the
provisions
contained in said Section 5, and the right to be so present does not
seem
to be an essential ingredient of that due process of law which is
guaranteed
by said constitutional and statutory provisions.
It is apparent that
by this Act [No. 867], the defendant is deprived of no essential nor
substantial
right. Section 13 provides that the judgment shall be entered in the
court
as of the date when the same was received by the clerk, in the same
manner
as if the judge had been present in court to direct the entry of the
judgment.
It is undoubted that when the judgment is promulgated in the presence
of
the defendant he has the right to do everything which he could do if
the
judge were personally present in court. He can present a motion for a
new
trial, or present any other motion which he desires to make. He can
then,
or within fifteen days thereafter, give notice of an appeal from the
judgment.
In fact, there is no right whatever which he can not exercise, if he
could
have exercised such right were the judge personally present.
In this particular
case, the application of this law has worked to the benefit of the
defendant.
He was confined in jail at the time judgment was rendered. He
immediately
gave notice of his appeal, and the appeal was prosecuted without the
delay
which would have been caused if it had been necessary to wait for the
promulgation
of the judgment until the judge should personally come again into that
province, which would not have been until two months thereafter.
In two provinces in
the Islands, courts are held only once a year; in most of them only
twice
a year. The want of such a law as this would in many cases prolong the
imprisonment of the defendant for six months, and in some cases a year.
It is no answer to this to say that a judge should not leave the
province
until he has decided all the cases submitted to him. The judges at
large
of the Courts of First Instance, and the other judges of that court,
are
by law subject to the orders of the Secretary of Finance and Justice as
to where and when they shall hold court, and their ability to stay in a
province until all cases are decided does not depend on their own will.
This act, in our opinion, so far from depriving the defendant of any
right
secured to him by said Section 5, operates directly to his benefit, and
is not prohibited by the act of Congress.
The remaining question
is, did the Commission intend to apply the law to criminal cases? There
is one judge in the Islands for each district, each district being made
up of several provinces. There are also judges at large who are not
assigned
to any particular province or district, but who exercise jurisdiction
in
different places, according to the exigencies of the work. It may be
and
frequently is impossible for either the judge of the proper district or
for a judge at large to dispose of all the cases which he hears during
the time when he is in the province. The demands of the service may
require
the judge at large to leave not only the province but the island in
which
he has been trying cases, before he has entered judgment in all of
them.
Moreover, the means of communication between certain parts of the
Islands
are such that a delay in the departure of a judge from the province
upon
a certain day might necessitate his staying there for weeks afterwards,
before another opportunity to leave would offer itself, to the
detriment
of the public service. Such considerations as these undoubtedly led the
Commission to pass this law, and we do not see why they are not all as
applicable to criminal cases as they are to civil cases.
If Section 13 stood
alone, We do not think there could be doubt upon the subject. It
is general in its terms, and distinctly says when a judge shall leave a
province "without having entered judgment in all the cases which were
heard
at such session." There is nothing to indicate that criminal cases were
to be excluded. But it is said that Section 14 is applicable to civil
cases,
and indicates, therefore, that Section 13 was to be applicable only to
civil cases. We agree that Section 14 relates exclusively to civil
cases,
but we do not agree with the deduction that therefore Section 13
relates
only to civil cases. We think that Section 13 was intended to and did
cover
all cases, both civil and criminal; that it was seen that in some
respects
it was not full enough to provide for certain contingencies in
connection
with appeals in civil cases, and the preparation of bills of
exceptions.
Therefore, for the purpose of covering the deficiencies of Section 13
in
this respect, Section 14 was enacted, and it does not, in our opinion,
cut down nor limit in any way the general terms contained in Section 13.
There is nothing in
the case of the United States vs. Karelsen
[1]
[2 Off. Gaz., 170] which is in conflict with this opinion. That case
was
decided after Act No. 575 was passed, which Act was similar to the
provisions
of Sections 13 and 14, above cited, and which was repealed by Act No.
867,
but the facts of that case did not bring it within the provisions of
this
law, for the judge who entered the judgment was in the province and in
court at the time he did so, but had left the province before the
judgment
was promulgated. For this reason, We held that Section 41 was
applicable,
and remanded the case for the judgment to be promulgated by the judge
in
the presence of the accused, but in this case, We hold that Sections 13
and 14 of said Act No. 867 are applicable to criminal cases, and so far
repeal said Section 41 of General Orders No. 58, that in a case falling
within the provisions of Sections 13 and 14, it is necessary that the
judge
should be present when the judgment is promulgated in the presence of
the
accused, but that the promulgation by the clerk has the same effect as
if the judge himself were personally present.
The judgment of the
court below is affirmed, with costs against the appellant, with a
change
of the penalty, however, to one year eight months and twenty-one days.
The defendant is also entitled to an allowance of one-half of the time
for which he has been imprisoned prior to the rendition of the judgment
upon this appeal. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J.,
Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Separate
Opinion
CARSON, J., Dissenting:
I dissent. I do not think
that the provisions of Section 13, Act No. 867, repeal or were intended
to repeal Section 41 of General Orders No. 58, which requires that the
defendant "must be personally present at the time of pronouncing
judgment,
if the conviction is for a felony."
________________________________
Endnote:[1]
3
Phil. Rep.,
223. |