FIRST
DIVISION
LA CAPELLANIA DEL
CONVENTO DE TAMBOBONG,
Petitioner-Appellant,
G.
R.
No. L-3543
October
1, 1907
-versus-
GUILLERMO
ANTONIO,
ET AL.,
Respondents-Appellants.
D E C I S I
O N
WILLARD, J :
Lino Cajili, as parish
priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Tambobong and administrator of
the
lands of the capellania of the convent of Tambobong, filed a
petition
in the Court of Land Registration asking that the said capellania
be inscribed as the owner of the tract of land described in the
petition.
having an area of 33 hectares 72 ares and 33 centares. Claro Santiago
appeared
and opposed the petition as to a part of the land therein described.
Raymundo
Andres also appeared and opposed the petition so far as it referred to
a tract of about 13 hectares in extent. Guillermo Antonio and
twenty-seven
others appeared and opposed the petition on the ground that they were
the
owners of certain portions of the land sought to be inscribed. Judgment
was rendered in the Court below supporting the opposition of Claro
Santiago,
and the opposition of Raymundo Andres as to the 13 hectares above
mentioned.
Judgment was entered in favor of the petitioner as to all of the land
except
that as to which the said two oppositions were sustained. From the
decree
of the Court sustaining these two oppositions, the petitioner appealed,
but in this Court he has neither assigned as error nor argued in his
brief
the ruling adverse to him made in the Court below. His appeal must,
therefore,
be considered as abandoned.
From the final decree
of the Court below against Guillermo Antonio and others, they have
appealed
and the only questions to be resolved relate to their appeal. The
evidence
relied upon the capellania to prove its ownership of the land in
controversy was a deed executed by the Spanish Government of the 30th
day
of September, 1891, by the terms of which it granted and conveyed to
Fr.
Patricio Martin, as administrator of the lands of the capellania
of the convent of Tambobong, a tract of land located as described in
the
petition, with an area of 23 hectares 36 ares and 2 centares. This deed
was issued in accordance with the provisions of law relating to the
adjustment
to the public lands of the State. It contains the following clause:
"And a due note of
this title will be recorded at the inspeccion general de montes,
presenting
the same to the chief of the province for inscription in the registry
prescribed
by the circular of December 6, 1881, and in order that the possession
legalized
by the present title may be published and ratified by the usual notices.
"Attention is called
to the fact that, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage
Law,
if the present title is not recorded in the corresponding registry of
the
property, it will not prejudice any third person."
The provisions of this
deed in regard to its annotation in the Forestry Bureau and in the
office
of the provincial governor were complied with. It was also presented to
the Registry of Property of the 12th day of November, 1891, and a
provisional
annotation thereof was then made which, on the 11th day of March, 1895,
was converted into a final inscription.
The appellants cite
in their brief the provisions of Articles 4, 11, and 12 the Royal
Decree
of the 26th of January, 1889, relating to the publication of notices,
the
survey of the lands, and adverse claims which may be made thereto. It
may
be noted in passing that this Royal Decree relates to the sale of
public
lands in the Philippines and not to their judgment. The judgment of
such
public lands was, at the time this deed was issued, governed by the
Royal
Decree of August 31, 1883 [Berriz, Anuario of 1888, p. 120], and the
regulations
for carrying this decree into effect dated October 20, 1888 [p. 124 of
the same volume]. The claim of the petitioner in this respect seems to
be that these provisions relating to the publication of notices, the
survey,
and adverse claims apply to the notices mentioned in that part of the
deed
which has been above quoted; but an examination of similar provisions
in
the Royal Decree and regulations of 1888 shows that all of these
proceedings
were taken before any deed was issued and these provisions have nothing
whatever to do with the notices which are referred to in the deed. When
the deed was executed by the Government, it passed the title to these
lands
out of the State to the petitioner. In some cases, after the deed was
granted,
the owner of the land was judicially put into possession thereof, but
such
proceedings were not at all necessary to complete his title. He was
allowed
to take such steps but not required to do so. [Art. 14, Decree of
August
31, 1888; Art. 30, Regulations of October 20, 1888]. It is to
this
judicial possession that the said clause in the deed refers.
A great space in the
appellants' brief is devoted to a discussion of the record of this deed
in the office of the Registry of Property. It will be noticed that the
deed itself does not require such a record. It contains a notice to the
owner that if is not recorded it cannot prejudice third persons; so,
even
if We assume that the document was never properly recorded in the
Registry
of Property, as claimed by the appellants, their position would not as
all be strengthened unless they came within the definitions of third
persons.
Upon the execution
of the deed, the capellania became the owner of the property and it
will
continue still to be the owner unless its failure to record its title
has
prejudice some third person. None of the twenty-eight appellants has
ever
recorded in the registry of property any deeds or other instruments
relating
to any part of this land. None of them, with the possible exception of
Angel Luna, ever had any written evidence of ownership of any of the
lands.
Their only claim of ownership rests upon their possession of the
property.
They have not in any way been prejudiced by the failure of the
petitioner
to record its deed. They are not third persons within the meaning of
the
Mortgage Law, and as to them the petitioner lost no rights by such
failure.
[Fabian vs. Smith, Bell & Co.,
[1]
5, Off. Gaz., 576; Legislacion Hipotecaria, Galindo Escosura, Vol. p.
670].
The appellants cite
the Order of the 12th of January 1, 1803, in which it is provided that
deeds such as the one in question must necessarily be recorded in the
registry
of property. It will be observed that this royal order imposes no
penalty
for failure to so record. If such failure made the deed void, the State
id the only person authorized to maintain an action to annul it. In the
case of the Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Topiño [4
Phil.
Rep., 33], the Court said at page 36:
"The defendants, not
being persons bound either principally or subsidiary by virtue of that
contract of sale between the Spanish Government and those original
grantees,
they can not maintain the action of nullity of which whey seek to avail
themselves as a defense in this suit."
Upon the question of fact
concerning the relation which the appellants, as occupants of the land.
bore to the capellania, we can not say that the evidence
preponderates
against them the findings of the Court below, which was against them.
In no one of the
answers
filed by the appellants was any question raised as to the personality
of
the capellania. Nothing is said upon this point in the decision of the
lower court, and it seems that this matter was not discussed at the
trial
below. Neither do we understand that any question of that kind is
raised
in the brief of the appellants in this court. Something is said in that
brief about the views of the registrar of property upon the point, and
it is noted that the inscribed the land in the name of the parish
church
of Tambobong, but this is of no importance in the view we take of the
case,
for we hold that the title of the petitioner is good without any
registry
at all. The question as to whether this capellania is or not a judicial
person, is, therefore, not decided in this case.
On the 4th of October
1905, the court below filed what is called a Decision. In this document
he stated the views which he had regarding the evidence of the several
defendants. No order for judgment of any kind was made in this
decision;
on the contrary the order is to the effect that the trial is reopened
for
the purpose of determining the location of the land of certain
defendants
other than these appellants and for the purpose of allowing the
petitioner
to the amended application. No order was made either denying or
granting
the prayer of the petitioner. On the 23rd of October, 1905, another
Decision
was filed by the Court, after the presentation of the amended petition,
in which final judgment was ordered, directing the inscription of the
land
described in the amended petition in favor of the petitioner.
The appellants claim
that in rendering two decisions in the case the court order committed
an
error. We do not think this claim can be sustained. It was within the
power
of the judge below to open the case for the admission of further
evidence
and for the presentation of an amended petition. That was all that the
first decision amounted to. Any other rule would work great hardship
the
petitioners in that court, and would require them to commence an
entirely
new proceeding when a slight amendment in the proceedings already
instituted
would accomplish the same result.
The judgment of the
court below as to the abovementioned appellants is affirmed, with costs
of this instance against them. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J.,
Torres, Johnson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
___________________________
Endnote:
[1]
Page 496, supra.
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