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EN
BANC
THE
MUNICIPALITY
OF CALOOCAN, RIZAL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
G.
R.
No. L-6444
May
14,
1954
-versus-
MANOTOK
REALTY,
INC. AND SEVERINO MANOTOK,
Defendants-Appellees.
D
E C I S I
O N
BENGZON,
J :
The Municipality of Caloocan,
Rizal, has appealed from the Decision of Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, Judge,
who dismissed its Complaint of April 22, 1952, seeking to expropriate a
parcel of land of the defendant Manotok Realty, Inc. Avowedly acting
under
Rep. Act No. 267, as amended, the plaintiff proposed to subdivide the
property
for resale to the actual tenants thereof.
Answering the Complaint
on May 8, 2952, the defendants moved for dismissal setting up three
main
defenses: [a] Nullity of the Resolution of the Municipal Council
directing
the expropriation, because the approval of the Department Head had not
been obtained; [b] The Government's right to expropriate lands for
resale
to tenants applied only to landed estates, which was not the case,
defendants'
property having hardly an area of four hectares, 39,374 sq. m., to be
exact;
and [c] The expropriation did not appear to be for public use and
benefit,
it was simply to accommodate a few individuals.
After considering
arguments
on both sides, the judge upheld the Motion to Dismiss holding, in
short,
that the property was not a "landed estate", [citing pertinent
decisions]
and that the condemnation did not serve a public purpose.
The plaintiff has
appealed
as stated, and has vigorously maintained, in its printed brief, the
proposition
that the lower Court erred: [a] in holding there was no legal authority
nor plausible reason for the taking of defendants' land; and [b] in
declaring
the expropriation was not for public purposes.
The defendants, on
the other hand, besides justifying His Honor's position, disputed the
timeliness
of this appeal, and reiterate the essential need of approval by the
Department
Head.
The issues and the
facts are well-defined. The expropriation We believe was clearly
improper.
The lot measured less than four hectares, and was not a landed estate,
subject to expropriation for purposes of subdivision and resale to
occupants
thereof.[1]
In Urban Estates Inc. vs. Montesa [see below], We said a parcel
containing
about five hectares was not a landed estate subject to expropriation
for
division among tenants.
The piece of land here
in question was purchased in 1943 from Dr. Leonides Lerma, by defendant
Severino Manotok for the benefit of his children. So that in May 1946,
a Transfer Certificate of Title was duly issued in the name of said
children,
nine of them, each becoming registered owner of one-ninths [1/9] of the
property. And before this proceeding was started, they formed the
corporation
Manotok Realty Co., to administer their interests.
Divided among nine
persons, the title would give 4375 square meters of land to each.
Obviously
the Government, insular or municipal, cannot consider that four
thousand
square meters is "landed estate" for expropriation purposes. And
grouping
the nine persons together, or suing them together as a corporation does
not conceal the resultant deprivation of nine individuals of their
landed
portions of 4375 square meters each. It would undoubtedly be unfair to
implead twenty owners of small contiguous lands and then maintain that
they own a large estate subject to condemnation proceedings [Cf.
Republic vs. Samia, 89 Phil., 483].
Anyway, even considered
as a whole, the Manotok property is not a large estate subject to
expropriation
under the Constitution.
The other questions
do not need to be decided. Judgment affirmed. So ordered.
Paras, C.J.,
Pablo, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ.,
concur.
_________________________
Endnote:[1]
Guido vs. Rural Progress Adm. 47 Off. Gaz., 1848, 84 Phil., 847; city
of
Manila vs. Arellano Law College, 47 Off. Gaz., 4197, 85 Phil., 663;
Republic
of the Philippines, vs. Samia 89 Phil., 483; Urban Estate Inc. vs.
Montesa,
88 Phil., 348. |