EN
BANC
VICENTE
MIJARES
AND
SULPICIA GUANZON,
Petitioners,
G.
R.
No. L-10458
April
22, 1957
-versus-
HONORABLE
EDMUNDO
S. PICCIO,
JUDGE OF
THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU
AND
PASTORA ALVAREZ
GUANZON,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I
O N
BAUTISTA
ANGELO, J :
This is a Petition for
Prohibition and
Certiorari
with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin
respondent Judge from enforcing his Order requiring petitioners to
answer
the Complaint and proceed with the trial in Civil Case No. R-3822 and
asking
at the same time that said Order be set aside and the case be dismissed
as regards said petitioners.
On December 24, 1954,
Pastora Alvarez Guanzon filed a Complaint in the Court of First
Instance
of Cebu against her husband, Jose M. Guanzon, containing two causes of
action: one for the annulment of a deed of sale in favor of Sulpicia
Guanzon
of certain real properties situated in the Province of Negros
Occidental,
and the annulment of a deed of donation inter-vivos in favor of Joven
Salvador
Guanzon of another set of real properties situated in the Province of
Cebu;
and another for the separation of their conjugal properties, which
include
both real and personal acquired during marriage [Civil Case No. R-
3823].
On October 19, 1955,
plaintiff filed a motion to bring into the case, Sulpicia Guanzon and
her
husband, Vicente Mijares, as parties defendants alleging that their
presence
therein is indispensable. This motion was granted and said defendants
were
duly summoned in accordance with law.
On January 17, 1956,
the new defendants Sulpicia Guanzon and Vicente Mijares, instead of
filing
their answer, filed a Motion to Dismiss based on three grounds, to wit:
[1] that venue is improperly laid, [2] that there is a misjoinder of
causes
of action and of parties defendants, and [3] that the Court has no
jurisdiction
over the persons of said defendants. After hearing the parties on this
motion, the court denied the same on February 7, 1956, holding that the
action is in personam as it does not affect title to real property,
that
there is no misjoinder of causes of action, and that it has
jurisdiction
over the persons of the movants. The movants filed a motion for
reconsideration,
and when this was denied, they interposed the present petition for
prohibition
and certiorari seeking to set aside the two orders adverted to.
The present case
involves
the rule which allows the joinder of several causes of action, the
pertinent
provision of which is embodied in Rule 2, Section 5, which provides
that
"Subject to rules regarding venue and joinder of parties, a party may
in
one complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party claim state,
in
the alternative or otherwise, as many different causes of action as he
may have against an opposing party."
While this rule appears
simple, however, difficulties may arise in its application, for it does
not state specifically the cases where several causes of action may be
joined, each case apparently depending upon the nature of the
transactions
involved. But one thing is clear: That the joining of causes of action
must be subject to the rules regarding venue and joinder of parties. If
these rules are violated, then a misjoinder of causes of action may
arise.
Former Chief Justice
Moran gives several illustrations of how this rule may be applied which
are interesting. On this point he makes the following comment:
"This rule, which is
now expressly extended to counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party
claims, is subject to the limitation regarding venue, whereby several
causes
of action with no common venue cannot be joined. For instance, if A, a
resident of Manila, has against B, a resident of Baguio, two causes of
action, one for money, and another for title to real property located
in
Zamboanga, he cannot join them in a single complaint, for the venue of
the first action, which is either Manila or Baguio, is different from
the
venue of the second, which is Zamboanga.
"The rule is likewise
subject to the limitation regarding joinder of parties. For instance,
if
plaintiff A has a cause of action against B, another cause of action
against
C, and another cause of action against D, the three causes of action
cannot
be joined, because there would be a misjoinder of parties defendant,
each
of them being interested in the cause of action alleged against him but
not in the other causes of action pleaded against the others.[1]
A claim on a promissory note against three defendants may not be joined
with a claim on another promissory note against two of the defendants,
for again there is a misjoinder of parties, the third defendant in the
first cause of action not having an interest in the second cause of
action."[2]
[Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1952 Ed., p. 24].
In the light of the instances
cited by former Chief Justice Moran, it may be stated that there is a
misjoinder
of causes of action in the present case not only as regards venue but
also
as regards the defendants. With regard to the first, it should be noted
that the first cause of action stated in the complaint refers to the
annulment
of a deed of sale of certain real properties situated in the province
of
Negros Occidental, and of a deed of donation inter vivos of another set
of real properties situated in the Province of Cebu. They therefore
refer
to two different transactions which affect properties situated in two
different
provinces. The venue has therefore been improperly laid as regards the
properties in Negros Occidental. With regard to the second, it also
appears
that the deed of sale which is sought to be annulled was made in favor
of Sulpicia Guanzon whereas the deed of donation was made in favor of
Joven
Salvador Guanzon, and there is nothing from which it may be inferred
that
the two defendants have a common interest that may be joined in one
cause
of action. On the contrary, their interest is distinct and separate.
They
cannot therefore be joined in one cause of action.
In the light of the
above considerations, it may, therefore, be stated that the motion to
dismiss
filed by petitioners in so far as the cause of action involving the
annulment
of the deed of sale covering the properties in Negros Occidental is
well
taken and should have been sustained by the lower Court.
Petition is granted.
The Orders of respondent Judge dated February 7, 1956, and March 5,
1956
are hereby set aside. The Complaint in so far as the cause of action
affecting
petitioners is hereby dismissed, leaving the Complaint valid as regards
the other defendants, with costs against respondent Pastora Alvarez
Guanzon.
Bengzon,
Padilla,
Montemayor,
Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ.,
concur.
_________________________
Endnotes:[1]
Gacula vs. Martinez et al., 80 Phil., 142.
[2]
Federal Housing Administrator vs. Christianson, 1 Fed. Rules |