Republic of the
PhilippinesSUPREME COURTEN BANC
IN
RE: PETITION
FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM.
CATHOLIC ARCHBISCHOP
OF MANILA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
G.
R.
No. L-15045
January
20, 1961
-versus-
SOCIAL
SECURITY
COMMISSION,
Respondent-Appellee.
D
E C I S I
O N
GUTIERREZ
DAVID, J :
On September 1, 1958, the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with the
Social
Security Commission a request that "Catholic Charities, and all
religious
and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or
indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Catholic
Archbishop
of Manila," be exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic Act No.
1161,
as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954.
The request was based on the claim that the said Act is a labor law and
does not cover religious and charitable institutions but is limited to
businesses and activities organized for profit. Acting upon the
recommendation
of its Legal Staff, the Social Security Commission in its Resolution
No.
572, series of 1958, denied the request. The Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila, reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional
objections,
requested for reconsideration of the resolution. The request, however,
was denied by the Commission in its Resolution No. 767, series of 1958;
hence, this appeal taken in pursuance of Section 5 [c] of Republic Act
No. 1161, as amended.
Section 9 of the Social
Security Law, as amended, provides that coverage "in the System shall
be
compulsory upon all employees between the age of sixteen and sixty
years
inclusive, if they have been for at least six months in the service of
an employer who is a member of the System, Provided, that the
Commission
may not compel any employer to become a member of the System unless he
shall have been in operation for at least two years and has at the time
of admission, if admitted for membership during the first year of the
System's
operation at least fifty employees, and if admitted for membership the
following year of operation and thereafter, at least six employees."
The
term "employer" as used in the law is defined as "any person, natural
or
juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines any
trade,
business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the
services
of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment,
except
the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities,
including corporations owned or controlled by the Government" [Par.
(c),
Sec. 8], while an "employee" refers to "any person who performs
services
for an `employer' in which either or both mental and physical efforts
are
used and who receives compensation for such services" [par. (d) sec.
8].
"Employment", according to paragraph [j] of said Section 8, covers any
service performed by an employer except those expressly enumerated
thereunder,
like employment under the Government, or any of its political
subdivisions,
branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned and
controlled
by the Government, domestic service in a private home, employment
purely
casual, etc.
From the above legal
provisions, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law
is predicated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship of
more or less permanent nature and extends to employment of all kinds
except
those expressly excluded.
Appellant contends
that the term "employer" as defined in the law should - following the
principle
of ejusdem generis - be limited to those who carry on
"undertakings
or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which are
pursued
for profit or gain," because the phrase "activity of any kind" in the
definition
is preceded by the words "any trade, business, industry, undertaking."
The contention cannot be sustained. The rule ejusdem generis applies
only
where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain
purpose
and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated.
[Grosjean
vs. American Paints Works (La), 160 So. 449]. In the case at bar, the
definition
of the term "employer" is, We think, sufficiently comprehensive as to
include
religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for
profit,
like herein appellant, within its meaning. This is made more evident by
the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or
entities
are not included. And certainly, had the Legislature really intended to
limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain
it would not have defined an "employer" in such a way as to include the
Government and yet make an express exception of it.
It is significant to
note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in
the employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable
purposes
were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage thereof
[Sec.
8, par. (j), Subpars. 7 and 8]. That portion of the law, however, has
been
deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took
effect
in 1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to
include
charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law.
In support of its
contention
that the Social Security Law was intended to cover only employment for
profit or gain, appellant also cites the discussions of the Senate,
portions
of which were quoted in its brief. There is, however, nothing
whatsoever
in those discussions touching upon the question of whether the law
should
be limited to organizations for profit or gain. Of course, the said
discussions
dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems of
industrializing
society and upon the plight of an employer who fails to make a profit.
But this is readily explained by the fact that the majority of those to
be affected by the operation of the law are corporations and industries
which are established primarily for profit or gain.
Appellant further
argues
that the Social Security Law is a labor law and, consequently,
following
the rule laid down in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs.
Araos
[G. R. No. L-10091, January 29, 1958] and other cases,[1]
applies only to industry and occupation for purposes of profit and
gain.
The cases cited, however, are not in point, for the reason that the law
therein involved expressly limits its application either to commercial,
industrial or agricultural establishments or enterprises.
Upon the other hand,
the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the "policy of the
Republic
of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social
security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people
throughout
the Philippines and shall provide protection to employees against the
hazards
of disability, sickness, old age and death." [Sec. 2, Republic Act No.
1161, as amended]. Such enactment is a legitimate exercise of the
police
power. It affords protection to labor, especially to working women and
minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the
"promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic
security
of all the people." Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with
the policy of the Church to ameliorate living conditions of the working
class, appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit the extent of its
provisions
to relations between capital and labor in industry and agriculture.
There is no merit in
the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the
coverage
of the Social Security Law violates the constitutional prohibition
against
the application of public funds for the use, benefit or support of any
priest who might be employed by appellant. The funds contributed to the
System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to
the members which are merely held in trust by the Government. At any
rate,
assuming that said funds are impressed with the character of public
funds,
their payment as retirement, death or disability benefits would not
constitute
a violation of the cited provision of the Constitution, since such
payment
shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest but because he
is
an employee.
Neither may it be
validly
argued that the enforcement of the Social Security Law impairs
appellant's
right to disseminate religious information. All that is required of
appellant
is to make monthly contributions to the System for covered employees in
its employ. These contributions, contrary to appellant's contention,
are
not "in the nature of taxes on employment." Together with the
contributions
imposed upon the employees and the Government, they are intended for
the
protection of said employees against the hazards of disability,
sickness,
old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote
social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people.
In view of the
foregoing,
Resolutions Nos. 572 and 767, Series of 1958, of the Social Security
Commission
are hereby affirmed. So ordered with costs against appellant.
Paras, C.J.,
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Concepcion,
Reyes,
J.B.L. and Barrera, JJ., concur in the result.
Bengzon, J.,
reserves his vote.
__________________________
Endnote:[1]
UST Hospital Employees Association vs. UST Hospital, G.R No. L-6988,
May
24, 1954; San Beda College vs. National Labor Union, G.R. No. L-7649,
October
29, 1955; Quezon Institute vs. Velasco and Quezon Institute vs. Paraso,
G.R. Nos. L-7742-43, November 23, 1955. |