EN
BANC
CROMWELL
COMMERCIAL
EMPLOYEES
AND LABORERS UNION
[PTUC],
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. L-19778
February
26, 1965
-versus-
COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS
AND
CROMWELL
COMMERCIAL
CO., INC.,
Respondents.
R
E S O L U
T I O N
REGALA,
J :
The facts of this case
are stated in the Decision of this Court which was promulgated on
September
30, 1964.
Briefly, Our Decision
rules that as far as reinstatement is concerned, both employees who are
discriminatorily dismissed as well as those who strike because of the
employer's
unfair labor practice are entitled to reinstatement. Excepted from the
rule are those who, on account of violence or other misconduct during
the
strike or who, because of subsequent employment elsewhere, must be
deemed
to have forfeited the right to reinstatement, having in view the
policies
of the Industrial Peace Act. With respect to backwages, however, We
hold
that only discriminatorily dismissed employees are entitled to backpay.
Those who voluntarily strike, even if it be in protest against unfair
labor
practice, are not entitled to backwages unless, after giving up the
strike
and presenting themselves to the employer, the latter should refuse to
reinstate them or should reinstate them subject to new conditions that
are also discriminatory.
On the basis of the
foregoing, We affirmed the Decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations.
The union has filed
a Motion for Reconsideration. First of all, it contends that in the
absence
of good faith or similar circumstances on the part of the employer, the
Court of Industrial Relations has no discretion to award half backwages
only to reinstated employees. Full backpay should have been given
instead
and this Court should have ordered this in its decision, so it is
averred.
To begin with, We note
that this point is being raised for the first time only now. Section 7
of Rule 51 states that "no error which does not affect the jurisdiction
over the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the
assignment
of errors and properly argued in the brief, save as the court, at its
option,
may notice plain errors not specified, and also clerical errors." Now,
the fact that full backpay was not given certainly cannot be
stigmatized
as "plain error," much less a clerical one. As noted in the decision of
the Court of Industrial Relations, the salesmen were not exactly
justified
in refusing to turn over their collections to the company. Nor is this
the first case that one half instead of full, backwages are awarded.
It is also contended
that those who struck in protest against the company's unfair labor
practice
should be given backwages because the company refused to take them back
except under the conditions contained in its March 1 Order. On this
point,
the Decision states:
"In contrast, the
rest
of the employees struck as a voluntary act of protest against what they
considered unfair labor practice of the company. The stoppage of their
work was not the direct consequence of the company's unfair labor
practice.
Hence, their economic loss should not be shifted to the employer. [See
Dinglasan v. National Labor Union, G.R. No. L-14183, Nov. 29, 1959]. As
explained by the National Labor Relations Board in the case of American
Manufacturing Co., 5 NLRB 443: 'When employees voluntarily go on
strike,
even if in protest against unfair labor practices, it has been our
policy
not to award them backpay during the strike. However, when the strikers
abandon the strike and apply for reinstatement despite the unfair labor
practice and the employer either refuses to reinstate them or imposes
upon
their reinstatement new conditions that constitute unfair labor
practice,
We are of the opinion that the considerations impelling our refusal to
award backpay are not longer controlling. Accordingly, we hold that
where,
as in this case, an employer refuses to reinstate strikers except upon
their acceptance of new conditions that discriminate against them
because
of their union membership or activities, the strikers who refuse to
accept
the conditions and are consequently refused reinstatement are entitled
to be made whole for any losses of pay they may have suffered by reason
of the respondent's discriminatory acts." [Quoted in Teller, 2 Labor
Disputes
and Collective Bargaining, Sec. 371, pp. 997-998]."
Now, it is clear from the
statement of the rule that those who strike voluntarily, even if in
protest
against unfair labor practice, are entitled to backpay only:
"when the strikers
abandon the strike and apply for reinstatement despite the unfair labor
practice and the employer either refuses to reinstate them or imposes
upon
their reinstatement new conditions that constitute unfair labor
practice."
In insisting, therefore,
on the company's observance of the collective bargaining agreement as
condition
for returning to work, the strikers did not in fact abandon their
strike,
because the company's non- observance of their agreement was precisely
the reason for their strike. This is the reason why we said that to be
entitled to backpay, the strikers must have offered to return to work
under
the same conditions just before their strike so as to place on the
company
the blame for the strikers' economic loss.
By underscoring certain
portions of the Decision in the American Manufacturing case, the
dissenting
opinion seems to imply that on the contrary, the voluntary strikers in
the former case were awarded backwages, it is because despite their
unconditional
offer to return to work, their employer refused to take them back
except
under "new conditions that discriminate against them." These new
conditions
were that these employees should sign a new contract as new employees
and
undergo medical examination. In contrast, no such conditions were
imposed
by the company in this case.
If the American
Manufacturing
case is being cited, it is for the general principle it lays, namely:
that
"when employees voluntarily go on strike, even if in protest against
unfair
labor practices, it has been our policy not to award them backpay
during
the strike."
Now, even in the
English
system, with its strict adherence to precedent,[1]
to distinguish one case from another held to be the rule is not to deny
its force as a precedent. As Professor Hart puts it:
"whatever
authoritative
status a rule extracted from precedent may have, it is compatible with
the exercise by courts that are bound by it of the following two types
of creative or legislative activity. On the one hand courts deciding a
later case may reach an opposite decision to that in a precedent by
narrowing
the rule extracted from the precedent, and admitting some exception to
it not before considered, or, if considered, left open. This process of
'distinguishing' the earlier case involves finding some legally
relevant
difference between can never be exhaustively determined." [The Concept
of Law, 131].
Anent the claim that the
notice given by the company to the employees was not a mere "tactical"
threat calculated to make them go back to work, suffice it to say that
if the strikers had anyway the right to reinstatement, no amount of
notice
of dismissal could negate that right. Any notice to that effect,
therefore,
could not be anything but a "tactical" threat.
Still on this point,
the dissenting opinion states that without a grievance committee [for
the
failure to constitute which the company was found at fault by the Court
of Industrial Relations] it is improbable, not to say inconceivable,
that
the laborers would "forego the right to strike without any alternative
method to have their grievances redressed. The opinion goes on that
"the
bargaining contract is indivisible, and the employer, who was the first
to breach it by blocking the organization of the grievances committee,
has no right whatsoever to claim enforcement of the no-strike clause."
The remedy for
violation
of a provision of an agreement is not another infraction of that
agreement.
We still have courts open for the redress of grievances.
Finally, it is
contended
that Andrada and Dario should have been ordered reinstated because the
Court of Industrial Relations itself recognized that minor misdemeanor
is an insufficient ground for denying reinstatement.
To be sure, what this
Court said is that the Court of Industrial Relations cannot order the
reinstatement
of those who are guilty of violence on the company's property and that
whether a misconduct is serious or not is for the Court of Industrial
Relations
to determine and only in cases of abuse of discretion will this Court
step
in. In other words, this Court did not agree with the Court of
Industrial
Relations' observation that occasional infractions of rules brought
about
by the rising temper may not justify denial of reinstatement. And this
Court also said that the question of whether or not those already
employed
elsewhere should be reinstated is the task of the Court of Industrial
Relations
and where there is no abuse of discretion, this Court will not
interfere.
Now the union says it is hard to show abuse of discretion. We think it
rather plain that that is no excuse for not proving abuse of
discretion.
To reinstate all employees irrespective of whether they have found
employment
elsewhere would be to negate the injunction that the question is one of
discretion to be determined if the order would effectuate the policies
of the law.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
Bengzon, C.J.,
Bautista Angelo, Paredes, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, J.,
concurs in the dissenting opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes.
Barrera and
Dizon,
JJ., took no part.
Separate
Opinions
REYES,
J.B.L., J.,
Dissenting:
My vote is for the
reconsideration of the Decision for the reasons expressed in my
original
dissent. While there was a non-strike clause in the collective
bargaining
agreement, operation of that clause was manifestly dependent on the
constitution
of the grievances committee also provided therein, for it is highly
improbable,
not to say inconceivable, that the laborers would forego the right to
strike
without any alternative method to have their grievances redressed. The
bargaining contract is indivisible, and the employer, who was the first
to breach it by blocking the organization of the grievances committee,
has no right whatsoever to claim enforcement of the no- strike clause.
The employer cannot disregard what is unfavorable to him and seek the
benefit
of those stipulations that are in his favor.
By the same token,
I do not believe the rule of the American Manufacturing case [5 NLRB
443]
on employees who voluntarily go on strike applies in the present case.
In the proceedings before us the employees were practically provoked
into
a strike because the employer blocked any other reasonable way to
ventilate
their complaints against management. In fact, the Decision cited really
favors the granting of backpay to laborers in the present case, who
offered
to return to work and abandon the strike, but whom the employer refused
to readmit, imposing the condition that its March 1st order be
accepted.
Said the NLRB in the case cited [at p. 467].
"When employees
voluntarily
go on strike, even if in protest against unfair labor practices, it has
been our policy not to award them backpay during the strike. However,
when
the strikers abandon the strike and apply for reinstatement despite the
unfair labor practices, and the employer either refuses to reinstate
them
or imposes upon their reinstatement new conditions that constitute
unfair
labor practices, we are of the opinion that the considerations
impelling
our refusal to award back pay are no longer controlling. Accordingly,
we
hold that where, as in this case, an employer refuses to reinstates
strikers
except upon their acceptance of new conditions that discriminate
against
them because of their union membership of activities, the strikers who
refuse to accept the conditions and are consequently refused
reinstatement
are entitled to be made whole for any losses of pay they may have
suffered
by reason of the respondent's discriminatory acts. Here the strikers
who
were refused reinstatement except on the conditions set forth by the
respondent
are entitled to reinstatement with back pay from July 27, 1937, to the
dates on which the respondent offers them reinstatement, less any
amounts
earned by them in the meantime." [Italics supplied].
There is, therefore,
no question in my mind that these laborers are entitled to backpay, at
the very least from and after March 14, 1957.
_________________________
Endnote:[1]
Close emphasis on material facts is what distinguishes the English
attitude
to decided case from that of continental jurists who in general regard
a judgment as a theoretical answer to rather abstract question of law.
[See Paton, A Textbook of Jurisprudence 160 (2d ed.)]. |