FIRST
DIVISION
EVELYN
YONAHA,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 112346
March 29, 1996
-versus-
HON.
COURT OF APPEALS
and HEIRS OF HECTOR CAÑETE,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
From the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing,
for lack of merit, the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
preliminary
injunction filed by Evelyn Yonaha against an Order dated 29 May 1992 of
the Regional Trial Court[1]
which had granted private respondent motion for the issuance of a writ
of subsidiary execution, the instant appeal was taken.
In Criminal Case
No. 01106-L, Elmer Ouano was
charged with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide"
in
an information which averred:
That on April 14, 1990, at or about 11:45
A.M.
in Basak, Lapu -lapu City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the afore-named accused, while driving a Toyota
Tamaraw
sporting Plate No. GCX-237 duly registered in the name of Raul Cabahug
and owned by EK SEA Products, did then and there, unlawfully and
feloniously
maneuver and operate it in a negligent and reckless manner, without
taking
the necessary precaution to avoid injuries to person and damage to
property,
as a result thereof the motor vehicle he was then driving bumped and
hit
Hector Cañete, which caused the latter's instantaneous death,
due
to the multiple severe traumatic injuries at different parts of his
body.[2]
When arraigned,
the accused pleaded "guilty"
and on 09 March 1992, the trial court pronounced its judgment:
Finding, therefore, the accused guilty
beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged against him and taking into
account
the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty
which the prosecuting fiscal readily accepted, the Court hereby
sentences
the accused to suffer and undergo an imprisonment of 1 year and 1 day
to
1 year and 8 months and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
P50,000.00
for the death of the victim; P30,000.00 for actual damages incurred in
connection with the burial and the nightly prayer of the deceased
victim
and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.[3]
On 27 April
1992, a writ of execution was issued
for the satisfaction of the monetary award. In his Return of Service
dated
07 May 1992, the MTCC Deputy City Sheriff stated that he had served the
writ on accused Elmer Ouano but that the latter had manifested his
inability
to pay the money obligation.
Forthwith,
private respondents presented a "motion
for subsidiary execution" with neither a notice of hearing nor notice
to
petitioner. Acting on the motion, nevertheless, the trial court issued
an order dated 29 May 1992, directing the issuance of a writ of
subsidiary
execution. The sheriff went to petitioner's residence to enforce the
writ
and it was then allegedly for the first time, that petitioner was
informed
of Ouano's conviction. Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to recall
the subsidiary writ of execution principally anchored on the lack of
prior
notice to her and on the fact that the employer's liability had yet to
be established. Private respondents opposed the motion.cralaw:red
On 24 August
1992, the trial court denied petitioner's
motion. On 23 September 1992, petitioner's plea for reconsideration of
the denial was likewise rejected.cralaw:red
Petitioner
promptly elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals [CA-G. R. SP No. 29116] for review. The appellate
court
initially restrained the implementation of the assailed orders and
issued
a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond.
Ultimately, however, the appellate court, in its decision of 28
September
1993, dismissed the petition for lack of merit and thereby lifted the
writ
of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated:
We are not unmindful of the ruling in the
aforecited
case of Lucia Pajarito vs. Señeris, supra. that
enforcement
of the secondary or subsidiary liability of employer maybe done by
motion
in the same criminal case, a recourse which presupposes a hearing. But
even assuming that the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution
requires
notice and hearing, We believe a hearing in the present case would be
sheer
rigmarole, an unnecessary formality, because, as employer, petitioner
became
subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of her accused driver Elmer
Ouano,
and proof of the latter's insolvency. And if she had any defense to
free
herself from such subsidiary liability, she could have ventilated and
substantiated
the same in connection with her [petitioner's] motion to stay and
recall
the writ of subsidiary execution in question. But from her said motion,
it can be gleaned that, except for the protestation of violation of due
process, and absence of notice to her of the motion for issuance of a
writ
of subsidiary execution, petitioner intimated no defense which could
absolve
her of subsidiary liability under the premises. Then too, after the
denial
of her motion to stay and recall subject writ, petitioner moved for
reconsideration
but in her motion for reconsideration, she averred no exculpatory facts
which could save her from subsidiary liability, as employer of the
convicted
Elmer Ouano.[4]
In the instant
appeal, petitioner additionally reminds
the Court that Ouano's conviction was not the result of a finding of
proof
beyond reasonable doubt but from his spontaneous plea of guilt.
We find merit in
the petition.cralaw:red
The statutory
basis for an employer's subsidiary
liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.[5]
This Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary
liability
in the same criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged
guilty,[6]
on the thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an incident in,
the
execution process of the judgment. But, execution against the employer
must not issue as just a matter of course, and it behooves the court,
as
a measure of due process to the employer, to determine and resolve a
priori,
in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability and propriety
of the employer's liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it
appears prima facie that the execution against the convicted
employee
cannot be satisfied. The court must convince itself that the convicted
employee is in truth in the employ of the employer; that the latter is
engaged in an industry of some kind; that the employee has committed
the
crime to which civil liability attaches while in the performance of his
duties as such; and that execution against the employee is unsuccessful
by reason of insolvency.[7]
The assumption
that since petitioner in this case
did not aver any exculpatory facts in her "motion to stay and recall"
as
well as in her motion for reconsideration which could save her from
liability;
a hearing would be a futile and a sheer rigmarole is unacceptable. The
employer must be given his full day in court.cralaw:red
To repeat, the
subsidiary liability of an employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code requires [a] the existence
of an employer-employee relationship; [b] that the employer is engaged
in some kind of industry; [c] that the employee is adjudged guilty of
the
wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge
of
his duties [not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the
discharge
of such duties]; and [d] that said employee is insolvent. The judgment
of conviction of the employee, of course, concludes the employer[8]
and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the same criminal case,
but to afford the employer due process, the court should hear and
decide
that liability on the basis of the conditions required therefor by law.[9]
WHEREFORE,
finding the Order dated 29 May 1992,
as well as the Order of 24 August 1992 to have been improvidently
issued,
said orders are hereby set aside. Petitioner shall be given the right
to
a hearing on the motion for the issuance of a writ of subsidiary
execution
filed by private respondents, and the case is remanded to the trial
court
for further proceedings conformably with our foregoing opinion. No
costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Padilla,
Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima,
Jr., JJ., concur.cralaw:red
_______________________________
Endnotes
[1]
RTC, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 27, Lapu-Lapu City, Hon. Teodoro K.
Risos,
Presiding.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 22-23.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[4]
Rollo, p. 27.
[5]
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons.-
The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall
also
apply to employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in any
kind
of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices or employees in the discharge of their duties.
[6]
Pajarito vs. Señeris, 87 SCRA 275.
[7]
Ozoa vs. Vda. de Medula, 156 SCRA 779.
[8]
See Ozoa vs. Vda. de Madula; Ibid.
[9]
See Vda. De Paman vs. Señeris, 115 SCRA 709.
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