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EN
BANC
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SENATOR HEHERSON
T. ALVAREZ,SENATOR JOSE D.
LINA, JR.,MR. NICASIO B.
BAUTISTA,MR. JESUS P. GONZAGA,MR. SOLOMON D.
MAYLEM,LEONORA C. MEDINA,CASIANO S. ALIPON,
Petitioners, |
G.
R.
No. 118303
January
31, 1996
-versus-
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HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR.,IN HIS CAPACITY
AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,HON. RAFAEL ALUNAN,
IN HIS CAPACITY ASSECRETARY OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT,HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ,
IN HIS CAPACITYAS SECRETARY OF BUDGET, THE COMMISSIONON AUDIT, HON. JOSE
MIRANDA, IN HIS CAPACITYAS MUNICIPAL MAYOUR
OF SANTIAGO AND HON.chanrobles virtual law libraryCHARITO MANUBAY,
HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR.,HON. ARTEMIO
ALVAREZ,
HON. DANILO VERGARA,HON. PETER DE JESUS,
HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD,HON. CELSO CALEON
AND HON. ABEL MUSNGI,IN THEIR CAPACITY
AS SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS,MR. RODRIGO L.
SANTOS,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS MUNICIPALTREASURER AND ATTY.
ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, IN HISCAPACITY AS
MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR,
Respondents.
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D
E C I S I
O N
HERMOSISIMA.
JR., J :
Of main concern to the
petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just recently passed by
Congress
and signed by the President into law, is constitutionally infirm.
Indeed, in this
Petition
for Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act
No. 7720, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago,
Isabela Into an Independent Component City to be Known as the City of
Santiago,"
mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the
House
of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
Also, petitioners claim
that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average
annual
income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991
in order to be converted into a component city.
Undisputed is the
following
chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill No. 8817 into Republic Act
No. 7720:
On April 18, 1993,
HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago
Into an Independent Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago,"
was filed in the House of Representatives with Representative Antonio
Abaya,
as principal author. Other sponsors included Representatives Ciriaco
Alfelor,
Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was
referred
to the House Committee on Local Government and the House Committee on
Appropriations
on May 5, 1993.
On May 19, 1993, June
1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993, public hearings on HB
No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on Local Government. The
committee submitted to the House a favorable report, with amendments,
on
December 9, 1993.
On December 13, 1993,
HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of Representatives on Second
Reading
and was approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993. On January 28,
1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate.
Meanwhile, a
counterpart
of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243 entitled, "An Act Coverting
the
Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be Known
as the City of Santiago," was filed in the Senate. It was
introduced
by Senator Vicente Sotto III as principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993.
This
was just after the House of Representatives had conducted its first
public
hearing on HB No. 8817.
On February 23, 1994,
or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the
Senate, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public
hearings
on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said committee submitted
Committee
Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be
approved
without amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No.
8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243. Senator Heherson T. Alvarez,
one
of the herein petitioners, indicated his approval thereto by signing
said
Report as member of the Committee on Local Government.
On March 3, 1994,
Committee
Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was
approved
on Third Reading on March 14, 1994. On March 22, 1994, the House of
Representatives,
upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the
amendments
proposed by the Senate.
The enrolled bill
submitted
to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive
on
May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was
held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of
Santiago
voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
The question as to
the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the following twin
issues:
[1] Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments IRAs] are to
included
in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for
purposes
of its conversion into an independent component city, and [2] Whether
or
not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of
HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in
the
House of Representatives.
I.
The annual income
of a local
government unit
includes the IRAs
Petitioners claim that
Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average
annual
last two [2] consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls
below
the required annual income of Pesos [P20,000,000.00] for its conversion
into a city, petitioners having computed Santiago's average annual
income
in the following manner:
Total income [at 1991
constant prices] for 1991 P20,379,057.07
Total income [at 1991
constant prices] for 1992 P21,570,106.87
——————
Total income for 1991
and 1992 P41,949,163.94
Minus:
IRAs for 1991 and
1992
P15,730,043.00
——————
Total income for 1991
and 1992 P26,219,120.94
Average Annual Income
P13,109,560.47
By dividing the total income
of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting the IRAs,
the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based
on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim that Santiago's
income
is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average annual income
requirement.
The certification
issued
by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance,
which indicates Santiago's average annual income to be P20,974,581.97,
is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not
excluded
from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not
actually
income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government
and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors
like
population, land and equal sharing.
In this regard, we
hold that petitioners' asseverations are untenable because Internal
Revenue
Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.
It is true that for
a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among
others,
have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the
last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices.[1]
Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance.[2]
Resolution of the
controversy
regarding compliance by the Municipality of Santiago with the
aforecited
income requirement hinges on a correlative and contextual explication
of
the meaning of internal revenue allotments [IRAs] vis-a-vis the
notion of income of a local government unit and the principles of local
autonomy and decentralization underlying the institutionalization and
intensified
empowerment of the local government system.
A Local Government
Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by
law
and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.[3]
Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation,
but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio,[4]
the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given
more
powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.[5]
Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby
deconcentrated,
enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop
not
only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources
and assets.[6]
The practical side
to development through a decentralized local government system
certainly
concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers
and
increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate on
a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more
expenses.
Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability
in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for
reasonably
adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out
its
functions.[7]
Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every
local government unit of [1] the right to create and broaden its own
source
of revenue; [2] the right to be allocated a just share in national
taxes
such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and
[3] the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization
and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial
boundaries.[8]
The funds generated
from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue
to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its
operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided
for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and
regulations.
For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must be
set
aside for local development projects.[9]
As such, for purposes of budget preparation, which budget should
reflect
the estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others,
the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are
considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is
defined
in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected
or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local
government
unit.[10]
The IRAs are items
of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of
the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue
to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of
the local government unit.[11]
They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably
rely
upon as the source of much needed funds. For purposes of converting the
Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of Finance
certified,
among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at
least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two [2] consecutive years based
on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of Finance did after
including
the IRAs in its computation of said average annual income.
Furthermore, Section
450 [c] of the Local Government Code provides that "the average annual
income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.'' To reiterate,
IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis,
too,
to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a
technical
definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code
that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers
referred
to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the national
government,
its instrumentalities and government-owned- or -controlled
corporations".[12]
Thus, Department of
Finance Order No. 35-93[13]
correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above disquisition when
it
defined annual income to be "revenues and receipts realized by
provinces
cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General
Fund
including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for
in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of
non-recurring
receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance,
loan
proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others" [Underscoring
ours].[14]
Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a
statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of
interpreting
and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be
accorded
great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown
to
be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute, or
other
laws.[15]
II.
In the enactment
of RA No. 7720,
there was compliance
with Section 24,
Article VI of the
1987 Constitution
Although a bill of
local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional
prescription,[16]
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of
petitioners
that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House
of
Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was
passed
in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No.
8817
was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was
filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own
admission
that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was
filed
on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only
of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817,
was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in
the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24,
Article
VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances
attending
the instant controversy.
Furthermore,
petitioners
themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on Third
Reading
and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local
Government
conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved
on
the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on
January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter or on February
23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public
hearings
on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB
No.
1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third
Reading,
from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a
substitute
bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does
not
contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local
application
should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the
Senate
does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
We have already
addressed
this issue in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance.[17]
There, on the matter of the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which,
as a revenue bill, is nonetheless constitutionally required to
originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, We explained:
"To begin with, it
is not the law - but the revenue bill - which is required by the
Constitution
to 'originate exclusively' in the House of Representatives. It is
important
to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo
such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting
of the whole as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be
produced.
To insist that a revenue statute - and not only the bill which
initiated
the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law - must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senate's
power not only to 'concur with amendments' but also to 'propose
amendments.'
It would be to violate the co-equality of legislative power of the two
houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
xxx
It is insisted,
however,
that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of
another Senate Bill [S. No. 1129] earlier filed and that what the
Senate
did was merely to 'take [H. No. 11197] into consideration' in enacting
S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate
preserving
H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version
following the enacting clause [which, it would seem petitioners admit
is
an amendment by substitution], and, on the other hand, separately
presenting
a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result
are two bills on the same subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution
simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives
on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members
of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
and
problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large,
are
expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective.
Both
views are thereby made to bear n the enactment of such laws.
Nor does the
Constitution
prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation
of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the
Senate
as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House Bill."[18]
III.
Every law,
including
RA No. 7720,
has in its
favor
the presumption
of
constitutionality
It is a well-entrenched
jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption
of constitutionality.[19]
Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified it must be shown that
there
is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful
and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for nullity must be
clear
and beyond reasonable doubt.[20]
Those who petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional
must
clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify such a
declaration;
otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into consideration the
justification
of our stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners
to challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on
the holding that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption.
The
dismissal of this petition is, therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J.,
Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Menoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Local Government Code, Section 450.
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52.
[4]
Ibid.
[5]
Local Government Code, Section 2.
[6]
Pimentel, Jr., Aquilino, The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key to
National Development, 1993 Edition, p. 4.
[7]
Local Government Code, Section 3[d].
[8]
Ibid.
[9]
Local Government Code, Section 17[g]; Rules and Regulations
Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991, Rule XXXII, Article 385.
[10]
Local Government Code, Section 306[i].
[11]
Local Government Code. Section 7.
[12]
Local Government Code, Section 17[g].
[13]
Dated June 16, 1993 on the subject of "Updating the Income
Classification
of Provinces, Cities and Municipalities Pursuant to the Provisions of
Section
8 of the Local Government Code of 1991." [This DOF order was issued to
implement Executive Order No. 249 dated July 25, 1987 entitled,
"Providing
for a New Income Classification of Provinces, Cities and Municipalities
and for Other Purposes.]"
[14]
Id Section 3.
[15]
Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 203 SCRA 504
[16]
1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 24.
[17]
235 SCRA 630.
[18]
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra.
[19]
Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52; Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287; Peralta
v.
COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad,
47 Phil. 387.
[20]
Peralta v. COMELEC, supra; Basco v. PAGCOR, supra.
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