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FELIPA
GARBIN,
G. R. No. 107653 February 5, 1996 -versus-HON.
COURT OF APPEALS [FORMER TENTH
DIVISION]
ROMERO, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac which had earlier dismissed the complaint for annulment of sale filed by private respondents. The facts are the following: Pablo Garbin and Leoncia Garbin are the parents of petitioner Felipa Garbin [Felipa] and private respondent Casimira Garbin [Casimira] married to private respondent Antonio Julian. Pablo Garbin is the original owner of Lot 12712, Camiling, Tarlac Cadastre with an area of 25,681 square meters, title thereto being evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 33251.cralaw:red On October 31, 1955, Pablo Garbin and his wife Leoncia executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate" purportedly conveying to private respondent Casimira Garbin the undivided northern half of the said lot. Casimira then registered an adverse claim over the property.cralaw:red On May 24, 1970, Pablo Garbin sold the entire Lot 12712, including the northern portion to petitioner Felipa by virtue of a Deed of Sale. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 88932 was issued in favor of Felipa. On July 29, 1974, Felipa and Pablo Garbin filed an ejectment case against private respondent spouses. In that case, the Municipal Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac decided against private respondents. They appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac which affirmed the questioned decision. Private respondents then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals but said petition was dismissed. They questioned the dismissal in this Court docketed as G. R. No. 59817 but the petition was denied due course.cralaw:red On March 1, 1982, before judgment could become final in the ejectment case, private respondents filed a complaint for annulment of sale, partition and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac. The issue presented therein was whether or not private respondents, as the alleged first vendees in a double sale [who annotated the same as an adverse claim on the covering title], have a superior right over petitioner, the subsequent vendee [who received a transfer certificate of title for the entire lot despite prior inscription of the adverse claim].cralaw:red The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint. Aggrieved, private respondents went to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. The appellate court said:
As regards the defense of prescription or laches invoked by defendant-appellee to defeat the claim of plaintiffs-appellants over the portion of land in question, We find the same equally undeserving of serious consideration. Considering that before instituting this action on March 2, 1982, plaintiffs-appellants were pre-occupied with the ejectment proceedings commenced against them by defendant-appellee on July 29, 1970; it cannot be said then, that plaintiffs-appellants slumbered on their rights and had failed to assert their claim seasonably. As a matter of fact, even during the pendency of the ejectment case, they did find time to initiate this case under consideration. Plaintiffs-appellants having been busy defending themselves in said ejectment case against them; their inability to file the present action sooner is understandable. It should be borne in mind that the running of the period of prescription is capable of interruption. And, to repeat; during the pendency of the ejectment case afore-mentioned; We believe that the running of the period of prescription of plaintiffs-appellants' cause of action had been interrupted. As regards the equitable principle of laches, the attendant facts and circumstances come to the fore. Whether or not laches set in depends on the surrounding facts and circumstances. Here, We believe that plaintiffs-appellants have not faltered or failed for an unreasonable length of time to assert their claim of ownership. With respect to the southern half of Lot 12712; plaintiffs-appellants' stance is also meritorious. When the wife of Pablo Garbin died, her estate was transmitted by operation of the law on intestate succession to plaintiff-appellant Casimira Garbin, defendant-appellee Felipa Garbin, and surviving spouse Pablo Garbin. So, when Pablo Garbin executed the deed of sale in favor of defendant-appellee, he could only convey to the latter his undivided share therein, which was 4/6 of the southern portion of Lot 12712 because as herein-above pointed out, the northern half of the said lot was effectively conveyed to plaintiffs-appellants, so that he could only dispose of 4/6 of the southern portion. Plaintiff-appellant Casimira Garbin inherited 1/6, and the remaining 1/6 of the southern portion went to defendant-appellee as her inheritance from their mother. Therefore, plaintiffs-appellants own 7/12 of Lot 12712 while defendant-appellee owns 5/12; the northern half being equivalent to 6/12, and out of the other 6/12, Pablo Garbin conveyed 4/12 to appellee Felipa Garbin, who inherited 1/12 in her own right. Plaintiff-appellant Casimira Garbin also inherited 1/12 which portion added to what appellants bought from Pablo Garbin, made appellant's area 7/12 of Lot 12712. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside; the sale by Pablo Garbin to defendant-appellee Felipa Garbin of the entire Lot 12712, Camiling, Tarlac Cadastre [Exh. "B"] is hereby declared null and void and without force and effect, and the resulting TCT No. T-88932 of the latter [Exh. "C"] is ordered cancelled; plaintiffs-appellants are adjudged the owners pro indiviso of seven-twelfth [7/12], including the northern half of the said lot, with defendant-appellee as the owner of the remaining five-twelfth [5/12], southern portion thereof. To avoid multiplicity of suits; the plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee are hereby given thirty [30] days from finality of this disposition, to submit to the trial court of origin a scheme of partition for subject lot on the basis of their undivided co-ownership of seven-twelfth [7/12] and five-twelfth [5/12], respectively; otherwise, pursuant to Rule 69, Revised Rules of Court, the lower court shall by order appoint not more than three [3] competent and disinterested commissioners to effect the partition in accordance herewith. Costs against defendant-appellee. SO ORDERED. Petitioner before this Court, now questions the appellate court's decision stating that:
3. Pablo Garbin himself repudiated the alleged sale to private respondent spouses in testimony before the trial court in the ejectment case, denying knowledge of the sale of subject property to them. 4. Pablo Garbin solely owned the subject lot as shown by the Original Certificate of Title and, thus, the property could not be considered conjugal. 5. Private respondents' cause of action had already prescribed. We find the petition meritorious. The central issue
to be resolved here is: does
the registration of the said adverse claim by private respondents
prevail
over the title of petitioner which was registered subsequent to the
adverse
claim?
Sec. 110 of Act No. 496 [otherwise known as the Land Registration Act] states:
From the
provisions of the law, it is clear that
mere registration of an adverse claim does not make such claim valid,
nor
is it permanent in character. More importantly, such registration does
not confer instant title of ownership since judicial determination on
the
issue of the ownership is still necessary.[2]
In view of the above, the entry in the day book automatically loses force and effect. Thus, it is the Deed of Sale that petitioner registered in her favor and the Transfer Certificate of Title subsequently obtained over the property, which has a superior right thereon.cralaw:red As regards the issue of the ownership by Pablo Garbin of the property, the Original Certificate of Title clearly states that he is the sole owner thereof. There is no basis, therefore, for the ruling of the appellate court that said property is conjugal in character and also for its computation of the shares that Pablo Garbin could dispose of when he executed the Deed of Sale on May 24, 1970 to Felipa.cralaw:red Lastly, on the issue of prescription, We agree with the trial court which found that the action for annulment of sale had already prescribed.
The unexplained interval of 29 years that the plaintiffs allowed to elapse before making any claim or instituting action constitutes laches that places them in estoppel to question the validity of the probate court's order and of the sale executed in pursuant thereof.[4] WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby set aside and that of the Regional Trial Court reinstated. Private respondents' complaint for annulment of sale is hereby dismissed.cralaw:red SO ORDERED.cralaw:red Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.cralaw:red ___________________________________
[2] Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, SCRA 136 [1963]. [3] G. R. No. 55134, December 4, 1995 (citing Barretto v. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771 [1956] and Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420 [1952]). [4] Laurel-Manila v. Galvan, 20 SCRA 198 [1967]. |
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