
SECOND
DIVISION
EDDIE
MANUEL, ROMEO BANA,
ROGELIO
PAGTAMA, JR. and JOEL REA,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 127553
November 28, 1997
-versus-
N.C.
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, JOHNNY LIM,
ANITA SY and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION [SECOND DIVISION],
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This Special
Civil Action for
Certiorari
seeks
to review the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
[NLRC]
dated June 27, 1996 in NLRC-NCR-00-07-04925-95 entitled "Eddie Manuel,
Romeo Bana, Rogelio Pagtama, Jr. and Joel Rea v. N.C. Construction
Supply,
Johnny Lim and Anita Sy."[1]
Petitioners Eddie
Manuel, Romeo Bana, Rogelio
Pagtama, Jr. and Joel Rea were employed as drivers at N.C. Construction
Supply owned by private respondents Johnny Lim [a.k.a. Lao Ching
Eng] and Anita Sy.cralaw:red
On June 3, 1995,
the security guards of respondent
company caught Aurelio Guevara, a company driver, and Jay Calso, his
helper
["pahinante"], taking out from the company premises two rolls of
electrical wire worth P500.00 without authority. Calso was brought to
the
Pasig Police station for questioning. During the investigation, Calso
named
seven other employees who were allegedly involved in a series of thefts
at respondent company, among them petitioners Manuel, Bana, Pagtama,
Jr.
and Rea.[2]
On June 5, 1995,
petitioners received separate
notices from respondent company informing them that they were
positively
identified by their co-worker, Jay Calso, as perpetrators of the
series of thefts committed at respondent company. They were thus
invited
to the Pasig police station for investigation regarding their alleged
involvement
in the offense.cralaw:red
Atty. Ramon
Reyes, private respondents' counsel
conducted in their behalf an investigation regarding petitioners'
involvement
in the theft. Atty. Reyes interrogated the petitioners on their alleged
participation in the series of thefts committed at respondent company.
Petitioners initially denied the charge. However, after being
positively
identified by Jay Calso, petitioners admitted their guilt and offered
to
resign in exchange for the withdrawal of any criminal charge against
them.[3]
Petitioners Bana and Rea filed separate resignation letters while
petitioners
Manuel and Pagtama, Jr. tendered their resignations orally. Petitioner
Bana's resignation letter[4]
reads:
Hunyo 6, 1995
Dear Bong,
Sa ganitong sitwasyon
nagpapasalamat rin
ako
na humantong sa ganito para hindi na tumagal ang masama naming gawain.
Piro lubos rin ako nagpapasalamat sa iyong pagpapatawad sa akin, at ang
masasabi ko lang na I'm very, very sorry na lang. Kasi alam mo naman na
kapos na kapos talaga ako. Kaya alam mo halos hindi na nga ako
nag-a-absent
dahil sa sahod ko lang kapos pa sa pamilya ko. Kaya sana sa pag-resign
ko sana mabigyan mo man lang ako nang kaunti para makapamasahi man lang
pau-wi sa Mindanao kasama ang mga anak ko. Yon lang
Gumagalang,
Boy
Petitioner
Rea's resignation letter,[5]
on the other hand, states:
Hunyo 6, 1995
Boss,
Dahil sa hindi maganda ang aking
naging
performance
sa inyo sa loob ng NC Construction Supply sa nakakahiya na aking
nasangkutan
magreresign na ho ako, magsisimula Hunyo 6, 1995. Siguro naman Boss
alam
naman ninyo ang totoo nakikisama lang ako sa mga dati ninyong tauhan
dahil
kailangan ko talaga ng trabaho kahit labag man sa aking kalooban ang
gumawa
ng hindi maganda.
Boss, kahit paano sana
maintindihan mo ako,
tatanggalin nyo na ho ako sana bigyan nyo na lang ako ng kahit pamasahe
namin pauwing probinsya para makapagbagong buhay na ako.
Salamat po.
Sumasainyo,
Joel Rea
Atty. Reyes
accepted petitioners' resignation effective
June 5, 1995. On July 17, 1995, petitioners filed a complaint against
private
respondents for illegal dismissal. Petitioners alleged that they were
not
informed of the charge against them nor were they given an opportunity
to dispute the same. They also alleged that their admission made at the
Pasig police station regarding their involvement in the theft as well
as
their resignation were not voluntary but were obtained by private
respondents'
lawyer by means of threat and intimidation.
Labor Arbiter
Manuel R. Caday ruled in favor of
petitioners and found their dismissal to be illegal. He held that
private
respondents failed to show a just cause for the termination of
petitioners'
services. He declared that petitioners' admission regarding their
involvement
in the theft was inadmissible in evidence as it was taken without the
assistance
of counsel, in violation of Section 12 Article III of the 1987
Constitution.[6]
He also held that petitioners were not afforded due process before
their
services were terminated. Hence, Labor Arbiter Caday ordered private
respondents
to reinstate petitioners to their former position without loss of
seniority
rights and to pay them full backwages. He also ordered private
respondents
to pay petitioners their service incentive leave benefits plus
attorney's
fees.[7]
On appeal, the
NLRC reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. It ruled that petitioners were dismissed for a just
cause.
It held that petitioners failed to adduce competent evidence to show a
vitiation of their admission regarding their participation in the
theft.
It further stated that such admission may be admitted in evidence
because
Section 12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution applies only to
criminal
proceedings but not to administrative proceedings. The NLRC, however,
agreed
with the Labor Arbiter that petitioners were denied due process. Hence,
it ordered private respondents to pay petitioners the amount of
P1,000.00
as indemnity. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, the
decision
appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside. A new one is hereby
entered
ordering respondents to pay to the complainants the amount of P1,000.00
each as and for indemnity for failure of the respondents to observe due
process.
Petitioners
filed the instant petition on the following
grounds:
1. The National Labor Relations
Commission
committed
grave abuse of discretion in declaring the dismissal legal;
2. The National Labor Relations
Commission
committed
grave abuse of discretion in declaring that the admission of
petitioners
is admissible in evidence despite the fact that it was obtained in a
hostile
environment and without the presence or assistance of counsel;
3. The National Labor Relations
Commission
committed
grave abuse of discretion in finding that respondents N.C. Construction
Supply et al. are right in withdrawing their trust and confidence with
petitioners without any valid and legal basis.[9]
We affirm the
decision of the NLRC.
An employer has a
right to terminate the services
of an employee subject to both substantive and procedural limitations.
This means that: [1] the dismissal must be for a just or authorized
cause
provided in the Labor Code;[10]
and [2] the employee must be accorded due process before his employment
is terminated. The validity of the dismissal hinges on the employer's
compliance
with these two requirements.[11] In the case at bar,
petitioners
who were employed as drivers at respondent company were found guilty of
stealing company property consisting of electrical wire, welding rod,
G.I.
sheet, steel bar and plywood. Article 282 of the Labor Code authorizes
an employer to terminate the services of an employee for loss of trust
and confidence, provided that the loss of confidence arises from
particular
proven facts. The law does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the employee's misconduct. Substantial evidence is sufficient.[12]
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[13]
Petitioners'
culpability in the instant case was
sufficiently proved by private respondents. Jay Calso, an employee of
respondent
company who has personal knowledge about the series of thefts that has
been going on at respondent company, positively identified petitioners
as among the perpetrators of the theft. Petitioners have not shown any
ill motive on the part of Calso to implicate them in the offense,
unless
it was true. In addition, petitioners admitted their participation in
the
theft during an investigation conducted by private respondents' lawyer.cralaw:red
We are not
convinced by petitioners' allegation
that such admission was obtained by means of threat or intimidation as
such allegation is couched in general terms and is unsupported by
evidence.
We also reject petitioners' argument that
said
admission is inadmissible as evidence against them under Section 12,
Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. The right to counsel under Section 12 of
the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case
under
custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into
custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that
lends
itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are
initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation.[14]
Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph [3] Section 12 of the
Bill of Rights applies only to admission made in a criminal
investigation
but not to those made in an administrative investigation.cralaw:red
In the case at
bar, the admission was made by
petitioners during the course of the investigation conducted by private
respondents' counsel to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
terminate their employment. Petitioners were not under custodial
investigation
as they were not yet accused by the police of committing a crime. The
investigation
was merely an administrative investigation conducted by the employer,
not
a criminal investigation. The questions were propounded by the
employer's
lawyer, not by police officers. The fact that the investigation was
conducted
at the police station did not necessarily put petitioners under
custodial
investigation as the venue of the investigation was merely incidental.
Hence, the admissions made by petitioners during such investigation may
be used as evidence to justify their dismissal.cralaw:red
Private
respondents, however, failed to observe
due process in terminating the employment of petitioners. Due process
demands
that the employer should furnish the worker whose employment is sought
to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the
cause[s]
for termination and afford him ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend
himself with the assistance of a representative if he so desires.
Specifically, the employer must furnish the worker with two written
notices
before termination of employment can be legally effected: [1] notice
which
apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought; and [2] the subsequent notice which informs the
employee
of the employer's decision to dismiss him.[15]
There is no showing in this case that private respondents furnished
petitioners
which such notices. Private respondents, through their counsel, Atty.
Reyes,
immediately terminated petitioners' services upon conclusion of the
investigation.
Private respondents must therefore indemnify petitioners for failure to
observe due process before dismissing them from work.cralaw:red
IN VIEW WHEREOF,
the petition is DISMISSED. The
assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado and
Martinez, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., is on leave.cralaw:red
_________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Penned by Commissioner Rogelio I. Rayala with the concurrence of
Presiding
Commissioner Raul I. Aquino and Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay.
[2]
Sworn Statement executed by Jay S. Calso before the PO1 Enrique R.
Jimenez
on June 4, 1995 at the Pasig Police Station; Annex "A" of private
respondents'
Comment; Rollo, p. 78.
[3]
Police Blotter of the Pasig Police Station dated June 5, 1995; Annex
"B"
of private respondent's Comment; Rollo, p. 80.
[4]
Annex "C" of private respondents' Comment; Rollo, p. 82.
[5]
Annex "D" of private respondents' Comment; Rollo, p. 83.
[6]Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence
of counsel.
xxx
xxx
xxx
[3] Any confession or
admission
obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible
in evidence against him.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 13-25.
[8]
NLRC Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 33.
[9]
Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 7.
[10]
Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 282. Termination by
employer.
An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
reasons:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[a] Serious misconduct
or
willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative
in connection with his work;
[b] Gross and habitual
neglect
by the employee of his duties;
[c] Fraud or willful
breach
by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized
representative;
[d] Commission of any
crime
or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
[e] Other causes
analogous to
the foregoing.
Art. 283. Closure of
establishment
and reduction of personnel. The employer may also terminate the
employment
of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices,
redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation to operation
of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the
purpose
of circumventing the provisions of this Title
[11]
Ranises v. NLRC, 262 SCRA 371 [1996]; Shoppers Gain Supermart v. NLRC,
259 SCRA 411 [1996]; Midas Touch Food Corp. v. NLRC, 259 SCRA 652
[1996].
[12]
ComSavings Bank v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 307 [1996]; MGG Marine Services, Inc.
v. NLRC, 259 SCRA 664 [1996].
[13]Section 5 Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court; Domasig v. NLRC, 261
SCRA 779 [1996].
[14]
People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 [1994] citing Gamboa v. Judge Cruz, 162
SCRA 642 [1988]; see also People v. Evangelista, 256 SCRA 611 [1996].
[15]
Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services [Phils] Inc. v. NLRC, 264 SCRA 307 [1996]. |