ChanRobles Virtual law Library
|
|
GO TO FULL LIST OF LATEST DECISIONS and RESOLUTIONS
ERNESTO
MORALES y DELA CRUZ,
G. R. No. 126623 December 12, 1997 -versus-COURT
OF APPEALS, HON. ALFREDO J. GUSTILO,
DAVIDE, JR., J.: The key issue in this case is whether, in the light of R. A. No. 7659[1] as interpreted in People v. Simon, [2] and R. A. No. 7691,[3] Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over violations of R. A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, when the imposable penalty is not more than six (6) years. The petitioner was charged with violation of Section 15 in relation to Section 20 of R. A. No. 6425, as amended by R. A. No. 7659, in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City on 13 March 1996. The accusatory portion of the said information reads as follows: "That on or about the 11th day of March 1996, in Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Ernesto Morales y De la Cruz, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to another 0.4587 grams of Metamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug. "CONTRARY TO LAW."[4] The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-8443
and raffled to Branch 116 of the said court.
In its Order[8] of 9 May 1996, the RTC denied the motion. It held:
"It is true that under the aforementioned provision, cases punishable with penalties of not more than six (6) years are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts. However, the exceptions are 'cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court' Under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the Court of First Instance now the Regional Trial Court and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, which no longer exist, 'shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this Act.' It is therefore clear that this case, which is a violation of Republic Act No. 6425, although punishable by a penalty of less than six (6) years, falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court." His motion for the reconsideration[9] of the order having been denied,[10] the petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[11] The case was docketed as CA-G. R. SP No. 40670. In its Comment[12] in CA-G. R. SP No. 40670, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agreed with the petitioner that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try the criminal case. It, however, asserted that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the special civil action for certiorari, as the same involved only the question of jurisdiction of an inferior court, hence, cognizable by the Supreme Court alone pursuant to Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, in connection with Section 5(2)(c), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 17 of Republic Act No. 5440. The OSG then recommended that the case be elevated to the Supreme Court for disposition, or that the Court of Appeals grant the petition and set aside the challenged order of the RTC should it rule that it had jurisdiction over petition.cralaw:red In its Resolution 1[13] of 8 August 1996, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction over the action. Explaining its ruling, it declared: "In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General, inter alia, contended that this Court has no jurisdiction over the petition for it properly falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." We fully agree.cralaw:red Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
"(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in xxx "(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue" Section 17 of R. A. 5446 otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 says that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is on issue. It is hereby stressed that the issue in the petition at bench is purely a question of jurisdiction which is resolvable on the basis of the records. After the denial[14]
on 13 September 1996 of his motion for reconsideration,[15]
the petitioner came to this Court via this petition for review under
Rule
45 of the Rules of Court raising the following issues:
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE/COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SECTION 15, IN RELATION TO SECTION 20, ART. III OF R. A. 6425, AS AMENDED, INVOLVING ONLY 0.4587 GRAMS OF SHABU.chanrobles virtual law library As to the first, the petitioner insists that respondent Court of Appeals has concurrent original jurisdiction with this Court over petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court involving decisions or orders of Regional Trial Courts pursuant to Section 9(1)[16] of B.P. Blg. 129 in relation to Section 5(1)[17] of Article VIII of the Constitution. He cites De Jesus v. Court of Appeals[18] wherein this Court held that the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 is concurrent with that of the Supreme Court, and with that of the Regional Trial Courts for writs enforceable within their respective regions. The petitioner further maintains that Section 5(2)(c) of Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R. A. No. 5440, relied upon by the Court of Appeals are not applicable inasmuch as they relate to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court and not to an original action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As regards the second issue, the petitioner asserts that the RTC below has no jurisdiction over the offense charged considering that only 0.4587 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) is involved. In light of Section 20 of R. A. No. 7659,[19] as interpreted in People v. Simon[20] and further explained in People v. Santos[21] and Ordoñez v. Vinarao,[22] the imposable penalty therefor would not exceed prision correccional, whose maximum period is six (6) years. Hence, under R. A. No. 7691, exclusive original jurisdiction therein is vested in Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.cralaw:red In its Comment on
the petition, the OSG submits
that all violations of R.A. No. 6425, as further amended by R. A. No.
7659,
which are punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six years now fall
under
the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Since on the basis of the quantity
of the regulated drug involved in this case the penalty imposable does
not exceed prision correccional, it is the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasay City which has jurisdiction over the case. It disagreed with the
opinion of the RTC that violations of R. A. No. 6425, as amended, still
fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC because the latter's
jurisdiction
thereon mandated by Section 39 of R. A. No. 6425 has been preserved by
the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 of
B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R. A. No. 7691. It submits that
Section
39 of R. A. No. 6425 was repealed by Section 6 of R. A. No. 7691, which
provides:
The OSG further contends that respondent Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction in view of Section 9(3) of B. P. Blg. 129; Sec. 5(2)(c) of Article VIII of the Constitution; and Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R. A. No. 5440. Nevertheless, it prays that this petition "be given due course and that Criminal Case No. 96-8443 be remanded to the proper metropolitan trial court for further proceedings." We resolved to give due course to this petition.cralaw:red The Court of Appeals erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction over petitioner's special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.cralaw:red Under Section 9(1) of B. P. Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals has concurrent original jurisdiction with the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 17(1) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, and with the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 21(7) of B. P. Blg. 129 to issue writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto.[24] These are original actions, not modes of appeals.cralaw:red Since what the petitioner filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals thereon is beyond doubt. This error of the Court of Appeals was due to its misapplication of Section 5(2)(c) of Article VIII of the Constitution and of that portion of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 vesting upon the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue. It forgot that this constitutional and statutory provisions pertain to the appellate not original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as correctly maintained by the petitioner. An appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is but a continuation of the original suit, not a commencement of a new action, such as that of a special civil action for certiorari. The general rule is that a denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash in criminal cases is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of an appeal or of a special civil action for certiorari. Nevertheless, this Court has allowed a special civil action for certiorari where a lower court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying a motion to dismiss or to quash.[25] The petitioner believed that the RTC below did so; hence, the special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals appeared to be the proper remedy.cralaw:red The next most logical step then is for us to simply set aside the challenged resolutions and to direct the Court of Appeals to resolve on the merits the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670. But, that would further delay the case. Considering the special importance of the lone legal issue raised, which can be resolved on the basis of the pleadings heretofore filed, and the fact that this Court has concurrent jurisdiction over petitioner's special action in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670, we deem it more practical and in the greater interest of justice not to remand the case to the Court of Appeals but, instead, to take direct cognizance thereof and resolve it once and for all.[26] We now address the second issue.cralaw:red Applying by
analogy the ruling in People v. Simon,[27]
People v. De Lara,[28]
People v. Santos,[29]
and Ordoñez v. Vinarao,[30]
the imposable penalty in this case which involves 0.4587 grams of shabu
should not exceed prision correccional. We say by analogy because these
cases involved marijuana, not methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). In
Section 20 of R. A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R. A. No.
7659,
the maximum quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride
for
purposes of imposing the maximum penalties are not the same. For the
latter,
if the quantity involved is 200 grams or more, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10 million shall
be imposed. Accordingly, if the quantity involved is below 200 grams,
the
imposable penalties should be as follows:
b) prision mayor if the quantity involved is from 66 to 133 grams; c) prision correccional if the quantity involved is 65 grams or below. Clearly, the penalty which may be imposed for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 96-8443 would at most be only prision correccional whose duration is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Does it follow then that, as the petitioner insists, the RTC has no jurisdiction thereon in view of the amendment of Section 32 of B. P. Blg. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, which vested upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts' exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties? This section 32 as thus amended now reads:
"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offender or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." The exception in the opening sentence is of special significance which we cannot disregard. By virtue thereof, the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases does not cover those cases which by provision of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan regardless of the prescribed penalty. Otherwise put, even if such cases are punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction, thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be. The aforementioned exception refers not only to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases,[31] but also to other laws which specifically lodge in Regional Trial Courts exclusive jurisdiction over specific criminal cases, e.g., (a) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R. A. Nos. 1289 and 4363 on written defamation or libel; (b) Decree on Intellectual Property (P. D. No. 49, as amended), which vests upon Courts of First Instance exclusive jurisdiction over the cases therein mentioned regardless of the imposable penalty; and (c) more appropriately for the case at bar, Section 39 of R. A. No. 6425, as amended by P. D. No. 44, which vests on Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts concurrent exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving violations of said Act.cralaw:red Jurisdiction is, of course, conferred by the Constitution or by Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.[32] Accordingly, Congress may, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such would be a special law and must be construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. In short, the special law prevails over the general law.cralaw:red R. A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered another special law on jurisdiction but merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, it does not have the effect of repealing or modifying Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code; Section 57 of the Decree on Intellectual Property; and Section 39 of R. A. No. 6425, as amended by P. D. No. 44. In a manner of speaking, R. A. No. 7691 was absorbed by the mother law, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.cralaw:red That Congress
indeed did not intend to repeal
these special laws vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Regional Trial
Courts over certain cases is clearly evident from the exception
provided
for in the opening sentence of Section 32 of B. P. Blg. 129, as amended
by R. A. No. 7691. These special laws are not, therefore, covered by
the
repealing clause (Section 6) of R. A. No. 7691. Neither can it be
successfully
argued that Section 39 of R. A. No. 6425, as amended by P. D. No. 44,
is
no longer operative because Section 44 of B. P. Blg. 129 abolished the
Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and Juvenile and
Domestic
Relations Courts. While, indeed, Section 44 provides that these courts
were to be "deemed automatically abolished" upon the declaration by the
President that the reorganization provided in B. P. Blg. 129 had been
completed,
this Court should not lose sight of the fact that the Regional Trial
Courts
merely replaced the Courts of First Instance as clearly borne out by
the
last two sentences of Section 44, to wit:
Consequently, it is not accurate to state that the "abolition" of the Courts of First Instance carried with it the abolition of their exclusive original jurisdiction in drug cases vested by Section 39 of R. A. No. 6425, as amended by P. D. No. 44. If that were so, then so must it be with respect to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 57 of the Decree on Intellectual Property. On the contrary, in the resolution of 19 June 1996 in Caro v. Court of Appeals[33] and in the resolution of 26 February 1997 in Villalon v. Baldado,[34] this Court expressly ruled that Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over libel cases pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. In Administrative Order No. 104-96 this Court mandates that: LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT.chanrobles virtual law library It likewise provides that jurisdiction over cases involving violations of intellectual property rights are "confined exclusively to the Regional Trial Courts." The same
Administrative Order recognizes that
violations of R. A. No. 6426, as amended, regardless of the quantity
involved,
are to be tried and decided by the Regional Trial Courts therein
designated
as special courts. As to the latter, this Court in its Resolution of 15
April 1997 in A.M. No. 96-11-421-RTC,[35]
resolved as follows:
Thereafter, in Circular No. 31-97 dated 15 May 1997, the Court Administrator directed Judges of "special courts for Kidnapping, Robbery, Carnapping, Dangerous Drugs and other Heinous Crimes" to comply with the aforesaid amendment to Administrative Order No. 104-96. To avoid any further confusion or misunderstanding, we hereby declare that the term "regular courts" found in the above amendment refers exclusively to the Regional Trial Courts and was not intended to include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby abandons the resolution in Gulhoran v. Escaño[36] where, through the Second Division, we ruled, in effect, that Section 39 of R. A. No. 6425, as amended, was repealed by virtue of the repealing clause of R. A. No. 7691. The RTC then did not commit any error in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 96-8443.cralaw:red WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, but only insofar as the issue of jurisdiction of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 is concerned. The Resolutions of 8 August and 13 September 1996 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE, while the challenged orders in Criminal Case No. 96-8443 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 116, are AFFIRMED. The trial court is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 96-8443 with all reasonable dispatch.cralaw:red No pronouncements as to costs.cralaw:red SO ORDERED.cralaw:red Narvasa, C.J.,
Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ.,
concur.
[1]
An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Heinous Crimes Amending for that
Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Laws, and for
Other Purposes.
|
|
|
