FIRST
DIVISION
RODOLFO
CAOILI,
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. 128369
December
22, 1997
-versus-
THE
HONORABLE
COURT
OF APPEALS
and HONORABLE
RUSTICO
V. PANGANIBAN,
Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 51,
Respondents.
R
E S O L U
T I O N
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner Rodolfo
Caoili seeks a reconsideration of the Court's 18th June 1997 resolution
dismissing his petition for review on certiorari. The petition assails
the resolution, dated 14 January 1997, of the Court of Appeals finding
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing
to exclude petitioner from a pending criminal case and to
correspondingly
amend the information theretofore filed with it.
The instant controversy,
as well as the antecedent circumstances leading to the petition, could
be said to have started when, in an Information filed on 15 March 1995
with the Regional Trial Court ["RTC"]of Manila, Branch 51 [Criminal
Case
No. 95141750], petitioner, Rodolfo "Rudy" Caoili, was charged, along
with
a certain Tony Yip, with violation of Presidential Decree ["P.D."] No.
1612. On 24 March 1995, petitioner sought a review by the Secretary of
Justice of the resolution, dated 16 February 1995, of Assistant
Prosecutor
Antonio R. Rebagay that had found a prima facie case against petitioner
that served as the basis for the information. In his ruling, dated 18
August
1995, the Secretary of Justice directed the exclusion of petitioner
Rodolfo
Caoili from the Information. The Secretary opined:
The only issue posed
in the petition is whether or not there is sufficient evidence to
indict
Caoili. To be liable for violation of P.D. 1612, Section 2 thereof
requires
that the offender buys or otherwise acquires and then sells or disposes
of any object of value which he knows or should be known to him to have
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The
allegations
of Atule and Azuela do not indicate that respondent Caoili acquired the
skiving machines in question knowing that the same were stolen
property.
The prima facie presumption of fencing from possession of stolen
property
does not apply to Caoili as complainant reacquired the subject skiving
machines not from respondent Caoili but from Yip. It is difficult to
give
credence to the claim of Atule and Azuela that respondent Caoili told
them
that he purchased the stolen skiving machines which he in turn sold to
Yip. It is simply contrary to common human behavior that a person would
intimate to another or others an unlawful act, that he purchased stolen
items and then dispose of it at a profit. Evidence to be believed must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be
credible
in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances.[1]
In declining to grant
the corresponding motion of the prosecutor to exclude petitioner from
the
information in consonance with the ruling of the Secretary of Justice,
the trial court ratiocinated:
Considering the records
of this case and it appearing that the Information was already filed in
Court, the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused is
now
with this Court and the prosecution may no longer interfere with the
judge's
disposition of the case.cralaw:red
The accused has to prove
his allegations when his turn to present defense evidence comes because
this allegations are matters of defense to be proven in Court.cralaw:red
It is also noted that
the Prosecutor has conducted the necessary preliminary investigation in
this case; examined the complaining witnesses; and there is a
reasonable
ground to believe that the offense charged has been committed and
accused
are probably guilty thereof. In fact accused Rodolfo Caoili filed his
counter-affidavit
beforethe Investigating Prosecutor during the Preliminary Investigation
of this case.[2]
Petitioner now insists,
following the rebuff by the Court of Appeals, that the determination of
a prima facie case of an investigating prosecutor after the examination
of declarants and his evaluation of the evidence cannot be considered
as
attaining finality while still subject to review by the Secretary of
Justice
who retains the power and authority to either affirm or reverse the
findings
of subordinate prosecutors. That prerogative, petitioner contends, is
all
up to the Secretary of Justice to take up so long as the accused has
not
yet been arraigned. Petitioner concludes that respondent Court of
Appeals
has erred in affirming the trial court in its questioned order
considering
that the rule laid down in Crespo vs. Mogul[3]
has already been abandoned by the pronouncements in Marcelo vs. Court
of
Appeals[4]
and Roberts, Jr., et al. vs. Court of Appeals,et al.[5]
It is too much of an
exaggeration to say that Crespo vs. Mogul no longer holds. The
Solicitor
General correctly points out that Roberts did not overturn or abandon
but
simply sustained the authority of the Secretary of Justice, recognized
under Rule 112, Section 4, of the Rules of Court, to review resolutions
of provincial or city prosecutors or the Chief State Prosecutor upon
petition
by a proper party even while the criminal case is already pending with
the courts. It did, understandably, caution the Secretary of Justice
from
being indiscriminate on this matter; thus, reiterating Marcelo, the
Court
has said:
Nothing in the said
ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to
review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary
of Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from
entertaining
a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once
a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of
a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary
of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the
discretion
of the court.[6]
Roberts went on to quote
with approval the Crespo rule in explaining the doctrine; thus:
The rule, therefore,
in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed
in
Court any disposition of the case as [to] its dismissal or the
conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution
of criminal cases even while the case is already in court he cannot
impose
his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on
what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within
its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case
filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option
to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after
a reinvestigation or upon instructions of Secretary of Justice who
reviewed
the records of the investigation.[7]
Evidently then, the appellate
court viewed and appreciated correctly the now prevailing
Crespo-Marcelo-Roberts
rule. Needless to say, the holding of this Court, or of the
appellate
court, in this instance is not to be taken as having any bearing on the
ultimate disposition by the trial court of the case on its merits.
WHEREFORE, the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner is DENIED WITH FINALITY.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo
and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
______________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Rollo, p. 57.
[2]
Rollo, p. 34.
[3]
151 SCRA 462.
[4]
235 SCRA 39.
[5]
254 SCRA 307.
[6]
Ibid., p. 331.
[7]
Ibid., p. 333. |