SECOND
DIVISION
NENA DE
GUZMAN,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 120941
April 18, 1997
-versus-
COURT
OF APPEALS,
and IGNACIO RANESES, ET AL.,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
This is a
petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. No. 40738-CV entitled Nena de Guzman v. Ignacio Raneses,
Isagani
Raneses and Hon. Lilian Dinulos-Pamontongan, which affirmed the
decision
of Branch 76 of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, ordering
petitioner to vacate the premises subject of the petition.[1] The facts show that on
July
6, 1988, an ejectment case, dated April 15, 1988 and docketed as Civil
Case No. 717, was filed by private respondents Isagani and Ignacio
Raneses
against petitioner Nena de Guzman before the Municipal Trial Court of
San
Mateo, Rizal.[2]
It was alleged that in 1986, petitioner, through stealth, unlawfully
constructed
a house within the 4.5 hectare lot owned by private respondents in
Labahan,
San Mateo, Rizal.[3]
Despite receipt of two demand letters from private respondents,
petitioner
refused to vacate the premises. On July 27, 1988, a summons and a copy
of the complaint were served on petitioner through her daughter Nancy
de
Guzman, a person of sufficient age and discretion. When petitioner
failed
to file her answer within the reglementary period, private respondents
moved for summary judgment.[4]
On August 17, 1988, a judgment by default was rendered by Municipal
Trial
Court Judge Apolinar T. Antazo ordering petitioner to vacate the
disputed
lots and to pay the private respondents P2,000.00 as attorney's fees
and
the costs of suit.[5]
On October 18, 1988, the Municipal Trial Court issued a Writ of
Execution
against the petitioner. On October 27, 1988, petitioner's counsel filed
a Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Set Aside the Decision. The
Municipal
Trial Court denied the Motion and granted the Writ of Execution. On
January
19, 1989, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo,
Rizal a Petition for Relief from Judgment, Injunction and Damages,
docketed
as Civil Case No. 540-SM. Petitioner argued that she was denied due
process
of law because the summons was not properly served on her.[6]
Allegedly, the deputy sheriff resorted to substituted service of
summons
without exerting any effort to find the petitioner. She also assailed
the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court to try the forcible entry
case
on the ground that the complaint was filed two years after her alleged
unlawful entry into the premises. On February 23, 1989, private
respondents
filed their answer to the petition. After giving due course to the
petition,
the Regional Trial Court, on July 10, 1992, rendered its decision
sustaining
petitioner's contention that the service of summons was improper and
the
ejectment suit was filed out of time. It ruled that to enable the
Municipal
Trial Court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner
through
substituted service of summons, it is necessary to show the
impossibility
of personal service which should be explained in the proof of service.[7]
It also found undisputed that the forcible entry case was filed two
years
after the alleged occupation of the land through stealth by petitioner;
hence, the action has prescribed.
The Regional
Trial Court further received evidence
on the ownership of the disputed lot.[8]
It held that the evidence showed that petitioner acquired her "rights"
to the property by purchase from persons who were mere tenants on the
property
while private respondents' claim over the property was supported by
documentary
proofs of ownership.[9]
Thus, it ordered petitioner to vacate the lot in dispute.
Within the reglementary period, petitioner,
through
counsel, filed her appeal with the Court of Appeals contending that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE
MERITS
OF THE CASE AT ONCE WITHOUT ISSUING ANY PRIOR ORDER SETTING ASIDE THE
DECISION
OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT.chanrobles virtual law library
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
DISMISSING THE
FORCIBLE ENTRY CASE [PRINCIPAL ACTION] FILED BY THE APPELLEES AFTER IT
DECLARED THAT THE SAID ACTION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND THAT THE LOWER
COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME.chanrobles virtual law library
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE
ISSUE
OF OWNERSHIP AND DECLARING THAT APPELLEES ARE THE OWNERS OF THE
PROPERTY
SUBJECT OF THE EJECTMENT SUIT AND THAT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO ITS
POSSESSION.chanrobles virtual law library
On January 24,
1995, the Court of Appeals sustained
the decision of the Regional Trial Court. It held that: (1) petitioner
chose the wrong remedy when it filed its petition for relief from
judgment
for there was no indication of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence
on her petition which would merit relief from the decision of the
Municipal
Trial Court. It ruled that petitioner's proper remedy was appeal, and
since
it did not do so, the decision of the Municipal Court became final and
executory;[10]
and (2) petitioner failed to prove her ownership or any right to
possess
the disputed lot for her predecessor-in-interest was a mere squatter.[11]
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution
dated June 27, 1955. Hence, this appeal with the following assignments
of error:
THE RESPONDENT COURT DECIDED A
QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE
COURT IN NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
DISMISSING
THE FORCIBLE ENTRY CASE (PRINCIPAL ACTION) AFTER IT DECLARED THAT THE
SAID
ACTION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION
OVER THE SAME.chanrobles virtual law library
THE RESPONDENT COURT DECIDED A
QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE
COURT IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ON THE
MATTER
OF POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
The petition is
meritorious.
It is clear that
petitioner was denied due process
as she was not properly summoned before the Municipal Trial Court
rendered
judgment against her. It is also indubitable on the face of the
Complaint
for forcible entry that the action had already prescribed. The
Complaint
dated April 15, 1988 alleged that petitioner entered the property by
stealth
sometime in 1986. We have ruled that "forcible entry and unlawful
detainer
are quieting processes and the one-year time bar to the suit is in
pursuance
of the summary nature of the action.[12]
The one year period is counted from the time the entry by stealth was
made
by the defendant.[13]
After the lapse of the one-year period, the remedy of the party
dispossessed
of a land is to file an "accion publiciana."[14]
Consequently, the respondent court committed reversible error when it
sustained
the ruling of the Regional Trial Court upholding the claim of ownership
of the private respondents.cralaw:red
IN VIEW WHEREOF,
the Decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The Complaint docketed as Civil Case No.
717 filed in the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal is ordered
DISMISSSED.
No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado, Romero,
Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
_______________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Decision penned by Associate Justice V.C. Serafin Guingona and
concurred
in by Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena and Ramon A. Barcelona, 3rd
Division
[2]
Presided by Judge Apolinar Antazo.
[3]
Complaint, Rollo, pp. 42-44.
[4]
Municipal Trial Court Decision, p. 1; Rollo, p. 45.
[5]
Ibid.
[6]
Petition for Relief from Judgment, p. 2; Rollo, p. 40.
[7]
Regional Trial Court Decision, pp. 2-4, Rollo, pp. 54-55.
[8]
Regional Trial Court Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 55.
[9]
TCT No. 150081, Exhibit "7"; TCT No. 150082, Exhibit "8"; TCT No.
150083,
Exhibit "9"; N-31041, Exhibit "10".
[10]Sec. 3, Rule 38, Revised Rules of Court.
[11]
Court of Appeals Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 29.
[12]
De Leon v. CA, 245 SCRA 166, 173 [1995].
[13]Section 1, Rule 70 Revised Rules of Court.
[14]
De Leon, op cit., p. 174. |