FIRST
DIVISION
PAGUIO TRANSPORT
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. 119500
August
28, 1998
-versus-
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION
AND
WILFREDO MELCHOR,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I
O N
PANGANIBAN,
J :
In dismissing the Petition,
this Court reiterates the following doctrines: [1] the "boundary
system"
used in taxi [and jeepney] operations presupposes an employer-employee
relation; [2] the employer must prove just [or authorized] cause and
due
process to justify dismissal of an employee; [3] strained relations
must
be demonstrated as a fact; and [4] back wages and reinstatement are
necessary
consequences of illegal dismissal.
The Case
Before Us is a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction assailing
the
December 16, 1994 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission[1]
in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01564-94 entitled "Wilfredo Melchor vs.
Paguio
Transport Corporation/Serafin Paguio." The dispositive portion of the
challenged
Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the appeal insofar as it seeks reversal of the finding on
illegal
dismissal is denied for lack of merit. The decision declaring that
complainant
was illegally dismissed is affirmed. The decision is however partially
modified insofar as liability therefor is concerned. The liability
shall
inure against Paguio Transport Corporation, subject to the provision of
the Corporation Code and the Rules of Court on matters taken herein.
The
backwages as computed in the assailed decision is set aside, and a new
one is hereby provided in the amount of P86,400.00 as computed in the
immediately
preceding paragraph."
Petitioner also impugns
the February 21, 1995 NLRC Resolution[2]
denying the motion for reconsideration.
The June 28, 1994
Decision
of the Labor Arbiter[3]
which the NLRC modified as to the amount of back wages, disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the
respondents
are hereby ordered to reinstate the complainant with full backwages
from
the time his salaries were withheld from him until his actual
reinstatement.
"The respondents are
further ordered to pay him his 13th month pay in the amount of
P5,600.00.
"Complainant's
backwages
up to the date of this Decision as computed by LEILANI E. CALALANG of
the
Commission's NLRC NCR Branch is:
"11/28/93 - 6/28/94
= 7 mos.
P800.00 x 3 days x
4 weeks = P9,600.00
P9,600.00 x 7 mos.
= P67.200.00
"The aspect of
reinstatement
either in the job or payroll at the option of the employers being
immediately
executory pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code, the respondents
are
hereby directed to so reinstate him when he reports for work by virtue
of this Decision.
"Other claims are
hereby
dismissed for lack of evidence."
The Facts The facts as summarized
in the challenged Decision, are as follows:
"Complainant Wilfredo
Melchor was hired by respondent company as a taxi driver on 25 December
1992 under the 'boundary system.' He was engaged to drive the taxi unit
assigned to him on a 24-hour schedule per trip every two [2] days, for
which he used to earn an average income from P500 to P700 per trip,
exclusive
of the P650.00 boundary and other deductions imposed on him. On 24
[sic]
November 1993, complainant allegedly met a vehicular accident along
Quirino
Avenue near the PNR Station and Plaza Dilao when he accidentally bumped
a car which stopped at the intersection even when the traffic light was
green and go. After he submitted the traffic accident report to the
office
of respondents, he was allegedly advised to stop working and have a
rest.
After several days, he allegedly reported for work only to be told that
his service was no longer needed. Hence, the complaint for illegal
dismissal,
among others.
"Respondents, for
their
part, maintained that complainant was not illegally dismissed, there
being
in the first place no employer-employee relationship between them. In
amplification,
it was argued that the element of control which was a paramount test to
determine the existence of such a relationship [was] lacking. So too,
it
argued the element of the payment of compensation. Considering that in
lieu of the latter, payment of boundary is instead made allegedly makes
the relationship between them of a 'wase-agreement' [sic].
Respondents
then argued that even if an employer-employee relationship were to be
presumed
as present, still complainant's termination arose out of a valid cause
and after he refused to articulate his stand on the investigation being
conducted on him. Respondents then harped on the supposed three
occasions
when complainant figured in a vehicular accident involving the taxi
unit
he was driving, viz: On August 3, which resulted in damages to
the
respondent in the amount of P150.00; On August 4 which again resulted
in
the damages to the respondent in the amount of P615.00; and again on 4
November 1993, the mishap costing the respondents this time P25,370.00
in damages. As a result of the alleged compounded damages which the
respondents
had to shoulder on account of the supposed reckless driving of the
complainant,
the former was allegedly left with no alternative but to ask
complainant's
explanation why he should still be allowed to drive. Complainant,
despite
several chances, allegedly failed to do so."[4]
Ruling of
the
NLRC
The NLRC held that
private respondent was an illegally dismissed employee of petitioner.
Upholding
the existence of an employer-employee relationship, it cited Doce v.
WCC,[5]
in which the Supreme Court ruled that "the relationship created between
the parties operating under a 'boundary system' is one of an employer
and
employee, and not of a lessor and a lessee."[6]
The NLRC sustained
the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that the private respondent was
illegally
dismissed for he "was not afforded the twin requirements of due
process."[7]
It rejected petitioner's claim that private respondent had figured in
three
vehicular incidents because of his reckless driving. It found that
"except
for petitioner's bare statements, no proof was presented to establish
with
particularity the circumstances being claimed. The guilt and
culpability
of [private respondent] which would give [petitioner] valid ground to
effect
his dismissal cannot be established by a mere allegation of his
reckless
driving."[8]
Public Respondent NLRC
found petitioner liable for backwages in the amount of P86,400, and not
P67,200 as computed by the labor arbiter. It found, however, that this
liability should be imposed on Petitioner Corporation only, and not on
its president who was also impleaded by private respondent.
Hence, this Petition.[9]
Issues
Petitioner raises the
following issues:
"[a] Whether or not
public respondent Commission acted in excess of jurisdiction and/or
with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering
the reinstatement of private respondent with full backwages, despite
its
strained relations with the petitioner and the reinstatement would, in
effect, be inimical to the interest of the latter in particular, and to
the riding public in general;
"[b] Whether or not
public respondent acted in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse
of discretion in refusing to reconsider its decision and resolution
complained
of despite the facts prevailing to support the reconsideration."[10]
In resolving the
Petition,
We shall address the following points: [1] employer-employee relation;
[2] presence of just cause; [3] due process; [4] strained relationship;
and [5] propriety of reinstatement and backwages.
The Court's
Ruling
The petition is
not meritorious.First Issue:Employer-Employee
Relation
Under the "boundary
system," private respondent was engaged to drive petitioner's taxi unit
on a 24-hour schedule every two days. On each such trip, private
respondent
remitted to petitioner a "boundary" of P650. Whatever he earned in
excess
of that amount was considered his income.
Petitioner argues that
under said arrangement, he had no control over the number of hours
private
respondent had to work and the routes he had to take. Therefore, he
concludes
that the employer-employee relationship cannot be deemed to exist.
Petitioner's contention
is not novel. In Martinez v. National Labor Relations Commission,[11]
this Court already ruled that the relationship of taxi owners and taxi
drivers is the same as that between jeepney owners and jeepney drivers
under the "boundary system." In both cases, the employer-employee
relationship
was deemed to exist, viz:
"The relationship
between
jeepney owners/operators on one hand and jeepney drivers on the other
under
the boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of
lessor-lessee.
In the lease of chattels, the lessor loses complete control over the
chattel
leased. In the case of jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers,
the
former exercise supervision and control over the latter. The fact that
the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only the excess of that
so-called boundary they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to
withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and
employee.
The doctrine is applicable in the present case. Thus, private
respondents
were employees.because they had been engaged to perform
activities
which were usually necessary or desirable in the usual trade or
business
of the employer."[12]
Second Issue:Just Cause
Petitioner also asserts
that private respondent's involvement in three vehicular accidents
within
a span of several months constitutes just cause for his dismissal. It
alleges
that, according to the police report concerning the most recent and
serious
vehicular mishap, it was private respondent who was at fault and that
the
"city prosecutor of Quezon City recommended that an Information for
reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property be filed against him."[13]
Petitioner, however,
did not submit any proof to support these allegations. Well-settled is
the rule that the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal
of an employee is for a just cause. The failure of the employer to
discharge
this burden means that the dismissal is not justified and that the
employee
is entitled to reinstatement and backwages.[14]
In this case, petitioner failed to prove any just or authorized cause
for
his dismissal. Private respondent, therefore, must be deemed illegally
dismissed.[15]
Petitioner contends
that he "submitted and presented material and competent documentary
evidence
consisting of police reports of vehicular accidents of taxicab units
owned
by petitioner and driven by private respondent, the repairs and
expenses
suffered by the petitioner as a result thereof and the resolution of
the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City finding private respondent at fault for
the November 4, 1993 vehicular accident caused by the latter."[16]
Adding that the submission of these documents only on appeal does not
diminish
their probative value, petitioner cites Article 221 of the Labor Code
which
reads:
"Article 221. Technical
rules not binding and prior resort to amicable settlement. - In any
proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the
rules
of procedure prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling
and it is the spirit and intention of the Code that the Commission and
its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable
means
to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively without
regard
to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due
process.
In any proceeding before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, the
parties
may be represented by legal counsel but it shall be the duty of the
Chairman,
any Presiding Commissioner or Commissioner or any Labor Arbiter to
exercise
complete control of the proceedings at all stages.
"Any provision of law
to the contrary notwithstanding, the Labor Arbiter shall exert all
efforts
towards [t]he amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his
jurisdiction
on or before the first hearing. The same rule shall apply to the
Commission
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction."
However, a careful examination
of both the original Complaint and the Petitioner's Memorandum of
Appeal
from the Labor Arbiter's Decision reveals that said pieces of
documentary
evidence were not mentioned or included therein,[17]
but were submitted by petitioner only when he filed his present
petition
with this Court. These pieces of evidence were attached and referred to
as Annexes "G", "H", "I", "J", "K" and "L" of the said petition. Such
factual
issues cannot be resolved in a Petition for Certiorari like the present
case, because the Court's review of NLRC Decisions is limited to
questions
of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. In PMI Colleges v. NLRC,[18]
the Court held:
"This Court is
definitely
not the proper venue to consider this matter for it is not a trier of
factsCertiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in
character.
It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. Factual issues
are not a proper subject for certiorari, as the power of the Supreme
Court
to review labor cases is limited to the issue of jurisdiction and grave
abuse of discretion.
"Of the same tenor
was our disquisition in Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC
where
we made plain that:
'In certiorari
proceedings
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, judicial review by this Court does
not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their determinations, the inquiry
being
limited essentially to whether or not said public respondents had acted
without or in excess of [their] jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.'
"Our deference to the
expertise
acquired by quasi-judicial agencies and the limited scope granted Us in
the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction restrain us from going so far
as
to probe into the correctness of a tribunal's evaluation of evidence,
unless
there is a palpable mistake and complete disregard thereof in which
case
certiorari would be proper. In plain terms, in certiorari proceedings,
we are concerned with mere errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment."
Equally devoid of correctness
is petitioner's claim that the documents should be considered pursuant
to Article 221 of the Labor Code which states that technical rules are
not binding in proceedings before the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC. The
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; as earlier stated, its
jurisdiction
in a Petition for Certiorari, like the present case, is confined to
questions
of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. The unexplained failure
of petitioner to present its evidence before the labor arbiter and the
NLRC cannot compel this Court to expand the scope of its review.
Indeed,
petitioner has not proffered a sufficient reason for this Court to do
so.
Petitioner's reliance
on Canete v. National Labor Relations Commission[19]
is misplaced. In that case, the documents were submitted to the NLRC
before
they were tackled by the Supreme Court.
Private respondent's
admission that he was involved in the November 4, 1993 accident did not
give petitioner a just cause to dismiss him. Mere involvement in an
accident,
absent any showing of fault or recklessness on the part of an employee,
is not a valid ground for dismissal.
Third Issue:No Due
Process
Petitioner insists
that private respondent was accorded due process, because he was
allowed
to explain his side and to show cause why he should still be allowed to
act as one of petitioner's drivers.
This does not persuade.
The Court has consistently held that in the dismissal of employees, the
twin requirements of notice and hearing are essential elements of due
process.
The employer must furnish the worker two written notices: [1] one to
apprise
him of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought;
and [2] the other to inform him of his employer's decision to dismiss
him.
As to the requirement of a hearing, the essence of due process lies
simply
in an opportunity to be heard, and not always and indispensably in an
actual
hearing.[20]
In the present case,
petitioner failed to present proof, other than its bare allegations,
that
it had complied with these requirements.[21]
We reiterate: the burden of proof rests on the employer. Private
respondent,
in fact, was not given notice that he was being dismissed. When ordered
to explain the vehicular accident that happened on November 4, 1993, he
was not informed that petitioner was contemplating his dismissal and
that
his involvement in said vehicular accident was the cause thereof.
Private
respondent was merely asked to explain the vehicular accident per se,
not his defense against a charge of dismissal arising from the
vehicular
accident. He became aware of his employer's intention to dismiss him
only
when he was actually told not to report for work anymore.
Fourth Issue:Strained
Relations
Notwithstanding its
failure to prove just cause and due process in the dismissal of private
respondent, petitioner seeks to bar his reinstatement by invoking the
doctrine
of strained relations. It contends that as a result of private
respondent's
"reckless and incompetent manner of driving, compounded by the damages
suffered by petitioner in terms of repairs, related expenses, and the
institution
of the instant case, the relationship between the parties are so
strained
as to preclude a harmonious working atmosphere to the prejudice of the
petitioner as well as private respondent."[22]
We are not persuaded.
Strained relations must be demonstrated as a fact. Petitioner failed to
do so. Its allegation that private respondent was incompetent and
reckless
in his manner of driving, which led to his involvement in three
vehicular
accidents, is not supported by the records. As earlier noted, no
evidence
was properly submitted by petitioner to prove or give credence to his
assertions.
Thus, Respondent NLRC ruled:
"Despite allegation
on the matter, not an iota of proof was presented to establish the
claim.
This observation equally applies to the allegation that complainants,
in
three [3] occasions had figured in [a] vehicular accident due to his
reckless
driving."[23]
Because the claim of petitioner
has no factual basis, the doctrine on strained relations cannot be
applied
in this case. Moreover, the filing of the Complaint for illegal
dismissal
does not by itself justify the invocation of this doctrine. As the
Court
held in Capili vs. NLRC:[24]
"The doctrine on
'strained
relations' cannot be applied indiscriminately since every labor dispute
almost invariably results in 'strained relations'; otherwise,
reinstatement
can never be possible simply because some hostility is engendered
between
the parties as a result of their disagreement. That is human nature."
Fifth Issue:Reinstatement
and Back Wages
Because he was
illegally
dismissed, private respondent is entitled to reinstatement and back
wages
pursuant to Section 279 of the Labor Code which reads:
"Art. 279. Security
of Tenure. - In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized
by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits
or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation
was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement."
Interpreting this provision,
the Court held in Bustamante v. NLRC[25]
that illegally dismissed employees are entitled to full back wages
without
conditions or limitations, viz.:
"A closer adherence
to the legislative policy behind Rep. Act No. 6715 points to 'full
backwages'
as meaning exactly that, i.e., without deducting from backwages
the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the
period
of his illegal dismissal. In other words, the provision calling for
'full
backwages' to illegally dismissed employees is clear, plain and free
from
ambiguity and, therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained
interpretation."
The Labor Arbiter awarded
backwages in the sum of P67,200 based on the following computation:
"11/28/93 - 6/28/94
= 7 mos.
P800.00 x 3 days x
4 weeks = P9,600.00
P9,600 x 7 mos. =
P67,200.00"[26]
In modifying the foregoing
award, the NLRC relied on this other formula:
"11/28/93 -
11/28/94
= 12 months
P600.00 x 3 days x
4 weeks = P7,200.00
P7,200 x 12 months
= P86,400.00."[27]
Although
the NLRC adjusted
the amount of private respondent's monthly income and the period during
which backwages may be awarded, neither the petitioner nor the private
respondent questioned the new computation. Accordingly, We sustain the
award but stress that the backwages ought to be computed from the time
of the illegal dismissal to the time of reinstatement, either actual or
in the payroll, without any deduction or qualification.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is hereby dismissed for utter lack of merit, and the assailed Decision
and Resolution are hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
J
.,
Vitug and Quisumbing,
JJ
., concur.
Bellosillo, JJ.,
took no part; did not participate in deliberations.
________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Third Division composed of Comm. Joaquin A. Tanodra, ponente; Presiding
Comm. Lourdes C. Javier and Comm. Ireneo B. Bernardo, concurring.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 46-47.
[3]
Potenciano S. Canizares, Jr.
[4]
NLRC Decision, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp. 39-41.
[5]
104 Phil. 946, December 22, 1958.
[6]
NLRC Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 43.
[7]
Ibid., p. 5; rollo, p. 42.
[8]
Ibid.
[9]
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on January 14, 1998, when
the Court noted and granted the Solicitor General's Manifestation and
Motion
dated November 25, 1997.
[10]
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 6; rollo, p. 144. It should be noted that
private respondent did not assail the NLRC Decision or any part thereof.
[11]
Martinez v. National Relations Commission, 272 SCRA 793, May 29, 1997,
per Bellosillo, J
[12]
Ibid., pp. 799-800.
[13]
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 8; rollo, p. 146.
[14]
Mabeza v. National Labor Relations Commission, 271 SCRA 670, 680, April
18, 1997, per Kapunan J
[15]
See Art. 282 and 283 of the Labor Code.
[16]
Memorandum for Petitioner; p. 10; rollo, p. 148.
[17]
NLRC Decision; p. 5; rollo, p. 42.
[18]
GR No. 121466, August 15, 1997, per Romero, J
[19]
250 SCRA 259, November 23, 1995.
[20]
Conti v. National Labor Relations Commission, 271 SCRA 114, 118, April
10, 1997.
[21]
NLRC Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 42.
[22]
Memorandum for Petitioner; pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 147-148.
[23]
NLRC Decision; p. 5; rollo, p. 42.
[24]
270 SCRA 488, 495, March 26, 1997, per Bellosillo J
[25]
265 SCRA 61, November 28, 1996, per Padilla, JSee also Highway Copra
Traders v. NLRC, GR No. 108889, July 30, 1998. Bustamante applies to
illegal
dismissals effected after March 21, 1989. In the present case, private
respondent was hired on December 25, 1992 and illegally dismissed on
November
28, 1993.
[26]
Labor arbiter's Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 32.
[27]
Assailed Decision; p. 7; rollo, p. 44. |