SECOND
DIVISION
NAGA
COLLEGE
FOUNDATION
EDUCATION
WORKERS
ORGANIZATION
[NCFEWO],
GERARDO J.
SAMAN,
EDUARDO C. LAURELES,
NESTOR P.
AVENIDO
AND OLIVE CEA,
Petitioners,
G.
R.
No. 122633
April
20, 1998
-versus-
HON.
VITO C. BOSE,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS
EXECUTIVE
LABOR
ARBITER, REGIONAL
ARBITRATION
BRANCH
NO. V, LEGASPI CITY
AND
NAGA COLLEGE
FOUNDATION AND
DR.
MELCHOR T.
VILLANUEVA,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I
O N
MENDOZA,
J :
Petitioners were employees
of the Naga College Foundation of which private respondent Melchor T.
Villanueva
is the President. In 1990, petitioners filed a Complaint with the
Regional
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC] in
Naga City for unfair labor practice, reinstatement, backwages and
damages
against private respondents, alleging illegal dismissal. On the other
hand,
private respondents filed a Complaint against petitioners for
conducting
an illegal strike.
The cases were
consolidated
and referred to the public respondent Executive Labor Arbiter [ELA] in
Legaspi City. On August 20, 1992 the ELA rendered a decision, ordering
the reinstatement of petitioners and the payment of backwages to them.
The dispositive portion of his Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered, directing Naga College Foundation and Dr. Melchor
T.
Villanueva or any responsible official to immediately reinstate the
individual
complainants to their respective former or equivalent positions without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to pay their
backwages
thru this Branch within ten [10] days from receipt hereof as follows:
"1. Eduardo C.
Laureles
P81,671.85
2. Olivia E. Cea
80,521.55
3. Ramon V. Surara
87,285.35
4. Nestor P.
Avenido
73,619.70
5. Gerardo J. Saman
91.587,50
–––––––––
GRAND TOTAL
P414,685.95
"All other claims are
dismissed
for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED."[1]
Private respondents appealed.
On January 19, 1993, while the appeal was pending, petitioners moved
for
the execution of the portion of the Decision insofar as it granted
reinstatement.[2]
The motion was made pursuant to Art. 223 of the Labor Code, as amended
by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715.
On February 23, 1993,
the parties entered into an agreement whereby private respondents
agreed
to reinstate petitioners in the payroll effective September 21, 1992,
the
date of receipt by them of the ELA's Decision. Private respondents
agreed
to pay petitioners their monthly salary beginning March 30, 1993, plus
the additional amount of P3,000.00, as monthly installment on the
salaries
which had accrued, plus interest. The agreement was approved by the ELA
in his order, dated March 26, 1993.
However, after paying
three installments of the accrued salaries of petitioners, private
respondents
failed to make further payments to petitioners. Petitioners asked the
ELA
for assistance and, as no action was taken on their request,[3]
petitioner Laureles on October 19, 1993 filed a Motion for Execution
directly
with the NLRC in Manila.[4]
Meanwhile, on June
15, 1993, the NLRC rendered a Decision affirming that of the Labor
Arbiter.[5]
Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was
denied.[6]
They filed a petition for certiorari, which this Court likewise
dismissed
in its resolution of July 11, 1994 [G.R. No. 113621].[7]
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on
August
31, 1994 and, on October 3, 1994, entry of judgment was made.[8]
On January 30, 1995,
petitioner Eduardo Laureles filed a motion for issuance of a writ of
executions.[9]
He filed other motions on February 13, 1995[10]
and March 10, 1995,[11]
reiterating his prayer for a writ of execution.
On March 16, 1995,[12]
respondent ELA denied the motions on the ground that the records of the
case were still in the NLRC in Manila. He stated, however, that he
would
execute the Decision once he received the records.
On March 24, 1995,[13]
petitioners again moved for the execution of the decision on the basis
of information that the records of the case had already been remanded
to
the ELA as early as January of 1994. It appears that although the
records
had indeed been returned to the ELA in January 1994, they were
subsequently
borrowed by the Solicitor General for the preparation of the comment on
the Supreme Court petition for certiorari filed by private respondents.
When the Solicitor General returned the records of the case, they were
returned to the NLRC branch in Naga City, instead of Legaspi City. It
was
not until public respondent inquired from the NLRC in Manila on April
11,
1995 that the error was discovered.
Anyway, the records
were finally received by the ELA in Legaspi City on April 21, 1995.[14]
But execution was held off because of the failure of petitioners to
submit
evidence of income which they earned during their dismissal.[15]
Petitioners insisted on execution according to the tenor of the
original
decision, without need of determining how much they might have earned
during
the period of their dismissal. They claimed that for the ELA to
consider
and deduct the income earned by them would be for him to amend the
Decision
in their favor, which had already become final and executory.
On November 27, 1995,
petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus to compel the ELA
to
resolve the matters pending before him and to issue a writ of execution.
On November 28, 1995,
the ELA finally acted on petitioners' motion. He denied execution on
the
ground that by filing a motion for execution in the NLRC in Manila,
petitioners
had abandoned their motions in the Legaspi office. At the same time,
however,
noting that the incidents relating to the execution of the decision had
caused friction between the parties and strained their relations, thus
allegedly making the reinstatement of petitioners to their former
positions
impracticable, the ELA ordered that, in lieu of reinstatement,
petitioners
be given separation pay.
On December 21, 1995,
petitioners asked for a reconsideration of the ELA's order.[16]
As private respondents deposited with the ELA four checks for
P142,332.00,
representing the separation pay of the four individual complainants,
allegedly
to stop the running of the period in relation to backwages,[17]
petitioners in addition filed another Manifestation[18]
objecting to the payment. Petitioners denounced the payment as nothing
but a scheme to circumvent the original Decision, already final, which
ordered their reinstatement and not the payment of separation pay.
On January 5, 1996,[19]
the ELA treated the manifestations of petitioners as an appeal from his
order dated November 28, 1995 and directed the records of the case to
be
sent to the NLRC in Manila for review.
On January 12, 1996,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, denying that they had
intended
to appeal from the order of the Labor Arbiter and arguing that to
consider
their manifestations as notice of intention to appeal would be to make
litigation endless.
On March 15, 1996,
petitioners filed a manifestation in this case, praying that the
January
5, 1996 order of the ELA be set aside and that the ELA be restrained
from
acting further in the case. Petitioners contended that the
reinstatement
portion of the decision had already been the subject of a compromise
agreement
and, therefore, the order deleting the order of reinstatement and
awarding
separation pay in lieu thereof in effect amended a final and executory
order. Petitioners claimed that they had been forced to file a motion
directly
in the NLRC because of the ELA's failure to act upon their motions, but
that they had no intention at all of abandoning their motion in the
ELA's
office.
Petitioners submit
the following issues for resolution:
[1] Whether or not
petitioners abandoned the agreement when they moved for the execution
of
the decision, and whether by doing so, the Executive Labor Arbiter
could
freely consider supervening events;
[2] Whether or not
the Executive Labor Arbiter committed a grave abuse of discretion in
considering
as an appeal the manifestation of petitioners re the granting of
separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement and the opposition to the compliance of
the
private respondents; and
[3] Whether
petitioners
are entitled to full backwages.
It
is alleged in private
respondents' comment that petitioner Ramon V. Surara was paid on
October
3, 1995 P172,980.50, representing three [3] years backwages and six
years'
separation pay as full payment of all his claims against private
respondents.[20]
On the other hand, Gerardo Saman, Olivia Cea and Nestor Avenido have
allegedly
been given their separation pay in the amounts of P47,772.00,
P21,000.00,
and P41,600.00, respectively,[21]
and only have to be paid backwages. Only Eduardo Laureles would,
therefore,
appear to still have an interest in this case. This allegation need not
be determined in this case, being more appropriately taken up in the
execution
of the decision of the NLRC.
First. It is contended
that the ELA no longer had jurisdiction to order payment of separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement because the June 15, 1993 Decision of the
NLRC, ordering reinstatement of petitioners, had already become final
and
executory. Indeed, in the compromise agreement made on February 23,
1993,
private respondents undertook to reinstate petitioners.
The Solicitor General
contends, however, that by asking for the execution of the decision of
the NLRC petitioner in effect abandoned or rescinded the compromise
agreement,
leaving the ELA free to consider supervening events, such as the strain
in relations of the parties, in the resolution of the motion for
execution.
There is no basis in the record for supposing that petitioners gave up
their claim for reinstatement. The subject of the compromise agreement
was their reinstatement as ordered in the decision of August 20, 1992
of
the ELA. The subject of the NLRC decision, dated June 15, 1993, which
they
sought to enforce in the motion for execution which they filed on
January
30, 1995, was also their reinstatement.
Whichever one it is,
no supervening event rendering execution unjust can be considered. For
one, petitioners did not occupy any managerial or confidential position
in the Naga College Foundation which might be affected by any bad
feeling
which might have been engendered as a result of the execution of the
decision.
For another, it was private respondents who appear to have caused a
strain
in the relation of the parties. Any bad feeling was caused by its
failure
to comply in good faith with their undertaking under the compromise
agreement.
As held in Globe-Mackay
Cable and Radio Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission:[22]
Obviously, the
principle
of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwise,
reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is
invariably
engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human
nature.
Besides, no strained
relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's
right;
otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily
separated
from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext
that
his relationship with his employer had already become strained.
Nor can it be argued
that petitioners had abandoned the benefits of the compromise agreement
by resorting to the NLRC. Petitioners were frustrated at the undue
delay
in the resolution of their motions by the ELA and they thought of
turning
to the NLRC in Manila in the hope of obtaining assistance. Abandonment
was far from their intention. It was clearly grave abuse of discretion
for the ELA to order separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and to
consider
the motion for execution of petitioners abandoned.
Second. It was bad
enough for the ELA to order separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. It
was worse for him when, after private respondents had deposited four
[4]
checks for the separation pay and petitioners objected, the ELA
considered
petitioners' opposition and manifestation as an appeal, which would
mean
further delay in the realization of the fruits of petitioners' victory.
Indeed, the case was
already in the final stages of execution of the judgment. In the first
place, there was no justification for the modification by the ELA of
the
decision which was already final. To treat petitioners' objection to
its
modification as an appeal would make litigation endless. The ELA did
this
[i.e., consider the alleged supervening event] after failing for
several months to resolve petitioners' motion for execution. He acted
only
after this petition for mandamus had been filed in this Court. Hence,
the
claim that the ELA order in question was an undisguised attempt to moot
the pending action in this Court.
Third. Anent the award
of backwages, petitioners contend that they are entitled to full
backwages
without deduction because the decision of the ELA [affirmed by the NLRC
on appeal and upheld by the Supreme Court] awarded them backwages
without
any qualification. They argue that any deduction from the backwages due
to them would constitute an amendment of the final and executory
decision
in their favor.
At the time the
Decision
was rendered by the ELA on August 20, 1992, the doctrine of Ferrer v.
NLRC[23]
was the prevailing rule. In that case, We held that income earned
during
the period of illegal dismissal should be deducted from the backwages
due
to employees.
But petitioners invoke
our recent ruling in Bustamante v. NLRC[24]
that illegally dismissed employees are entitled to full backwages
without
deduction or qualification in accordance with R.A. No. 6715, if the
cause
of action accrued after March 21, 1989, the date of effectivity of R.A.
No. 6715.
Private respondents
oppose the stand of petitioners and the Solicitor General. They contend
that, since at the time the Decision in this case became final and
executory
the Ferrer case was the prevailing rule, the Bustamante case cannot be
applied.
There is no question
that R.A. 6715 was already in force at the time petitioners were
illegally
dismissed. However, even after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6715 on
March
21, 1989, the Court had applied the rule in Mercury Drug v. CIR,[25]
which limited recovery of backwages to three years until the Decision
in
the Ferrer case was handed down on July 5, 1993.
With the ruling in
Bustamante v. NLRC giving full effect to R.A. No. 6715, however,
illegally dismissed employees now are entitled to the payment of full
backwages
as long as the cause of action accrued after March 21, 1989.[26]
Private respondents
contend that whatever the later rule is, under the doctrine of "law of
the case", the Ferrer case should be applied to this case because it
was
the prevailing rule at the time the Decision in this case attained
finality.
The Decision of the ELA was rendered on August 20, 1992 and that of the
NLRC affirming the ELA Decision was rendered on June 15, 1993, while
the
Decision in Ferrer v. NLRC was rendered only on July 5, 1993. How could
the ruling in Ferrer have been impliedly embodied in the Decision of
the
ELA? Nor is there any ruling in this case applying to it the Ferrer
doctrine
which could be considered to have settled the question of backwages
under
the doctrine of "law of the case." The fact is that the Decision of the
ELA ordered the payment of backwages to petitioners without any
deduction
or qualification and that Decision has become final and executory.
WHEREFORE, the Petition
is granted and the Orders of the public respondent Executive Labor
Arbiter
dated November 28, 1995 and January 5, 1996 are hereby annulled and set
aside. Private respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate petitioners
to their former positions without loss of seniority and to pay them
full
backwages, subject however to any agreement the parties may have
entered
into. The public respondent is ordered to issue forthwith the
corresponding
writ for the execution of his Decision of August 20, 1992 in accordance
with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Melo, Puno
and Martinez, JJ., concur.
________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Petition, Annex A, p. 9; Rollo, p. 28.
[2]
Id., Annex B; id., pp. 29-30.
[3]
Id., Annexes E and F; id., pp. 37 and p. 39.
[4]
Id., Annex E; id., p. 38.
[5]
Id., Annex G; id., p. 43-54.
[6]
Id., Annex H; id., pp. 56-57.
[7]
Id., Annex J; id., p. 79.
[8]
Id., Annex K; id., p. 80.
[9]
Id., Annex L; id., pp. 82-83.
[10]
Id.,
Annex
L-1;
id., pp. 84-85.
[11]
Id., Annex T; id., pp. 100-101.
[12]
Id., Annex R; id., p. 97-98.
[13]
Id., Annex M-1; id., p. 88.
[14]
Comment of the Solicitor General, pp. 16-17; id., pp. 219-220.
[15]
Petition, Annex W; id., pp. 113-114.
[16]
Petitioners' Manifestation, Annex B; id., pp. 177-179.
[17]
Id., Annex B-1; id., pp. 180-181.
[18]
Id., Annex C; id., pp. 182-183.
[19]
Id., Annex D; id., pp. 184.
[20]
Private Respondents' Comment, p. 6; id., p. 271.
[21]
Id., p. 16; id., p. 281.
[22]
206 SCRA 701, 712 [1992].
[23]
224 SCRA 410, 423 [1993].
[24]
265 SCRA 61, 70 [1996].
[25]
56 SCRA 694 [1974].
[26]
Ala Mode Garments, Inc. v. NLRC, 268 SCRA 497 [1997]. |