ManilaEN
BANC
ST. MARTIN
FUNERAL
HOME,
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. 130866
September
16, 1998
-versus-
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION
AND
BIENVENIDO
ARICAYOS,
Respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO,
J :
The present Petition for
Certiorari stemmed from a Complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
herein
private respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC),
Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private
respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of
petitioner
St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no
contract
of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name
included
in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from
his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was
intended
for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR).[1]
Petitioner, on the
other hand, claims that private respondent was not its employee but
only
the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's
Funeral
Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as
an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the
mother
of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private
respondent
voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the
mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the
management
of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the
payment
of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to
show
that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the
business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer
allowed
to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter
filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his
employment.[2]
Based on the position
papers of the parties, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor
of
petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee
relationship
existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no
jurisdiction
over the case.[3]
Not satisfied with
the said Decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending
that
the Labor Arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence
submitted
by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a "volunteer and not as an
employee
of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996,
or
a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no
employer-employee
relationship between him and petitioner.[4]
On June 13, 1997, the
NLRC rendered a Resolution setting aside the questioned decision and
remanding
the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings.[5]
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit,[6]
hence, the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave
abuse
of discretion.[7]
Before proceeding
further
into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now
exigent
and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic
practicability
of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows
with
respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor
disputes
that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes
introduced
over the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
442
(The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.)
129
(The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and
warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.
We prefatorily delve
into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the
Department
of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were
expressly
declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to
the President of the Philippines.
On May 1, 1974, P.D.
No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take
effect
six months after its promulgation.[8]
Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to
the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy
coordination
only.[9]
Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an
aggrieved
party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the
Secretary
of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and
abolished
such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under
the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from
the
decision of the NLRC.[10]
The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No.
6715,
instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases
within
twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such
decision
shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt
thereof
by the parties.
When the issue was
raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no
jurisdiction
to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of
Labor,
since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the
Court
nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying
power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on
questions
of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by
statute;
that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative
agency
within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the
parties;
and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the
separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.[11]
Pursuant to such
ruling,
and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of
the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a
precondition for any further or subsequent remedy,[12]
and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari
under
Rule 65,[13]
for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary .period of sixty
days
from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for
finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as
contemplated
in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may
still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional
and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period
under Rule 65.[14]
Turning now to the
matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally
provided
as follows:
"SECTION 9. Jurisdiction.
— The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
"(1) Original
jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and
quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid
of
its appellate jurisdiction;
"(2) Exclusive
original
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial
Courts; and
"(3) Exclusive
appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders,
or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities,
boards, or commissions, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions
of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph
(4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
"The Intermediate
Appellate
Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence
and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised
in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
including
the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
"These provisions
shall
not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor
Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals."[15]
Subsequently, and as it
presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective
March 18, 1995, to wit:
"SECTION 9. Jurisdiction.
— The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
"(1) Original
jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and
quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid
of
its appellate jurisdiction;
"(2) Exclusive
original
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial
Courts; and
"(3) Exclusive
appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders
or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities,
boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission,
the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission
and
the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,
the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the
third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948.
"The Court of Appeals
shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings receive evidence
and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised
in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
including
the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
Trials
or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be
completed
within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice."
It will readily be observed
that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court,[16]
the following amendments of the original provisions of Section 9 of
B.P.
No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.:
1. The last paragraph
which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines and
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced by a
new
paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct
trials
and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to
the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3)
of
the section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now
provides
"except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines
under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this
Act,
and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948."
(Emphasis
supplied)
3. Contrarily,
however,
specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies
over
which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission,
the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings Us to
a somewhat perplexing impassè, both in point of purpose
and
terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over
decisions
of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition
for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a
special
original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues,
that
is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have
been
brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
It will, however, be
noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants
exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final
adjudications
of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally
or specifically referred to therein except, among others, "those
falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with
the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended." This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and
said
all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC[17]
Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from
the
NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by
necessary
implication.
The same exceptive
clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of
Appeals
has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the
appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,
the provisions of B. P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section
17
of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly
excluded
from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
However,
because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also
supposedly
excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme
Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and
impracticable,
and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there
are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards
wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or
of
any other court for that matter.
A review of the
legislative
records on the antecedents of R A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may
have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said
Act
or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress
did
intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC
in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the
term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we
have
reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the
considerations
extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No.
1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452.[18]
In sponsoring Senate
Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship speech[19]
from which we reproduce the following excerpts:
"The Judiciary
Reorganization
Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of
Appeals
and at the same time expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among
others,
its appellate jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final
judgment
of Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions,
resolutions,
orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards
and commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions
of BP Blg. 129 and of subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and
subparagraph
4 of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
"Mr. President, the
purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the
transfer of some of its burden of review of factual issues to the Court
of Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the
expansion
of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short by
the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which
excludes
from its coverage the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued under
the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of
Assessment
Appeals."
"Among the highest
number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Court are labor
cases.
Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to eliminate the exceptions
enumerated
in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the coverage of appellate
review
of the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and
Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees
Compensation
Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court.
(Emphases and corrections ours)
xxx
"Senate Bill No. 1495
authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna provides the ideal
situation of drastically reducing the workload of the Supreme Court
without
depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an appellate
tribunal.
"In closing, allow
me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice Teehankee in 1986
in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:
'Amendatory
legislation
is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme Court of the burden of
reviewing
these cases which present no important issues involved beyond the
particular
fact and the parties involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly
devote
its time to cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated
task
as the guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the people's
basic
rights and additional task expressly vested on it now "to determine
whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.'
"We used to have
500,000
cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It has been cut down to
300,000 cases some five years ago. I understand we are now back to
400,000
cases. Unless we distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall
continue to mount and add to the number of cases pending.
"In view of the
foregoing,
Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we have submitted, the
Committee on Justice and Human Rights requests the support and
collegial
approval of our Chamber.
xxx"
Surprisingly, however,
in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was
introduced
by the said sponsor and the following proceedings transpired:[20]
Senator Roco: On page
2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution,"
add the phrase " The Labor Code of the Philippines under P.D.
442,
as Amended." So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues
arising
from the Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President: Is
there
any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
Senator Roco: On the
same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This was also
discussed
with our Colleagues in the House of Representatives and as we
understand
it, as approved in the House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.
The President: Is
there
any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
Senator Roco: There
are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.
Senator Romulo: Mr.
President, I move that we close the period of Committee amendments.
The President: Is
there
any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
(Emphasis
supplied)
xxx
Thereafter, since there
were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on
second
reading and being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on third
reading
followed.[21]
The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill
No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of
Representatives,
the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20, 1995,[22]
inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court
earlier
discussed.
The Court is,
therefore,
of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the
special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle
for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal"
in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could
have
been
a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original
action
for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the
appellate
courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which
the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil
action
of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this
Court
and the Court of Appeals;[23]
whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the
intention
of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No.
1495.
Incidentally, it was
noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion
that
recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in
the
process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the
proceedings.
On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized, that
procedure
would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand,
Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of
Appeals
would give litigants the advantage to have all the evidence on record
be
reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and
conclusions
of said bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee,
the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual
findings
of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reversed on appeal to
the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which
are
factual in nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright by minute
resolutions.[24]
While We do not wish
to intrude into the congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of
a law, on this score, We add the further observations that there is a
growing
number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a
trier
of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC
for
resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of
Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the
increased
number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an
imperative
need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of
constitutional
protection to labor.
Therefore, all
references
in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC
to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and
refer
to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such
petitions
should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate
forum for the relief desired.
Apropos to this
directive
that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with
their
hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al.[25]
should be taken into account:
One final observation.
We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of
petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of
litigants
who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts
in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court
despite
the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise
of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by
law
to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because
of
the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of
the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication
of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower
court
as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped
to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We,
therefore,
reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment
of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the
foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
remanded,
and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be forwarded, to the Court
of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the
views
and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J.,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban,
Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ, concur.
____________________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, 17.
[2]
Ibid., 18-19.
[3]
Ibid., 19.
[4]
Ibid., 16.
[5]
Ibid., 21.
[6]
Ibid., 23-24.
[7]
Ibid., 6.
[8]
Article 2.
[9]
Article 213.
[10]
While Art. 223 bears the epigraph of "Appeal," it actually refers only
to decisions, awards, or orders of the labor arbiter which shall be
final
and executory unless appealed to the NLRC by any or both parties within
ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof.
[11]
San Miguel Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor, et al., G.R. No.
L-39195,
May 15, 1975, 64 SCRA 56; Scott vs. Inciong, et al., G.R. No. L-38868,
December 29, 1975, 68 SCRA 473; Bordeos, et al., vs. NLRC, et al., G.R.
Nos. 115314-23, September 26, 1996, 262 SCRA 424.
[12]
Zapata vs. NLRC, et al, G.R. No. 77827, July 5, 1989, 175 SCRA 56.
[13]
See, for instance, Pure Foods Corporation vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
78591,
March 21, 1989, 171 SCRA 415.
[14]
Mantrade, etc. vs. Bacungan, et al., G.R. No. L-48437, September 30,
1986,
144 SCRA 511.
[15]
75 O.G. 4781, August 29, 1983.
[16]
Executive Order No. 33 restored the name of the Court of Appeals, in
lieu
of the intermediate Appellate Court, effective July 28, 1986.
[17]
The different modes of appeal, that is, by writ of error (Rule 41),
petition
for review (Rules 42 and 43), and petition for review on certiorari
(Rule
45) obviously cannot be availed of because there is no provision for
appellate
review of NLRC decisions in P.D. No. 442, as amended.
[18]
An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, Amending for
the Purpose Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, known as the
Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980.
[19]
Transcript of Session Proceedings (TSP), S. No. 1495, February 8, 1995,
31-36.
[20]
TSP, id., February 15, 1995, 18-19.
[21]
TSP, id., id., 19-21; Record of the Senate, Vol. V, No. 63, pp. 180-181.
[22]
TSP, id., February 20, 1995, pp. 42-43.
[23]
The Regional Trial Court also shares that concurrent jurisdiction but
that
cannot be considered with regard to the NLRC since they are of the same
rank.
[24]
TSP, S. No. 1495, February 8, 1995, pp. 32-33.
[25]
G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633. See also Tano, et
al.
vs. Socrates, et al., G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 155. |