ATTY. FRANCISCO
F. ANGELES,[1]
Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O
N
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this administrative
complaint[2]
filed on November 11, 1975, against Atty. Francisco F. Angeles for
grave
misconduct as a lawyer, respondent stands charged with infidelity in
the
discharge of fiduciary obligations to his clients, herein complainants
Honorio Manalang and Florencio Cirillo.
Manalang and Cirillo
alleged that they were the complainants in a case for overtime and
separation
pay filed against their employer, the Philippine Racing Club
Restaurant,
before the National Labor Relations Commission Region IV Office,
docketed
as NLRC-RO 4 No. 4-2417-74. Respondent was their counsel. Judgment was
rendered in their favor, in the amount of P6,500. After the decision
became
final, a writ of execution issued. However, without authority from his
clients, respondent compromised the award and was able to collect
P5,500
only.cralaw:red
Complainants said they
made several demands upon respondent to turn over to them the amount
collected
minus the agreed upon attorney's fees of thirty percent (30%), but
Atty.
Angeles refused and offered to give them only the sum of P2,650.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Complainants then instituted
the instant case, with the assistance of the then Citizens Legal
Assistance
Office (CLAO)[3]
of the Department of Justice.cralaw:red
In his answer, filed
on December 15, 1975, respondent stated that he offered to give
complainants
their money, but they insisted that he "deduct from this attorney's
fees
the amount of P2,000, representing the amount discounted by the counsel
of the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, together with sheriff legal
fees
and other administrative expenses."[4]
Respondent claimed that to accept complainants' proposition meant that
he "would not be compensated for prosecuting and handling the case."[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In our resolution[6]
of January 9, 1976, we referred the case to the Office of Solicitor
General
(OSG) for investigation, report, and recommendation.cralaw:red
The OSG conducted several
hearings from March-August 1976.[7]
The complainants' testimonies were received. Respondent appeared only
at
three (3) hearings, those of June 21, 1976,[8]
July 1, 1976[9]
and August 6, 1976.[10]
On August 24, 1976, the Solicitor General ordered respondent's
testimony
stricken from the record and the case deemed submitted for resolution[11]
for his failure to appear despite due notice.cralaw:red
Thereafter, the case
was transferred to the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar
of the Philippines (IBP). Hearings were scheduled on September 20 and
November
21, 1991, but neither party appeared despite prior due notice. The IBP
then subpoenaed respondent for him to appear at the hearings on
February
12-13, 1992, but the notices were returned unserved with the indication
that respondent had changed address. On July 8, 1992, the IBP issued an
order stating that respondent had been given ample opportunities to
present
his evidence and considered the case submitted for resolution on the
basis
of the existing evidence.cralaw:red
On January 23, 1997,
the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline issued a resolution recommending
that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.[12]
This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
resolution
of July 26, 1997.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On September 23, 1997,
respondent moved for reconsideration of the resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors, dated July 26, 1997.cralaw:red
On October 8, 1997,
we resolved to refer this matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant
"for
recommendation within twenty (20) days from notice."[14]
On June 19, 2002, the Bar Confidant recommended that "the IBP
Resolution,
recommending suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for
two (2) years be affirmed."[15]
The sole issue in this
case is whether respondent Atty. Francisco F. Angeles should be
suspended
from the practice of law because of grave misconduct related to his
clients'
funds.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Where a member of the
bar stands charged with malpractice, the proceedings are not meant
solely
to rule on his culpability but also to determine if the lawyer
concerned
is possessed of that good moral character, which is a condition
precedent
to the privilege of practicing law and continuing in the practice
thereof.[16]
For the bar must not only maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency,
it must likewise be exacting in its standards for honesty, integrity,
and
fair dealing.cralaw:red
In the instant case,
there is no dispute that complainants were awarded P6,500.00 in NLRC-RO
4 No. 4-2417-74 for unpaid overtime and separation pay. Of this amount,
thirty percent (30%) or P1,950 was agreed to be paid to respondent as
his
attorney's fees. In other words, complainants were to receive from
respondent
the net sum of P4,550 or P2,275 each. Alleging difficulties in
collecting
the full amount awarded, respondent compromised the award on execution
and collected only P5,500 from the losing party in NLRC-RO 4 No.
4-2417-74.
This compromise was allegedly without authority from his clients. The
authority
to compromise cannot be lightly presumed and must be supported by
evidence.[17]
In the instant case, respondent failed to show such authority.cralaw:red
Money claims due to
workers cannot, as a rule, be the object of settlement or compromise
effected
by counsel without the consent of the workers concerned.[18]
A client has every right to expect from his counsel that nothing will
be
taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law validly applied.
By
compromising the judgment without the consent of his clients,
respondent
not only went against the stream of judicial dicta, he also exhibited
an
uncaring lack of devotion to the interest of his clients as well as
want
of zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights. In so doing, he
violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[19]
Worse, as found by the
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, respondent only offered to remit to
complainants
the amount of P2,650 or P1,325 each, an amount substantially less than
the P2,275 that each complainant was entitled to receive under the
judgment.
On this score, respondent failed to establish any credible
defense.
Moreover, he consistently failed to appear at the hearings scheduled by
the CBD. Hence, his excuse for failing to give the money due his
clients
merit scant consideration.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A lawyer shall hold
in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.[20]
In the instant case, the records clearly and abundantly point to
respondent's
receipt of and failure to deliver upon demand, the amount of P4,550
intended
for his clients. This is a clear breach of Rule 16.03,[21]
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Moreover, his
excuse
in his answer, that he should be allowed to deduct sheriff's fees and
other
administrative expenses before delivering the money due his clients, is
unsatisfactory. Respondent clearly failed to comply with the
Rules
of Court in the enforcement of an attorney's liens.[22]
The records of this case are barren of any statement of respondent's
claims
for lien or payment of his alleged disbursements. Nor did
respondent
present any showing that he caused written notices of his lien on the
money
judgment to be served upon his clients and to the losing party in
NLRC-RO
4 No. 4-2417-74.cralaw:red
His act of holding on
to his clients' money without their acquiescence is conduct indicative
of lack of integrity and propriety. He was clinging to something
which was not his, and to which he had no right.[23]
He appears oblivious of the admonition that a member of the legal
fraternity
should refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust
and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity
of the legal profession.[24]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We note that in 1976
at the hearings before the OSG, complainant Manalang declared he was
already
58 years old,[25]
while complainant Cirillo stated that he was 64 years of age.[26]
A quarter of century has since passed. It is true that a
disciplinary
action involves no private interest and affords no redress for private
grievance, since it is undertaken solely for the public welfare, and
the
attorney-at-law is called to task mainly to answer to this Court for
his
conduct as an officer of the court.[27]
Nevertheless, we must stress that disciplinary action against a member
of the bar involves the public interest, and it should be resolved with
dispatch.[28]
Moreover, we note that respondent's clients in the instant case were
poor
working men. They were made to wait long for their money, by
their
very own counsel, contrary to the Attorney's Oath and the Code of
Professional
Responsibility. This is contrary to all ethical principles that members
of the bar are supposed to uphold. Thus, we find no hesitance in
imposing
on respondent the penalty of suspension. However, this is the
first
case on record against him, a fact which could be taken into account by
way of mitigation. Considering further the amount involved, the
penalty
of six (6) months suspension appears to us in order.cralaw:red
ACCORDINGLY, the Court
hereby SUSPENDS Atty. Francisco F. Angeles from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months, effective immediately upon his receipt of
this
Resolution. He is also ordered to pay the sum of two thousand two
hundred seventy five pesos (P2,275.00) each to complainants Honorio
Manalang
and Florencio Cirillo, with interest of six percent (6%) per annum from
the time of filing this complaint until fully paid.cralaw:red
Let a copy of this resolution
be served personally on respondent at his last known address and
entered
in his record as attorney. Let the IBP, the Bar Confidant, and the
Court
Administrator be furnished also a copy of this resolution for their
information
and guidance as well as for circularization to all courts in the
country.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, (Chairman),
Mendoza, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Admitted to the Bar, March 22, 1966. See 1998 Law List 53.
[2]
Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 1-3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Now the Public Attorney's Office or PAO.
[4]
Supra, note 1 at 9.
[5]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Id. at 15.
[7]
See entirety of Records, Vol. II.
[8]
Id. at 19.
[9]
Id. at 17.
[10]
Id. at 12.
[11]
Id. at 9.
[12]
Rollo, p. 22.
[13]
Id. at 17.
[14]
Id. at 23.
[15]
Id. at 38.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
In re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25 (1920).
[17]
General Rubber and Footwear Corp. v. Drilon, G.R. No. 76988, 31 January
1989, 169 SCRA 808, 814.
[18]
See Danao Development Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
Nos.
L-40706 & L-40707, 16 February 1978, 81 SCRA 487, 502.
[19]
Canon 17: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
[20]
Canon 16, Code of Professional Responsibility.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds
and
may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful
fees
and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his clients. He
shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions
he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Rule 138, Sec. 37. Attorney's Liens. - An attorney shall have a lien
upon
the funds, documents and papers of his client, which have lawfully come
into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements
have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof.
He
shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment
of money and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he
has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when
he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be
entered
upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered
to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same
right
and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have
to
enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.
[23]
See Gonato v. Adaza, A.C. No. 4083, 27 March 2000, 328 SCRA 694, 697.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Maligsa v. Cabanting, A.C. No. 4539, 14 May 1997, 272 SCRA 408, 413,
citing
Marcelo v. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, 18 September 1992, 214 SCRA 1,
13.
[25]
TSN, March 4, 1976, p. 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Id. at 42.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, A.C. No. 2884, 28 January 1998, 285 SCRA 93, 101.
[28]
De Vera v. Pineda, G.R. No. 96333, 2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 434, 443.