SECOND DIVISION
JOCELYN
V.
GRAGEDA,
Complainant,
A.M.
MTJ
No. 04-1526
February 02, 2004
-versus-
JUDGE NIETO T.
TRESVALLES,[
*]MUNICIPAL
TRIAL
COURT, VIRAC, CATANDUANES,
Respondent.
D
E C I S I
O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
The instant administrative
case arose when Jocelyn V. Grageda filed an Affidavit-Complaint[1]
dated January 18, 2000 charging Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles, Municipal
Trial
Court, Virac, Catanduanes, with gross ignorance of the law and abuse of
authority relative to Criminal Case No. 5307 entitled People v.
Bernardo
Tablizo, Jr. for murder.cralaw:red
The facts that led to
the filing of the complaint as summarized by Executive Judge Romulo P.
Atencia, are as follows:
The complainant in this
administrative case was the wife of Gil Grageda who died at about 8:30
in the evening of November 24, 2000 in Constantino, Virac, Catanduanes
due to multiple stab wounds. On December 1, 2000, a complaint
charging
Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. y Pitajen for the murder of Gil Grageda was filed
for preliminary investigation with the Municipal Trial Court, 5th
Judicial
Region, Virac, Catanduanes, presided by respondent Judge Nieto T.
Tresvalles,
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 5307.chanrobles virtual law library
After Criminal Case
No. 5307 was filed in his court for preliminary investigation, Judge
Nieto
T. Tresvalles conducted a preliminary examination on December 5,
2000.
On the same day, December 5, 2000, he issued an Order which textually
reads,
as follows:
“After
conducting
the preliminary investigation, the Court believes that a prima facie
case
exists that the crime charged has been committed and that the accused
is
probably guilty thereof. Let therefore a warrant of arrest issue
for his arrest. The bail bond of P30,000.00 is hereby fixed for
his
provisional liberty on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the
accused
is not strong.
“SO ORDERED.”
The corresponding
warrant
for the arrest of Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. was issued on the same day,
stating
that the bail for the accused’s temporary liberty was in the amount of
P30,000.00.
The accused surrendered
on December 11, 2000. The respondent Judge immediately issued an
order committing the person of the accused Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. y
Pitajen
to the Municipal Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology,
Virac,
Catanduanes. Also on the same day, the accused, through counsel,
filed a motion to strike out the testimony of witness Perlita Tablizo
(wife
of the accused) and to grant accused bail.cralaw:red
The following day, December
12, 2000, the respondent Judge issued an Order releasing accused
Bernardo
P. Tablizo, Jr. from the custody of law after the latter posted a
personal
bail bond in the amount of P30,000.00.cralaw:red
In an Order dated February
28, 2001, the respondent transmitted the records of the case to the
Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor, which contained a denial of the accused’s
motion to strike out the testimony of Perlita Tablizo.chanrobles virtual law library
First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Antonio C.A. Ayo, Jr. of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor
thereafter conducted preliminary investigation (I.S. No. 00-30),
ultimately
recommending the filing of an information for murder against Bernardo
P.
Tablizo, Jr. with the aggravating circumstances of use of motor
vehicle,
treachery and evident premeditation. No bail was recommended for
the temporary liberty of the accused.cralaw:red
Thereafter, an information
charging Bernardo P. Tablizo, Jr. for murder was filed with the
Regional
Trial Court, Branch 43, which is now awaiting decision.[2]
The respondent was,
thereafter, charged with gross ignorance of the law, conduct unbecoming
of a member of the Bench, failure to conduct himself in a manner that
would
justify his continued stay in the judiciary, and violation of the Code
of Judicial Conduct.[3]
According to the complainant, the respondent judge granted bail to the
accused in Criminal Case No. 5307 without the requisite bail hearing,
despite
the fact that there was an eyewitness to the murder who made a positive
identification of the accused. The complainant also alleged that
the amount of P30,000.00 printed on the Warrant of Arrest issued by the
respondent judge appeared to be “snowpaked,” an indication that another
entry was previously made, possibly a “no bail recommendation.”
Furthermore,
no counter-affidavit or answer was filed by the accused during the
preliminary
investigation conducted by the respondent judge, and it took the police
authorities seven days to arrest the accused after the issuance of the
warrant of arrest. Thus:
16. I
hereby
execute this Affidavit to respond to the call in (sic) to encouraging
the
public to report erring judges to the Supreme Court and not to the
media,
as I am also very much concerned, not only of being a victim of
injustice,
but also of being prejudicial to [the] government’s interest as a
consequence
of incompetence, gross ignorance, misconduct of the Presiding Judge
Nieto
T. Tresvalles of the Municipal Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes in the
granting of bail to the accused, even when the evidence of his guilt
was
strong and without an Application for Bail, considering that a
Complaint
for Murder was filed, and without an Order, to which the judge is to
make
as Summary of Evidence filed by the complainant and her witnesses to
immediately
cut short his membership in the Bench, be terminated and dismissed from
the judicial service with forfeiture of all his benefits and leave
credits
with prejudice to his re-employment in any public office.[4]
In his Comment, the
respondent
admitted that no bail hearing was conducted in Criminal Case No. 5307,
but reasoned that the evidence of the guilt of the accused was not
strong.
According to the respondent, the matter of granting bail is an exercise
of judgment, and that the accused should not be denied his
constitutional
right to bail.chanrobles virtual law library
It is true that a hearing
is necessary before an accused should be released on bail in cases
where
the granting of bail is discretionary on the part of the judge.
However,
it is also equally true that in the exercise of his sound discretion
and
opinion, he is not also precluded in seeing to it that the evidence of
the prosecution is adduced in support for the denial of bail to the
accused
to guide the court on what to do on the matter. But the public
prosecutor
failed during the hearing.[5]
The respondent also
explained that a judge issuing a warrant of arrest is not an arresting
officer. Thus, if it took seven days for the accused to be
arrested
after the issuance of the warrant, it was no longer his concern.cralaw:red
In its Report[6]
dated June 19, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator opined that
Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court make it mandatory
for
the court to conduct a hearing before an accused charged with a capital
offense is granted bail, and that failure to do so amounts to gross
ignorance
of the law. It was recommended that the complaint be re-docketed
as a regular administrative matter and that the respondent judge be
fined
in the amount of P10,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of
the
same act shall be dealt with more severely.cralaw:red
In a Resolution dated
July 28, 2003, the Court referred the matter to Executive Judge Romulo
P. Atencia. Thereafter, the Executive Judge submitted his Report
and Recommendation dated November 6, 2003.cralaw:red
According to the Executive
Judge, the actual implementation of a warrant of arrest is the
responsibility
of other functionaries of the government. In fact, the respondent
issued the warrant of arrest on December 5, 2000, only four days after
the case was filed in his sala on December 1, 2000. Thus, the
respondent
cannot be blamed in any wise if the accused was not arrested or held in
custody prior to December 11, 2000.cralaw:red
According to the Executive
Judge, the charge that no bail was really granted for the provisional
liberty
of the accused in the sum of P30,000 and that the said amount was
merely
superimposed on the warrant of arrest is not supported by the
records.
Since the respondent issued an Order on December 5, 2000 fixing the
bail
at P30,000, the contention that no such order granting bail was issued
is, likewise, devoid of merit. Thus, the Executive Judge
concluded,
even assuming that there was such a superimposition on the warrant of
arrest,
the same was merely made to conform to the said Order.chanrobles virtual law library
Anent the charge that
the accused was not required to file a comment on the complaint, the
Executive
Judge found that no fault could be attributed to the respondent on this
regard, as it is the prerogative of the accused to submit any pleading
in his defense. However, the respondent judge failed to make any
findings of facts and the law supporting his action as mandated by
Section
5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.cralaw:red
The Executive Judge
also stated that at the time the respondent judge granted bail to the
accused
on December 5, 2000, no application for bail had as yet been filed by
the
accused. Furthermore, no hearing was held to determine whether
the
evidence of the prosecution on the guilt of the accused was strong or
not.[7]
According to the Executive Judge, a hearing is required to afford the
judge
a basis for determining the existence of the facts set forth under
Section
6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in granting or rejecting a plea of
bail.
Thus, the grant of bail without due hearing deprives the prosecution of
procedural due process, a right to which it is equally entitled to as
the
defense. Thus:chanrobles virtual law library
The
respondent
Judge seeks to justify his grant of bail by claiming that “the
testimonies
of the witnesses will not warrant the charge of murder.” This
claim,
however, is belied by his own Order granting bail when he stated that
“the
Court believes that a prima facie case exists that the crime charged
has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.” The
offense
for which he found the accused to be probably guilty of is “Murder,”
since
it was “the crime charged” … The warrant of arrest issued by the
respondent
Judge designated the offense as “Murder.”[8]
The Executive Judge
agreed
with the finding of the Court Administrator that the respondent is
guilty
of gross ignorance of the law.
We agree that the respondent
judge is administratively liable for granting bail to an accused
charged
with murder without conducting the requisite bail hearing.cralaw:red
The importance of a
hearing in applications for bail should once more be emphasized.
Section 8, Rule 114 provides as follows:
Sec. 8. Burden of proof
in bail application. - At the hearing of an application for bail
filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense
punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has
the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The
evidence
presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically
reproduced
at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any
witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, or
otherwise,
unable to testify.chanrobles virtual law library
The importance of the
Rule lies on the fact that on the result of the bail hearing depends
the
right of an accused to provisional liberty vis-à-vis the duty of
the State to protect the people against dangerous elements. The
resolution
of the issue affects important norms in our society: liberty on one
hand,
and order on the other. To minimize, if not eliminate, error and
arbitrariness in a judge’s decision, the Rules require the judge to
hear
the parties and then make an intelligent assessment of their evidence.[9]
The respondent’s argument
that a hearing is “only necessary if there is an application for
admission
to bail” is erroneous. As found by the Executive Judge:
The fact
that
the accused has not even filed yet any application for bail at the time
bail was fixed on December 5, 2000 aggravates matters. To state
the
obvious, there was no occasion for the respondent Judge to exercise any
discretion on the matter of bail at that point in time as the accused
was
not asking to be released on temporary liberty. The respondent
Judge
should have followed the straight and trodden path, well-traveled by
members
of the bench, that bail should not be allowed in cases of murder.
It might also be worth mentioning, in passing, that the right to bail
may
be waived considering its personal nature. It arises from the
time
one is placed in the custody of the law. The fact that the respondent
Judge
already granted bail when the accused has not been arrested yet
compounds
the aggravation.[10]
Admission to bail
presupposes
the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the
applicable
legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an
opportunity
to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications
for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion
is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is
strong.
In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally, and
within
the confines of due process, that is, after the evaluation of the
evidence
submitted by the prosecution.[11]
In this case, the respondent judge motu proprio granted bail to the
accused.
The prosecution was not even afforded an opportunity to present its
evidence,
in accordance with the Rules.chanrobles virtual law library
We likewise agree with
the finding of the Executive Judge that the respondent’s claim of good
faith will not exonerate him from administrative liability.cralaw:red
The respondent Judge
also argues in his Position Paper submitted to the undersigned
Executive
Judge that there is absolutely no evidence to show that he was
motivated
by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in granting bail. As
such,
he argues that his act which was done in his official capacity is not
subject
to disciplinary action. Unfortunately for the respondent Judge,
it
is already settled that when a judge grants bail to a person charged
with
a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life
imprisonment without conducting the required [bail] hearing, he is
considered
guilty of ignorance or incompetence the gravity of which cannot be
excused
by a claim of good faith or excusable negligence.[12]
In the recent case of
Rosalia Docena-Caspe v. Judge Arnulfo O. Bagtas,[13]
the Court stressed the indispensable nature of a hearing in petitions
for
bail, citing a plethora of cases,[14]
where judges were found to be grossly ignorant of the rules and
procedures
and were fined P20,000.00 therefor.cralaw:red
Moreover, the respondent
judge failed to adhere to the mandate of Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court which provides:
Sec. 5.
Resolution
of investigating judge and its review. – Within ten (10) days after the
preliminary investigation, the investigating judge shall transmit the
resolution
of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman
or
his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, for appropriate action. The
resolution
shall state the findings of facts and the law supporting his action,
together
with the record of the case which shall include: (a) the warrant, if
the
arrest is by virtue of a warrant; (b) the affidavits,
counter-affidavits
and other supporting evidence of the parties; (c) the undertaking or
bail
of the accused and the order for his release; (d) the transcripts of
the
proceedings during the preliminary investigation; and (e) the order of
cancellation of his bail bond, if the resolution is for the dismissal
of
the complaint.chanrobles virtual law library
No such report on the
findings
of fact and law was made by the respondent. As found by the
Executive
Judge, the December 5, 2000 Order of the respondent finding probable
cause
that the crime of murder was committed was made only for the purpose of
issuing of a warrant of arrest against the accused, thus:
It is apparent that
the aforementioned finding was made only for purposes of issuance of a
warrant of arrest, as at that time, the accused was still at
large.
Strictly speaking, this was not yet a finding of any prima facie case
upon
which an Information charging the proper offense should be filed in
court.
The respondent Judge was yet to issue a subpoena to the accused
attaching
to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and
documents
as required under Sec. 3 (a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The
accused has not yet submitted any counter-affidavit or has waived the
submission
thereof. In other words, preliminary investigation was not yet
terminated.
Subsequently, however, the respondent Judge never issued any other
resolution
on the result of the preliminary investigation he conducted up to the
time
he transmitted the records to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor.
The respondent Judge did not make any findings of facts and the law
supporting
his action as mandated by Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court. Therefore, his original, premature finding of
probable
guilt made on December 5, 2000 was already his verdict on the
preliminary
investigation yet to be conducted. This cavalier disregard of
procedural
rules leaves much to be desired.[15]
A judge owes it to himself
and his office to know by heart basic legal principles and to harness
his
legal know-how correctly and justly – anything less than that is
constitutive
of the serious charge of gross ignorance of the law, perhaps, grave
misconduct.[16]
In Celestina B. Corpuz vs. Judge Orlando F. Siapno,[17]
we had the occasion to state, thus:
When a judge displays
an utter unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes the
confidence
of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and the
court
the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of
laws and the prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a
judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.[18]chanrobles virtual law library
While the Executive
Judge agreed that the respondent should be held administratively
liable,
it was recommended that he be merely reprimanded, as “a balancing of
the
equities involved should tilt the scales in favor of the respondent for
his loyalty, diligence and reliability.” Thus:
There are
six
(6) first level courts in the Province of Catanduanes. Of these,
five (5) do not have incumbent judges. As the only judge in the
first
level courts, respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles has, for many years,
been Acting Judge of all the other vacant courts which are scattered
throughout
the island province, accessible only through dirt mountain roads.
This necessarily entailed great sacrifices on the part of the
respondent
Judge, not to mention that the extra remuneration given to Judges for
sitting
in vacant salas is a mere pittance. Inasmuch as this
administrative
matter concerns the official acts of the respondent, equity demands
that
the bad be weighed together with the good.
PREMISES CONSIDERED,
the undersigned is inclined to adopt the recommendation of the Office
of
the Court Administrator that the respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles
be
FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition
of the same act shall be dealt with more severely. However,
considering
that the said respondent is in the twilight of his career with the
Judiciary,
as his compulsory retirement is scheduled in January of the coming year
which is barely two (2) months away, and considering further that the
respondent
Judge did the yeoman’s job of single-handedly operating the judicial
machinery
in the Province of Catanduanes for many years as the only first level
court
Judge in the entire province, it is the respectful recommendation of
the
undersigned that respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles be instead
only REPRIMANDED.[19]
The records show that
the
respondent judge compulsorily retired on January 22, 2004, having
served
thirty-four years in the judiciary. Under the circumstances, the
Court finds that a fine of P10,000.00 is just and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, respondent
JUDGE NIETO T. TRESVALLES is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law
and is FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to be
deducted
from his retirement benefits.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman), Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[*]
The respondent compulsorily retired on January 22, 2004.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 003-006.chanrobles virtual law library
[2]
Rollo, pp. 102-103.
[3]
Id. at 002.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Id. at 005-006.
[5]
Id. at 022.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Id. at 062-065.
[7]
Rollo, p. 106.
[8]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
Re: Release by Judge Manuel T. Muro, RTC. Br. 54, Manila, of an Accused
in a Non-Bailable Offense.
[10]
Rollo, p. 107.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
Fortuna v. Penaco-Sitaca, 358 SCRA 615 (2001).
[12]
Rollo, p. 107.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1767, March 28, 2003.
[14]
Manonggiring v. Ibrahim, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1663, November 15, 2002;
Panganiban
v. Cupin-Tesorero, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1454, August 27, 2002; Tabao v.
Barataman,
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1384, April 11, 2002; Comia v. Antona, 337 SCRA 656
(2000);
Layola v. Gabo, Jr., 380 Phil. 318 (2000).
[15]
Rollo, p. 108.chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
Poso v. Mijares, 387 SCRA 485 (2002).
[17]
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1106, June 17, 2003.
[18]
Id. at 7.chanrobles virtual law library
[19]
Rollo, pp. 108-109.
chan
robles virtual law library |