FIRST DIVISION
NAPOLEON
R.
GONZAGA
AND RICARDO R. GONZAGA,
Complainants,
A.
C.
No. 1954
July 23, 2004
-versus-
ATTY.
EUGENIO V.
VILLANUEVA, JR.,
Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O
N
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:cralaw:red
For final resolution
by this Court in this case is the complaint for disbarment filed by
complainants
Napoleon R. Gonzaga and Ricardo R. Gonzaga against respondent Atty.
Eugenio
V. Villanueva, Jr. The grounds alleged therein are deceit,
malpractice,
gross misconduct, and violation of oath of office.cralaw:red
At the outset, we note
that this is a 25-year-old case, having been filed by the complainants
as early as 6 October 1978. In March 1979, this Court referred it
to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report,
and recommendation.[1]
The case remained pending before the OSG for several years. The
parties
submitted their pleadings and manifestations. Motions for
postponement
were attributed mostly to the ill health of both respondent[2]
and complainant Napoleon Gonzaga.[3]
The latter even went at some time to the United States of America (USA)
for medical treatment. In July 1986, Assistant Solicitor General
Zoilo Andin directed the parties to manifest whether they were still
interested
in pursuing the case which had been lying dormant for sometime.[4]
The complainants manifested in the affirmative and moved that the
hearing
be set sometime in November 1986.[5]
As to what transpired thereafter until 1991 is not extant from the
records.cralaw:red
In 1991, the case was
forwarded to the Integrated Bar (IBP) of the Philippines for
continuation
of the hearings.[6]
At that time, the respondent was already residing in the USA.[7]
Again, motions for postponements due to various reasons, including the
failing health of the parties, were filed.cralaw:red
The complainants claimed
that they did not pursue the case for sometime because of Christian
charity.
They wanted to give the respondent a chance to have a complete medical
treatment.[8]
For his part, the respondent alleged that it was complainants’ gross
negligence
and patent lack of interest that caused the delay in the proceedings.[9]chanrobles virtual law library
On 9 November 1998,
because of the length of time that the case has been pending,
Commissioner
Agustinus V. Gonzaga of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed
the
parties to manifest whether they were still willing to continue with
the
case.[10]chanrobles virtual law library
In the interim, both
complainants died; hence, their counsel manifested to just make a
formal
offer of exhibits and rest their case.[11]
On the other hand, the respondent failed to confer with his counsel for
years, and his whereabouts were not known. Thus, his counsel, the
Ponce, Enrile, Reyes and Manalastas Law Office, withdrew its
representation
in the case.[12]
That was the last of what was heard from the respondent and his counsel.cralaw:red
After twelve years that
the case was in its office, the IBP finally issued a resolution on the
case in September 2003.cralaw:red
Now, this Court shall
end this 25-year-old dispute.cralaw:red
In the verified complaint
filed before this Court on 6 October 1978, the complainants
alleged
that on 30 July 1977, their parents were brutally murdered at Forbes
Park,
Makati, Rizal (now Makati City). Immediately after the incident,
their sister who was wounded, was confined at the Makati Medical
Center.
Respondent Atty. Eugenio Villanueva, Jr., came to the Makati Medical
Center,
ostensibly to condole with them. At that time, the murder of
their
parents was under investigation by the Makati police.
Representing
himself to be a relative, the respondent volunteered his assistance in
the criminal investigation by accompanying the complainants to the
Makati
Police Department. Feeling grateful of respondent’s apparent
solicitude,
the complainants decided to formally request the former’s services as
legal
counsel in the criminal case.cralaw:red
On the afternoon of
1 August 1977, while the complainants were busy attending to many
people
inside the San Antonio Church in Forbes Park, Makati, for the misa
requiem,
the respondent came and handed them a half-page piece of paper for
their
signatures and told them that it was his authority to appear in the
criminal
case. Without scrutinizing the contents of the half-page paper
and
trusting respondent’s integrity, the complainants hurriedly signed the
piece of paper so they could continue to arrange for the misa requiem.chanrobles virtual law library
On 2 August 1977, upon
their arrival in Bacolod City, and even before the burial of their
parents,
the complainants hired the services of Atty. William Mirano to
institute
in court the intestate proceedings on the estate of their deceased
parents.
Three days after, Atty. Mirano filed the corresponding petition before
the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. The
petition
was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 13298.cralaw:red
Several days after,
the respondent filed a similar petition without complainants’ knowledge
and consent and despite knowledge of the filing of the petition by
Atty.
Mirano. The petition contained egregious errors particularly on
the
ages and residences of the heirs. It was signed and verified by
the
respondent himself. Not one of the heirs signed the petition.cralaw:red
The complainants then
confronted the respondent about the filing of the second
petition.
To their shock, surprise, and disbelief, the respondent showed them the
authority dated 1 August 1977. With grave abuse of their trust
and
confidence, he caused the insertion on the half-page piece of paper his
authority to represent them in the intestate proceedings. The
document
was purportedly notarized by Atty. Crisanto P. Realubin even if they
never
appeared before him.cralaw:red
At first, the respondent
blamed his secretary for making the insertion. However, when the
story sounded incredible, he declared that “as a smart lawyer he
thought
of things ahead of time.”chanrobles virtual law library
In order not to embarrass
the respondent, the complainants made it clear to the former that his
authority
in the intestate case would only be to help their counsel of record
secure
the order appointing them as co-special administrators.cralaw:red
On 10 August 1977, Judge
Oscar Victoriano of the intestate court appointed the complainants as
co-special
administrators. Despite such appointment and the termination of
his
authority to represent them, the respondent stubbornly insisted in
appearing
in the intestate proceedings.[13]
This compelled the complainants to file a motion for the termination of
his services in the intestate court.[14]
On 2 January 1979, the
respondent simultaneously filed with this Court both his Answer and a
motion
to dismiss. In his Answer, the respondent declared that he
represented
the complainants in the criminal case of their parents and in the
intestate
proceedings by virtue of an oral authority which was put in writing on
1 August 1977. The document conferring him authority was not
written
on a half-page paper but on a long, legal size bond paper. The
National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) found the document to be genuine,
authentic,
and without any alteration or addition, as lines 1 to 18 were typed
only
in one setting. He denied complainants’ allegation of being an
ambulance
chaser. On the contrary, the complainants sought for his services
on 30 July 1977, aware that the three killers of their parents were
highly
connected and that the respondent was the lawyer of their parents in
several
cases in the lower courts and the Supreme Court since 1967 until
1976.
Complainants’ Joint Manifestation[15]
dated 9 August 1977 praying for their appointment as co-administrators,
which was granted by the court on 10 August 1977,[16]
confirmed his authority to appear before the intestate court.
Further,
during the hearing on 30 September 1977, the complainants admitted that
the respondent was authorized to appear as private prosecutor in the
criminal
case in Pasig City and to file administration proceedings.chanrobles virtual law library
Anent the notarization
of the 1 August 1977 document the respondent alleged that the
complainants
appeared before Atty. Realubin for the acknowledgment of that document,
and that any irregularity on the notarial register is the
responsibility
of the notary public and could not destroy the authenticity of the
document.[17]
In his Report and Recommendation[18]
dated 9 September 2003, IBP’s Investigating Commissioner Atty. Leland
R.
Villadolid, Jr., concluded that the respondent employed deceit to cause
complainants to sign the authority dated 1 August 1977. In
addition,
the respondent’s continued appearance in the intestate court in spite
of
the express revocation of his authority to appear therein is unbecoming
a member of the Bar. He, thus, recommended that the respondent be
suspended for a period of at least two years and be imposed a fine of
at
least P5,000 with a warning that a repetition of a similar act in the
future
will be severely dealt with.cralaw:red
In its Resolution No.
XVI-2003-171 of 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors
approved and adopted Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.’s Report and
Recommendation,
with the modification consisting in the reduction of the recommended
penalty
of suspension from the practice of law from two years to six months.cralaw:red
The core issues are
(1) whether the respondent employed deceit in obtaining the signatures
of the complainants on the document giving him authority to file the
petition
for the administration of the intestate estate of their deceased
parents;
and (2) whether respondent’s continued appearance in the intestate
proceedings
after the appointment of the complainants as special co-administrators
was improper.cralaw:red
This Court resolves
both issues in the affirmative.chanrobles virtual law library
Undisputed is the existence
of a contract for legal services between the respondent and the
complainants,
as evidenced by their written agreement dated 1 August 1977[19]
wherein the latter authorized the former to represent them in the
criminal
case and the intestate proceedings of their parents. This
document
was prepared by the respondent and presented to the complainants in the
church while they were preparing for the requiem mass two days after
their
parents were brutally murdered.[20]
Trusting that the respondent, who was the counsel of their parents in
many
cases, would be true to their agreement that he was to represent them
in
the criminal case only, the complainants signed the document without
scrutinizing
it.[21]
But it turned out that the document contained respondent’s authority to
also appear in the intestate proceedings.cralaw:red
That the complainants
never intended to authorize the respondent to represent them in the
intestate
proceedings can be deduced from the following circumstances:
1. On 2
August 1977, a day after the signing of the questioned authority in
favor
of the respondent, the complainants engaged the services of Atty.
Mirano
to file the petition for the administration and settlement of the
intestate
estate of their parents;chanrobles virtual law library
2. Atty. Mirano
filed the petition on 5 August 1977;[22]chanrobles virtual law library
3. The petition
filed by Atty. Mirano was signed by all the heirs;
4. The petition
filed by the respondent was signed by him alone and contained glaring
errors
on the ages and respective residences of the heirs;[23]
5. The complainants
did not appear before notary public Atty. Crisanto P. Realubin for the
acknowledgment of the 1 August 1977 document; and
6. Atty. Crisanto
P. Realubin was suspended for six months for falsely certifying that
the
complainants personally appeared before him and acknowledged to him
that
the document was their free and voluntary act and deed.[24]
The failure of the complainants
to examine the document closely is justified by the following attending
circumstances: (1) it was presented to them for their signing at the
church
when they were busy preparing for the misa requiem; (2) they were still
emotionally shocked by the brutal killing of their parents two days
earlier;
(4) they were busy with the investigation of the murder; (5) they had
to
attend to the wake activities of their deceased parents; and (6)
finally,
they trusted that the respondent would reflect in the document their
agreement
that he would represent them only in the criminal case.cralaw:red
To avoid embarrassing
the respondent after learning of the actual content of the 1 August
1977
document, the complainants executed a document giving the former
authority
to appear in the intestate case until they shall have been appointed as
co-administrators of the estate of their deceased parents.[25]
But, even after the appointment of the complainants as
co-administrators
and the termination by them of respondent’s services,[26]
the respondent continued to appear in the intestate proceedings.[27]chanrobles virtual law library
It must be pointed out
that the relation of attorney-client may be terminated by (1) the act
of
the client; (2) the act of the attorney; (3) the death of the client;
(4)
the death of the attorney; or (5) the accomplishment of the purpose for
which it was created.[28]
Ordinarily, the attorney-client relation is ended by the completion of
the specific task for which the attorney was employed. In this
case,
the attorney-client relationship between the complainants and the
respondent
was terminated by the complainants upon their appointment as special
co-administrators
of the estate of their deceased parents.cralaw:red
Notably, the difference
between the revocation of the authority by the act of the client and by
the act of the attorney is that the first may be done at any time with
or without cause, whereas the second can be made only with the client’s
written consent or for justified cause.[29]
Evidently, respondent’s
obstinate refusal to withdraw from the intestate proceedings was
improper.
Since his unauthorized appearance was willful, he could have been cited
in contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his
official
transactions.[30]
In addition, he may be disciplined for professional misconduct.cralaw:red
A lawyer may be disbarred
or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties,
or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit;
malpractice;
gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a
crime
involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is
required
to take before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience
of
any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful
appearance
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough
as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or
commits
in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must
at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only
conditions
precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands
for his continued membership therein.[31]chanrobles virtual law library
However, the power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution, and must be used only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character
of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
Disbarment
should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension,
would accomplish the end desired.[32]chanrobles virtual law library
We hold that the recommended
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six
months
by the IBP Board of Governors is adequate and commensurate to the
offense.cralaw:red
ACCORDINGLY, the Court
resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty. Eugenio V. Villanueva, Jr., from
the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon service
on
him of a copy of this Resolution, with a WARNING that a repetition of
the
same acts subject of the complaint in this case or of similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.cralaw:red
Let copies of this Resolution
be spread on the personal record of respondent in this Court and
furnished
the Office of the Court Administrator for distribution to all courts in
the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
information
and guidance.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, vol. 1, 109.
[2]
Id., vol. 4, 26, 34, 47, 54, 56-57.
[3]
Id., vol., 4, 24.
[4]
Id., vol. 4, 1.
[5]
Id., vol. 4, 6.
[6]
Id., vol. 5, 1.
[7]
Id., vol. 5, 6.chanrobles virtual law library
[8]
Id., vol. 5, 149-150.
[9]
Id., vol. 5, 165-167.
[10]
Id., vol. 6, 1.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
Rollo, vol. 6, 12-13.
[12]
Id., vol. 6, 18-20.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
Exhibit “H,” Rollo, vol. 1, 12-14.
[14]
Exh. “I,” Rollo, vol. 1, 15-16.
[15]
Exh. “F,” Rollo, vol. 1, 90.
[16]
Exh. “I,” Rollo, vol. 1, 91.
[17]
Rollo, vol. 1, 65.chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
Rollo, unpaginated.
[19]
Exh. “J,” Rollo, vol. 1, 79.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
Pars. F and G of the Complaint, 2; Rollo, vol. 1, 2.
[21]
Par. G of the Complaint, 2; Rollo, vol. 1, 2.
[22]
Par. H, Complaint, 2-3; Rollo, vol. 1, 2-3.
[23]
Exh. “C-3,” Rollo, vol. 1, 8.chanrobles virtual law library
[24]
Gonzaga v. Realubin, 312 Phil. 381 (1995).
[25]
Exh. “E-1,” Rollo, vol. 1, 11.chanrobles virtual law library
[26]
Exh. “E,” Rollo, vol. 1, 11.chanrobles virtual law library
[27]
Par. N, Complaint, 4; Rollo, vol. 1, 4.
[28]
Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics 275-286 (6th ed. 1997).chanrobles virtual law library
[29]
Sec. 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court; see also Aro v. Nañawa,
137 Phil 745, 762 (1969).
[30]
Sec. 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.chanrobles virtual law library
[31]
Tucay v. Tucay, 376 Phil. 336-340 (1999).
[32]
Resurreccion v. Sayson, 360 Phil. 313, 321 (1998). |