FIRST DIVISION
RENE ESPINA AND
CEBU
DISCOVERY
BAY PROPERTIES,
INC.,
Complainants,
A.M.
No.
P-02-1580
April 9, 2003 - versus -
JUAN A. GATO,
Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O
N
AZCUNA,
J.:
Before us is a complaint
filed by Rene Espina and Cebu Discovery Properties, Inc. (CDPI) against
Juan A. Gato, Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court, Lapulapu City,
for
acting with manifest bias and partiality in Civil Case No. 2309-L,
entitled
"Concordio Bancale, et al. v. Eva Paras" while it was still pending
before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, of Lapulapu City.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Concordio Bancale, Jr.,
Cesario Bancale, Felipa Bancale, Patrocinio Bancale, Felicisima
Bancale,
Marcos Bancale, Cornelio Bancale, Demetrio Bancale, Teofila Bancale,
Ignacio
Bancale, Enriqueta Jumao-as-Bancale, Pinky Bancale, Darwin Bancale,
Marie
Alene Bancale, Maria Ethel Bancale, Juanita Bancale-Igoy, Marta
Bancale-Nuñez,
Fortunata Bancale-Gemeno, Isidra Bancale, Gavino Bancale, Marcelino
Bahio,
Praxedes Bahio, Heraclio Bahio, Jr., Gloria Malinao, Leonarda Canada
and
Regina Bancale-Igoy are owners of a parcel of land in Punta
Engaño,
Lapulapu City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 36425 and
36426. They are also the plaintiffs in the civil case entitled,
"Concordio
Bancale, et al. v. Eva Paras."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Except for plaintiff
therein Regina Bancale-Igoy, the abovementioned persons sold their
undivided
interest over the subject property to complainant CDPI. The parties
executed
an Agreement to Sell and to Buy dated January 31, 1997, and a Deed of
Absolute
Sale dated August 29, 1997.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Three days prior to
plaintiffs’ signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale or on August 26, 1997,
Attys. Generoso A. Juaban and Francis M. Zosa, plaintiffs’ counsel,
filed
a motion to set attorneys’ fees at P9 million. On the very same
day,
the trial court granted the motion. However, on September 2,
1997,
plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order.
They alleged therein that although Attys. Juaban and Zosa were their
lawyers
in the abovementioned civil case, they did not conform to the said
motion.
Moreover, they alleged that the counsel falsely made it appear that
plaintiff
Regina Bancale-Igoy spoke for all of them when she conformed to the
motion.
She allegedly did not have the authority of the other plaintiffs to
conform
to their counsel’s motion to set the attorneys’ fees at P9 million.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Plaintiffs’ motion
for reconsideration was, however, denied by the trial court on the
ground
that said order had already become final and executory. Hence,
pursuant
to the said order, the trial court issued a writ of execution addressed
to respondent sheriff dated October 14, 1997, which states as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREAS, on August 26,
1997, this Court issued an order which reads as follows:
"As prayed for by Retired
Judge Generoso A. Juaban and Atty. Francis M. Zosa, their attorney’s
fees
is hereby fixed at P9 million pesos, to be taken from the money due
from
the buyer to the sellers under the agreement to buy and sell.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Furnish copies of this
Order to Judge Generoso Juaban and Francis M. Zosa, accordingly.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED."
WHEREAS, on October
10, 1997, this court issued an Order which read as follows:
"Considering that the
Order of this Court dated August 26, 1997 has already become final and
executory, not having been appealed, the motion for execution is hereby
GRANTED.cralaw:red
Let a Writ of Execution
issue to satisfy the Order dated August 26, 1997 to enforce the same
fixing
the attorney’s fees.cralaw:red
Sheriff Juan A. Gato
of this Branch is hereby directed to implement the Writ.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED."
WHEREFORE, we command
you to collect the attorney’s fees fixed by the court at P9 million
pesos
from the plaintiffs in this case, which is due from the buyer to the
sellers
under the agreement to buy and sell, plus the legal fees for the
service
of this writ, after payment of the sheriff’s fees to the official
Cashier
of the Sheriff’s Office. Thereafter, you shall render your report
of the action you shall have taken on this writ within the period fixed
by the rules.[1]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On October 23, 1997,
respondent sheriff, to satisfy the abovementioned writ of execution,
levied
upon the rights, shares, interests and participation of the plaintiffs
over the property under TCT Nos. 36425 and 36426. This he did,
despite
the fact that the writ of execution issued by the trial court
specifically
directed that the attorney’s fees were "to be taken from the money due
from the buyer to the sellers under the agreement to buy and sell."
Respondent
issued a notice of sale on execution dated October 24, 1997, which
stated
that the property would be sold at a public auction on November 28,
1997
at 2 o’clock in the afternoon.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A third party claim
with the office of respondent sheriff was filed by complainant Rene
Espina
for himself and on behalf of CDPI on November 18, 1997. On
November
28, 1997, the subject properties were sold at public auction to Attys.
Juaban and Zosa for P9 million. A certificate of sale was issued
in favor of Attys. Juaban and Zosa and the same was registered with the
Registry of Deeds on December 3, 1997, in accordance with Section 25,
Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.
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However, before the
lapse of the one-year period of redemption under Section 33 of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court, or on December 1, 1998, the trial court issued
an
order setting aside the order dated October 10, 1997, which considered
as final and executory the order of August 26, 1997. The
dispositive
portion of the order states:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing premises, this Court hereby sets aside the order issued
in
this case on October 10, 1997, which considered as final and executory
the 26 August 1997 order and, in its stead, hereby gives due course to
the appeal filed by the plaintiffs-movants from the order issued in
this
case on 22 September 1997 which in effect is an appeal from the said 26
August 1997 order.[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On January 27, 1999,
Attys. Juaban and Zosa wrote a letter to respondent requesting him to
execute
a final deed of sale in their favor since no redemption was made.
Respondent, in a letter dated February 4, 1999, answered that he no
longer
had any authority to issue the final deed of sale by virtue of the
December
1, 1998 order. However, despite this knowledge, respondent still
transmitted to Attys. Juaban and Zosa the Final Deed of Conveyance
without
the approval of the court. His letter said:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Dear Sirs:
Pursuant to your letter
of January 27, 1999 undersigned prepared the Sheriff’s Definite Deed of
Sale over the properties sold at public auction on November 28, 1997,
which
in effect a Certificate of Sale was issued [sic] on December 3, 1997,
and
was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the City of
Lapulapu
on December 24, 1997 at 11:20 a.m. under Entry No. 3727, Vol. XVIII,
Page
290. However, when I submitted the same deed to the Presiding
Judge
for approval, the latter had informed undersigned that he already
issued
an order dated December 1, 1998 setting aside the orders of October 10
and August 26, 1997, which were the basis of the execution in Civil
Case
No. 2309-L.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In effect, the undersigned
has no more personality in issuance of a definite deed of conveyance.cralaw:red
Undersigned, nevertheless,
is enclosing the prepared deed without the approval of the presiding
judge
of this court.cralaw:red
Respectfully yours,
(signed)
JUAN GATO
RTC Sheriff IV[3]
In its 1st Indorsement
dated December 5, 2001, Court Administrator Presbitero Velasco, Jr.
directed
respondent to comment on the complaint.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent complied
on January 18, 2002. In his Comment, he stated that from the time
the Notice of Levy on Execution was filed with the Office of the
Register
of Deeds of Lapulapu City up to the latter part of November 1999,
nobody
informed him that the lots had already been acquired by CDPI.
Moreover,
the acquisition by CDPI of the said property was not reflected on
the titles with the Office of the Register of Deeds. Neither, he
added, were the issuance of new titles annotated. He further reasoned
that
he issued a final conveyance of the properties to Attys. Juaban and
Zosa
since no redemption was made and no injunctive writ against it was
issued
by an appellate court. He claimed, therefore, that he had no
reason
to withhold the issuance of the final conveyance of the aforesaid lots.
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In his Report and
Recommendation,
the Court Administrator said that respondent cannot claim that he
regularly
performed his duties in this case. It was noted that the writ of
execution commanding him to satisfy the attorney’s fees from the money
due from the buyer to the sellers was issued on October 14, 1997.
Nine days later, or on October 23, 1997, respondent filed a Notice of
Levy
on Execution with the Register of Deeds covering the subject
lots.
The Court Administrator concluded that respondent’s unusual zeal and
precipitate
decision in taking the necessary steps to transfer ownership of the
lots
to counsel for the plaintiffs effectively destroyed the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his official duties. He further
concluded that respondent’s act gave Attys. Juaban and Zosa undue
benefit
or advantage and caused complainants undue injury.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We agree.cralaw:red
Firstly, the haste with
which respondent levied upon the plaintiffs’ property is unexplained.[4]
Furthermore, despite a third-party claim filed
by
complainant Espina for CDPI on November
18,
1997, the property was sold at public auction to Attys. Juaban and Zosa
on November 28, 1997. It is true that sheriffs are responsible
for
the prompt service and implementation of writs and other orders issued
by the court. They cannot afford to be inefficient in
the work assigned to them.[5]
However, prompt service and efficiency should not be reasons to
compromise
the integrity of the court and the proper administration of justice. By
the very nature of their duties, sheriffs perform a very sensitive
function
in the dispensation of justice. Thus, their conduct must, at all
times, be above suspicion.[6]
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Secondly, as stated
earlier, the trial court ordered in the writ of execution that the P9
million
to be paid to Attys. Juaban and Zosa as attorneys’ fees "be taken from
the money due from the buyer to the sellers under the agreement to buy
and sell." Nevertheless, respondent levied upon the
aforementioned
property in blatant disregard of this order. It is a
well-settled
rule that the duty of a sheriff is merely ministerial.[7]
When a writ is placed in the hands of the sheriff, it is his
ministerial
duty to proceed to execute in accordance with the terms of its mandate.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thirdly, when Attys.
Juaban and Zosa requested respondent to issue a Final Deed of
Conveyance
to them, respondent already knew that he no longer had authority to
issue
the same. He had already been appraised of the fact that a
subsequent
order, dated December 1, 1998, set aside the orders that were the basis
of the writ of execution. This was admitted by him in his letter
to Attys. Juaban and Zosa. Despite this knowledge, he still
issued
a final deed of sale in favor of the said lawyers without the approval
of the court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
From all these facts,
it is clear that respondent showed manifest partiality in favor of
Attys.
Juaban and Zosa, giving them unwarranted benefit, advantage and
preference
and that, with evident bad faith, he caused undue injury to
complainants.
Respondent thereby failed to comply with the strict standards required
of public officers and employees.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, respondent
Sheriff Juan Gato is found GUILTY of grave abuse of official functions
and manifest partiality amounting to grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial
to the administration of justice, and is hereby suspended from service
for THREE (3) months without pay, with the warning that repetition in
the
future of the same or similar misconduct will be dealt with more
severely.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ.,
concur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Annex "F" of Complaint; rollo, p. 37.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Annex "I" of the Complaint; rollo, p. 44.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Annex "M" of the Complaint; rollo, p. 52.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Annex "G" of Complaint; rollo, p. 38.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Oliveros v. San Jose, A.M. No. P-02-1582, January 28, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Castro v. Bague, A.M. No. P-99-1346, June 20, 2001.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Ducat v. CA, 322 SCRA 695 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Jason v. Ygaña, 337 SCRA 264 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |