Republic
of the Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
ATTY. MANUEL T.
MOLINA,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-01-1638
(formerly A.M.
OCA
IPI No. 97-291-RTJ)
December 8, 2003
-versus-
JUDGE BENEDICTO
A.
PAZ, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 6,APARRI, CAGAYAN
AND JUDGE SEGUNDO
B. CATRAL, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
8,
APARRI, CAGAYAN,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO,
J.:cralaw:red
The
Case
This administrative
case stemmed from a Letter dated 5 February 1997[1]
and a Sworn Statement[2]
executed by Atty. Manuel T. Molina ("Atty. Molina") charging
respondents
Judge Benedicto A. Paz ("Judge Paz") of the Regional Trial Court of
Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 6 ("RTC-Branch 6") and Judge Segundo B. Catral ("Judge
Catral") of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 8
("RTC-Branch
8"), with misconduct and grave abuse of authority. Atty. Molina filed a
Supplemental Complaint dated 21 April 1997[3]
charging respondents with grave misconduct and dishonesty.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court will delve
into the merits of the administrative complaint only as against
respondent
Judge Paz because in the Resolution dated 6 May 2002, we dismissed the
administrative complaint against Judge Catral for lack of merit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Facts
Mayor Licerio Antiporda,
Jr. ("Mayor Antiporda") and Atty. Franklin Tamargo ("Atty. Tamargo")
were
candidates for the mayoralty post in Buguey, Cagayan in the 8 May 1995
elections. On the night of election day, seven persons belonging to the
political group headed by Mayor Antiporda were killed in Barangay
Pattao.
On the same date, three political followers of Atty. Tamargo were
killed
and one person was injured in Barangay San Isidro. Cases for multiple
murder
and attempted murder were filed against Licerio, the son of Mayor
Antiporda,
and other John Does. These cases were raffled to RTC-Branch 8, presided
by respondent Judge Catral, and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 08-879
to 08-882. This Court subsequently ordered the transfer of the murder
cases
to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 22. However, the seven
cases
for multiple murder filed against Attys. Molina and Tamargo, Godofredo
Flores, Roy Flores, Quirino Cabeza and ten other John Does were raffled
to respondent Judge Paz.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the instant administrative
complaint, Atty. Molina alleges that sometime in November 1996,
respondent
Judge Paz and Mayor Antiporda sought his help in settling the cases
filed
against Licerio, the son of Mayor Antiporda. Attys. Molina and Tamargo
were the private prosecutors in the criminal cases against the mayor's
son. Atty. Molina claims that at a meeting held at the Rembrandt Hotel
in Quezon City respondent Judge Paz assured Atty. Molina that the
criminal
cases for murder against Attys. Molina and Tamargo would be dismissed
should
there be a settlement of the cases of the mayor's son.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Atty. Molina further
claims that at another meeting held in December 1996, respondent Judge
Paz and Mayor Antiporda asked him to go to Buguey, Cagayan to convince
the Tamargo group to settle the cases against the mayor's son. Judge
Paz
allegedly reminded Atty. Molina that it would be best to settle the
cases
of the mayor's son so that the cases against Atty. Molina and his
co-accused
could also be settled. Judge Paz purportedly told Atty. Molina that
Judge
Catral had been urging the transfer of the cases to the latter's court,
which had been designated a special court for heinous crimes. Judge
Catral,
according to Judge Paz, would certainly issue a warrant of arrest since
he knew Atty. Molina as the counsel of Flaviano Cortes who had filed
numerous
administrative cases against Judge Catral.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Atty. Molina claims
that at a meeting held on 11 January 1997, he informed respondent Judge
Paz and Mayor Antiporda that the complainants in the murder cases did
not
want to settle the cases against the mayor's son. Respondent Judge Paz
allegedly expressed his disappointment and remarked that he did not
issue
a warrant of arrest against Attys. Molina and Tamargo hoping that the
cases
would be settled. Atty. Molina claims that respondent Judge Paz then
asked
him to postpone the hearing of the cases pending in Manila for a
"cooling-off
period," to which Atty. Molina agreed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 20 January 1997 during
the next hearing of the Manila cases, Atty. Molina as requested by
respondent
Judge Paz asked for postponement of the hearing. However, when Attys.
Molina
and Tamargo left the judge's chamber, policemen from Buguey, Cagayan,
armed
with a warrant issued by Judge Catral, arrested them and brought them
to
the Manila City Hall Police Detachment. There they were presented, in
handcuffs,
before media reporters and then brought directly to Buguey jail.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Atty. Molina claims
that Judge Catral hastily issued the warrant of arrest because the
logbook
of respondent Judge Paz does not show that the records of the murder
cases
had been transferred to Judge Catral.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his Supplemental
Complaint, Atty. Molina accuses respondent Judge Paz of unlawfully
using
the power of his office when Judge Catral issued another warrant of
arrest
after the Court of Appeals had granted the petition for writ of habeas
corpus filed by him and Atty. Tamargo.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For his part, respondent
Judge Paz admits having facilitated the meeting of Atty. Molina and
Mayor
Antiporda but claims it was out of sheer compassion, devoid of bias and
prejudice. Respondent Judge Paz claims he accepted the invitation of
Mayor
Antiporda to act as mediator between the warring political opponents
solely
to restore peace in the Municipality of Buguey, Cagayan.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This Court referred
the administrative case to Justice Ruben T. Reyes ("Investigating
Justice")
of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Report of the
Investigating
Justice
The Investigating Justice
found nothing in the records to establish respondent Judge Catral's
direct
involvement in the alleged "barter" of the cases. Respondent Judge
Catral
issued the warrant of arrest after the transfer of the records of the
case
to his sala on 10 January 1997. Judge Catral took four days to
determine
the existence of probable cause. Respondent Judge Catral issued the
warrant
of arrest on 13 January 1997. The Investigating Justice found as devoid
of merit Atty. Molina's claim that Judge Catral hastily issued the
warrant
of arrest. The Investigating Justice opined that the determination of
the
existence of probable cause rests on the sound judgment of respondent
Judge
Catral. An administrative case is not the proper remedy for an error
allegedly
committed by a judge in deciding a case or issuing an order. Likewise,
there was no proof of the alleged falsification of judicial records.
Hence,
the Investigating Justice recommended the exculpation of respondent
Judge
Catral from the charges.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Investigating Justice
likewise found no sufficient evidence to establish the charges of grave
misconduct, abuse of authority and dishonesty against respondent Judge
Paz. However, the Investigating Justice recommended that respondent
Judge
Paz be fined P1,000 for improper conduct. Good faith and an earnest
desire
to forge a reconciliation between the parties may have motivated
respondent
Judge Paz to intervene as mediator. However, the Investigating Justice
believed that respondent Judge should have remembered the cardinal rule
that judges should avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but also
even the mere appearance of impropriety.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The case was referred
to the Office of the Court Administrator ("OCA") for evaluation, report
and recommendation. The OCA agreed with the findings and conclusions of
the Investigating Justice and adopted in toto the latter's
recommendation.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 6 May 2002, this
Court issued a Resolution adopting the recommendation of the
Investigating
Justice to dismiss the administrative complaint for lack of merit only
as against respondent Judge Catral.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thus, in the instant
case, the Court will resolve only the administrative case against
respondent
Judge Paz.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court's Ruling
Respondent Judge Paz
compulsorily retired from the service on 21 September 1998 and has not
received his retirement benefits because of this pending administrative
case. In the Resolutions[5]
dated 7 June 2000 and 7 August 2000, this Court denied his request[6]
for partial release of his retirement benefits considering the gravity
of the charges against him and the ongoing investigation. On 20
December
2000, respondent Judge Catral filed a Motion to Resolve and/or to
Dismiss
the case because of the Manifestation dated 24 July 2000 of Atty.
Molina
to "discontinue to prosecute his complaint."[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The retirement of a
judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the
finding
of any administrative liability to which he should still be answerable.[8]
The withdrawal or recantation of the complainant by the administrative
charges does not necessarily result in the dismissal of the
administrative
case. We have repeatedly ruled that:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
withdrawal of a complaint
or subsequent desistance by the complainant in an administrative case
does
not necessarily warrant its dismissal. Administrative actions cannot
depend
on the will or pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his
own, condone what may be detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by
the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its
disciplinary
power. The Court does not dismiss administrative cases against members
of the Bench merely on the basis of withdrawal of the charges.
Desistance
cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and decide
the
complaint against the respondent. To be sure, public interest is at
stake
in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the
judiciary.
And the program and efforts of this Court in improving the delivery of
justice to the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by
private
arrangements between the parties.[9]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent Judge Paz,
in his Comment,[10]
admitted having facilitated the meeting of Atty. Molina and Mayor
Antiporda
out of court, with the aim of settling the disputes between the two
political
factions. He claims, however, that it was out of sheer compassion,
devoid
of bias and prejudice. He avers he accepted the invitation of Mayor
Antiporda
to sit between the warring political opponents as a mediator hoping to
restore mutual understanding and peace in the Municipality of Buguey,
Cagayan.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent Judge Paz
may have good and noble intentions. However, the Code
of Judicial Conduct[11]
mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity,
and independence. He should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and
avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. His
personal
behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also
outside the court, must be beyond reproach, for he is the visible
personification
of law and of justice.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct states:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A judge
should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
RULE 2.01. — A
judge
should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
RULE 2.04. — A
judge
shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation
or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
Even the personal
behavior
of judges in their everyday lives should be beyond reproach. Judges
should
avoid even the slightest infraction of the law.[13]
Those who occupy exalted positions in the administration of justice
must
pay a high price for the honor bestowed on them. Their private as well
as their official conduct must be always free from the appearance of
impropriety.[14]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Judges should be extra
prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them
to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. Judges
need not live in seclusion, nor avoid all social interrelations. When
time
and work commitments permit, judges may continue to relate to members
of
the bar in worthwhile endeavors in such fields of interest as are in
keeping
with the noble objectives of the legal profession.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, in pending
or prospective litigations before them, judges should be scrupulously
careful
to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their
personal,
social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity. Not only
must judges possess proficiency in law, they must also act and behave
in
such manner that would assure litigants and their counsel of the
judges'
competence, integrity and independence.[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the present administrative
case, respondent Judge Paz admitted to facilitating a meeting between
Atty.
Molina and Mayor Antiporda with the aim of forging a settlement between
the warring political factions. Respondent Judge Paz saw himself as a
mediator
between the contending political factions in the Municipality of
Buguey.
However, Atty. Molina was at that time facing a multiple murder case in
the sala of respondent Judge Paz and the victims of the multiple murder
case were the political followers of Mayor Antiporda. In short,
respondent
Judge Paz held a private meeting with Atty. Molina, who was then
accused
of multiple murder before respondent Judge. Respondent Judge Paz knew
that
Atty. Molina was a private prosecutor in the criminal cases against the
mayor's son pending with another court. The disputes between the
political
factions involved grave felonies, which respondent Judge Paz should
have
known could not be the subject of compromise.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. A judge must
not
only be impartial, he must also appear to be impartial. Public
confidence
in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of
judges.
Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance.[16]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent Judge Paz's
actuation constitutes simple misconduct, which for a first offense is
punishable
with suspension of one month and one day to six months.[17]
However, respondent Judge Paz had retired compulsorily on 21 September
1998. In lieu of suspension, respondent Judge Paz should be fined, not
P1,000 as recommended by the Investigating Justice, but P20,000
considering
that simple misconduct is a less serious charge.[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, respondent
Judge Benedicto A. Paz is adjudged guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and
FINED
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.
Let the retirement benefits of respondent Judge Benedicto A. Paz be
released
immediately, subject to the deduction of the P20,000 fine and the usual
clearances.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Panganiban,
Ynares-Santiago and Azcuna, JJ., concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, p. 1.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Ibid., pp. 2–4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Ibid., pp. 23–24.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Rollo, pp. 79–80.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Rollo, pp. 612 & 614.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Ibid., pp. 598–600.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Ibid., pp. 616–619.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Lilia v. Fanuñal, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1503, 13 December 2001, 372
SCRA
213.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Rizon v. Judge Zerna, 417 Phil. 634 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Rollo, pp. 76–141.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Effective 20 October 1989.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Agpalasin v. Judge Agcaoili, 386 Phil. 452 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Atty. Cabrera v. Judge Pajares, 226 Phil. 53 (1986).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Jugueta v. Boncaros, A.M. No. 440-CFI, 30 September 1974, 60 SCRA 27.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Sibayan-Joaquin v. Judge Javellana, 420 Phil. 584 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Dela Cruz v. Judge Bersamira, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1567, 24 July 2000, 336
SCRA
353.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Supreme Court Circular Memorandum No. 30 dated 20 July 1989. The simple
misconduct was committed prior to the amendment of Rule 140, which
amendment
took effect on 1 October 2001.
[18]
Section 11(B)(2) of Rule 140.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
|