SECOND DIVISION
RUDY T.
SALCEDO,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
MTJ-00-1328
February 11, 2004
-versus-
JUDGE
AMADO S.
CAGUIOAAND SHERIFF
BIENVENIDO
C. ARAGONES,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT IN CITIES,
BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH 3),
Respondents.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
R E S O L U T I O
N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
In an Affidavit-Complaint[1]
dated September 9, 1998, Rudy T. Salcedo charged Judge Amado S. Caguioa
and Sheriff Bienvenido C. Aragones, both of the Municipal Trial Court
in
Cities, Baguio City (Branch 3), with partiality and gross inexcusable
negligence
relative to Civil Case No. 10099, entitled “Peliz Loy Realty Corp. vs.
Rudy T. Salcedo.”
Complainant was the
defendant in Civil Case No. 10099 for unlawful detainer involving a
hotel
known as Veny’s Inn located at No. 22-24 Session Road, Baguio
City.
On August 18, 1998, respondent Judge rendered a decision in said case
against
complainant. On the same day, complainant filed a notice of
appeal.
On August 21, 1998, the plaintiff, Peliz Loy Realty Corp. (Peliz Loy,
for
brevity), filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution
pending
appeal. On August 24, 1998, complainant filed a Motion to Strike
Out the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal on the ground that the
motion
did not contain a notice of hearing as well as a proof of service in
violation
of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
On the same day, respondent Judge issued an Order granting the motion
for
execution pending appeal. On August 25, 1998, complainant filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio
City
praying for the annulment of the Order dated August 24, 1998 issued by
respondent, granting the motion for execution pending appeal.
Complainant
filed before respondent Judge a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend the
Order of August 24, 1998, praying that the execution be suspended until
his application for temporary restraining order, which was pending with
the RTC, has been acted upon. Nonetheless, on August 25, 1998,
respondent
Sheriff implemented the writ of execution.cralaw:red
Complainant alleges
that respondent Judge issued the writ of execution without notice to
him
and respondent Sheriff forcibly ejected him and his family from Veny’s
Inn without affording them time to bring out jewelries and cash as well
as personal properties and effects. He claims that jewelries
amounting
to P450,000.00 and cash of P200,000.00 were lost. Complainant
submits
that respondents conspired with Peliz Loy and its counsel, Atty. Galo
R.
Reyes, in the issuance and enforcement of the illegal order of
execution,
thereby giving Peliz Loy unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of their official, administrative or judicial
functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.[2]chanrobles virtual law library
In his Comment, respondent
claims that the instant Administrative Complaint is an offshoot of the
Order, dated August 31, 1998, of the RTC of Baguio City (Branch 7)
which
issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to enjoin the implementation
of the writ of execution. He submits that the RTC erred in
issuing
the TRO because the writ has already been implemented on August
25,1998.
He maintains that the writ of execution is valid and properly
implemented
because Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure makes
it ministerial and mandatory for the court to grant execution after a
decision
is rendered in an ejectment case which is adverse to defendant.
He
adds that the only way to stay execution is by perfecting an appeal,
filing
a supersedeas bond and depositing from time to time with the RTC,
during
the pendency of such appeal, the amount of rents or the reasonable
value
of the use and occupation of the property as fixed by the court of
origin.
He argues that complainant in this case did not file a supersedeas
bond.
Besides, he submits that a motion for issuance of a writ of execution
is
not a litigated motion.[3]
For his part, respondent
Sheriff claims that he acted in accordance with his sworn duty as a
sheriff
and officer of the court. He contends that there is no truth to
complainant’s
claim that he was not able to bring out his jewelries and cash because
all the occupants of the building were given time to remove their
personal
effects.[4]chanrobles virtual law library
Both respondents insist
that no unwarranted benefits or advantage were given to Peliz
Loy.
Respondent Judge claims that he merely relied on the evidence adduced
and
the applicable law and complainant cannot now claim that respondents
acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence
because the former even tolerated the dilatory motions of the
latter.
Respondents submit that the instant complaint is without basis and
filed
merely to harass them.[5]
Subsequently, in a letter[6]
dated August 5, 1999, complainant prayed for the dismissal of the case
against respondents considering that his dispute with Peliz Loy had
been
fully settled amicably to the satisfaction of the parties.cralaw:red
Consistent with the
policy of the Court to proceed with investigations on complaints for
misconduct
and similar charges against a judge or court personnel despite
desistance
by complainant or withdrawal of complaint, the Court in a Resolution,[7]
dated October 25, 2000, docketed the case as a regular administrative
matter
and required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to
submit
the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.cralaw:red
In compliance, respondent
Judge filed his letter-manifestation[8]
dated November 28, 2000 praying for a favorable resolution.
Complainant
filed his Compliance[9]
dated December 13, 2000 manifesting his willingness to have the case
submitted
for resolution based on the pleadings.chanrobles virtual law library
Upon a show cause order[10]
of the Court dated September 8, 2003, respondent Sheriff filed on
November
20, 2003 his manifestation of willingness to submit the case for
resolution
on the basis of the pleadings filed.[11]
In its Evaluation Report,
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), applying Kaw vs.
Anunciacion,
Jr.,[12]
opines that respondent judge committed Gross Ignorance of the Law when
he issued the Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal
without
hearing and notice to complainant, since the purpose of Sections 4, 5,
and 6 of Rule 15 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure in requiring that the motion shall be in
writing
and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served upon the adverse
party
is to give the latter the opportunity to argue against the motion so
that
he could avail of a remedy. Thus, the OCA recommends to the Court
that respondent Judge be fined P5,000.00.cralaw:red
With respect to the
charge against respondent Sheriff, the OCA opines that a sheriff, in
the
exercise of ministerial functions, cannot be held liable for
implementing
the writ of execution issued by the court since there is no proof that
he oppressively disregarded procedural rules. The OCA adds that
the
allegation that “jewelries amounting to P450,000.00 and cash of
P200,000.00
were lost” is unsubstantiated since nary an iota of proof,
testimonial
or otherwise, was adduced to prove the same. Thus, the OCA
recommends
that the charge against respondent Sheriff be dismissed for
insufficiency
of evidence.chanrobles virtual law library
We do not agree with
to the OCA’s finding that respondent Judge is administratively liable
for
gross ignorance of law.cralaw:red
It is plain from the
complaint that the error attributable to respondent Judge pertains to
the
exercise of his adjudicative functions. Settled is the rule that
errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative
functions
cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should
instead
be assailed through judicial remedies. In the recent case of
Bello
III vs. Diaz,[13]
we reiterated that disciplinary proceedings against judges do not
complement,
supplement or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or
extraordinary;
an inquiry into their administrative liability arising from judicial
acts
may be made only after other available remedies have been
settled.
We extensively quoted therein the rationale for the rule as laid down
in
Flores vs. Abesamis,[14]
to wit:
As everyone
knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or
irregularities
being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction.
The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be
regarded
as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of
evidence,
or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or
legal
principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of
judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The
extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be
deemed
extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic
exercise
of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are, inter alia, the special civil
action
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a
petition
for change of venue, as the case may be.chanrobles virtual law library
Now, the
established
doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions
against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute
for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary.
Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the
entry
of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are
pre-requisites
for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges
concerned,
whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only
after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the
appellate
tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into
his
criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have
opened,
or closed.
Flores resorted to
administrative
prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for or
supplement to the specific modes of appeals or review provided by law
from
court judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges’ orders had
caused
him ‘undue injury.’ This is impermissible, as this Court has
already
more than once ruled. Law and logic decree that ‘administrative or
criminal
remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review
where
such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof’. Indeed,
since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from
external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation,
the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they
may
do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties
and
functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently
of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within
the
scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally,
prosecution of the judge can be had only if “there be a final
declaration
by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly
unjust
character of the challenged judgment or order, and ** also evidence of
malice or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part
of
the judge in rendering said judgment or order” or under the stringent
circumstances
set out in Article 32 of the Civil
Code.[15]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Complainant herein
utilized
the available judicial remedy of certiorari before the RTC of Baguio
City
(Branch 7) to seek a review of the questioned order of respondent
Judge.
Complainant has not shown that a final decision has already been
rendered
by the RTC on the alleged impropriety of the order of execution to
warrant
this administrative recourse. Therefore, a decision on the
propriety
of the order of respondent Judge in this administrative proceeding
would
be premature. It has been said that a complainant who resorts to
administrative
disciplinary action, even before the judicial remedies are settled, in
effect, abuses court processes.[16]
With regard to the charges
against respondent Sheriff, we find that his act of immediately
implementing
the writ of execution does not constitute “partiality, evident bad
faith
or gross inexcusable negligence” nor is it an act of collusion
with
Peliz Loy. He acted within the bounds of his duty. It is
elementary
that a sheriff’s duty in the execution of the writ is purely
ministerial;
he is to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter.[17]
He has no discretion whether to execute the judgment or not.[18]
When a writ is placed in the hands of the sheriff, it is his duty, in
the
absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable
celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its mandate.[19]chanrobles virtual law library
Complainant alleged
that he lost jewelry and cash during the enforcement of the writ but
the
same remains unsubstantiated. Needless to stress, in
administrative
proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in the Complaint.[20]
In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the
presumption
that a sheriff has regularly performed his official duty.[21]
We agree with the observation of the OCA that “[complainant’s]
desistance
only negates the allegations that he had lost personal belongings and
cash
money. If he felt really aggrieved, he should have pursued his
case
against the sheriff.”
WHEREFORE, the present
Administrative Complaint against Judge Amado S. Caguioa of the
Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Baguio City (Branch 3) is DISMISSED for being
premature;
and, the administrative complaint against Sheriff Bienvenido C.
Aragones
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman), Quisumbing,
Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
The Affidavit-Complaint was initially filed with the Office of the
Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. The latter referred the affidavit-complaint
to the Office of the Court Administrator, Rollo, p. 1.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 2-6.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Id., pp. 21-25.
[4]
Id., p. 25.
[5]
Ibid.
[6]
Id., p. 47.
[7]
Id., p. 57.
[8]
Id., p. 59.
[9]
Id., p. 70.
[10]
Id., p. 86.
[11]
Id., p. 88.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
242 SCRA 1 (1995).chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
AM-MTJ-00-1311, October 3, 2003.
[14]
275 SCRA 302 (1997).chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Id. at pp. 316-317 (1997).
[16]
Caguioa vs. Laviña, 345 SCRA 49, 57 (2000).chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
Wenceslao vs. Madrazo, 247 SCRA 696, 704 (1995); Eduarte vs. Ramos, 238
SCRA 36, 40 (1994).
[18]
Aristorenas vs. Molina, 246 SCRA 134, 137 (1995); Evangelista vs.
Penserga,
242 SCRA 702, 709 (1005).
[19]
Francisco vs. Cruz, 340 SCRA 76, 85 (2000); Mamanteo vs. Magumun, 311
SCRA
259, 265 (1999).
[20]
Sinnott vs. Barte, 372 SCRA 282, 292 (2001); Lorena vs. Encomienda, 302
SCRA 632, 641 (1999).chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Onquit vs. Binamira-Parcia, 297 SCRA 354, 364 (1998); Navale vs. Court
of Appeals, 253 SCRA 705, 710 (1996). |