EN BANC
PERLITA
AVANCENA,
Complainant,
A.
M.
No. MTJ-01-1383
March 5, 2003
-versus-
JUDGE
RICARDO P.
LIWANAG,MUNICIPAL
TRIAL
COURT, SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN,
Respondent.
D
E C I S I
O N
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn Complaint dated
August 23, 1999, Perlita Avancena charged Judge Ricardo P. Liwanag of
the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan with
violation
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act,[1]
in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 7258-97 and 7259-97 being heard
by respondent.
Complainant alleged
that: she is the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 7258-97 and 7259-97 for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; on May 5, 1999, her counsel filed
a "Motion to Postpone Promulgation and to Re-open Trial to Allow
Accused
to Present Further Evidence;" following the opposition filed by the
prosecution
and her reply thereto, respondent denied the motion on the ground that
she was ably represented by counsel during the trial of the case; prior
to the dismissal of her motion, respondent summoned her to his chamber
where he told her that she will be convicted on May 7, 1999 unless she
pays him the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00); respondent
assured
her that he will take care of the fiscal and the private complainant;
she
refused to pay the amount since her unpaid balance was only One Hundred
Forty Thousand Pesos (P140,000.00) and so, there is no reason for her
to
pay the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) demanded; through a court
personnel,
respondent summoned her again and told her to raise only Five Hundred
Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) if she could not afford the One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00)
and the cases will be archived; prior to the hearing on July 2, 1999,
respondent
sent Raymunda Flores, a close friend of the judge and offended party in
the criminal case, to her (complainant's) house; Flores told her that
she
was tasked by the respondent to bring her to his chamber but she
refused;
a certain Cora Española, Court Interpreter of the MTC, told her
through the telephone that respondent would be waiting for her until
4:30
in the afternoon; when she called the respondent, the latter told her
that
if she did not give the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00),
he would continue with the promulgation on July 12, 1999 and would not
allow her to file any motion for bail unless she pays a fine of Four
Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his Comment dated
October 7, 1999, respondent claimed that: the presentation of the
original
copies of the check which was the subject of the earlier "Motion to
Postpone
Promulgation and to Reopen Trial to Allow Accused to Present Further
Evidence"
filed after the presentation and formal offer of evidence by the
defense,
was deemed by the court as a mere dilatory move; it was not necessary
because
the defense had previous opportunities to compare the originals with
the
xerox copies which were marked when the prosecution presented its
evidence;
the claim of the complainant that he demanded One Million Pesos
(P1,000.000.00)
from her is a lie and a fabrication; he could not offer to take care of
the fiscal or public prosecutor because the case had already reached
the
stage when the evidence of both parties have long been offered and
could
no longer be altered or recalled, much less withdrawn; it is
unthinkable
that he would demand such staggering amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00)
through a court personnel because availing of such a conduct would be
the
height of irresponsibility; his alleged close friendship with Raymunda
Flores is not true; he could not have conspired with his court
interpreter
to call the accused-complainant because that would have generated
suspicion
as the case had long been set for promulgation; the allegation that he
had warned her that after promulgation and in the event of conviction,
she would immediately be imprisoned without bail unless she paid a fine
of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) is false because the
accused
was assisted by a competent counsel and therefore knows that there is a
period of appeal and as long as the decision had not become final and
executory,
the accused is allowed to temporarily enjoy his or her freedom.[2]
In a Resolution dated
November 26, 2001, the case was re-docketed as Administrative Matter
No.
MTJ-01-1383 and referred to Executive Judge Oscar C. Herrera, Jr. of
the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Malolos, Bulacan for investigation, report
and
recommendation.[3]
Judge Herrera conducted
lengthy hearings on the case. Complainant Perlita Avancena testified in
support of her complaint while respondent testified on his defense.
Thereafter,
the administrative case was deemed submitted for decision.cralaw:red
Upon motion of complainant
to re-open trial and to allow complainant to present rebuttal evidence,[4]
Judge Herrera re-opened the hearing.[5]
Joselito Guillen of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
testified
on the entrapment operation conducted on respondent on the basis of a
complaint
of alleged extortion by herein complainant. Atty. Salvador C. Quimpo,
counsel
of complainant in the criminal cases before the respondent,
corroborated
the testimony of complainant on the occasion when respondent told them
"ayusin na lang ang kasong ito" and showed to him a draft decision
convicting
complainant in the two criminal cases.cralaw:red
Respondent testified
on sur-rebuttal denouncing the allegations of the complainant's
additional
witnesses as fabricated lies. Thereafter, the parties agreed to
terminate
the presentation of evidence.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his Report, dated
June 15, 2002, Judge Herrera gave more weight to the testimonies of
complainant
and her witnesses and concluded that the charges against respondent are
true.cralaw:red
The following are the
findings of fact and conclusions of Judge Herrera, quoted verbatim:
"The undersigned closely
observed the conduct and demeanor of the complainant during the
investigation.
She was forthright and testified in a spontaneous manner. Her
declarations
were clear, convincing and consistent with the averments in her
verified
complaint dated August 23, 1999 (Exh. ‘A') filed with the Supreme
Court.
She claimed that the very first time she was summoned to the chamber of
respondent judge prior to "the initial date set for promulgation
of judgment, she was shown by respondent judge himself with a draft of
the decision convicting her in the two (2) criminal cases in question.
At one point, complainant nearly shed tears as she narrated that she
was
practically harassed and coerced by respondent judge into giving in to
his demand, and that she was affected emotionally and psychologically
by
the intimidations of the respondent. Nothing in her demeanor indicated
that she was fabricating a lie against respondent judge.cralaw:red
"The declarations of
complainant find support in the testimonies of NBI Agent Joselito
Guillen
and Atty. Salvador Quimpo.cralaw:red
"NBI Agent Guillen testified
that he prepared the marked money for an entrapment operation against
respondent
judge because of the complaint for extortion lodged by complainant. The
operation was "actually carried out but it was unsuccessful because the
judge had some visitors in his house when the pay-off was to be made by
the complainant. The fact that a complaint for extortion was lodged
against
respondent judge and an actual entrapment operation was laid and
carried
out, albeit unsuccessful, lends credence to the charge made by
complainant
against respondent judge. There was no showing whatsoever that he was
actuated
by any improper motive in testifying against respondent judge.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Atty. Quimpo, on the
other hand, insisted that he was with complainant when summoned at one
instance by the respondent in his chamber. He himself was shown by
respondent
judge with a draft of the decision saying ‘ayusin na lang ang kasong
ito'.
Although it may be said that he is biased against respondent judge for
the partially unfavorable decision rendered by the latter against Ms.
Avancena,
there is also no showing that he was actuated by any improper motive in
testifying against the judge. A member of the bar in good standing,
there
was similarly nothing in his demeanor indicating that he was
fabricating
a lie against respondent judge.cralaw:red
"Upon the other hand,
the denial of respondent judge and his claim that he is being harassed
by complainant do not appear to be credible. His denial cannot prevail
over the clear, straightforward and positive assertions of complainant.
Respondent judge's contention that he could not have threatened to
convict
complainant in the two (2) criminal cases because his decision
convicted
her only in one case and acquitted her in the other, is specious and
unacceptable.cralaw:red
"By respondent judge's
own admission, the decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 7258-97 and 7259-98
was originally set for promulgation on May 7, 1999 but was eventually
promulgated
only on August 27, 1999, or almost four (4) months after the original
schedule.
While he attributes this to dilatory motions filed by complainant and
counsel
all of which he denied, the fact of the matter is that he could have
proceeded
with the promulgation on the original date set, unless he himself had
wanted
it to be delayed in anticipation of complainant's heeding his demand
for
money. Also, the period of almost four (4) months was enough time to
make
changes in the text of the decision. In the light of the accusation
against
him now, it is self-serving for respondent judge to claim that the text
of the decision he was supposed to promulgate on May 7, 1999 is exactly
the same as that which was actually promulgated on August 27, 1999."[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, Judge Herrera
did not recommend a specific penalty to be meted out to respondent.cralaw:red
In its Memorandum dated
November 12, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) adopted
the findings of the Investigating Judge that respondent be found guilty
of violation of R.A. 3019 and recommended to the Court that respondent
be fined in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).cralaw:red
In administrative proceedings,
the quantum of proof required to establish a respondent's malfeasance
is
not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence,[8]
i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept
as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.[9]
Faced with the conflicting versions of complainant and respondent, the
Court gives more weight to the allegations and testimony of the
complainant
and her witnesses who testified clearly and consistently before the
Investigating
Judge.cralaw:red
Complainant remained
steadfast throughout her testimony that respondent demanded from her a
number of times prior to the promulgation of the decision the amount of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) which was later reduced to Five
Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). She was courageous enough to move for
respondent's
inhibition in the criminal cases being heard by him because of this,
but
the same proved futile.[10]
NBI Agent Joselito Guillen
testified that the NBI conducted an entrapment operation on respondent,
albeit the same was unsuccessful. Nonetheless, his testimony bolsters
complainant's
allegation of the extortion attempts of the respondent in exchange for
a decision of acquittal is not a fabrication or an absurd concoction of
complainant or her lawyer in retaliation for a verdict of conviction in
the criminal cases.cralaw:red
Furthermore, the fact
that respondent acquitted complainant in one of the criminal cases
against
her is not a valid defense to prove that he did not demand money from
complainant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court finds noteworthy
the period of almost four (4) months which elapsed from May 7, 1999,
the
date originally set for promulgation of the decision in Criminal Cases
Nos. 7258-97 and 7259-97, and August 27, 1999, the date it was actually
promulgated. It indicates a deliberate effort on the part of the
respondent
to delay the promulgation of the decision in order to give complainant
more time to raise the money demanded by him. Notably, respondent
failed
to satisfactorily explain the delay in the promulgation of the decision
in complainant's cases.cralaw:red
The Court agrees with
the observation of the Investigating Judge that the period of almost
four
(4) months was enough time to make changes in the text of the decision,
and therefore, "it is self-serving for respondent judge to claim that
the
text of the decision he was supposed to promulgate on May 7, 1999 is
exactly
the same as that which was actually promulgated on August 27, 1999."
In addition, verification
with the OCA discloses that aside from the instant complaint,
respondent
judge has other pending administrative complaints filed against him. In
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1418, respondent judge stands charged with Grave
Misconduct,
Conduct Unbecoming of a Member of the Judiciary and Grave Abuse of
Authority,
while in A.M. No. MTJ-02-1460 he stands indicted for Graft and
Corruption,
Manifest Bias and Partiality. Respondent is presently under preventive
suspension per Resolution dated July 17, 2002 in A.M. No. MTJ-02-1440
pending
resolution of the judicial audit and physical inventory of the cases of
MTC of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. Needless to state, these
circumstances
only further erode the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary
for
it is the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of
impropriety
to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent
times
has been the object of criticism and controversy.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Taking into account
the established facts of this case and the above circumstances, the
Court
believes that the imposition of fine recommended by the OCA is not
commensurate
to the gravity of respondent's malfeasance.cralaw:red
A judge should always
be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner
that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty.[12]
Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue; it is a necessity.[13]
In this case, it is not only improper for a judge to meet privately
with
the accused without the presence of the complainant[14]
but the conduct of respondent shows that his decisions are influenced
by
monetary considerations. His act alone of demanding money from a
party-litigant
in exchange for a favorable verdict constitutes serious misconduct in
office.
It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct in office, which
erodes
the respect for law and the courts.[15]
The fact that the complainant was not able to give him the money
demanded
does not make the offense of the respondent nor the penalty therefor,
any
lighter.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Under Section 3 of Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, violations of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practices
Law (R.A. No. 3019) are considered serious charges. Section 10 of the
same
Rule provides the following sanctions that may be imposed for a serious
charge: (a) dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits,
except
accrued leaves, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office including a government-owned or controlled
corporation;
(b) suspension for three (3) to six (6) months without salary and
benefits;
or (c) a fine of not less than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but
not
more than (P40,000.00).cralaw:red
Respondent tainted the
image of the Judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to
keep
it at all times unsullied and worthy of the people's trust.[16]
Violation of R.A. 3019 affects the moral fiber and personal integrity
of
respondent. He becomes an ineffective tool in the administration of
justice
and the court over which he is called to preside will be a mockery, one
devoid of respect. There is no place in the judiciary for those who
cannot
meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.[17]
Respondent does not deserve to remain in the Judiciary, where integrity
is an indispensable credential, and should accordingly be removed from
the service.cralaw:red
The Court once again
reminds all those who don judicial robes that no position exacts a
greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a
seat
in the judiciary.[18]
While a judge should possess proficiency in law in order that he can
competently
construe and enforce the law, it is equally important that he must at
all
times maintain and preserve the trust and faith of parties litigants in
court.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, Judge Ricardo
P. Liwanag is DISMISSED from service with prejudice to re-employment in
any government agency and government-owned or controlled corporation
and
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.cralaw:red
Further, pursuant to
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which took effect on October 1, 2002, respondent
is
required to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should
not
also be disbarred from the practice of law for conduct unbecoming of a
member of the bar.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This decision shall
take effect immediately.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo,
Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago,
and
Corona, JJ., on leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-6.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 29-34.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 38-39.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Rollo, p. 74-75.
[5]
Rollo, p. 78.
[6]
Rollo, p. 83.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 248-260.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Naval vs. Panday, 321 SCRA 290, 301-302 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Cynthia Resngit-Marquez, et al. vs. Judge Llamas, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1708,
July 23, 2002.
[10]
Annexes "G" and "H" of the Complaint, Rollo, pp. 18-26.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Dela Cruz vs. Bersamira, 336 SCRA 353, 365 (2000); Antonio Yu-Asensi
vs.
Judge Francisco D. Villanueva, 322 SCRA 255, 269-270 (2000).
[12]
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Barron, 297 SCRA 376, 392 (1998);
Yuson vs. Noel, 227 SCRA 1, 7 (1993).
[13]
Capuno vs. Jaramillo, Jr., 234 SCRA 212, 232 (1994).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Dacera, Jr. vs. Dizon, Jr., 337 SCRA 144, 149 (2000); Dela Cruz, vs.
Bersamira,
336 SCRA 353, 363 (2000); Gallo vs. Cordero, 245 SCRA 219, 225 (1995).
[15]
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Gaticales, 208 SCRA 508, 515
(1992);
Haw Tay vs. Singayao, 154 SCRA 107, 111-112 (1987).
[16]
Garcia vs. De la Peña, 229 SCRA 766, 775 (1994).
[17]
Supra, Note 14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Cabulisan vs. Pagalilauan, 297 SCRA 593, 599-560 (1998). |