FIRST DIVISION
NENA D. YPIL,
Complainant,
A. M.
No.
MTJ-02-1457
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1070-MTJ)
August 11, 2004 - versus -
JUDGE PERLA C. VILO,
MCTC-BOGO, CEBU,
Respondent.
R E S O L U
T I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Eight-year-old Mariles
Ypil was allegedly raped by Edilberto Bacaldo at around 8:00 a.m. of
March
9, 2000. A complaint for rape against Bacaldo was filed on
September
4, 2000 at the Bogo-San Remigio Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
The
preliminary investigation was scheduled for October 26, 2000.
However,
on October 2, 2000, Acting Judge Perla Vilo issued a warrant of arrest
for Bacaldo with bail fixed at P200,000. Bacaldo was able
to
post bail and could no longer be located at present.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is in relation to
the grant of bail that Nena Ypil, mother of Mariles Ypil, wrote to the
Supreme Court on May 24, 2001 to complain against Judge Vilo for
allegedly
failing to follow the procedural requirements in granting bail.cralaw:red
Respondent avers that
bail may be granted even in instances where the crime charged is
punishable
by reclusion perpetua as long as the evidence of guilt is not
strong.
Respondent explains that in the case complained of, the accused was
able
to put up strong defenses, hence, she allowed the bail to be set at
P200,000.
She maintains that her finding on the apparent strength of the
accused’s
defense was confirmed by both the Provincial Prosecutor and Acting
Presiding
Judge Jesus dela Peña. The Provincial Prosecutor
recommended
the dismissal of the case for lack of prima facie evidence and Judge
dela
Peña ordered the dismissal of the case on the ground of
insufficiency
of evidence.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Though respondent is
correct in her comment that bail may be granted at the discretion of
the
judge as long as the evidence of guilt to a capital offense is not
strong,
we agree with complainant that respondent judge lapsed into procedural
error in granting bail to the accused.cralaw:red
First, it must be stressed
that the discretion of the judge to grant bail is not absolute nor
without
limitations. The discretion must be sound, and exercised within
reasonable
bounds. Admission to bail as a matter of discretion
presupposes
the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the
applicable
legal principles.[1]
This discretion may be rightly exercised only after the evidence is
submitted
to the court at the hearing and properly weighed. Since evidence
cannot be properly weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion
requires
that the evidence be submitted to the court with the accused having the
right to cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in
rebuttal.[2]
Second, the trial court
cannot motu proprio grant bail. The records show that the
respondent
issued the warrant of arrest, wherein she granted bail to the accused,
even before she conducted the searching questions and answers.
There
is no showing that the accused filed a petition for bail and that a
hearing
for the allowance of bail was held.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Although the Rules of
Court authorize the investigating judge to determine the amount of
bail,
such authority does not include the outright granting of bail without a
preliminary hearing on the matter, more so in a case where the crime
charged
is statutory rape, a capital offense punishable by reclusion perpetua.[3]
Under Section 7, Rule
114 of the 1985 Rules of Court, the applicable rule in the instant
case,
no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall
be admitted bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
When
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of
discretion.
When bail is discretionary, a hearing is mandatory to determine whether
the evidence of guilt is strong before bail can be granted to the
accused.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Though the determination
of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of
judicial
discretion, this discretion lies NOT in the determination of whether or
not a hearing should be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of
the weight of the prosecution’s evidence of guilt against the accused.[5]
Even in cases where
there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.
This
hearing on the petition for bail is separate and distinct from the
initial
hearing to determine probable cause. In the determination of
probable
cause, the court merely ascertains whether or not there is sufficient
ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has indeed been
committed
and that respondents are probably guilty of such crime.[6]
Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong still has to be
established.
The prosecution must be given a chance to prove the strength or
weakness
of its evidence; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs.[7]
Third, a bail application
does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty,
but
likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of
the community from dangerous elements. These two rights must be
balanced
by a magistrate in the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for
hearing
to guide his exercise of discretion.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To grant an application
for bail and fix the amount thereof without a hearing duly called for
the
purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong
constitutes
gross ignorance or incompetence whose grossness cannot be excused by a
claim of good faith or excusable negligence. This is in violation
of Rule 3.01[9]
of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Furthermore, the Court has held
that the failure of the judge to conduct the hearing required prior to
the grant of bail in capital offenses is inexcusable and reflects gross
ignorance of the law and a cavalier disregard of its requirement.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The act of Judge Vilo
in fixing the bail without hearing took place on October 2, 2000 or
before
the effectivity, on October 1, 2001, of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which
classified
gross ignorance of law as a serious charge and penalized the offense
with
a fine of not less than P20,000 but not more than P40,000. The
amendment
on the amount of fine cannot be applied retroactively.[11]
In line with applicable jurisprudence,[12]
the fine to be imposed ought to be P10,000 only.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, respondent
Judge Perla Vilo, acting judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Bogo-San Remigio, is found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and is
hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), with a
warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more
severely.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman),
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Bantuas v. Pangadapun, RTJ-98-1407, 20 July 1998, 292 SCRA 622, 627
citing
People v. Nano, G.R. No. 94639, 13 January 1992, 205 SCRA 155, 161.
[2]
Basco v. Rapatalo, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335, 5 March 1997, 269 SCRA 220,
225.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
See Directo v. Bautista, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1205, 29 November 2000, 346
SCRA
223, 227.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Cortes v. Agcaoili, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1414, 20 August 1998, 294 SCRA 423,
459.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Directo v. Bautista, supra at 228.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Id. citing People v. Dacudao, G.R. No. 81389, 21 February 1989, 170
SCRA
489, 494.
[7]
Id. citing People v. Sola, Nos. L-56158-64, 17 March 1981, 103 SCRA
393,
400.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1488, 20 June 2000, 334 SCRA
1, 17.
[9]
Rule 3.01 – A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional
competence.
[10]
Bantuas v. Pangadapun, supra at 629.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Vileña v. Mapaye, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1424, 24 April 2002, 381 SCRA
489, 493.
[12]
Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1488, 20 June 2000; Go et.
al.
v. Bongolan and Benesa, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1464, 26 July 1999; Almeron v.
Sardido, A.M. No. MTJ-97-1142, 6 November 1997. |