FIRST DIVISION
ATTYS. VILMA
HILDA
D. VILLANUEVA-FABELLA
AND WILMAR T. ARUGAY,
Complainants,
A.M.
No.
MTJ-04-1518
January 15, 2004
-versus-
JUDGE RALPH S. LEE AND SHERIFF
JUSTINIANO
C. DE LA CRUZ JR.,BOTH OF THE
METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, QUEZON CITY,
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
PANGANIBAN,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Once more, we remind members
of the judicial branch – judges and judicial personnel alike -- to be
conscientious,
diligent and thorough in the performance of their functions. At all
times
they must observe the high standards of public service required of
them.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Case and the
Facts
In an administrative
Complaint[1]
dated November 12, 2002, Attys. Vilma Hilda D. Villanueva-Fabella and
Wilmar
T. Arugay charged Judge Ralph S. Lee of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC)
of Quezon City (Branch 38) with manifest partiality, incompetence and
gross
ignorance of the law; and Sheriff Justiniano C. de la Cruz Jr. of the
same
MeTC, with unjust, oppressive, irregular and excessive enforcement of a
writ of attachment. The factual antecedents of the matters are
summarized
by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) as follows:
"The complainants are
counsels for the defendants in Civil Case No. [38]-28457 entitled ‘Star
Paper Corporation vs. Society of St. Paul and Fr. Leonardo Eleazar’ for
Sum of Money with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment. They narrated that
on 19 June 2002, their clients were served a copy of the complaint and
a Writ of Attachment by Sheriff Dela Cruz based on the plaintiff’s
allegation
that the defendants contracted a debt in bad faith with no intention of
paying the same.cralaw:red
"On the aforementioned
day, a printing machine was levied and delivered to the plaintiff’s
warehouse,
although there was an offer by the defendants to pay right there and
then
P223,457.75, the amount fixed in the order of attachment, but the
plaintiff
denied the defendants’ plea not to attach the machine, saying that [it]
had already set [its] mind on attaching the same.cralaw:red
"Atty. Fabella, together
with three (3) priests, asked the sheriff to levy on a less expensive
machine
but to no avail. She then told the sheriff that he [would]
unnecessarily
levy on the machinery because a cash deposit to discharge the
attachment
could be filed that same afternoon but he just dismissed the same,
saying
that it takes time before the court could approve the counterbond.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"The complainants claim[ed]
that Sheriff Dela Cruz violated x x x Rule 57, Section 7, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure which provide[d] that in the attachment of personal
property
capable of manual delivery, [the property should] be taken and safely
kept
in the sheriff’s custody. The machinery, according to complainants,
[was]
brought to [the] plaintiff’s warehouse in San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon
City. The foregoing show[ed] that the implementation of the writ of
attachment
was marred by excessiveness, irregularity and oppressiveness.cralaw:red
x x
x
x x x x x x
"On 3 July 2002, Judge
Lee granted the defendants’ Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment filed
19 June 2002. Thereafter, on 9 July 2002, an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Withdraw Cash Deposit was filed, without notice to the defendants and
despite
failure of the plaintiff to set such litigious motion for hearing and
contrary
to existing laws and jurisprudence. Judge Lee granted the same in his
Order
of 17 July 2002. Defendants only learned of the withdrawal when they
received
a copy of the said Order.cralaw:red
"A Motion for reconsideration
of the 17 July 2002 Order was filed on 30 August 2002. Defendants
stressed
that the Motion to Withdraw Cash Deposit has no basis, shows no
urgency,
lacks notice and hearing, and is already a prejudgment of the case even
before the pre-trial stage which is tantamount to the taking of
property
without due process of law.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"For failure of the
plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial conference, the court granted the
motion to declare the plaintiff as non-suited as well as the prayer to
allow the ex parte presentation of the defense’s evidence on its
counterclaim.cralaw:red
"The plaintiff then
filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration of the Order declaring it
as
non-suited[,] which was set for hearing in the morning of 24 October
2002,
the same day the aforementioned ex parte presentation of evidence was
supposed
to commence.cralaw:red
"Judge Lee was not around
in the morning so the hearing on the motion did not materialize with
the
ex-parte presentation of evidence in the afternoon because the Clerk of
Court refused to proceed for the reason that a motion for
reconsideration
had been filed the day before. The Clerk of Court then conferred with
the
respondent Judge in his chambers who produced a handwritten note
granting
the said motion. She explained to complainant Atty. Arugay that she did
not notice that Judge Lee had already issued the Order granting such
motion[;]
thus, the ex parte presentation of evidence could not proceed.cralaw:red
"According to complainants,
the Clerk of Court could not explain the irregularity in the granting
of
the plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and the fact that the same
was
swiftly resolved[,] while the defendants’ similar motion [had] not been
resolved for more than two (2) months already."[2]
In his Comment[3]
dated January 9, 2003, respondent judge claimed that the Complaint was
fatally defective, because complainants did not have legal personality
to file it; neither did they present affidavits, verified statements or
any authority to represent their clients. Further, the Complaint did
not
contain a certification of non-forum shopping, but instead had a
handwritten
verification not sworn to or subscribed before an administering officer.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
He likewise assailed
complainants’ allegations as hearsay. As to what had allegedly
transpired
during the implementation of the subject Writ of Attachment, he adopted
the averments in respondent sheriff’s Comment[4]
alleging the presumption of regularity in the discharge of official
functions.cralaw:red
Respondent judge admitted
that he had committed a procedural error when he released the
counter-bond[5]
to the plaintiff in the said civil case. However, when the defendants
therein,
through their Motion for Reconsideration, called his attention to the
mistake,
he immediately ordered[6]
the return[7]
of the counter-bond to the custody of the Office of the Clerk of Court.
He cited jurisprudence to defend his acts and asserted his good faith
and
lack of malice. Moreover, he averred that he had not delayed the
resolution
of the Motion. Finally, he urged the Court to dismiss the instant
Complaint
outright for being instituted without basis and merely to harass him.cralaw:red
In his Comment,[8]
respondent sheriff claimed that after receiving the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment, he sought its implementation through the assistance of the
clerk of court of the MTC-Makati, Sheriff Ernesto Adan, and the Makati
police. He allowed the parties in the civil case to negotiate for a
settlement,
but when the negotiations bogged down, he attached a printing machine
that
was not in use at the time.cralaw:red
He denied that there
was abuse in the levy, claiming that the machine was an old 1970 model.
Moreover, he said that, contrary to complainants’ allegation that the
machine
was valuable, no receipt to prove its true value was ever shown.cralaw:red
Respondent sheriff added
that it was in his own belief and best judgment to temporarily place
the
delicate printing machine in the warehouse of the plaintiff for
safekeeping.
The machine was eventually returned to the defendants by virtue of the
Order discharging the Writ. In fact, one of the complainants personally
acknowledged receipt of the machine.cralaw:red
As to the allegation
that he was arrogant, respondent sheriff claimed that he waited for
more
than three hours before exercising his ministerial function. Lastly, he
adopted the averments in the Comment of respondent judge on other
events
that had transpired during the pendency of the civil case, the subject
of the instant Complaint.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Evaluation and
Recommendation of the OCA
The OCA opined that
the provisions cited by complainants -- those in Sections 12 and 18 of
Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[9]
-- did not require the adverse party to be first notified and then
heard
before an attachment bond may be released. Considering that the bond
posted
by the attaching creditor would answer for the damages and costs the
court
may award the adverse party by reason of the attachment, the better
practice
was for the latter to be notified and heard before the motion to
discharge
attachment could be resolved.cralaw:red
According to the OCA,
the error was corrected when respondent judge, on Motion for
Reconsideration,
reversed himself before the adverse party incurred any damage. The OCA
emphasized that before the full disciplinary powers of this Court could
befall a judge, the erroneous act should have been committed with
fraud,
dishonesty, corruption, malice or bad faith. It opined that such fact
had
not been clearly and convincingly shown in the instant case.[10]
The OCA found that respondent
sheriff had erred when he deposited the plaintiff’s levied property in
the warehouse and thereby lost actual or constructive possession
thereof.
The OCA said that this legal violation could not be justified by the
weight
and the condition of the machine, which could have been deposited in a
rented private warehouse where it could have been guarded under his
strict
supervision.cralaw:red
Consequently, the OCA
recommended that respondent judge "be REMINDED to be more circumspect
in
the performance of his duties and to keep abreast with the law and
jurisprudence";
and that respondent sheriff "be SUSPENDED for one (1) month without pay
for violation of Rule 57, Section 7(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure
with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act(s) shall be
dealt with more severely in the future."[11]
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings
and the recommendation of the OCA.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Administrative
Liability
With respect to the
charges against respondent judge, we find that his grant of the
withdrawal
of the cash deposit -- an Order he later reversed by ruling that the
deposit
be returned to the clerk of court -- was a mere error of judgment, not
an act revealing gross ignorance of the law or procedure.cralaw:red
Attachment is a juridical
institution intended to secure the outcome of a trial -- specifically,
the satisfaction of a pecuniary obligation.[12]
Such order is enforced through a writ that may be issued at the
commencement
of an action,[13]
commanding the sheriff to attach property, rights, credits or effects
of
a defendant to satisfy the plaintiff’s demand.[14]
Hence, the property of a defendant, when taken, is put in custodia
legis.[15]
In order to prevent
the sheriff from levying an attachment on property, the defendant (also
called the adverse party) may make a deposit or give a counter-bond in
an amount equal to that fixed in the order of attachment. Such deposit
or counter-bound is intended to secure the payment of any judgment that
the plaintiff (also called the attaching party or the applicant to the
writ) may recover in the action.[16]
After a writ has been enforced, however, the adverse party may still
move
for the discharge of the attachment, wholly or in part, by also making
a deposit or giving a counter-bond to secure the payment of any judgment[17]
the attaching party may recover in the action.[18]
The property attached shall then be released and delivered to the
adverse
party; and the money deposited shall be applied under the direction of
the court to the satisfaction of any judgment that may be rendered in
favor
of the prevailing party.[19]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the instant case,
respondent judge had ordered[20]
the withdrawal of the cash deposit of the defendant and released it in
favor of the plaintiff, even before judgment was rendered. This action
was clearly in violation of the Rules mandating that after the
discharge
of an attachment, the money deposited shall stand in place of the
property
released.[21]
However, the inadvertence[22]
of respondent judge was not gross enough to merit sanction.cralaw:red
First, he rectified
himself within the period given for deciding motions. Section 15(1) of
Article VIII of the Constitution mandates all trial courts to resolve
all
matters filed within three months from date of submission.[23]
The Motion for Reconsideration[24]
of the July 17, 2002 Order granting the withdrawal of the deposit was
filed
on August 30, 2002, and submitted for resolution on September 5, 2002,[25]
the date of hearing.[26]
The Order[27]
granting this Motion was then issued on November 4, 2002, well within
the
three-month period. The money was returned, and no prejudice was
suffered
by any of the parties.cralaw:red
Second, respondent judge
owned up to his mistake[28]
in his Comment. This is an admirable act. Under the Code of Judicial
Conduct,
judges should be the embodiment of competence[29]
and should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in
the
integrity of the judiciary.[30]
They must be faithful to the law.[31]
That respondent judge admitted his mistake shows his recognition of his
fallibility and his openness to punishment, the imposition of which
restores
public confidence in the judicial system. His July 17, 2002 Order was
merely
an honest mistake of judgment -- an innocent error in the exercise of
discretion
-- but not a display of gross incompetence or unfaithfulness to the law.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We have already ruled
that as long as the judgment remains unsatisfied, it would be erroneous
to order the cancellation of a bond filed for the discharge of a writ
of
attachment.[32]
In like manner, it would be erroneous to order the withdrawal of a cash
deposit before judgment is rendered. Be that as it may, "a [judge] may
not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order x x
x he renders."[33]
Otherwise, a judicial office would be untenable,[34]
for "no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
administration
of justice can be infallible."[35]
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order of
a judge must not only be erroneous; more important, it must be
motivated
by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive.[36]
Certainly, mere error of judgment is not a ground for disciplinary
proceedings.[37]
Complainants alleged
that respondent judge committed another violation of the Rules of Court
when he granted[38]
the plaintiff’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Cash Deposit.[39]
The Rules mandate that, except for motions that the court may act upon
without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written
motion
shall be set for hearing by the applicant.[40]
The notice of hearing shall be addressed to the defendants therein and
shall specify the time and date of the hearing, which must not be later
than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.[41]
The motion and notice shall be served at least three days before the
date
of hearing.[42]
Without proof of its service, the court cannot act upon it.[43]
Indeed, the plaintiff’s
Motion to withdraw the cash deposit lacked notice of hearing and proof
of service. Respondent judge should not have acted upon it. However,
because
he had erroneously thought that the rights of the defendants would not
be prejudiced thereby, he took action. His poor judgment obviously
resulted
in his issuance of the erroneous Order that granted the release of the
deposit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Similarly, the verified
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order declaring plaintiff as
non-suited
and allowing the ex-parte presentation of evidence by the defense
should
have been heard in open court, not granted in chamber. Respondent judge
must have thought that this Motion, which had been filed by the
plaintiff,
required immediate action; and so the former granted it by ordering --
through a handwritten note which we do not approve of -- the deferment
of the scheduled presentation.[44]
This Order should not have been issued, because the Motion had been
filed
only a day before the scheduled hearing.[45]
The rules on notice of hearing and proof of service should have been
observed
by both the plaintiff’s counsel and respondent judge. Unfortunately,
the
latter’s poor judgment likewise prevailed, but still fell short of
gross
ignorance of the law or procedure.cralaw:red
Specious is the argument
of respondent judge that complainants have no legal personality to file
the instant Administrative Complaint against him. His contention that
the
allegations contained therein are hearsay[46]
also deserves scant consideration. Rule 140 allows the institution of
disciplinary
proceedings against judges, not only upon a verified complaint --
supported
by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts
alleged
therein or by documents substantiating the allegations -- but even upon
an anonymous one.[47]
Complainants herein have the requisite personal knowledge and have, in
fact, executed a joint Complaint-Affidavit and substantiated their
allegations
with pertinent documents.cralaw:red
The verification[48]
in their Complaint, albeit handwritten after the jurat, is sufficient
in
form and substance.[49]
Such verification is a clear affirmation that they are prepared to
establish
the truth of the facts pleaded.[50]
In fact, the lack of it is "merely a formal defect that is neither
jurisdictional
nor fatal."[51]
This Court may order the correction of a pleading, "if the attending
circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in
order to serve the ends of justice."[52]
The jurat that preceded the verification simply evidences the fact that
the Affidavit was properly made and sworn to before the officer
certifying
it.[53]
Furthermore, a certification against forum shopping is not needed in
this
case; Rule 140 makes no such requirement.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We find that the charges
against respondent sheriff have bases. Verily, he blatantly violated
Section
7(b) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court when he deposited the machine in
the warehouse of the plaintiff. In enforcing a writ of attachment, a
sheriff
who takes personal property capable of manual delivery shall safely
keep
it in custody after issuing the corresponding receipt therefor.[54]
Respondent sheriff failed to do so.cralaw:red
To constitute a valid
levy of attachment, the officer levying it must have "actual possession
of the property attached."[55]
"He must put himself in [a] position to, and must assert and, in fact,
enforce a dominion over the property adverse to and exclusive of the
attachment
debtor."[56]
To this rule we add that the officer cannot even deliver the property
to
the attachment creditor, as the parties must await the judgment in the
action. The levied property must be in the "substantial presence and
possession"[57]
of the levying officer, who "cannot act as special deputy sheriff of
any
party litigant."[58]
The officer may put someone "in possession of the property for the
purpose
of guarding it," but the former cannot be "relieve[d] x x x from
liability
to the parties interested in said attachment."[59]
Sheriffs are officers
of the court[6]
who serve and execute writs addressed to them by the court, and who
prepare
and submit returns of their proceedings.[61]
They also keep custody of attached properties.[62]
As officers of the court, they must discharge their duties with "great
care and diligence."[63]
They have to "perform faithfully and accurately what is incumbent upon
[them]"[64]
and show at all times a "high degree of professionalism in the
performance
of [their] duties."[65]
The duty of sheriffs
to execute a writ issued by a court is purely ministerial,[66]
not discretionary.[67]
Clearly, they must keep the levied property safely in their custody,
not
in that of any of the parties. They exercise no discretion in this
regard,
for attachment is harsh, extraordinary and summary in nature -- a
"rigorous
remedy which exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance."[68]
Contrary to the claim of respondent sheriff, his unusual zeal and
precipitate
decision to give possession of the machine to the plaintiff effectively
destroys, the presumption of regularity in his performance of official
duties.[69]
"Any method of execution falling short of the requirement of the law
deserves
reproach and should not be countenanced."[70]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In implementing the
Writ, respondent sheriff cannot afford to err without adversely
affecting
the proper dispensation of justice.[71]
"Sheriffs play an important
role in the administration of justice. As agents of the law, high
standards
are expected of them. x x x His conduct, at all times, must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but must, and above all else, be
above suspicion."[72]
As a public officer
who is a repository of public trust, respondent sheriff has the
obligation
to perform the duties of his office "honestly, faithfully and to the
best
of his ability."[73]
He must be "circumspect and proper in his behavior."[74]
Reasonable skill and diligence he must use in the performance of
official
duties, especially when the rights of individuals may be jeopardized by
neglect.[75]
Sheriffs must always
"hold inviolate and invigorate the tenet that a public office is a
public
trust."[76]
As court personnel, their conduct must be beyond reproach and free from
any suspicion that may taint the judiciary.[77]
In view of their exalted position as keepers of public faith, court
personnel
are indeed saddled with a heavy burden of responsibility[78]
to the public. Hence, they must thoroughly avoid any impression of
impropriety,
misdeed or negligence in the performance of official duties.[79]
We have held thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"x x x [T]his Court
condemns and would never countenance such conduct, act or omission on
the
part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just
tend
to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary."[80]
Once again we emphasize
that "[a]t the grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriffs x x x are
indispensably in close contact with the litigants, hence, their conduct
should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the
court, for the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in
the
conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat,
from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel;[81]
hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in
the
court to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice."[82]
Dismissed for lack of basis, however, is the charge of excessive
enforcement
of a writ filed against respondent sheriff.cralaw:red
Applying Section 8 of
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, respondent judge is found wanting in
the
exercise of good discretion only. His errors of judgment fall short of
gross ignorance of the law or procedure, yet reflect poorly on his
esteemed
position as a public officer in a court of justice. Judges must be
conscientious,
studious and thorough,[83]
observing utmost diligence in the performance of their judicial
functions.[84]
They have to "exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules."[85]
Moreover, they must require court personnel to observe at all times
high
standards of public service and fidelity.[86]
Applying the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[87]
we find respondent sheriff guilty of simple neglect of duty for
violating
Section 7(b) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Simple neglect of duty
is
the "failure x x x to give proper attention to a task expected"[88]
of an employee, thus signifying a "disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness
or indifference."[89]
Classified as a less grave offense, it is punishable by a suspension of
one month and one day to six months. Considering that the failure of
respondent
sheriff to fulfill his duty seems to be his first infraction during his
stint in the judiciary, the Court considers the recommended sanction
appropriate.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the Court
reiterates its REMINDER[90]
to Judge Ralph S. Lee of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch
38) to evince due care in the exercise of his adjudicative functions.
On
the other hand, Sheriff Justiniano C. de la Cruz Jr. of the same branch
is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and is hereby SUSPENDED for
one
month and one day without pay, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or of a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-7.
[2]
OCA Report, pp. 1-4; rollo, pp. 101-104.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 49-57.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Dated January 9, 2003; rollo, pp. 96-98.
[5]
See OR No. 16169183 dated June 20, 2002; id., p. 20.
[6]
See Order dated November 4, 2002; id., p. 91.
[7]
See OR No. 17204808 dated December 19, 2002; id., p. 94.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 96-98.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
The OCA erroneously refers to these as the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
See OCA Report, p. 4; id., p. 104.
[10]
Id., pp. 5 & 105.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Id., pp. 5-6 & 105-106.
[12]
Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products Corp. v. Hon. Macaraig Jr., 359 Phil.
831, 855-856, December 2, 1998.
[13]
Also called preliminary attachment, its purpose is to seize the
debtor’s
property in advance of the final judgment and hold it to satisfy the
said
judgment. (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I [5th rev. ed.], p.
399.) Attachment secures a contingent lien on the property, until the
creditor
obtains a judgment and applies the property to its satisfaction.
(Francisco,
The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. IV-A [1971], p. 5.)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. III (1997), pp. 2-3.
[15]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
§5 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. See Feria and Noche, Civil
Procedure
Annotated, Vol. 2 (2001 ed.), p. 285.
[17]
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, supra, p. 46; citing Philippine
British Assurance Co., Inc. v. IAC, 150 SCRA 520, 527, May 29, 1987.
[18]
§12 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; Feria and Noche, Civil
Procedure
Annotated, supra, p. 302.
[19]
§18 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. On the presupposition that a
judgment has been rendered, the applicant who fails to recover by
execution
can proceed against the deposit. (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium,
supra,
p. 414.) This option presupposes a judgment rendered.
[20]
See Order dated July 17, 2002; rollo, p. 33.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
§12 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. See Moran, Comments on the
Rules
of Court; supra, p. 47.
The
deposit of cash or the filing of a counter-bond does not put the
property
attached out of the reach of the attaching party. The cash deposit or
counter-bond
stands in its place. Hence, its release does not in any way prejudice
his
rights. (Dizon v. Valdes, 131 Phil. 728, 731-732, April 25, 1968.)
[22]
See Order dated November 4, 2002; rollo, p. 91.
[23]
Spouses Morta v. Judge Bagagñan, AM No. MTJ-03-1513, November
12,
2003, p. 8.
[24]
Rollo, pp. 34-41.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
See Order dated September 5, 2002; rollo, p. 90.
[26]
See Notice of Hearing/Request for Submission; id., p. 41.
[27]
Rollo, p. 91.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Id., p. 53.
[29]
Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
[30]
Canon 2 of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
[31]
Canon 3 of Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
[32]
Anzures v. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., 92 Phil. 742, 743,
February
28, 1953.
[33]
Daracan v. Natividad, 341 SCRA 161, 175, September 27, 2000, per
Ynares-Santiago,
J.; citing Santos v. Judge Orlino, 357 Phil. 102, 109, September 25,
1998;
and Rodrigo v. Quijano, 79 SCRA 10, 12, September 9, 1977.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Santos v. Judge Orlino, supra.
[35]
Pilipinas-Bank v. Justice Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA 834, 846, October 18,
1990, per Gutierrez Jr., J.; citing Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation
v. Capistrano, 159 SCRA 47, 56, March 18, 1998, per curiam.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
Guerrero v. Villamor, 357 Phil. 90, 99, September 25, 1998.
[37]
Id., p. 100.
[38]
See Order dated July 17, 2002; rollo, p. 33.
[39]
Rollo, pp. 31-32. This Motion was filed on July 9, 2002.
[40]
Paragraph 1 of §4 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
[41]
§5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[42]
Unless the court, for good cause, sets the hearing on shorter notice.
(Paragraph
2 of §4 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.)
[43]
§6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
[44]
Rollo, p. 51.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[45]
The Motion was filed on October 23, 2002; the hearing was scheduled the
following day. See rollo, p. 51.
[46]
§36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
[47]
This complaint should be supported by public records of indubitable
integrity.
(§1 of AM No. 01-8-10-SC, September 11, 2001.) See also Cruz v.
Judge
Yaneza 363 Phil. 629, 649, March 9, 1999 and Macalintal v. Judge Teh,
345
Phil. 871, 875-876, October 16, 1997.
[48]
Complaint, p. 7; rollo, p. 7.
[49]
Paragraph 2 of §4 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
[50]
Harp v. State, 26 SW 714, 715, May 5, 1894. See Guevara, Legal Forms
Annotated
(15th rev. ed., 1991), p. 46.
[51]
Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan, 358 SCRA 240, 247, May 25, 2001, per Davide Jr.,
CJ.
[52]
Ibid. The Rules shall be liberally construed to secure a just, speedy
and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (§6 of
Rule
1 of the Rules of Court.)
[53]
Young v. Wooden, 265 SW 24, 24-25, October 3, 1924. See also
Tañada,
Modern Philippine Legal Forms, Vol. I (6th ed., 1996), p. 31; and
Peña,
Legal Forms for Conveyancing and Other Deeds (4th ed., 1994), p. 39.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[54]
§7(b) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
[55]
Walker v. McMicking, 14 Phil. 668, 673, December 23, 1909, per Johnson,
J.
[56]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[57]
Ibid.
[58]
Bilag-Rivera v. Flora, 315 Phil. 668, 680, July 6, 1995, per Padilla, J.
[59]
Feria and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, supra, p. 288; citing
Walker
v. McMicking, supra.
[60]
§D of Chapter VII, The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court,
Vol.
I.
[61]
§D of Chapter VI, id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[62]
§F of Chapter VI, id.
[63]
Vda. de Velayo v. Ramos, 374 SCRA 1, 6, January 17, 2002, per
Ynares-Santiago,
J.
[64]
Spouses Biglete v. Maputi Jr., 377 SCRA 1, 5, February 15, 2002, per
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
J.; citing Remollo v. Atty. Garcia, 357 Phil. 79, 86, September 25,
1998.
[65]
Spouses Morta v. Judge Bagagñan, AM No. MTJ-03-1513, November
12,
2003, p. 12, per Panganiban, J.
[66]
"When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his ministerial
duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it
in
accordance with its mandate." (Francisco v. Cruz, 340 SCRA 76, 85,
September
8, 2000, per Davide Jr., CJ.)
[67]
Remollo v. Atty. Garcia, supra. See Portes v. Deputy Prov. Sheriff
Tepace,
334 Phil. 839, January 30, 1997.
[68]
Lirio v. Ramos, 331 Phil. 378, 389, October 11, 1996, per Davide Jr.,
J.
(now CJ). See Gruenberg v. CA, 138 SCRA 471, 477-478, September 10,
1985,
per Gutierrez Jr.; citing Salas v. Adil, 90 SCRA 121, 125, May 14,
1979,
per Antonio, J.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[69]
Cunanan v. Flores, 377 Phil. 5, 11, November 24, 1999. See Bilag-Rivera
v. Flora, supra.
[70]
Spouses Biglete v. Maputi Jr., supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[71]
Magat v. Judge Pimentel, 346 SCRA 153, 159, November 28, 2000. See
Ignacio
v. Payumo, 344 SCRA 169, 172, October 24, 2000.
[72]
Llamado v. Ravelo, 345 Phil. 842, 853, October 16, 1997, per
Hermosisima
Jr., J.
[73]
Vda. de Velayo v. Ramos, supra; citing Spouses Pecson v. Sicat Jr., 358
Phil. 606, 616, October 19, 1998, per Romero, J.
[74]
Tiongco v. Molina, 416 Phil. 676, 683, September 4, 2001, per
Quisumbing,
J.; citing Evangelista v. Penserga, 312 Phil. 806, 815, March 27, 1995,
per Bidin, J.
[75]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[76]
Ventura v. Concepcion, 346 SCRA 14, 18, November 27, 2000, per curiam.
[77]
Abanil v. Ramos Jr., 346 SCRA 20, 24, November 27, 2000.
[78]
Llamado v. Ravelo, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[79]
Vda. de Velayo v. Ramos, supra.
[80]
Loyao Jr. v. Armecin, 337 SCRA 47, 52, August 1, 2000, per
Ynares-Santiago,
J.; citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Sheriff IV Cabe, 389
Phil.
685, 698-699, June 26, 2000, per De Leon Jr., J.; Mendoza v. Judge
Mabutas,
223 SCRA 411, 419, June 17, 1993, per curiam; and Sy v. Academia, 198
SCRA
705, 717, July 3, 1991, per curiam.
[81]
Remollo v. Atty. Garcia, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[82]
Canlas v. Balasbas, 337 SCRA 41, 46, August 1, 2000, per Panganiban,
J.;
citing Vda de. Abellera v. Dalisay, 335 Phil. 527, 530-531, February
12,
1997, per Melo, J.
[83]
Judge Paz v. Judge Tiong, 323 Phil. 430, 437, February 9, 1996.
[84]
Saylo v. Judge Rojo, 386 Phil. 446, 452, April 12, 2000.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[85]
Cortes v. Judge Agcaoili, 355 Phil. 848, 883, August 20, 1998, per
Panganiban,
J.
[86]
Canon 3 of Rule 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[87]
§52.B.1. of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in
the Civil Service, CSC Resolution No. 991936, August 31, 1999, amending
§23 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations
implementing Book V of EO 292 and other pertinent civil service laws,
CSC
Resolution No. 91-1631, December 27, 1991.
[88]
Atty. Dajao v. Lluch, 380 SCRA 104, 108, April 3, 2002, per
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
J.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[89]
Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa, 415 Phil. 713, 721, August 21,
2001, per Puno, J.
[90]
See the Court’s July 7, 2003 Resolution upholding the May 19, 2003 OCA
Report reminding respondent judge to be more circumspect in the
performance
of his duties and to keep himself abreast with the law and
jurisprudence.
The herein reiteration is included in this Decision to close the matter
in this Court’s records. |