EN BANC
ROMEO B.
ALMOJUELA,
JR.,
Complainant,
A.
M.
No. MTJ-04-1521
July 27, 2004
-versus-
JUDGE REVELINO M.
RINGOR AND AMALIA L.
DIRECTO,CLERK OF COURT,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT, BALAOAN, LA UNION,
Respondents.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
In a Sworn Complaint[1]
dated November 12, 2003, Romeo B. Almojuela, Jr. charged Judge Revelino
M. Ringor, Acting Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Balaoan, La
Union
with Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Dishonesty and
Violation
of Judicial Ethics, as well as his Clerk of Court, Amalia L. Directo,
with
Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty.
Complainant is one of
the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4941, 4942 and 4943, all pending
before
respondent Judge.[2]
He alleges that on November 12, 2002, the private offended party,
Belinda
Enriquez, executed a waiver[3]
exculpating him from the charges. Thus, on January 2, 2003,
complainant
filed an Omnibus Motion in Criminal Case No. 4941 praying, among
others,
for the quashal of the complaint.[4]
At the hearing of the
Omnibus Motion on January 8, 2003, neither the Chief of Police of
Balaoan,
La Union who filed the Criminal Complaints, nor Belinda Enriquez
appeared
to oppose the motion.cralaw:red
On January 15, 2003,
respondent Judge issued an Order[5]
granting complainant’s motion to quash, reasoning thus:
The move
and
request of accused thru counsel to be present at the preliminary
investigation
is no longer necessary in view of the WAIVER executed by complainant.
The Motion to
Quash
or dismiss the charges against accused Romeo B. Almojuela, Jr. is
meritorious
and in order, considering the execution by complainant of the WAIVER
exculpating
him of the charges.
The prayer of the
accused
thru counsel for quashal of the charge against accused Romeo B.
Almojuela,
Jr. is in order, hence, it is granted.
Let, therefore,
accused
Romeo B. Almojuela, Jr. be discharged and removed as accused in the
above-mentioned
case.
The PNP, Balaoan,
La
Union, meanwhile is ordered and directed to cause the criminal
complaint
to exclude accused Romeo B. Almojuela, Jr. from the complaint.chanrobles virtual law library
Furnish a copy of
this
Order to accused and counsel and to the complainant for their
information
and guidance. x x x
Subsequently, on March
24, 2003, respondent Judge issued another Order, which reads in
pertinent
part:
Accused’s
counsel
and mother before this case was set for preliminary examination were
constantly
following for the resolution of the Court on the pleadings filed re:
the
Omnibus Motion and the counter affidavit of accused Romeo B. Almojuela,
Jr. Because of their insistent follow ups, the Court has issued
an
Order dated January 15, 2003 acting on the pleadings filed.
However,
when the private complainant, Belinda Enriquez came to Court inquiring
into the status of her case, she was informed of the alleged waiver she
signed before the barangay officials of their place. She alleged
that she was forced, coerced and threatened to sign the waiver and does
not even know its content. So on this information given by the
private
complainant, on the Order dated January 15, 2003 which was issued and
prepared
by the Court, there was an instruction to the staff of the Court to
withhold
and not to be released the Order as it will be cancelled because of the
allegation of the private complainant. The Court learned later
that
the said Order issued and prepared dated January 15, 2003 somewhat
leaked
or was furnished the accused, Romeo B. Almojuela, Jr. despite orders or
instruction to the court’s staff to withhold or not to release it.
x x
x
x x
x
x x x
In the event that
the
Order dated January 15, 2003 issued and prepared by the Court leaked or
was furnished accused Romeo B. Almojuela, Jr. despite instructions to
the
court’s staff that it be withheld and not to be released as it will be
cancelled, the said Order dated January 15, 2003 is now hereby ordered
cancelled, annulled and reconsidered.chanrobles virtual law library
Furnish a copy
each
of this Order to the accused, Romeo B. Almojuela, Jr., his counsel
Atty.
Rolando S. Bala, the private complainant Belinda Enriquez and counsel
Atty.
Francisco R. Collado and to the Honorable Court Administrator, Supreme
Court of the Philippines, Manila for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Complainant avers that,
as gleaned from the March 24, 2003 Order, respondent Judge privately
communicated
with Enriquez, during which she told him matters affecting the
case.
In doing so, he accorded undue consideration to her ex parte
allegations
regarding the execution of the waiver and, on the basis thereof,
directed
his staff to withhold the Order dated January 15, 2003.
Complainant further
alleges that the March 24, 2003 Order was irregular because the private
prosecutor’s Opposition to Motion to Quash was filed after the said
Motion
had already been granted. Worse, herein complainant or his
counsel
was not furnished copy of the said Opposition.cralaw:red
Complainant, moreover,
claims that on February 21, 2003, respondent Judge conducted a
preliminary
investigation but did not propound searching questions to the private
offended
party regarding the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
Waiver.
Respondent Judge further manifested bias against herein complainant
when
he denied the latter’s repeated requests to submit clarificatory
questions
to Belinda Enriquez.cralaw:red
Respondent Directo filed
her Comment dated February 21, 2003,[7]
wherein she declared that she did not receive any directive from
respondent
Judge to withhold the January 15, 2003 Order; that she released the
Order
as part of her ministerial functions; and that she had no official
participation
in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.chanrobles virtual law library
In his Comment dated
June 23, 2003,[8]
respondent Judge alleges that after he issued the Order dated January
15,
2003 granting the Motion to Quash, Belinda Enriquez inquired about the
status of the case. When she learned that the complaint had been
quashed on the basis of her waiver, she claimed that she was forced,
coerced
and threatened into signing the same by their Barangay Captain.
She
asserted that she was not even aware of its contents. Hence,
respondent
Judge instructed his staff not to release the Order dated January 15,
2003.
However, despite such instruction, a copy of the said Order had been
furnished
the accused.cralaw:red
On March 24, 2003, respondent
Judge issued an Order cancelling and annulling the Order of January 15,
2003. He contends that it was still within his authority to do
so.
Moreover, complainant could have filed a motion for reconsideration,
but
instead he chose to file an administrative complaint against him, a
petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of
Balaoan,
La Union, and a Motion for Inhibition with the Municipal Trial Court of
the same town.cralaw:red
Respondent Judge avers
that the ex parte hearing referred to by complainant is actually the
preliminary
examination he conducted to determine probable cause, wherein defense
counsel
and complainant’s mother were present.cralaw:red
The complaint was referred
to the Office of the Court Administrator, which submitted its Report to
this Court recommending dismissal of the administrative complaint
against
Amalia L. Directo, and imposition on respondent Judge of a fine in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for Gross Ignorance of the
Law
and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for Violation of Rule 10.03 of the
Code
of Professional Responsibility.[9]
Upon being required
by this Court, both complainant[10]
and respondent[11]
manifested their willingness to submit the case for resolution on the
basis
of the pleadings filed.chanrobles virtual law library
There is no question
that the Order of January 15, 2003 granting the Motion to Quash was
issued
prematurely by respondent Judge. The proper procedure should have
been to summon the private offended party to ascertain whether she
executed
the waiver voluntarily.cralaw:red
It is apparent that
respondent Judge is ignorant of the procedure in conducting a
preliminary
investigation. Evidently he was referring to the old rule where
preliminary
investigation consisted of two stages, namely: (1) preliminary
examination,
and (2) preliminary investigation proper. Under Rule 112, Section
3 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, there is now only one stage of
preliminary
investigation.[12]
Under the old rules,
the preliminary investigation conducted by a municipal judge had two
stages:
(1) the preliminary examination stage during which the investigating
judge
determines whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an
offense
has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof, so that
a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial; and
(2)
the preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or information
is read to the accused after his arrest and he is informed of the
substance
of the evidence adduced against him, after which he is allowed to
present
evidence in his favor if he so desires. Presidential Decree 911,
upon which the present rule is based, removed the preliminary
examination
stage and integrated it into the preliminary investigation
proper.
Now, the proceedings consist only of one stage.[13]
Every judge is required
to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge
owes
it to his office to simply apply it; and anything less than that would
be constitutive of Gross Ignorance of the Law. In short, when the
law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance
of the law.[14]
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental
a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is
either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he
holds
or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done
in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.[15]chanrobles virtual law library
Canon 4 of the Canon
of Judicial Ethics requires that a judge should be studious of the
principles of law; while Canon 18 mandates that he should administer
his
office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law
itself,
remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge
under the sanction of law.[16]
The maxim “ignorance
of the law excuses no one” has special application to judges, who,
under
Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity,
and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant
with the law and basic legal principles.[17]
In the case at bar,
respondent Judge not only failed to perform his judicial duties in
accordance
with the Rules, but he also acted willfully and in gross disregard of
the
law and controlling jurisprudence. He was ignorant not only of
the
scope of his authority to conduct a preliminary investigation but also
the procedure to follow in conducting a preliminary investigation.[18]
Therefore, respondent
Judge is guilty of Gross Misconduct, defined as a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior
or gross negligence by the public officer.[19]
Furthermore, he violated
Canon 1, Rule 1.03 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that a judge should be vigilant
against any attempt to subvert the independence of the judiciary and
resist
any pressure from whatever source. Respondent Judge demonstrated
that he was susceptible to external pressure when he stated that
“Accused’s
counsel and mother, before this case was set for hearing were
consistently
following [up] for the resolution of the Court on the pleadings filed
x
x x Because of their insistent follow-ups, the Court
has issued an Order dated January 15, 2003 acting on the pleadings
filed.”[20]
A judge may be held
liable for serious misconduct when there is reliable evidence showing
that
the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an
intention
to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal
rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a
mere
error of judgment.[21]chanrobles virtual law library
In the case at bar,
respondent Judge lacked judicious reasoning and intentionally violated
the law when he deliberately rescinded his January 15, 2003 Order with
another Order dated March 24, 2003 based on the statements made by
Enriquez
at a hearing conducted after the charges had already been
dismissed.
The former had ample opportunity to question the latter during the
preliminary
investigation regarding the Waiver, yet he grossly neglected to do so
and
failed in his duty as a public officer.cralaw:red
Rule 140, Section 8
of the Rules of
Court,
states:
Sec.
8.
Serious charges. – Serious charges include:
x x
x
x x
x
x x xchanrobles virtual law library
3. Gross
misconduct
constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
x x
x
x x
x
x x xchanrobles virtual law library
Rule 140, Section 11,
in
turn, provides:
Sec.
11.
Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge,
any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1.
Dismissal
from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporation:
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include
accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension
from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding
six (6) months; orchanrobles virtual law library
3. A fine of
more than
P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
x x
x
x x
x
x x x
WHEREFORE, respondent
JUDGE
REVELINO M. RINGOR is found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct. He is
ORDERED
to pay a FINE in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00)
and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, C.J., Puno,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, p. 1.
[2]
Id., pp. 9-10.
[3]
Id., p. 12.
[4]
Id., p. 13.
[5]
Id., p. 18.
[6]
Id., pp. 20-21.
[7]
Id., p. 38.
[8]
Id., p. 39.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
Rule 10.03 – A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall
not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
[10]
Rollo, p. 78.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
Id., p. 76.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
Sales v. Calvan, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1331, 27 February 2002, 378 SCRA 1.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
Sangguniang Bayan of Batac, Ilocos Norte v. Albano, A.M. No.
MTJ-94-1004,
21 August 1996, 260 SCRA 561, 566 (italics in the original).
[14]
Cañas v. Castigador, G.R. No. 139844, 15 December 2000, 348 SCRA
425, 440.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Lim v. Fineza, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1705, 5 May 2003, 402 SCRA 534; citing
Monterola
v. Caoibes, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1620, 18 March 2002, 379 SCRA 334; Carreon
v. Flores, A.M. No. 111-MJ, 30 May 1975, 64 SCRA 238.chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
Jason v. Ygana, 392 Phil. 24 [2000].chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA
1,6.
[18]
Villanueva v. Almazan, 384 Phil. 776 [2000].chanrobles virtual law library
[19]
Imperial v. Santiago, Jr., A.M. No. P-01-1449, 24 February 2003.
[20]
Id., p. 20; italics ours.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Mercado v. Dysangco, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1301, 30 July 2002, 385 SCRA 327,
332; citing Ang Kek Chen v. Judge Andrade, 376 Phil. 136 [1999]. |