EN BANC
DARIO MANALASTAS,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
MTJ-04-1523
February 6, 2004
-versus-
JUDGE RODRIGO R.
FLORES,MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 2,SAN FRANCISCO,
PAMPANGA,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
This is an Administrative
Complaint against Judge Rodrigo R. Flores,[1]
Municipal Trial Court (now Municipal Trial Court in Cities), Branch 2,
City of San Fernando, Pampanga, for dishonesty, gross incompetence,
gross
ignorance of the law, patent immorality and gross inefficiency.
The pertinent facts,
as culled from the records, are as follows:
As an aftermath of the
May 1997 Barangay Elections in San Jose, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Alberto
Guinto, as protestant, filed an election contest[2]
against Dario Manalastas, as protestee, with the MTC of San Fernando,
Pampanga,
then presided by the respondent judge. As the election case
required
the revision of a number of ballot boxes, the respondent appointed a
revision
committee, which thereafter submitted its report to the court.[3]
The respondent then issued an Order dated November 9, 1998, declaring
the
case submitted for decision[14]
despite the protestee’s objections and demands for a hearing.cralaw:red
Before the decision
on the case could be promulgated, a signed copy thereof was leaked out
to the winning party. Upon learning of the aforesaid incident,
the
respondent immediately imputed the blame on his court interpreter, Mrs.
Candelaria M. Mangulabnan. Thus, on August 30, 1999, he issued an
Order stating, inter alia, that the Decision dated May 5, 1999 was
stolen
from his office and therefore “unofficial,” “a mere scrap of paper,
hence,
had no force and effect.” In the same Order, the respondent set the
case
for promulgation of judgment on September 6, 1999.[5]
Meanwhile, protestee
Dario Manalastas, now the complainant, filed a Letter-Complaint dated
September
6, 1999 against the respondent, accusing the latter of high-handed
irregularities
committed in the proceedings of Barangay Election Protest No.
97-04.
The complainant averred that it was wrong for respondent to consider
the
election protest submitted for decision without conducting a hearing
thereon
and despite vehement objection from his camp. Furthermore, after
furnishing him a copy of the Decision dated May 5, 1999 the respondent
issued an order, ex parte, declaring it null and void and directing
that
another decision be promulgated on September 6, 1999. Complainant
further imputed the following acts to the respondent:chanrobles virtual law library
(1) The
respondent
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 99-1855, 99-1856 and 99-1857 for rape in
exchange for P160,000 which he demanded from the relatives of the
accused,
after which he deliberately failed to transmit the records to the
provincial
prosecutor for review;
(2) The respondent
granted
several motions for reduction of bail on the condition that part of the
reduced bail be given to him; the respondent likewise dismissed cases
after
preliminary investigation on the condition that the bond posted by the
accused be given to him;
(3) In Criminal
Case
No. 99-2248, the respondent judge reduced the bail bond from P127,000
to
P30,000, but only P25,000 was deposited with the court as the
difference
was kept by the respondent;
(4) In criminal
cases
raffled to the respondent judge’s sala, he undertook to procure the
surety
bonds for the accused for a fee or commission;
(5) In one case
involving
violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, the respondent ordered the detained
accused
transferred from the municipal jail to a rehabilitation center, in the
process enabling the latter to escape before the case reached the
Regional
Trial Court;chanrobles virtual law library
(6) Most rulings,
resolutions
and decisions of the respondent were prepared by his clerk of court; he
likewise allowed other judges to interfere in cases pending before him,
and even signed decisions prepared by other judges; and
(7) The respondent
flaunted
different women, introducing them as his paramours, and induced other
lawyers
to tag along by providing them with women.[6]
The case was docketed
as A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-780-MTJ. In compliance with the directive of
Court
Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo,[7]
the respondent judge submitted his comment on the administrative
complaint,
vehemently denying all the charges against him. He asserted that
the charges were unsubstantiated and mere hearsay. He demanded an
immediate hearing to prove his innocence and reserved his right to file
counter-charges against his accuser.[8]
In a letter[9]
dated November 15, 1999, the complainant requested the withdrawal of
his
complaint against the respondent judge, as the filing of the complaint
was “a product of misappreciation and miscomprehension of facts for
which
no fault could be ascribed or attributed to anyone, including the
respondent
judge.”[10]
In a Resolution dated
August 22, 2001, we resolved to refer the case as recommended to
Executive
Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr., Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pampanga, for
investigation,
report and recommendation.[11]
On July 11, 2001, Judge Adelaida A. Medina succeeded Judge Sunga, Jr.
as
the new Executive Judge of the RTC of Pampanga.[12]
Thus, in a Resolution dated December 3, 2001, we referred the case to
the
new executive judge.[13]chanrobles virtual law library
Upon receipt of the
case, Judge Medina scheduled a hearing on February 19, 2002.
Neither
party appeared on the said date. Instead, the complainant filed a
Manifestation dated February 12, 2002, reiterating his disinterest in
prosecuting
the instant case and prayed for its dismissal. Attached thereto
was
an Affidavit of Desistance, stating that whatever errors respondent
judge
committed in Barangay Election Protest No. 97-04 were errors of
judgment
that could not be taken against him. The complainant also
declared
that the evidence he intended to present in support of his charges had
been lost, and despite diligent efforts could not be located.cralaw:red
The complainant appeared
in the hearing of March 12, 2002 and affirmed the validity and
voluntariness
of his Affidavit of Desistance. Executive Judge Medina thereafter
submitted
her Report dated May 14, 2003, with the following recommendation:
Respondent
judge is guilty of corrupt act[s] and gross misconduct constituting
violations
of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11, 2001, both are
serious
charges punishable by the penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture
of benefits, suspension, or fine. However, respondent judge had earlier
been dismissed and his benefits forfeited in connection with another
administrative
case. Thus, the remaining penalty that may be imposed upon respondent
judge
is a fine of more than Php20,000 but not exceeding Php40,000.chanrobles virtual law library
Considering that
this
is the third of a series of administrative charges lodged against
respondent
judge, all of which involving (sic) corruption in office, the
undersigned
deems it proper to recommend the imposition upon him of a fine in the
maximum
amount of Php40,000. What emerges from the cases filed against
respondent
judge is a pattern of corruption so serious as to tarnish the image of
the entire judiciary. To this, the court must not turn a blind
eye,
as it serves only to erode the public’s faith and trust in the
judiciary.[14]
We agree with the
investigating
judge that the respondent is administratively liable.
The withdrawal of the
Complaint or the execution of an Affidavit of Desistance does not
automatically
result in the dismissal of an administrative case. To condition
an
administrative action upon the will of the complainant, who for one
reason
or another, condones a detestable act, would be to strip this Court of
its power to supervise and discipline erring members of the judiciary.[15]
The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its
jurisdiction
nor deprive it of its power to determine the veracity of the charges
made
and to discipline, such as the results of its investigation may
warrant,
an erring respondent. The Court’s interest in the affairs of the
judiciary is a paramount concern that must not know bounds.[16]
With respect to the
irregularities of Barangay Election Protest No. 97-04, we quote with
approval
the following findings and observations of the investigating judge:
As regards
the allegation of inefficiency relative to the proceedings in Election
Protest Case No. 97-04, a related case was filed before RTC Branch 47,
entitled “Dario Manalastas vs. Hon. Rodrigo R. Flores, et al.”, and
docketed
as Civil Case No. 11929. The case is one for prohibition and
mandamus,
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order. It is also alleged therein that the
procedure followed by respondent judge in the election protest case was
highly irregular.chanrobles virtual law library
x
x
x
Indeed, as alleged
by
the complainant, respondent judge considered the election protest case
submitted for decision upon his receipt of the report of the revision
committee,
over the objections of counsel for protestee. Attached hereto as
Annexes “C” & “D” are copies of the order and manifestation of
objection.[17]
In issuing the Order
considering
the case submitted for decision based on a mere report, the respondent
judge was clearly guilty of violating due process, tantamount to gross
ignorance of the law. Revision is merely the first stage, and not
the alpha and omega, of an election contest.[18]
The respondent judge should have known that the function of the
revisors
is very limited. In Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos,[19]
we elucidated, thus:
x
x x Revisors do not have any judicial discretion; their
duties
are merely clerical in nature (Hontiveros v. Altavas, 24 Phil. 632
[1913]).
In fact, their opinion or decision on the more crucial or critical
matter
of what ballots are to be contested or not does not even bind the
Tribunal
(Yalung v. Atienza, 52 Phil. 781 [1929]; Olano v. Tibayan, 53 Phil. 168
[1929]). Thus, no undue importance may be given to the revision
phase
of an election contest. It can never serve as a logical or an
acceptable
basis for the conclusion that massive fraud or irregularities were
committed
during an election, or that a Protestant had won in said
election.
If that were so, a Protestant may contest all ballot boxes and, in the
course of the revision thereof, object – for any imagined ground
whatsoever,
even if the same be totally unfounded and ridiculous – to all ballots
credited
to the Protestee; and then, at the end of the day, said Protestant may
even announce to the whole world that contrary to what is reflected in
the election returns, Protestee had actually lost the election.[20]chanrobles virtual law library
The respondent judge
should
have given the complainant his day in court to enable the latter to air
his grounds for contesting the ballots and to submit evidence in his
behalf.
In failing to conduct hearings, the respondent blatantly disregarded
the
complainant’s right to be heard. As a judge of the municipal
trial
court, vested with jurisdiction to hear and decide election contests
involving
barangay officials, he is expected to be familiar with these legal
requirements.
Although election contests have to be resolved quickly, judges must not
sacrifice for expediency’s sake the fundamental requirements of due
process
nor to forget that they must conscientiously endeavor each time to seek
the truth, to know and aptly apply the law, and to dispose of the
controversy,
objectively and impartially, all to the end that justice is done to
every
party.[21]
Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, the respondent judge
is
expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the laws
and rules of procedure.[22]
The litigants will have faith in the administration of justice only if
they believe that the occupants of the bench cannot be accused of
deficiency
in their grasp of legal principles.[23]
Anent the other charges
against respondent judge, Judge Medina found that Criminal Cases Nos.
99-1855
to 99-1857 and Criminal Case No. 99-2248 were dismissed after
preliminary
investigation. In all these cases, the respondent judge failed to
transmit the resolutions and records to the provincial prosecutor upon
the conclusion of the proceedings.cralaw:red
It was discovered during
the investigation that, while the three subject cases involved rape and
thus cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the records of the cases
and
the results of the preliminary investigation thereof were not forwarded
to the office of the provincial prosecutor for review, as required by
law.
The missing records were surprisingly found on February 4, 2003 and
subsequently
turned over to the undersigned. As claimed by complainant, the
records
were indeed not turned over to the provincial prosecutor for review of
the findings in the preliminary investigation.chanrobles virtual law library
The private complainant
in said cases executed an Affidavit of Desistance on June 26,
1999.
Noticeably, the affidavit was sworn to before respondent himself.
Moreover, the order dismissing the cases, along with one case for acts
of lasciviousness against the same accused, were issued on the same
date
which was a Saturday. Accused received copies of the orders on
June
27, 1999, a Sunday.[24]
Section 5, Rule 112
of the then Rules
on Criminal Procedure mandated municipal trial court judges to
transmit
to the provincial or city prosecutor for appropriate action its
resolution
of the case upon concluding the preliminary investigation. Thus:
Sec. 5.
Duty
of investigating judge. – Within ten (10) days after the conclusion of
the preliminary investigation, the investigating judge shall transmit
to
the provincial or city fiscal, for appropriate action, the resolution
of
the case, stating briefly the findings of facts and the law supporting
his action, together with the entire records of the case, which shall
include:
(a) the warrant, if the arrest is by virtue of a warrant; (b) the
affidavits
and other supporting evidence of the parties; (c) the undertaking or
bail
of the accused; (d) the order of release of the accused and
cancellation
of his bail bond, if the resolution is for the dismissal of the
complaint.
Should the
provincial
or city fiscal disagree with the findings of the investigating judge on
the existence of probable cause, the fiscal’s ruling shall prevail, but
he must explain his action in writing furnishing the parties with
copies
of his resolution, not later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the
records from the judge. If the accused is detained, the fiscal
shall
order his release.chanrobles virtual law library
The respondent judge’s
inexorable failure to transmit the resolution and the records as
mandated
by the Rules renders him administratively liable.
A preliminary investigation
is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.[25]
It is an executive, not a judicial function. It falls under the
authority
of the prosecutor who is given by law the power to direct and control
all
criminal actions. However, since there are not enough fiscals and
prosecutors to investigate the crimes committed in all the
municipalities
all over the country, the government was constrained to assign this
function
to judges of Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.[26]
Thus, when a municipal judge conducts preliminary investigation, he
performs
a non-judicial function as an exception to his usual duties. His
findings, therefore, are subject to review by the provincial or city
prosecutor
whose findings, in turn, may be reviewed by the Secretary of Justice in
appropriate cases. Hence, the investigating judge, after
conducting
a preliminary investigation, must perform his ministerial duty to
transmit
within ten (10) days the resolution of the case together with the
entire
records to the provincial or city prosecutor.[27]
The performance of this non-judicial or executive function, however,
does
not place judges beyond the disciplinary power of this Court for any
act
or omission in relation or as an incident to their task, which is only
in addition to their judicial functions.[28]
Thus, the Court has imposed disciplinary sanctions on judges for their
ignorance or deliberate disregard of the laws on preliminary
investigation.[29]
Judges are expected
to strive for excellence in the performance of their duties. As
exemplars
of law and justice, they are mandated to embody competence, integrity
and
independence.[30]
Verily, they owe it to the public to know the very laws they are
supposed
to apply to controversies. They are called upon to exhibit more
than
a cursory acquaintance of the statutes and procedural laws.[31]
Anything less would constitute gross ignorance of the law.[32]chanrobles virtual law library
With respect to the
charges of corruption, Judge Medina made the following findings:
On the
other
hand, Criminal Case No. 99-2248, in which respondent allegedly took
part
of the bail paid, is now pending before Branch 48 of the RTC, San
Fernando,
Pampanga. It appears on the records that the recommended bail was
Php127,000. Accused moved for its reduction to Php30,000.
In
said motion, the figures Php30,000, the amount prayed for was
superimposed
with the figures Php25,000 without any explanation. This seems to
affirm
complainant’s allegation that respondent judge pocketed the Php5,000
difference.
Copies of said motion and order are hereto attached as Annexes “A”
&
“B,” respectively.[33]
We do not agree.
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove.
The complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such
an
accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent
judge
connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be
more
than substantial.[34]
The allegation of bribery, the charges of dishonesty, gross
incompetence,
patent immorality and gross inefficiency are unsubstantiated, and shall
thus be dismissed.
It must be noted, however,
that this is not the first time that the respondent judge has been
charged
administratively. In Atty. Ma. Elisa F. Velez v. Judge Rodrigo R.
Flores,[35]
the Court en banc found him guilty of bribery and judicial indolence
and
ordered his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement
benefits, save leave credits and vacation benefits, with prejudice to
reemployment
in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities
including government-owned and controlled corporations.chanrobles virtual law library
Considering the foregoing,
the penalty of dismissal from the service is no longer feasible in the
instant case. Pursuant to Section 11-A (3) of Rule 141 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the Court finds that a fine of P40,000 is justified
under the circumstances.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, Judge Rodrigo
R. Flores is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is hereby
meted
a FINE of P40,000 to be deducted from his leave credits and whatever
other
benefits he may be entitled to.cralaw:red
This decision shall
take effect immediately.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Puno,
Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on official
leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Dismissed from the service per Decision of this Court in G.R. No. A.M.
No. MTJ-01-1366, dated February 7, 2003.
[2]
Docketed as Election Protest No. 97-04.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 5-8.
[4]
Report and Recommendation, Annex “C.
[5]
Rollo, p. 11.
[6]
Id. at 1-2.
[7]
Id. at 12.
[8]
Id. at 13.
[9]
Id. at 14.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id. at 24.
[12]
Id. at 25.
[13]
Id. at 26.chanrobles virtual law library
[14]
Report and Recommendation, p. 5.
[15]
Anguluan v. Taguba, 93 SCRA 179 (1979).
[16]
Marcelino v. Judge Singson, Jr., 243 SCRA 685 (1995).
[17]
Report and Recommendation, p. 4.chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, 253 SCRA 559 (1996).
[19]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
Id. at 577-578.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Young v. De Guzman, 303 SCRA 254 (1999).
[22]
Chavez v. Escañan, 343 SCRA 170 (2000).chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
Mercado, et. al. v. Judge Dysangco, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1301, July 30, 2002.
[24]
Report and Recommendation, p. 3.chanrobles virtual law library
[25]
Section 1, Rule 112, The 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[26]
Castillo v. Villaluz, 171 SCRA 39 (1989).chanrobles virtual law library
[27]
Balagapo, Jr. v. Duquilla, 238 SCRA 645 (1994).
[28]
Sandoval v. Manalo, 260 SCRA 611 (1996).
[29]
Ancog v. Tan, 227 SCRA 137 (1993).chanrobles virtual law library
[30]
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
[31]
Tabao v. Barataman, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1384, April 11, 2002.
[32]
Peña, et. al. v. Judge Martizano, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1451, May 30,
2003.
[33]
Report and Recommendation, pp. 3-4.chanrobles virtual law library
[34]
Cataños v. Escaño, Jr., 251 SCRA 174 (1995).
[35]
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1366, February 7, 2003. |