FIRST DIVISION
ELENA R. ALCARAZ,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
MTJ-04-1539
April 14, 2004
-versus-
JUDGE FRANCISCO
S. LINDO,METROPOLITAN
TRIAL
COURT OF MALABON, BRANCH 55,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Judges are the visible
representations of law and justice. They ought to be embodiments of
competence,
integrity and independence. In particular, judges are frontline
officers
in the administration of justice. It is therefore essential that they
live
up to the high standards demanded by the Code of Judicial Conduct. To
be
able to render substantial justice and to maintain public confidence in
the legal system, they are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Judicial competence
requires
no less.[1]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Complainant Elena Alcaraz
was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 1782-98, an action for sum
of money entitled, "Maria Aurora C. Santos, Plaintiff versus Rufina
Eligio,
Elena Alcaraz & her husband, Raustino C. Alcaraz, and Conchita
Ocampo
& her husband, Rodolfo Ocampo, Defendants." The case was filed on
January
9, 1998 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Malabon and raffled to
Branch
55, presided by respondent Judge Francisco S. Lindo. Plaintiff therein,
Atty. Ma. Aurora C. Santos, sought the collection of the unpaid
obligation
of defendants under the promissory note they executed in her favor.[2]
Defendant Eligio filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint,[3]
which was denied by respondent judge in an Order dated February 13,
1998.[4]
On June 5, 1998, respondent
judge, acting on an Omnibus Motion filed by plaintiff,[5]
issued an Order declaring the Alcaraz spouses and the Ocampo spouses in
default for failure to file their respective answers.[6]
Subsequently, defendant Eligio was likewise declared in default for
failure
to file answer. Accordingly, plaintiff Santos was allowed to present
her
evidence ex-parte.[7]
On October 15, 1998,
judgment by default was rendered against defendants, ordering them,
jointly
and severally, to pay the unpaid obligation under the promissory note
with
interest and penalty thereon, attorney’s fees and liquidated damages.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On February 19, 1999,
defendant Elena Alcaraz filed a Motion for Annulment of Decision.[9]
The Motion was denied by respondent judge in an Order dated June 22,
1999.[10]
Hence, on July 22, 1999,
Elena Alcaraz instituted the instant petition for disbarment against
respondent
judge. She alleged that she was not furnished a copy of the Order dated
June 5, 1998 declaring her and the other defendants in default, or of
the
Order declaring the other defendant, Rufina Eligio, in default; that
respondent
judge, in rendering the judgment by default, did not diligently
ascertain
the facts; and that respondent judge committed abuse of discretion when
he denied complainant’s Motion for Annulment of Decision on the basis
only
of the arguments in the opposition filed by plaintiff Santos.cralaw:red
When required to comment,
respondent judge alleged that complainant’s Motion for Annulment of
Decision
was not properly verified and was not accompanied by an affidavit
showing
fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence; that notwithstanding
these defects, he took cognizance of the Motion, set it for hearing and
resolved the same; that he denied the Motion because the allegations
therein
were false. He reminded complainant that she still had three days to
appeal
the decision, but no appeal was filed. He further averred that his
judgment
was rendered based on substantial evidence and the monetary awards
therein
were in accordance with the contracts between the parties.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In her Reply,[12]
complainant asserted that she was not furnished copies of the following
pleadings and court orders:
(a) The Motion to Dismiss
filed by defendant Eligio;
(b) The Order denying
the said motion;
(c) The Omnibus Motion
of the plaintiff praying that the defendants (except Rufina Eligio) be
declared in default:
(d) The Order declaring
four of the defendants, including the complainant, in default;
(e) The Motion to declare
Eligio in default;
(f) The documentary
exhibits of the plaintiff consisting of the promissory notes, summary
of
payments and the demand letter;
(g) The withdrawal of
the appearance of Atty. Mario M. Villegas as counsel for the defendants:
(h) The Order granting
the said withdrawal and directing the defendants to hire the services
of
a new counsel; and
(i) The Motion to Admit
Opposition with the Opposition attached filed by the plaintiff to
oppose
the Motion for Annulment of Decision.cralaw:red
The case was referred
to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
On March 28, 2000, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo recommended
that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P3,000.00 for failure
to
comply with Rule 9, Sections 3 (a) and 3(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, with a warning that the repetition of the same offense shall
merit a stiffer penalty.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We agree with the recommendation
that respondent judge be fined except as to the amount of fine to be
imposed.
For failure to comply with Rule 9, Sections 3 (a) and 3(b) of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, respondent judge should be fined in the
amount
of P5,000.00.cralaw:red
Rule 9, Section 3 (a)
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
(a) Effect of order
of default. – A party in default shall be entitled to notice of
subsequent
proceedings but shall not take part in the trial.cralaw:red
It is evident from the
foregoing rule that even when a defendant is already declared in
default,
he is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings.[14]
Complainant’s assertion that she was not furnished, not only with the
order
of default, but the subsequent orders of the respondent judge in Civil
Case No. 1782-98, and the respondent’s failure to controvert this
allegations,
leaves us with no other conclusion other than that respondent judge was
remiss in his duty to observe the Rules.cralaw:red
In his Comment, respondent
judge merely averred that complainant was served summons, that she
filed
her answer, that the plaintiff filed a motion to declare them in
default,
and that he issued the order declaring four of the defendants in
default
on June 5, 1998. He said nothing about furnishing complainant with
copies
of the order of default and of the subsequent orders. Silence is
admission
if there was a chance to deny, especially if it constitutes one of the
principal charges against the respondent.[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent’s failure
to comply with the elementary dictates of procedural rules constitutes
a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Code is explicit in
its
mandate that:
A judge shall be faithful
to the law and maintain professional competence.[16]
Competence is the mark
of a good judge. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge,
whereby
he judges his own fellowmen, the judge owes it to the public who depend
on him, and to the dignity of the court he sits in, to be proficient in
the law.[17]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Anent the correctness
of respondent Judge’s decision and denial of complainant’s Motion for
Annulment
of Decision, being essentially judicial in character, the proper action
that complainant should have taken was an appeal to the Regional Trial
Court. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for
every
act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial remedy
exists
and is available.[18]
We reiterate that judges
are duty bound to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional
competence
at all times. Their role in the administration of justice requires a
continuous
study of the law, lest public confidence in the judiciary be eroded by
incompetence and irresponsible conduct.[19]
WHEREFORE, Respondent
Judge Francisco S. Lindo is found to have violated Rule 3.01 of the
Code
of Judicial Conduct and is FINED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), and
is
warned that a repetition of this or similar acts will be dealt with
more
severely.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban,
Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Francisca P. Pascual v. Judge Eduardo U. Jovellanos, A.M. No.
MTJ-02-1429,
4 October 2002, 390 SCRA 333.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 50-56.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Id., p. 59.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Id., p. 60.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Id., pp. 61-65.
[6]
Id., p. 66.
[7]
Id., p. 71.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Id., pp. 79-81.
[9]
Id., pp. 91-94.
[10]
Id., p. 121.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Id., pp. 45-49.
[12]
Id., pp. 157-162.
[13]
Id., pp. 365-368.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Gubat, The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated, 2000 edition, p.
136.
[15]
Perez v. Suller, A.M. No. MTJ-94-936, 6 November 1995, 249 SCRA 665.
[16]
Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1994 edition, p. 349, citing
Malcolm,
Legal and Judicial Ethics.
[18]
Santos v. Orlino, A.M. No. RTJ-94-1418, 25 September 1998, 296 SCRA 101.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Evelio Pena, et al. v. Judge Orlando A. Martizano, A.M. No.
MTJ-02-1451,
30 May 2003. |