SECOND DIVISION
JUDGE JOSE C.
REYES,
JR., EXECUTIVE JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
- SAN MATEO, RIZAL,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
P-04-1801
April 2, 2004
-versus-
RICARDO CRISTI,
CASH CLERK II, OFFICE OF THECLERK
OF COURT,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT - SAN MATEO, RIZAL,
Respondent.
D E C I S I
O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A letter-complaint dated
December 23, 1999 was filed against Ricardo F. Cristi, Cash Clerk II,
Office
of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court (RTC), San Mateo, Rizal,
for
habitual absenteeism and dishonesty.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The letter-complaint
was written by Atty. Fermin M. Ofilas, Clerk of Court of the said RTC
and
addressed to Executive Judge Jose C. Reyes, Jr.[1]
Atty. Ofilas averred that he purposely did not sign the daily time
record
(DTR) of the respondent corresponding to the period of June up to
November
1999, as it might be construed as a condonation of the acts of the
latter,
which are valid subject of serious disciplinary action.cralaw:red
It appears that over
the said six-month period, the respondent reported to work for only
seventy-five
(75) days and was absent for fifty-seven (57) days, as follows:[2]
No. of Days Present
No.
of Days Absent
June
9
13
July
15
7
August
13
9
September
8
14
October
13
8
November
13
6
When his attention was
called to his habitual absenteeism, the respondent promised to mend his
ways. But after showing up for work a few times thereafter, he reverted
to his old conduct. Verification with the Leave Section of the
Supreme
Court revealed that as of April 1999, the respondent’s leave credits
had
already been exhausted. Nonetheless, he continued to receive his
salaries without deductions.cralaw:red
According to Atty. Ofilas,
the respondent likewise committed acts of dishonesty when he repeatedly
superimposed his signature on the lines drawn at the last column or
space
of the attendance sheet/logbook during certain days. The lines
were
drawn to indicate the close of office hours on those days. By
superimposing
his signature thereon, the respondent made it appear that he was
present
on those days when in fact he was absent. He committed this act
at
least four (4) times in June, four (4) times in July and once in
September
1999.cralaw:red
In his 1st Indorsement
dated February 7, 2000, Judge Reyes forwarded the letter-complaint to
the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). The respondent was then
directed to file his comment thereon.cralaw:red
In his Comment dated
November 30, 2002, the respondent admitted his absences during the
period
of June to November 1999, but averred that he filed the corresponding
applications
for leave. For reasons not known to the respondent, Atty. Ofilas
did not act upon these applications. The respondent denied
making any untruthful statements in the logbook. He pointed out
that
the clerk-in-charge, Ms. Aranzazu Baltazar, had affixed her initials on
his DTRs indicating that the entries therein had been verified by her.cralaw:red
The respondent further
stated that he had already resigned from his position as of March 3,
2000
and that his resignation had been duly accepted by the OCA.cralaw:red
In this Court’s Resolution
dated July 9, 2003, the matter was referred to Hon. Elizabeth
Balquin-Reyes,
Acting Executive Judge, RTC, San Mateo, Rizal, for investigation,
report
and recommendation.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After conducting the
investigation, the Investigating Judge submitted her Report dated
October
3, 2003 and made the following findings:
Mr. Ricardo Cristi was
guilty of Habitual Absenteeism having incurred unauthorized absences
exceeding
the allowable days prescribed by CSC Memoranda Circular. However,
as to his Dishonesty, the same was not proven by the mere allegation
that
he was not really present on those days he signed the logbook. It would
appear that he was only late on those days. A careful scrutiny of
the logbook would show that respondent signed the logbook on the day he
was alleged to have been absent. The succeeding days when there
are
no more employees to sign, there are no spaces left, while the days
when
respondent was allegedly only late, there are spaces. An example
is Annex “D” under date of July 22, 1999. No. 6 is a space, then a line
after which Cristi signed on the line. This was followed by July
23, 1999, where the last number again was 6 and the name Ricardo Cristi
was absent as indicated. There was no space after that and
followed
immediately by July 26 and also on July 28. This practice could
be
seen in the pages of the logbook.cralaw:red
1.
Mr. Ricardo Cristi although appointed Cash Clerk II or Clerk III was
not
given the duties of his office.cralaw:red
2.
The allegations that he had problems on those months he committed the
unauthorized
absences could be true, as there were no deficiency reports against him
prior to those dates.cralaw:red
3.
The dishonesty alleged in the report was not proved but a mere
allegation.[3]
The Investigating Judge
opined that although the respondent was guilty of habitual absenteeism
as provided for in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 4, the instant case has
become moot and academic. Considering that the respondent’s resignation
had been accepted by the OCA before the proper charges could be filed
against
him, the Court no longer has jurisdiction over his person and all
claims
against him can no longer be enforced.[4]
On January 13, 2004,
the OCA submitted to the Court its Memorandum of even date stating that
while it subscribes to the factual findings of the Investigating Judge,
it takes exception to her recommendation that no administrative
sanction
can be imposed on the respondent since he had already resigned.
According
to the OCA, the respondent’s resignation does not render the case moot
and academic, nor deprive the Court of the authority to investigate the
charges against him. The OCA recommends that a fine equivalent to
three (3) months salary be imposed on the respondent.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court agrees with
the recommendation of the OCA.cralaw:red
Indeed, the fact that
the respondent had already resigned from his position does not render
the
complaint against him moot and academic. It must be noted that
Atty.
Ofilas’ Letter-Complaint dated December 23, 1999 was forwarded to the
OCA
by way of Executive Judge Reyes’ 1st Indorsement on February 7,
2000.
The respondent resigned only on March 3, 2000. The jurisdiction
over
the respondent has already attached at the time of the filing of the
letter-complaint,
and was not lost by the mere fact that he resigned from his office
during
the pendency of the case against him.[6]
As this Court has pronounced:
. Nonetheless, these
facts do not render the complaint against him moot and academic since
our
jurisdiction over him has attached at the time of the filing of the
Letter-Complaint
and his verified Comment thereto and is not lost by the mere fact that
he had left the office during the pendency of his case. To
deprive
this Court of authority to pronounce his innocence or guilt of the
charges
against is undoubtedly fraught with injustices and pregnant with
dreadful
and dangerous implications. For, what remedy would the people
have
against a civil servant who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct
during
his last days in office? What would prevent a corrupt and unscrupulous
government employee from committing abuses and other condemnable acts
knowing
fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune
to all administrative penalties? As we held in Perez v. Abiera,
“[i]f
only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain
its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials
under
its supervision and control for acts performed in office which
are
inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants
and
the general public. If innocent, respondent official merits
vindication
of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he served
well
and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding
censure
and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.”[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It cannot be gainsaid
that the respondent is guilty of habitual absenteeism.[8]
Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998, provides that
“[a]n officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be considered
habitually
absent if he incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable two
and
one-half (2½) days monthly leave credits under the Leave Law for
at least three (3) months in a semester or at least three (3)
consecutive
months during the year”
As shown earlier, the
respondent incurred a total of fifty-seven (57) days unauthorized
absences
from the period of June up to November 1999, clearly exceeding the
allowable
2.5 days monthly leave. Although, as found by the Investigating
Judge,
there was no evidence that he falsified his DTRs, the respondent
admitted
that he incurred such number of absences.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 52-A, Rule IV
of Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999, classifies habitual
absenteeism
as a grave offense with the following corresponding penalties: for the
first offense - suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one
(1)
year; and for the second offense – dismissal.cralaw:red
As pointed out by the
OCA, this is the respondent’s first offense and the penalty imposable
on
him would have been that of suspension. However, since he had
already
resigned and the penalty of suspension obviously can no longer be
imposed
on him, a fine equivalent to three (3) months salary is, thus,
warranted.cralaw:red
Times without number,
this Court has stressed that the conduct and behavior of everyone
connected
with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, like the
courts
below, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk, should be
circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility.[9]
As enshrined in the Constitution, “[p]ublic office is a public
trust.
Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.[10]
It must be emphasized that the Court cannot countenance any act or
omission
which diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the
Judiciary.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, respondent
Ricardo F. Cristi is found guilty of habitual absenteeism and ordered
to
pay a FINE equivalent to three (3) months’ salary, to be deducted from
whatever benefits and/or leave credits may be due him.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez,
and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., (Chairman), on
official leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
As shown by respondent’s application for leave; Rollo, pp. 12-27.
[3]
Report, pp. 3-5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Id. at 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Memorandum of the OCA, p. 4.
[6]
Villanueva v. Milan, 390 SCRA 17 (2002).
[7]
Ibid. (Emphases in the original.)
[8]
Administrative Circular No. 2-99 reads in part:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II.
Absenteeism and tardiness, even if such do not qualify as “habitual” or
“frequent” under Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 04,
Series
of 1991, shall be dealt with severely, and any falsification of daily
time
records to cover-up for such absenteeism and/or tardiness shall
constitute
gross dishonesty or serious misconduct.
[9]
Re: Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) of Ms. Lilian B. Bantog,
Court
Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City, 359 SCRA 20 (2001).
[10]
Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Supra at note 8. |