FIRST DIVISION
GINA B. ANG,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-00-1590
January 15, 2002
-versus-
JUDGE ENRIQUE B.
ASIS, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Naval,
Biliran,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:cralaw:red
In a Complaint-Affidavit
dated April 7, 2000[1]
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator, Gina B. Ang charged
Judge
Enrique C. Asis, Presiding Judge of Branch 16 of the Regional Trial
Court
of Naval, Biliran, with Bribery, Extortion and Violation of the
Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act relative to Election Case No. 98-01.
Complainant alleged
that she filed with respondent's court an election protest against her
opponent, Caridad Atok, who was declared mayor of Kawayan, Biliran in
the
May 1998 election. Sometime in October 1998, while her election protest
was pending, respondent allegedly intimated to complainant's lawyers
that
he will decide the case in complainant's favor in exchange for monetary
consideration. Without her knowledge, complainant's father delivered to
respondent the total amount of P140,000.00 on three occasions in
October
1998, January 1999, and April 1999.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sometime in December
1998, complainant was told by her lawyers that respondent had requested
assistance in the promotion of his brother, then Examiner II at the
Bureau
of Customs, through complainant's cousin, Atty. Ramon Salazar, Jr., who
was the Chief of Staff of the Customs Commissioner. Complainant refused
but, unbeknown to her, her family immediately contacted her cousin and
respondent's brother was soon promoted.cralaw:red
Complainant had earlier
planned to file an administrative complaint against respondent for his
failure to resolve her election protest within sixty days from the time
it was deemed submitted for decision, but her lawyers told her to wait.
Subsequently, complainant learned that respondent had requested that
his
son be admitted for training at the Philippine Heart Center.
Complainant
refused as she might be misinterpreted as extending any assistance to
respondent
in order to obtain a favorable decision. Nevertheless, she acceded to
her
lawyers' request to bring respondent's son to Manila and even paid for
the latter's plane fare and accommodation until his application was
granted
by the Philippine Heart Center.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In January 2000, complainant
allegedly received a call from respondent telling her that his son
needed
P4,000.00 for his training. Thinking that this was a request for a
loan,
she agreed. Since she did not have cash at the time, she asked her
friend
to give a check to respondent's son.cralaw:red
On March 14, 2000, respondent
rendered his decision in the election protest declaring Caridad Atok
winner
in the mayoralty race.cralaw:red
Respondent filed his
Comment.[2]
He vehemently denied the charges of complainant and instead, he cited
various
citations he received as a member of the Judiciary of Biliran because
of
his integrity. He denied having solicited help from Atty. Salazar for
the
promotion of his brother at the Bureau of Customs. Rather, his
brother's
promotion was through the recommendation of his superiors and of Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada of San Juan.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent also denied
that he asked complainant to help his son, Enrique, Jr., in his
application
for training at the Philippine Heart Center. He alleged that his son
went
to Manila to apply for work at the Heart Center upon the advice of a
family
friend. While in Manila, his son stayed with his uncle, Nestorio Asis,
who works at the Bureau of Customs.cralaw:red
Respondent alleged that
his son was prepared to pay for training fees in cash but that he
suddenly
received a check for P4,000.00 from complainant's friend.cralaw:red
Finally, respondent
surmised that complainant filed the charges against him out of spite
for
losing her election protest and because her appeal was dismissed for
non-payment
of docket fees.cralaw:red
The instant case was
referred to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Perlita Tria-Tirona for
investigation, report and recommendation.[3]
On September 17, 2001,
Justice Tirona recommended that the charges for bribery and extortion
be
dismissed; that respondent be given a severe reprimand with the
admonition
to be more diligent in the adjudication of his cases and to be
scrupulous
in the observance of periods fixed by law. Justice Tirona based these
on
the following disquisitions:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
From the affidavit-complaint
of the complainant, it will be noted that all the charges of
complainant
are based on informations (sic) allegedly given or passed on to her by
her lawyers. Complainant's lawyers in her electoral protest filed in
the
sala of respondent Judge Asis were Attorneys Lee and Matriano.cralaw:red
However, complainant
did not present any of these lawyers, Attys. Lee or Matriano to
corroborate
her allegations that they, Attys. Lee and Matriano were approached by
respondent
"intimating" that for a consideration her will render a favorable
decision
for complainant in the electoral protest.cralaw:red
xxx xxx xxx.cralaw:red
As regards complainant's
second charge against respondent that respondent sought complainant's
help
in connection with the promotion of respondent's brother who was then
employed
with the Bureau of Customs because respondent allegedly learned that
complainant's
cousin Atty. Ramon Salazar was then the Chief of Staff of then Customs
Commissioner Nelson Tan, complainant was again just told about it by
her
lawyers. According to complainant, her initial reaction when she was
told
about it by her lawyers was "like before because according to her she
did
not like it to appear that she was buying a favorable decision." But,
she
said that when his family learned about it, they lost no time in
contacting
her cousin Atty. Salazar.cralaw:red
However, no evidence
was presented by complainant that indeed respondent sought her
assistance
in connection with his brother's promotion neither was it shown that
respondent's
brother was promoted because of Atty. Salazar. On the contrary, it was
shown by respondent that his brother was promoted through the help of
Jinggoy
Estrada, among others. Besides, how influential was Atty. Salazar to be
able to work for respondent's brother? This was never shown by
complainant.cralaw:red
Anent the charge that
respondent sought the help of complainant in connection with the
application
of respondent's son Enrique, Jr. who is a registered nurse, at the
Philippine
Heart Center, complainant again admitted that she was just informed
about
it. In other words, respondent did not talk to complainant about this.
According to complainant, respondent called her up. Again complainant
was
not able to prove this allegation.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
xxx xxx xxx.cralaw:red
While the check for
P4,000.00 made by complainant's witness Melba Buenvenida was indeed
paid
to the Heart Center and signed at the back of the check by respondent's
son, this does not prove that respondent himself was the one who
solicited
the amount from complainant.cralaw:red
Complainant, in her
effort to pin down respondent on the charges filed by her against him
presented
pictures of the house of respondent in Barugo which respondent does not
deny, and according to complainant said residence is not worth
P400,000.00
but much more and complainant concludes that respondent resorted to the
acts complained of in order to finish the construction of respondent's
house in Barugo. Complainant further claims that the house of
respondent
can be estimated to be worth 2 to 3 million.cralaw:red
We are not impressed
by said argument of the complainant. The fact alone that respondent had
the house constructed does not prove that the charges of complainant
for
bribery/extortion, etc. are true.cralaw:red
xxx xxx xxx.cralaw:red
Regarding the charge
for violation of the Anti-Graft Law (RA 3019, as amended) in relation
to
the electoral protest case filed by the complainant, the records show
that
the electoral protest case was filed in May 1998. The case was finally
decided by respondent on March 14, 2000.cralaw:red
However, while there
was undoubtedly a delay in the disposition of said case, the records
also
show that the parties contributed to the delay. xxx xxx xxx.cralaw:red
But while this will
not totally exonerate the respondent from any administrative liability
for the delay, if at all, it may mitigate his liability. Needless to
state,
a judge should at all times, remain in full control of the proceedings
in his sala and should adopt a firm policy against improvident
postponements
- more importantly he should follow the time limits set for deciding
cases.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court finds the
recommendation of Justice Tirona well-taken.cralaw:red
Anent the charges of
Bribery, Extortion and Violation of the Anti-Graft Law, this Court has
often held that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the
acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to
disciplinary
action, even though such acts are erroneous.[5]
In Santos v. Judge Orlino,[6]
it was held:
Existing doctrine is
that judges are not liable for what they do in the exercise of their
judicial
functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction.
Certain
it is that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for
every
erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold otherwise would render
judicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the fact or
interpret
the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in
his
judgment. The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious
or
incurred with evident bad faith.cralaw:red
Stated succinctly, for
administrative liability to attach it must be established that
respondent
was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other motive.[7]
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes
a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong;
a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud.[8]
It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design
or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes.[9]
Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of
the accused to do wrong or cause damage.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case at bar,
the record does not show that respondent judge was moved by ill-will or
bad faith in rendering the adverse judgment, or that his ruling was
manifestly
unjust. Complainant has not, in fact, adduced any proof to show that
impropriety
attended the issuance of the subject decision. To reiterate, bad faith
is not presumed and he who alleges the same has the onus of proving it.[11]
In view of the fact that complainant relied mainly on second-hand
information
to prove her charges, her complaint is reduced into a bare indictment
or
mere speculation.cralaw:red
Concededly, administrative
proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence.
However,
the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still subject
to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement of due process.
Indeed,
the Rules, even in an administrative case, demand that if the
respondent
judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense,
the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from
direct knowledge.[12]
The judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any
of
its members could be faulted, competent evidence should be presented,
especially
since the charge is penal in character.[13]
To hold a judge liable
for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, it must be shown
beyond
reasonable doubt that the judgment or order is unjust and that it was
made
with a conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.[14]
The ground for the removal
of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Such
is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is
misconduct
in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general
rule in regard to admissibility in evidence in criminal trials apply.[15]
In short, this Court
can not give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation.[16]
While this Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or
omission
that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the
people's
faith in the judiciary, neither will it hesitate to shield those under
its employ from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than
promote the orderly administration of justice.[17]
It is true that no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration
of justice can be infallible.[18]
Although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for
every erroneous order or decision he renders, relative immunity is not
a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his
adjudicatory
prerogatives.[19]
Such immunity does not relieve a judge of his obligation to observe
propriety,
discreetness and due care in the performance of his judicial functions.[20]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Given the prevailing
facts of the case respondent judge must be faulted for his tardiness in
resolving Election Case No. 98-01.cralaw:red
As stated in Ruperto
v. Banquerigo:[21]
The office of a judge
exists for one solemn end - to promote the ends of justice by
administering
it speedily and impartially. The judge as the person presiding over
that
court is the visible representation of the law and justice. These are
self-evident
dogmas which do not even have to be emphasized, but to which we are
wont
to advert to when some members of the judiciary commit legal missteps
or
stray from the axioms of judicial ethics.cralaw:red
Failure to resolve cases
submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a
serious
violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy
disposition
of their cases.[22]
Moreover, Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct explicitly provide:
Rule 1.02. A judge
should administer justice impartially and without delay. (emphasis ours)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Rule 3.05. A judge
shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within
the required periods. (emphasis ours)
In furtherance of the
foregoing mandate, This Court issued Administrative Circular No. 13-87,
which states:
The reorganized judiciary
is tasked with the tremendous responsibility of assisting parties
litigants
in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases
and proceedings as directed in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.[23]
Delay is a recurring complaint of every litigant. The main objective of
every judge, particularly trial judges, should be to avoid delays, or
if
it cannot be totally avoided, to hold them to the minimum and to
repudiate
manifestly dilatory tactics.cralaw:red
GENERAL GUIDELINES
For all members of the
judiciary, the following guidelines are hereby issued:
x x x x x x x x x
3. Judges shall observe
scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the
Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or
matters
submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided
or
resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower
collegiate
courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months
to do so. xxx xxx xxx.[24]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Also, this Court's Administrative
Circular No. 1-88 states that:
Pursuant to Sec. 12,
Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating the adoption of a
systematic
plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending
in the Supreme Court and the lower courts prior to the effectivity of
the
Constitution on February 2, 1987, the following directives must be
complied
with strictly by all concerned.cralaw:red
x x x x x x x x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
6. Motions and Other
Interlocutory Matters.cralaw:red
x x x x x x x x x
6.1. All Presiding Judges
must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters
pending before their courts. xxx xxx xxx.cralaw:red
This Court in a litany
of cases has reminded members of the bench that the unreasonable delay
of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms
of judicial conduct and constitutes a ground for administrative
sanction
against the defaulting magistrate.[25]
Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of
our
people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into
disrepute.[26]
Hence, magistrates are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their
failure
to do so constitutes gross inefficiency.[27]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It bears stressing that
a judge should, at all times, remain in full control of the proceedings
in his sala and should adopt a firm policy against improvident
postponements
- more importantly, he should follow the time limit set for deciding
cases.[28]
Judges are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in
the
performance of their judicial functions and duties.[29]
To reiterate, judges are bound to dispose of the court's business
promptly
and to decide cases within the required period.[30]
If he can not do so, he should seek extensions from this Court to avoid
administrative liability.[31]
While the Court agrees
with the Investigating Justice that respondent should be reprimanded
for
his deficiency of diligence in the adjudication of his cases as well as
the non-observance of the periods thereof fixed by law, he should be
additionally
meted a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the charges for Bribery and Extortion filed against
respondent
Judge Enrique C. Asis are DISMISSED for lack of merit. However,
respondent
Judge is REPRIMANDED for his incompetence in not acting speedily on
Election
Case No. 98-01 and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of
Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). Further, respondent Judge is ADMONISHED to
be more circumspect and to act with more dispatch in the performance of
his judicial functions. Any commission of similar acts in the future
shall
be dealt with more severely by this Court.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 10-12.
[2]
Ibid., pp. 20-26.
[3]
Id., p. 82.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Report and Recommendation, pp. 13-19.
[5]
Canson v. Garchitorena, 311 SCRA 268 [1999]; Morada v. Judge Tayao, 229
SCRA 723 [1994].
[6]
296 SCRA 101 [1998].
[7]
Guerrero v. Villamor, 296 SCRA 88 [1998].
[8]
Spiegel v. Beacon Participation, 8 NE 2nd Series 895, 1007.
[9]
Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [1966].
[10]
Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 287 SCRA 382 [1998].
[11]
Ford, Phils. v. CA, 267 SCRA 320 [1997].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Raquiza v. Castañeda, 81 SCRA 235 [1978].
[13]
OCA v. Pascual, 259 SCRA 604 [1996].
[14]
Naval v. Panday, 275 SCRA 654 [1997].
[15]
Raquiza v. Castañeda, Jr., 81 SCRA 235 [1978]; emphasis ours.
[16]
Lambino v. De Vera, 275 SCRA 60 [1997].
[17]
Sarmiento v. Salamat, A.M. No. P-01-1501, 4 September 2001.
[18]
Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA 834 [1990].
[19]
De Vera v. Dames III, 310 SCRA 213 [1999].
[20]
Enojas v. Gacott, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-99-1513, 19 January 2000.
[21]
293 SCRA 704 [1998].
[22]
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in Branch 34, Regional Trial
Court
of Iriga City, 324 SCRA 397, 401 [2000].
[23]
Now Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[24]
Emphasis ours.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Dysico v. Dacumos, 262 SCRA 275 [1996]; Re: Report on the Audit and
Inventory
of Cases in RTC, Branch 55, Alaminos, Pangasinan, 262 SCRA 555 [1996];
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court,
Branches 61, 134 and 147, Makati, Metro Manila, 248 SCRA 5 [1995]; Re:
Query of Judge Danilo M. Tenerife, 255 SCRA 184 [1996]; Re: Report on
the
Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of the Records of Cases in MTCC,
Br. 2, Batangas City, 248 SCRA 36 [1995]; Bentulan v. Dumatol, 233 SCRA
168 [1994]; Re: Letter of Mr. Octavio Kalalo, 231 SCRA 403 [1993];
Longboan
v. Polig, 186 SCRA 556 [1990].
[26]
Abarquez v. Rebosura, 285 SCRA 109 [1998]; Ng v. Ulibari, 293 SCRA 342
[1998]; Guintu v. Lucero, 261 SCRA 1 [1996]; Report on the Audit and
Inventory
of Cases in the RTC, Branch 11, Balayan, Batangas, 234 SCRA 502 [1994].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Sanchez v. Vestil, 298 SCRA 1 [1998]; Grefaldeo v. Judge Lacson, 293
SCRA
524 [1998].
[28]
Hernandez v. De Guzman, 252 SCRA 64 [1996].
[29]
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Circuit
Trial
Court, Dingle-Duenas, Iloilo, 280 SCRA 637 [1997].
[30]
Rule 3.05, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
Sena v. Villarin, A.M. No. 00-1258-MTJ, 22 March 2000. |