FIRST DIVISION
EDUARDO P. DIEGO,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-02-1673
(formerly OCA I.P.I.
No. 00-1104-RTJ)
August 11, 2004
-versus-
JUDGE SILVERIO G.
CASTILLO,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
DAGUPAN CITY, BRANCH
43,
Respondent.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is an Administrative
Complaint against Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for
allegedly
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or
rendering
judgment in gross ignorance of the law.
The facts and circumstances
of the criminal case are summarized, as follows:
(a) On
January
9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio,
Jr., solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City.
The couple were both Filipinos. In the marriage contract, the
accused
used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil status of
single;chanrobles virtual law library
(b) In a document
dated
February 15, 1978, denominated as a “Decree of Divorce” and purportedly
issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of
Harris County, Texas (247th Judicial District), it was “ordered,
adjudged
and decreed, that the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between
Jorge
de Perio and Crescencia de Perio are hereby Dissolved, Cancelled and
Annulled
and the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce.”
(c) Subsequently,
on
June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with
herein
complainant’s brother, Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr.
Clemente T. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City. The marriage
contract
shows that this time, the accused used and adopted the name Lucena
Escoto,
again, with a civil status of single.[1]
After trial of the
criminal
case for bigamy, respondent Judge promulgated a decision, on February
24,
1999, the dispositive part of which stated:
WHEREFORE,
for failure of the STATE to prove accused’s guilt beyond whisper of
doubt,
the COURT hereby orders her ACQUITTAL with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[2]
The Decision states
that
the main basis for the acquittal was good faith on the part of the
accused.
Respondent Judge gave credence to the defense of the accused that she
acted
without any malicious intent. The combined testimonial and documentary
evidence of the defense was aimed at convincing the court that accused
Lucena Escoto had sufficient grounds to believe that her previous
marriage
to Jorge de Perio had been validly dissolved by the divorce decree and
that she was legally free to contract the second marriage with Manuel
P.
Diego.chanrobles virtual law library
In rendering the decision,
respondent Judge reasoned, thus:chanrobles virtual law library
While it is
true that in our jurisdiction the matrimonial bond between Jorge de
Perio
and the accused are not yet annulled, it remains undisputed that
cessation
of the same was decreed in the Family District Court of Harris County,
Texas, 247th Judicial District, effective February 15, 1978.
x
x x
The CHARGE filed
against
the accused is categorized as Mala en se (sic) which requires the
indispensable
presence of criminal intent/dolo.
The felony on BIGAMY
as defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code explicitly mandates
that it must be committed with criminal intent. In other words, there
must
be an unquestionable demonstration on the part of the perpetrator that
he/she criminally, willfully and unlawfully contracted a second
marriage
despite knowledge that his/her first marriage is still existing.cralaw:red
As borne out by the
evidence adduced, the accused contracted the second marriage after she
was informed and furnished of the Divorce Decree which was granted by
the
Family District Court of Harris County Texas in her favor.chanrobles virtual law library
As an ordinary laywoman
accused being a recipient of a divorce decree, she entertains the
impression
that she can contract a subsequent marriage which she did when she
married
the late Manuel Diego.cralaw:red
To the honest evaluation
of the Court the act complained of against the accused is not patently
illegal for the reason that she acted in good faith believing that her
marriage was already annulled by a foreign judgment.[3]
Complainant herein alleges
that the decision rendered by the respondent Judge is manifestly
against
the law and contrary to the evidence. He questions the
evidentiary
weight and admissibility of the divorce decree as a basis for the
finding
of good faith. In addition, complainant stresses that the
evidence
on record negates respondent Judge’s finding of good faith on the part
of the accused. Thus, complainant urges this Court to impose sanctions
upon respondent Judge as, according to complainant, these acts amount
to
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the
law.cralaw:red
In his comment, respondent
Judge explains that what was in issue was the criminal culpability of
the
accused under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent
Judge
does not dispute that the second marriage was bigamous because at the
time
it was contracted, the first marriage was still subsisting since
divorce
is not recognized in our country and because the accused’s first
husband
was still alive. Respondent Judge, however, maintains that what was
controlling
was whether by virtue of the divorce decree the accused honestly
believed,
albeit mistakenly, that her first marriage had been severed and she
could
marry again. According to respondent Judge, the same is a state of mind
personal to the accused. He further stressed that knowledge of the law
should not be exacted strictly from the accused since she is a lay
person,
and that ineptitude should not be confused with criminal intent.chanrobles virtual law library
By separate manifestations,
both parties agreed to submit the case for resolution based on the
pleadings.
The Disputed
Decision
A careful study of the
disputed decision reveals that respondent Judge had been less than
circumspect
in his study of the law and jurisprudence applicable to the bigamy case.cralaw:red
In his comment, respondent
Judge stated: “That the accused married Manuel P. Diego in the honest
belief
that she was free to do so by virtue of the decree of divorce is a
mistake
of fact.”chanrobles virtual law library
This Court, in People
v. Bitdu,[4]
carefully distinguished between a mistake of fact, which could be a
basis
for the defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from a mistake of law,
which does not excuse a person, even a lay person, from
liability.
Bitdu held that even if the accused, who had obtained a divorce under
the
Mohammedan custom, honestly believed that in contracting her second
marriage
she was not committing any violation of the law, and that she had no
criminal
intent, the same does not justify her act. This Court further
stated
therein that with respect to the contention that the accused acted in
good
faith in contracting the second marriage, believing that she had been
validly
divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone
is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that
his
act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences
thereof.[5]
Moreover, squarely applicable
to the criminal case for bigamy, is People v. Schneckenburger,[6]
where it was held that the accused who secured a foreign divorce, and
later
remarried in the Philippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce
was
valid, is liable for bigamy.cralaw:red
These findings notwithstanding,
the issue before us is whether or not respondent Judge should be held
administratively
liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross
ignorance
of the law.chanrobles virtual law library
Knowingly
Rendering
an Unjust Judgment
Knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized under
Article
204[7]
of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be
proved
that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust.
Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally.
It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be
held
liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown
that
the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by
the evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate
intent to do an injustice.[8]
The law requires that
(a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case
submitted
to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said
judgment is unjust.[9]
This Court reiterates that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be
shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious
and
deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a defense to
the
charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the law.[10]
As held in Alforte v.
Santos,[11]
even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, she still
cannot
be administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or
corrupt purpose. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in
rendering
an unjust decision must still be proved and failure on the part of the
complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the
administrative
complaint.[12]chanrobles virtual law library
There is, therefore,
no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
Gross Ignorance
of
the Law
Anent the charge of
gross ignorance of the law, Mañozca v. Domagas,[13]
is instructive. Therein respondent judge was charged with gross
ignorance
of the law resulting in a manifestly unjust judgment for granting a
demurrer
to the evidence in a bigamy case. The grant of the demurrer to the
evidence
was based on the judge’s finding of good faith on the part of the
accused,
anchored upon a document denominated as a “Separation of Property with
Renunciation of Rights.” This Court stated that said act of the judge
exhibited
ignorance of the law, and accordingly he was fined in the amount of
P5,000.cralaw:red
Also, in Guillermo v.
Reyes, Jr.,[14]
where therein respondent judge was given a reprimand with a stern
warning
of a more severe penalty should the same or similar act be committed in
the future, this Court explained:chanrobles virtual law library
We have heretofore ruled
that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every
erroneous
order or decision he renders. To unjustifiably hold otherwise, assuming
that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make
his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts
or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible
in his judgment. The error must be gross or patent, malicious,
deliberate
or in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the
judge
acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative
sanctions
are called for as an imperative duty of this Court.cralaw:red
As a matter of public
policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not
subject
to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith
and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient
defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge.
It does not mean, however, that a judge, given the leeway he is
accorded
in such cases, should not evince due care in the performance of his
adjudicatory
prerogatives.cralaw:red
Furthermore, in Wingarts
v. Mejia,[15]
where therein respondent judge, although absolved of any guilt for the
charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, was still imposed
sanctions
by this Court, thus:chanrobles virtual law library
In any
event,
respondent judge deserves to be appropriately penalized for his
regrettably
erroneous action in connection with Criminal Case No. 2664 of his
court.
We have repeatedly stressed that a municipal trial judge occupies the
forefront
of the judicial arm that is closest in reach to the public he serves,
and
he must accordingly act at all times with great constancy and utmost
probity.
Any kind of failure in the discharge of this grave responsibility
cannot
be countenanced, in order to maintain the faith of the public in the
judiciary,
especially on the level of courts to which most of them resort for
redress.[16]
Applying these
precedents
to
the present case, the error committed by respondent Judge being gross
and
patent, the same constitutes ignorance of the law of a nature
sufficient
to warrant disciplinary action. Penalty
After evaluation of
the merits of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended
that respondent Judge be reprimanded with a stern warning of a more
severe
penalty in the future.chanrobles virtual law library
The act of respondent
Judge in rendering the decision in question took place on February 24,
1999 or before the effectivity, on October 1, 2001, of A.M. No.
01-8-10-SC
which classified gross ignorance of the law as a serious charge and
penalized
the offense with a fine of not less than P20,000 but not more than
P40,000.cralaw:red
Applying the rule as
then prevailing,[17]
and in line with applicable jurisprudence,[18]
the sanction on respondent Judge should be a fine in the amount of
P10,000.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, Regional
Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is hereby FINED in the amount of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
See, Affidavit-Complaint, pp. 1-2.
[2]
Affidavit-Complaint, Annex “A,” p. 10.
[3]
Affidavit-Complaint, Annex “A,” pp. 9-10.
[4]
58 Phil. 817 (1933).chanrobles virtual law library
[5]
Id. at 822.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
73 Phil. 413 (1941).chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
Art. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. – Any judge who shall
knowingly
render an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision,
shall
be punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification.chanrobles virtual law library
[8]
Ubarra v. Mapalad, 220 SCRA 224, 234 (1993); citing Sta. Maria v. Ubay,
87 SCRA 179 (1978); Rodrigo v. Quijano, 79 SCRA 10 (1977); Pabalan v.
Guevarra,
74 SCRA 53 (1976); In re: Rafael C. Climaco, 55 SCRA 107, 119
(1974);
and Evangelista v. Baes, 61 SCRA 475 (1974).
[9]
Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Villanueva, 216 SCRA 121, 127 (1992).chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Id., at pp. 127-128 & 133.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
243 SCRA 514, 518 (1995).
[12]
Id.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
248 SCRA 625 (1995).
[14]
240 SCRA 154, 161 (1995).
[15]
242 SCRA 436 (1995).
[16]
Id., at p. 447.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
Vileña v. Mapaye, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1424, 381 SCRA 489 (2002).chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1488, 334 SCRA 1 (2000); Go.
v. Bongolan, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1464, 311 SCRA 99 (1999); Almeron v.
Sardido,
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1142, 281 SCRA 415 (1997). |