THIRD DIVISION
BAILINANG P.
MAROHOMBSAR,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-02-1674
January 22, 2004
-versus-
JUDGE SANTOS B.
ADIONG,
Respondent. R E S O L U T I O
N
CORONA,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is a complaint filed
against Judge Santos B. Adiong of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8,
Marawi
City, Lanao del Sur, charging him with gross ignorance of law, abuse of
discretion and conduct unbecoming of a judge in connection with his
issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary restraining
order
in Civil Case No. 1670-99, entitled Ms. Yasmira N. Pangadapun vs. Ms.
Bailinang
P. Marohombsar.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After respondent filed
his comment, we issued a resolution on February 6, 2000 referring the
case
to Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria of the Court of Appeals for
investigation,
report and recommendation.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Complainant Marohombsar
was the defendant in Civil Case No. 1670-99 for "injunction with prayer
for preliminary injunction." The case was filed on March 17, 1999 by
Yasmira
Pangadapun, daughter of Judge Yusoph Pangadapun of RTC Branch 10,
Marawi
City. In the said complaint, Pangadapun questioned the legality of
Marohombsar’s
appointment by DSWD Regional Secretary Salic-Malna as provincial social
welfare officer V of the Department of Social Welfare and Development –
Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (DSWD-ARMM). Prior to
Marohombsar’s
appointment, Pangadapun used to occupy said position as
officer-in-charge.cralaw:red
Upon the filing of the
said complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO and set the hearing on
the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on
April
6, 1999. Summons, together with a copy of the complaint and a notice
indicating
that a preliminary conference would be held on March 22, 1999, was also
served on both parties.cralaw:red
On March 18, 1999, Marohombsar
filed an ex parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO. Pangadapun was
given
until March 26, 1999 to comment and, pending the filing of the same,
the
TRO was extended up to said date.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On March 22, 1999, respondent
issued an order stating that a preliminary conference had been held and
that both parties had waived the raffle of the case. He reset the
hearing
on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
from April 6, 1999 to April 5, 1999 at 2:00 p.m.cralaw:red
On March 29, 1999, respondent
gave Pangadapun up to April 5, 1999 to file her comment and again, the
TRO was extended to that date.cralaw:red
During the hearing on
the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on
April 5, 1999, none of the lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent
considered
it submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary injunction the
following
day.cralaw:red
In his partial Comment
dated November 13, 2000, respondent denied that: (1) he issued the TRO
in favor of Pangadapun without benefit of a hearing; (2) in his order
dated
March 22, 1999, he made it appear that a preliminary conference was
held
where the parties agreed to waive the raffle of the case, when in fact
there was none; (3) he falsified the records of the case and (4) he
granted
the preliminary injunction without a hearing. He alleged that the
complaint
was purely a harassment case filed by a disgruntled party because of
the
latter’s failure to obtain a favorable resolution from him. Although
respondent
judge admitted that Judge Yusoph Pangadapun and Judge Abdulhakim
Ibrahim
were his distant relatives and townmates, he stressed that "never in
our
careers in the judiciary have we interfered nor influenced one another
on any pending case before our courts."
During the preliminary
hearing of the complaint on April 18, 2002 before Justice Labitoria,
the
parties agreed to have the case decided based on the pleadings
presented.cralaw:red
Respondent submitted
the following additional evidence and exhibits to strengthen his case:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
a) partial Comment on
the Complainant’s Affidavit-Complaint;
b) 2nd Indorsement dated
December 11, 2000 in OCA IPI No. 00-929-RTJ executed by Judge
Abdulhakim
A.R. Ibrahim showing that the complainant likewise filed an
administrative
case against him involving the same parties and cause of action, and
c) Supreme Court resolution
dated September 11, 2001 dismissing the administrative case against
Judge
Ibrahim.cralaw:red
On the other hand, complainant
filed her "comment/objection to respondent’s formal offer of exhibits"
on the ground that all the documents were irrelevant and immaterial to
the instant case.cralaw:red
In his final report
and recommendation, Justice Labitoria recommended that respondent judge
be absolved of all the charges against him.cralaw:red
We find the recommendation
of Justice Labitoria to be supported by the evidence and we approve the
same.cralaw:red
A TRO is generally granted
without notice to the opposite party and is intended only as a
restraint
on him until the propriety of granting a temporary injunction can be
determined.
It goes no further than to preserve the status quo until that
determination.[1]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent judge was
justified in issuing the TRO ex parte due to his assessment of the
urgency
of the relief sought. Rule 58, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure
provides:
Preliminary injunction
not granted without notice; exception. – No preliminary injunction
shall
be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person
sought
to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by
the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result
to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to
which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a
temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty
(20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined,
except
as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must
order
said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why
the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period
whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and
accordingly
issue the corresponding order.cralaw:red
However, and subject
to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of
extreme
urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable
injury,
the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of
a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order
effective
for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately
comply with provisions of the next preceding section as to service of
summons
and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the
aforesaid
seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall
conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary
restraining
order shall be extended until the application for preliminary
injunction
can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the
temporary
restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original
seventy-two
(72) hours provided therein.cralaw:red
Complainant also contends
that respondent issued an order dated March 22, 1999 making it appear
that
a preliminary conference was held and the parties agreed to waive the
raffle
of the case when, in truth and in fact, no conference was held.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We are not persuaded.
The order of March 22, 1999 stated in part:
In the preliminary conference
scheduled this morning, counsels of both parties jointly agreed to
waive
the raffling of the case and for this court to continue further
proceedings
considering that the plaintiff is the daughter of Hon. Yusoph
Pangadapun,
Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 10 and per manifestation of Atty. Tingcap
Mortaba, counsel for the plaintiff, should the case be raffled to
Branch
9, the Presiding Judge, Hon. Amer R. Ibrahim will voluntarily inhibit
himself
from hearing the case.cralaw:red
In the summary hearing
that followed for the purpose of determining whether the TRO previously
issued on March 17, 1999 shall be extended or not, the counsels is
(sic)
submitting the same for resolution on the basis of the pleading.cralaw:red
We note that complainant
did not dispute the order of respondent judge immediately after its
issuance.
Hence, the presumption was that the order in question was proper and
well
taken.cralaw:red
Complainant likewise
insists that respondent judge tampered with the records of the case, as
shown by its inconsistent pagination.cralaw:red
We agree with the finding
of Justice Labitoria who accepted respondent judge’s explanation that:
Resolutions or orders
are dictated either in open Court or inside the chamber. The attending
stenographers type the same in a draft form and then presented to me
for
proper correction or modification before finally typing them for my
signature.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Because of the many
number of cases calendared daily and other related works being attended
to, all this paper works take a little time to finish until finally
attach
(sic) to the records of the cases. This explains the little delay
sometimes
in sewing or attaching some orders or other Court processes to the
records.
All of this is always under the strict and direct supervision of the
Branch
Clerk of Court.cralaw:red
In the same investigation
report, Justice Labitoria went on to say:
Besides, complainant
merely assumes that respondent judge doctored the records to favor
plaintiff.
Her mind was already set that it would be impossible for the staff or
respondent
judge not to commit any error in sewing the records. However, as human
beings all of us are prone to commit some mistakes. As what happened in
the instant case. Thus, a mere suspicion that a judge was partial to
party
is not enough as there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, complainant’s
assertion that she was denied due process because the preliminary
injunction
was issued without hearing is likewise untenable.cralaw:red
In applications for
preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice and
hearing
before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all
petitions for preliminary injunction need undergo a trial-type hearing,
it being doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all
times
and in all instances, essential to due process.[2]
The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable
opportunity
to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in support of his
defense.
In the present case, complainant was able to move for a reconsideration
of the order in question, hence her right to due process was not in
anyway
transgressed. We have ruled that a party cannot claim that he has been
denied due process when he has availed of the opportunity to present
his
position.[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Even assuming for the
sake of argument that respondent judge erred in ordering the issuance
of
the writ of preliminary injunction, we ruled in Equatorial Realty vs.
Anunciacion,
Jr.[4]
that, as a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his official
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts
are
erroneous, provided he acts in good faith and without malice.
Respondent
judge, or any other member of the bench for that matter, is presumed to
have acted regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due
process.[5]
WHEREFORE, the administrative
complaint against Judge Santos B. Adiong is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of
merit.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Vitug, J.,
(Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez,
and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. III, 1999 Ed., p. 113 citing Francisco, The
Revised Rules of Court, Vol. IV-A, 1972 ed., pp. 184-185.
[2]
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, Inc. vs. Bitanga, 362 SCRA 635,
646-647
[2001].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Amarillo, et al., vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 145007-08, Jan. 28,
2003,
National Police Commission vs. Bernabe, 332 SCRA 74, 81 [2000]; Toh vs.
Court of Appeals, 344 SCRA 831, 836 [2000].
[4]
280 SCRA 571 [1997].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
People vs. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213 [1998]. |