FIRST DIVISION
JUDGE SALVADOR P.
DE GUZMAN (RET.),
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-03-1755
July 3, 2003
-versus-
JUDGE
AMALIA F.
DY, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH
213,
MANDALUYONG
CITY,
Respondent.
R
E S O L U
T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
Complainant Salvador P.
De Guzman, Jr., a retired Regional Trial Court Judge and now a
practicing
lawyer, filed a verified complaint[1]
charging Judge Amalia F. Dy, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court
of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, with Grave and Serious Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Judiciary.
Complainant avers that
his services were engaged by Lourdes L. Reyes for the purpose of filing
a criminal complaint for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against
Emmanuel
A. Cosico. Sometime in 1996, Cosico issued in favor of Reyes four
checks which were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. The
parties
entered into an agreement whereby the South Rich Acres, Inc., Cosico’s
employer, shall redeem the dishonored checks from Reyes by conveying to
her a parcel of land on condition that the title thereto was free from
any encumbrances. In turn, Reyes promised to return the
dishonored
checks to Cosico. However, upon learning that the land was
mortgaged,
Reyes filed the criminal complaint against Cosico. The
corresponding
information was thereafter filed against Cosico with the Metropolitan
Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 59, which was docketed as Criminal
Case
No. 81017.chanrobles virtual law library
In the meantime, Emmanuel
Cosico filed with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, an
action for specific performance, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
CV-00-0184,
for the return of the four dishonored checks. His counsel and
father,
Atty. Manuel M. Cosico, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong
a motion to suspend the proceedings, on the ground of the pendency of a
prejudicial question in Civil Case No. CV-00-0184. The
Metropolitan
Trial Court suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 81017;
however,
on motion for reconsideration of complainant, it set aside its order of
suspension and issued a warrant for the arrest of Cosico.cralaw:red
Cosico then filed a
petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City,
presided by respondent judge, and docketed as Civil Case No.
MC-00-1286.
On November 10, 2000, respondent judge issued a Temporary Restraining
Order
enjoining the arraignment of Cosico which was scheduled on November 13,
2000. Thereafter, on February 9, 2001, respondent issued a writ
of
preliminary injunction to restrain the arraignment set on February 12,
2001.cralaw:red
Complainant filed a
motion for reconsideration and argued that, under Rule 111, Section 7
of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, one of the elements of a
prejudicial
question is a previously instituted action involving an issue similar
or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action.
The motion was denied by respondent judge in an Order dated June 4,
2001.[2]chanrobles virtual law library
Hence, complainant filed
an administrative complaint against respondent judge assailing her
orders
which are allegedly favorable to Atty. Cosico, who is her "compadre".cralaw:red
In her Comment,[3]
respondent judge denied that Atty. Cosico was her compadre or that
Atty.
Cosico resorted to extra-legal means to obtain the orders dated
November
10, 2000 and February 9, 2001. She maintained that the said
orders
were based on applicable substantive and remedial laws. The
petition
for certiorari was filed in her court during the effectivity of the
1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 111, Section 5 of which does not
require
that the civil action be instituted ahead of the criminal action for a
prejudicial question to arise. Thus, she ruled that Civil Case
No.
CV-00-0184 raised a prejudicial question which will affect the
determination
of the accused’s criminal liability in Criminal Case No. 81017.cralaw:red
On November 27, 2002,
the parties were required to manifest their willingness to have the
case
submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings[4]
filed, which both complainant[5]
and respondent[6]
complied with.cralaw:red
After evaluation, the
Court Administrator recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed
for lack of merit on the ground that the errors raised in the complaint
were judicial in nature, and that an administrative complaint is not
the
appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or
irregular
where a judicial remedy exists and is readily available.[7]
We agree.chanrobles virtual law library
In administrative proceedings,
the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations
in his complaint.[8]
In the absence of contrary evidence as in this case, what will prevail
is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his
duties.[9]
The Rules, even in an administrative case, demand that, if the
respondent
judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense,
the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from
direct knowledge.[10]
Before any member of the Judiciary can be faulted, there should be due
investigation and presentation of competent evidence, especially since
the charge is penal in character.[11]
The ground for the removal
of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable
doubt.
Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is
misconduct
in office, willful neglect, corruption, or incompetence. The
general
rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.[12]
For liability to attach,
the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the
performance
of official duties must not only found to be erroneous but, most
importantly,
it must be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty,
hatred
or some other like motive.[13]
Similarly, a judge will be held administratively liable for rendering
an
unjust judgment - one which is contrary to law or
jurisprudence
or is not supported by evidence - when he acts in bad
faith,
malice, revenge or some other similar motive.[14]
In other words, in order to hold a judge liable for knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the
judgment
was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.[15]
In the case at bar,
the record is bereft of any showing of wrongful, improper or unlawful
conduct
on the part of respondent judge. Indeed, the charge against her
is
based on nothing more than complainant’s suspicion that Atty. Cosico
"perhaps
used ‘inducements other than legal that touched the heart and soul’ of
Judge Dy."[16]
However, we can not give credence to charges based on mere suspicion
and
speculation.[17]chanrobles virtual law library
Even assuming for the
sake of argument that respondent judge erred, the lapse would be an
error
of judgment. A judge may not be administratively charged for
errors
of judgment, in the absence of showing of any bad faith, malice or
corrupt
purpose.[18]
It is well-settled that judges can not be held to account criminally,
civilly
or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith.[19]
If a party is prejudiced by the orders of a judge, his remedy lies with
the proper court and not with the Office of the Court Administrator.[20]
WHEREFORE, in view of
all the foregoing, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-5.
[2]
Rollo, p. 19.
[3]
Id., pp. 21-24.
[4]
Id., p. 38.
[5]
Id., p. 39.
[6]
Id., pp. 40-41.
[7]
Id., pp. 36-37.chanrobles virtual law library
[8]
Lorena v. Encomienda, 362 Phil. 248 [1999]; Cortes v. Agcaoili, A.M.
No.
RTJ-98-1414, 20 August 1998, 294 SCRA 423.
[9]
Oniquit v. Binamira-Parcia, 358 Phil. 1 [1998].chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Raquiza v. Castaneda, Jr., A.M. No. 1312-CFI, 31 January 1978, 81 SCRA
235.
[11]
OCA v. Judge Filomeno Pascual, 328 Phil. 978 [1996].
[12]
Raquiza v. Castañeda, Jr., supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
De la Cruz v. Concepcion, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1062, 25 August 1994, 235
SCRA
597.chanrobles virtual law library
[14]
Guerrero v. Villamor, A.M. No. RTJ-90-483, 25 September 1998, 296 SCRA
88, 98.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Naval v. Panday, A.M. No. RTJ-95-1283, 21 July 1997, 275 SCRA 654, 694;
citing Basbacio v. Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice, G.R.
No. 109445, 7 November 1994, 238 SCRA 5; Louis Vuitton, S.A. v.
Villanueva,
A.M No. MTJ-92-643, 27 November 1992, 216 SCRA 121.chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
Rollo, p. 3.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
Lambino v. De Vera, 341 Phil. 42 [1997].chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
Re: Judge Silverio S. Tayao, RTC Branch 143, Makati, A.M. No.
93-8-1204-RTC,
7 February 1994, 229 SCRA 723.
[19]
In Re: Petition for Dismissal from Service and/or Disbarment of Judge
Baltazar
R. Dizon, A.M. No. 3086, 31 May 1989, 173 SCRA 719.
[20]
Dionisio v. Escano, 362 Phil. 46 [1999].
chan
robles virtual law library |