SECOND DIVISION
FELICIDAD
B.
DADIZON,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-03-1760
January 15, 2004
-versus-
JUDGE
ENRIQUE C.
ASIS,
Respondent. R E S O L U T I O
N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
In a letter-complaint[1]
dated July 29, 2002, complainant Felicidad B. Dadizon charged
respondent
Judge Enrique C. Asis, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Naval,
Biliran, Branch 16, of grave misconduct, bias and partiality, and
oppression.
Complainant alleges
that respondent committed an act of oppression and willfully intended
to
cause her undue harm when respondent dismissed on appeal Criminal Case
No. N-2019, entitled "People v. Maria Suzon and Pablo Suzon" for
falsification
of public document, based on the sworn affidavit[2]
of the private complainant, Socorro Bernadas. Complainant claims that
the
sworn affidavit of Socorro M. Bernadas in Criminal Case No. N-2019 was
not presented in court and the affiant was not examined as to its
contents
and due execution. She adds that neither complainant, as an affected
party,
nor her counsel was served copies of the said affidavit.[3]
Complainant also charges
respondent judge of oppression, for having acted with grave abuse of
authority,
and of violating the Rules of Court in issuing a preliminary injunction
in Civil Case No. B-1165, entitled "Wilma Bernadas-Cariaga, et al. v.
Sps.
Felicidad Bernadas-Dadizon and Nestor Dadizon," without giving
complainant
and her co-defendant a chance to oppose the application for preliminary
injunction. Respondent also allegedly prevented her from presenting
evidence
during the cross-examination of Wilma Bernadas-Cariaga. Complainant
also
states that with bias and manifest partiality, respondent granted
reliefs
not included in application and subsequently issued a Supplemental
Order
on July 25, 2002, a day before the scheduled date of hearing appearing
in the notice included in the motion for the issuance of said order.
She
laments the absence of a prior hearing on the motion, and contests the
Supplemental Order as having been issued in bad faith and for corrupt
motives,
since it gave to the Sps. Armando Garcia and Imelda Bernadas-Garcia and
Ma. Jeanette Bernadas - strangers to the case - the right to stay and
occupy
the house and lot subject of Civil Case No. B-1165.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Furthermore, according
to complainant, respondent decided Civil Case No. B-1165 and three
other
cases - Civil Case No. B-1091 for annulment of sale, Civil Case No.
B-1066,
a partition case, and SP Proc. No. P-160 for the probate of the will of
Eustaquia Bernadas - all without any hearing. In Civil Case No. B-1043,
entitled "Perla B. Matiga v. Municipality of Naval," respondent decided
in favor of the Municipality of Naval. Complainant claims that
respondent
awarded an area of land in excess of what the plaintiffs therein owned
and dismissed without trial a related case, Civil Case No. B-1160,
entitled
"Felicidad B. Dadizon, as Administrator of the Estate of the Late
Eustaquia
and Diosdado Bernadas v. Perla B. Matiga, et al."[5]
On September 18, 2002,
respondent filed his Comment[6]
denying that he relied on the private complainant’s affidavit of
recantation
when he acquitted the accused in Criminal Case No. N-2019. He states
that
the reason for the acquittal was the failure of the prosecution to
prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. He points out that
the
sole basis for the MTC’s judgment of conviction was the doubtful and
generally
inconclusive findings of the NBI dactyloscopy expert. Respondent adds
that
the dismissal of complainant’s appeal to the Court of Appeals
questioning
the denial of her motion for reconsideration of the decision was
elevated
to this Court on appeal by certiorari.[7]
However, in a Resolution dated October 8, 2001, this Court dismissed
her
petition.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As regards Civil Case
No. B-1165, respondent denies that the hearing on the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction held on June 19, 2002 was the only
hearing
conducted. He says that the main case is still pending. He adds that a
perusal of the Order dated August 8, 2002, would reveal that the
co-heirs
Sps. Armando Garcia and Imelda Bernadas-Garcia and Ma. Jeanette
Bernadas—the
alleged strangers to the case—occupied the ancestral house prior to the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. This being the case,
another
hearing to amend the writ was no longer necessary. In any case, the
application
for a writ of preliminary injunction and the Supplemental Order
ordering
complainant to restore them in possession of some of the rooms of the
ancestral
house became moot when a co-heir by the name of Merope Bernadas
Floether,
acting for complainant, left the keys to the house making the entire
ancestral
house available to the other co-heirs.[8]
According to respondent,
Civil Case No. B-1043 was appealed and decided by the Court of Appeals
in favor of the Municipality of Naval on the ground of prescription.
Civil
Case Nos. B-1091 and B-1066 are still pending appeal with the Court of
Appeals, while the appeal of SP Proc. No. P-160 with the Court of
Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 73624, was dismissed on September 4, 2002.[9]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On February 24, 2003,[10]
this Court referred the case to the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals
for raffle among the Associate Justices of that court for
investigation,
report, and recommendation. On even date, this Court also resolved to
re-docket
this case as a regular administrative case.[11]
On March 3, 2003, complainant
filed a Reply[12]
insisting that the affidavit of recantation was the sole basis of the
dismissal
of the appeal and maintains that the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
N-2019
was void. She also reiterated the other allegations in her complaint.cralaw:red
In his report, Justice
Eliezer R. de los Santos, to whom the case was raffled, recommended the
dismissal of the case for lack of merit.cralaw:red
We find his recommendation
well-taken.cralaw:red
Misconduct is defined
as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the
administration
of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right
determination
of the cause.[13]
It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by
a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.[14]
To justify the taking of drastic disciplinary action, the law requires
that the error or mistake must be gross or patent, malicious,
deliberate
or in bad faith.[15]
For respondent to be
liable for misconduct, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the
judge in the performance of official duty must not only be found to be
erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established that he was
moved
by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive.[16]
Bad faith is the ground for liability in misconduct.[17]
Here, this ground is inapplicable, since there is no showing of any
wrongful,
improper or unlawful conduct on respondent’s part. Complainant failed
to
substantiate her allegations with credible proof, for she only relied
on
presumptions as evidence of bad faith.[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The acquittal of the
accused in Criminal Case No. N-2019, in our view, is not without lawful
basis. Respondent acquitted the accused not on account of the sworn
affidavit
of desistance of Socorro Bernadas but because the prosecution failed to
present evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable
doubt. As respondent pointed out, although available for presentation
in
court, the person whose signature was allegedly falsified never
testified.[19]
As respondent observed, the judgment of conviction in the MTC was based
on speculations and the inconclusive findings of the NBI dactyloscopy
expert.
In the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary, we find that the
issue involves a judicial matter. Moreover, here could prevail the
presumption
that the respondent regularly performed his duties in good faith.[20]
Complainant alleges
that in Civil Case No. B-1165, herein respondent failed to comply with
the twin requirements of notice and hearing as provided in Section 5[21]
of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court before issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction. However, the records show that there was a hearing on June
19, 2002. Both parties were represented at the said hearing.
Complainant’s
counsel presented arguments, opposing issuance of said writ. Thus, in
this
connection, we find her complaint baseless.cralaw:red
Issuance of said writ
is entirely within the discretion of the trial court. The only
limitation
is that this discretion should be exercised based upon the grounds and
in the manner provided by law.[22]
The requisites for injunctive relief are (1) there must be a right in
esse
or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against
which
the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.[23]
Respondent was able to show that petitioners in said case were entitled
to the writ because there existed in favor of the petitioners a clear
and
unmistakable right therefor, and the facts clearly showed an urgent and
paramount necessity for its issuance to prevent serious damage. There,
the petitioners adequately proved their status as co-owners of the
subject
ancestral house and lot, and that they were forced out of the ancestral
house preparatory to their intended sale.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That respondent ruled
against complainant in several cases filed before his sala would not
per
se amount to partiality against her, much less warrant the conclusion
that
respondent intended to oppress her. Bias and partiality cannot be
presumed.[24]
Indeed, complainant admitted during the investigation of this case
before
Justice de los Santos that she filed the instant complaint simply
because
she disagreed with respondent’s rulings.[25]
She further admitted that in this administrative case, she wanted to
hold
respondent liable for the gross errors committed by her counsel in
handling
her cases.[26]
If so, her counsel and not the judge ought to be the one taken to task.
For the filing of an administrative complaint against the judge would
not
even lie, even if actions were perceived to have gone beyond the norms
of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy exists.[27]
With much less reason could an administrative case against the judge be
a vehicle to correct possible mistakes of one’s counsel. Complainant
herein
obviously abused administrative process for a most unacceptable excuse.cralaw:red
Any administrative complaint
leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating
eye,
for its consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, such
that
respondent stands to face the sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment.[28]
Mere suspicion, as in this case, that a judge was partial to a party is
not enough.[29]
Inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent judge connotes a
misconduct
so grave that, if proven, it would entail dismissal from the service,
the
quantum of proof required should be more than substantial.[30]
Even in an administrative case, the rules demand that, if the
respondent
judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any grave offense,
the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from
direct knowledge of the witness. The Judiciary to which herein
respondent
belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it
should only be after due investigation and after the presentation of
competent
evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character.[31]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In sum, we rule that
there is no merit in complainant’s charge of gross ignorance of the law
leveled against respondent. To constitute gross ignorance of the law,
the
acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence,
but were also motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.[32]
Gross ignorance of the law is a serious accusation, and a person who
accuses
a judge of this very serious offense must be sure of the grounds for
the
accusation.[33]
When an administrative
charge against a judge or any personnel of the court has no basis
whatsoever,
this Court will not hesitate to protect him against any groundless
accusation
that trifles with judicial processes.[34]
We will not shirk from our responsibility of imposing discipline upon
employees
of the Judiciary, but neither shall we hesitate to shield the same
employees
from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the
orderly administration of justice.[35]
WHEREFORE, the instant
administrative complaint is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-9.
[2]
Id. at 27, Annex "C".
[3]
Id. at 1.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Id. at 4-6.
[5]
Id. at 6, 117.
[6]
Id. at 242-255.
[7]
Id. at 242-248.
[8]
Id. at 252-253; TSN, 3 June 2003, p. 327.
[9]
Rollo, p. 254.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Id. at 263.
[11]
Id. at 265.
[12]
Temporary Rollo, pp. 3-7.
[13]
Yap v. Inopiquez, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-02-1431, 9 May 2003, pp. 14-15.
[14]
Exec. Judge Loyao, Jr. v. Caube, A.M. No. P-02-1599, 30 April 2003, p.
6.
[15]
Tan Tiac Chiong v. Cosico, A.M. No. CA-02-33, 31 July 2002, 385 SCRA
509,
514.
[16]
Frani v. Judge Pagayatan, 416 Phil. 205, 212-213 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Supra, note 15 at 515.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
TSN, 3 June 2003, p. 136.
[19]
See Rollo, p. 5. See also TSN, 3 June 2003, p. 224.
[20]
See Onquit v. Judge Binamira-Parcia, 358 Phil. 1, 11 (1998).
[21]
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice;
exception.—No
preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior
notice
to the party or person sought to be enjoined. x x x
[22]
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, Inc. v. Bitanga, 415 Phil. 43, 59
(2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Philippine Sinter Corporation v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co.,
Inc., G.R. No. 127371, 25 April 2002, 381 SCRA 582, 591.
[24]
Atty. Cea v. Judge Paguio, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1479 (Formerly OCA IPI No.
01-1003-MTJ),
17 February 2003, p. 8.
[25]
TSN, 3 June 2003, pp. 136, 234.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Id. at 240.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Hilario v. Ocampo III, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1305, 3 December 2001, 371 SCRA
260, 272; Barbers v. Laguio, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1568, 15 February
2001,
351 SCRA 606, 618.
[28]
Supra, note 24 at 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
People v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 137283, 17 February 2003, p. 13.
[30]
Supra, note 24.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
Araos v. Luna-Pison, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1677 (Formerly OCA IPI No.
00-1027-RTJ),
28 February 2002, p. 3.
[32]
Merontos Vda. de Sayson v. Judge Zerna, 414 Phil. 705, 712 (2001);
Frani
v. Judge Pagayatan, 416 Phil. 205, 212 (2001).
[33]
Visbal v. Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1306, 20 March 2001, 354 SCRA 631, 640.
[34]
Tan Tiac Chiong v. Cosico, A.M. No. CA-02-33, 31 July 2002, 385 SCRA
509,
519.
[35]
Francisco v. Leyva, 364 Phil. 1, 4 (1999). |