THIRD DIVISION
JOSE B.
CUSTODIO,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-03-1761
April 30, 2003 - versus -
JUDGE
JESUS V.
QUITAIN,REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
DAVAO CITY, BRANCH
15,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN,
J.:
Unreasonable delays
in resolving pending cases, motions or other incidents diminish public
trust in the judiciary. They constitute less serious charges that
are administratively sanctionable under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Case and the
Facts
This administrative
case stems from a Complaint[1]
filed by Jose B. Custodio with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA)
on August 23, 2000. In the Complaint, Judge Jesus V. Quitain of
the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City (Branch 15) was charged with
delay
in resolving incidents relative to Criminal Case No. 37921-96 entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Jose B. Custodio."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The factual antecedents
are summarized by the OCA in this wise:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Petitioner, who is
the accused in the aforecited criminal case, alleges that from the time
the case of rape was filed against him in late 1996, he filed several
motions
for inhibitions which were all denied by respondent judge despite the
very
patent and serious grounds. On 28 January 1999, he filed a final
motion for compulsory inhibition dated 26 January 1999. This was
likewise denied per Order dated 11 June 1999 or after almost five (5)
months
from filing. In connection with the said denial of the final
motion
for inhibition he filed the following, to wit: a) motion for
reconsideration/clarification
dated 16 July 1999; b) urgent motion to resolve pending motion for
reconsideration/clarification
dated 10 August 1999; c) supplemental grounds for pending final motion
for inhibition dated 26 January 1999; d) motion to resolve inhibition
incident
with additional grounds dated 17 January 2000; and e) second motion to
resolve long pending motion for inhibition with additional newly
discovered
ground dated 5 April 2000.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Petitioner claims that
for about 1 year and 7 months respondent unlawfully, unjustly,
wrongfully,
deliberately and maliciously failed to render resolution of the said
motion
for inhibition in violation of the constitutional right of the accused
to speedy trial and despite respondent having issued two orders dated
19
November 1999 and 28 January 2000 declaring said motion for inhibition
as submitted for resolution."[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his Comment[3]
dated November 10, 2000, respondent denied having maliciously delayed
the
resolution of complainant’s Motion for Inhibition.[4]
He explained thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"x x x. The prosecution
filed on February 8, 1999 a Motion to Strike Out Final Motion for
Inhibition
ten days after the said motion was filed. On February 9, 1999 the
accused testified but the trial was stopped because the defense
objected
to the participation of the private prosecutor. The Court
overruled
the objection and the accused was given up to March 5, 1999 to file his
Memorandum of Authorities regarding the inhibition.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"On February 26, 1999,
accused filed his Memorandum. The public prosecutor then filed a
motion that it be given up to March 18, 1999 to answer the
motion.
The Court gave the prosecution up to March 23, 1999 to file its
pleading.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"On March 24, 1999,
the prosecutor submitted its Comment. On March 26, 1999, the
accused
filed a Motion to File Reply to prosecution’s Comment and asked that it
be given fifteen (15) days from March 24, 1999 to file a rejoinder
which
the Court granted the same day. However, on April 8, 1999, the
accused
filed a second extension of time to file a reply to the prosecution’s
comment.
This was granted and accused was given ten (10) days or up to April 18,
1999 to file his reply. On April 20, 1999, the accused submitted
his [R]eply to the prosecution’s [C]omment."[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, respondent
claimed that his Order[6]
denying complainant’s Final Motion for Inhibition was rendered only 52
days after the last pleading was filed, and not after 1 year and 7
months
as alleged by complainant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Findings and
Recommendation
of the OCA
In its Report[7]
dated August 21, 2002, the OCA noted that complainant had filed a
Petition
for Mandamus before the Court of Appeals (CA). He had sought
therein
to compel respondent to act on the pending Motion for Reconsideration[8]
of the Order denying the Final Motion for Inhibition. In its
October
15, 2001 Decision,[9]
the CA[10]
ruled in favor of complainant. We reproduce the pertinent
findings:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"The motion for reconsideration
of RESPONDENT JUDGE’s June 11, 1999 Order, denying CUSTODIO’s motion
for
inhibition, had been submitted for resolution as early as July
23,1999.
To date, RESPONDENT JUDGE has not resolved said pending incident, in
violation
of the clear mandate of Section 4, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure
that ‘a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be resolved
within
thirty (30) days from the time it is submitted for resolution.’ It
bears
noting that no motion for extension of the foregoing period was sought
by RESPONDENT JUDGE with the Supreme Court, and despite CUSTODIO’s
repeated
motion for resolution, his motion for reconsideration has remained
pending
and unresolved. x x x."[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Citing the above CA
pronouncements, the OCA recommended that respondent be fined P5,000,
with
a warning that the commission of the same or a similar act in the
future
would be dealt with more severely.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the OCA’s
finding that respondent judge is guilty of unreasonable delay.
However,
we modify the penalty in accordance with Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent’s
Administrative
Liability
The administration of
justice is a sacred task. Verily, judges are expected to be
embodiments
of competence, integrity, and independence,[12]
who will administer justice impartially and without delay.[13]
Anything less than these exacting standards would undermine the
people’s
faith in the judiciary and bring it into disrepute.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the present case,
complainant alleges that respondent failed to act on the Final Motion
for
Inhibition from the time it was submitted on January 28, 1999 up to the
time this case was filed on August 23, 2000. However, the records
show that respondent already ruled on the Final Motion for Inhibition
when
he denied it on June 11, 1999.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
What remained pending,
though, was the Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Order[14]
of denial, which complainant had filed on July 19, 1999.
Respondent
issued two Orders dated November 19, 1999[15]
and January 28, 2000,[16]
declaring that the MR was deemed submitted for decision. However,
he failed to act on it, until the appellate court granted complainant’s
Petition for Mandamus on October 15, 2001.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Delay in the administration
of justice is a common cause of complaints against the judiciary.
It is the sworn duty of judges to dispose of the court’s business
promptly
and to decide cases within the required periods.[17]
If, for good and valid reasons, they cannot resolve pending cases,
motions
or other incidents within the reglementary period, we stress that they
should file a request for extension with this Court. Otherwise,
they
shall be sanctioned under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Moreover, the immediate
resolution of the pending Motion in Criminal Case No. 37921-96 was
essential
to the continuation of the trial of the case. Respondent should
have
realized that delay in deciding complainant’s Motion for
Reconsideration
would interrupt the course of the trial and diminish the parties’ right
to a speedy disposition of their case. Such delay was therefore
unwarranted,
as it would only inflame distrust and discontent in the judiciary as a
whole.
Rule 37 of the
Rules
of Court
Not Applicable
Contrary to the justification
given by the OCA and the CA, Section 4 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court[18]
does not provide for the determination of the period of time within
which
the subject Motion for Reconsideration must be resolved.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Rule 37 pertains to
the filing of a motion for a new trial or of a motion for
reconsideration
of a judgment or final order that has decided a case on its
merits.
On the other hand, an order denying a motion for inhibition, which is
governed
by Rule 41, is merely interlocutory and is not a judgment, as the case
still stands for regular trial. Therefore, the period provided in
Section 4 does not apply.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There is no specific
rule providing for a definite period of time within which to resolve a
motion for reconsideration of an order denying inhibition.
However,
we emphasize that all presiding judges must endeavor to act promptly on
all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts[19]
within the 90-day period provided in the Constitution,[20]
unless the law requires a lesser period.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Under Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or an order or in
transmitting
the records of a case constitutes a less serious charge. It is
penalized
with suspension without pay for not less than 1 month or more than 3
months,
or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, Respondent
Judge Jesus V. Quitain of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City
(Branch 15) is found guilty of undue delay in resolving a motion, for
which
he is FINED P10,100, with a WARNING that the commission of the
same
or a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno, J.,
(Chairman),
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-9. The Complaint was erroneously entitled
"Petition."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
OCA Report dated August 21, 2002, p. 1; rollo, p. 296.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Rollo, pp. 74-75.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Annex "B" of Complaint; rollo, pp. 35-44.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Respondent’s Comment, p. 2; id., p. 75.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Rollo, p. 114.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Id., pp. 296-299. Signed by Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O.
Lock
and approved by Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco Jr.
[8]
Annex "B-2" of Complaint; rollo, pp. 49-51.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Id., pp. 283-295.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Special Third Division. Penned by Justice Eriberto U. Rosario Jr.
and concurred in by Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero (Division
chairman)
and Bienvenido L. Reyes (member).
[11]
CA Decision, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 289-290.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Id., Rule 1.02.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Rollo, pp. 49-51.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Id., p. 70.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Id., p. 71.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
"SECTION 4. Resolution of motion.- A motion for new trial or
reconsideration
shall be resolved within thirty (30) days from the time it is submitted
for resolution."
[19]
Paragraph 6.1 of Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Under Article VIII, Section 15:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"SEC.
15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from
date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme
Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months
for all other lower courts.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x x
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